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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
After more than half a century’s development, the European Union (EU) has set up a 
prominent example of regional integration.
1
 The EU was created by, developing 
through and drawing its legitimacy from a series of Treaties signed by participating 
nation states. From the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC, 1951), to the Treaties of Rome (the EEC and the Euratom Treaties) (1957), to 
the Merger Treaty (i.e. the Brussels Treaty, 1965), to the Single European Act (SEA, 
1986), to the Treaty on European Union (TEU, i.e. the Maastricht Treaty) (1992), to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), to the Treaty of Nice (2001), and then to the Treaty of 
Lisbon (2007),
2
 history witnessed the EU’s gradual but steady enlargement in both its 
membership and its policy-making areas, and so far the EU has achieved the goal of 
keeping the European continent as an area of stability, security and prosperity.  
The introduction of the Lisbon Treaty was regarded as a historical landmark of 
the European integration project. This new treaty brings institutional changes to the EU, 
among which two institutional reforms are eye-catching. The first one is the creation of 
two new permanent posts — the President of the European Council and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The second one is 
more powers allotted to the European Parliament (EP), as the previous co-decision 
procedure got legalized as the “ordinary legislative procedure” (OLP, defined in Article 
294 TFEU (the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union)), extending into 
most EU policy decision-making, and thereby the EP became a true co-legislator with 
                                                 
1 “Europe has integrated” in the sense that “the linkages between politics on the EC level and politics 
on the national level have expanded in scope and deepened in intensity” (Stone Sweet and Brunell 
1998, 63), and “the horizontal and vertical linkages between social, economic, and political actors (…) 
are constructed and sustained by EC rules” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 9). 
2 Cooperation among European national states evolved. First, it was the ECSC, then the EEC 
(European Economic Community), later the EC (European Community), and finally the EU (since the 
Maastricht Treaty). These different names refer to the same object: the European regional integration 
project at its various developing stages against specific historical backgrounds. These terms are used 
to mention the EU in different periods of time. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the Lisbon 
Treaty abolished the three-pillar structure of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty, enabling EU 
legislative procedures and legal personality originally reserved for the European Community (the first 
pillar) to cover the full extent of the EU.  
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the Council as it assumed equal importance of the Council.
3
 The intention of these 
institutional innovations was to make the EU stronger, more efficient, democratic and 
externally coherent.
4
 Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty took effect in December 2009 in 
the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, and the EU met its most serious challenge 
at the beginning of the millennium: the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
5
 Breaking out 
first in Greece in the fall of 2009, then Ireland in 2010, and Portugal in 2011, the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with potential contagious risk to other euro countries, 
Italy and Spain in particular (e.g. Shi et al. 2012; Pan et al. 2011; Yurtsever 2011), later 
spread into Spain in 2012
6




 Due to the fact that the worsening 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro countries causes financial instability and affects 
economic recovery in the euro area in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, as 
well as endangers European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to fall apart, the 
crisis this time was also referred to as the euro crisis. It is widely acknowledged that if 
the sovereign debt crisis is not addressed properly, it may cause the collapse of the euro 
system, and “if the euro failed, so too would the EU”.
9
 The evolution of the euro 
member states’ sovereign debt crisis essentially decides the fate of the common 
currency and influences EU policy-making and the reform of EMU. The sovereign debt 
                                                 
3 See, for example, “Glossary, Codecision Procedure” (European Union) and “Legislative Procedures” 
(European Union); also see Lelieveldt and Princen (2011, 102-103) and Warleigh-Lack and 
Drachenberg (2013, 204-206).  
4 See “Treaty of Lisbon, Questions and Answers” (European Union).  
5 The formal usage to indicate EU member states which have adopted the euro as their currency is the 
“euro area”, which consistently appears in EU Treaties and other official documents, while the term 
“eurozone” is popularly used in news reports. Nevertheless, the EU official website particularly 
dedicating to the euro area utilizes the word “eurozone” to indicate the official portal of the euro area, 
see <http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/>. 
6 See, for example, “Financial Assistance for the Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in Spain” 
(European Commission). 
7 See, for example, “Eurozone Approves Problematic Cyprus Bailout” (EUbusiness 13 April 2013); 
European Parliament-20130507IPR08063 (8 May 2013). 
8 Accompanying the euro member state debt crisis was the devaluation of the common single 
currency — the euro (e.g. Hosli et al. 2011a, 99-102), as the statistics of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) show that the exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar declined from 1: 1.5120 on 3 
December 2009 to 1:1.1942 on 8 June 2010. See the ECB official website: 
<http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html>. Viewed from the 
whole history of the euro, the decreased external value of the euro during the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis is not the worst, and it appears acceptable against the whole records of the euro in the past. 
Moreover, the depreciation of the euro is not always a bad thing – it makes EU goods more 
competitive with lower prices in the international market, which an efficient way to boost economic 
recovery and growth. 
9 See “Eurozone Must ‘Resist Alarmism’, Olli Rehn Says” (BBC News 16 November 2010). 
25 
 
issue is not only a thorny problem for the euro countries, but also for the non-euro EU 
member states, and therefore, addressing the sovereign debt crisis is relevant to EU 
economic governance as a whole.
10
 Additionally, the debt issue has appeared as a 
global phenomenon, as other major developed countries in the world, such as the 
United States (US) and Japan, also have alarming and unsustainably high government 
budget deficits and debts. Thus, the EU’s dealings with this crisis are situated in a 
broader international context and the EU’s lessons and experience can make 
contributions to the solution of this worldwide issue. 
 
1.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
Imposing financial, economic and political instability and disintegrative threats to 
EMU and the whole EU, the euro area sovereign debt crisis urgently demands the EU 
and its member states to take effective measures to counter the crisis. How to contain 
and solve the crisis as well as how to strengthen EU economic governance remains a 
hotly debated topic among EU politicians, economists and academics. In order to solve 
the sovereign debt crisis, EU institutions have been taking various new initiatives and 
measures, and the crisis, originally being a serious challenge to EMU and the EU, also 
turns out to be an opportunity for the EU to reform and develop (e.g. Hosli 2011b; Shi 
et al. 2011b, 2012; Pan et al. 2011). As the crisis exposes the institutional problems of 
EMU and EU economic governance, there is an increasing consensus among 
politicians and scholars to solve the debt crisis via closer economic and political 
coordination at the EU level, among which the calling for political integration grows as 
the monetary union needs a political union to support it (e.g. Almunia 16 January 2013; 
Issing 1 October 2012; Yurtsever 2011, 693)
11
 and pro-integrative propositions like 
                                                 
10 The term “(EU) economic governance” can be used in a narrow sense differentiating from fiscal 
and financial initiatives and policies (see e.g. Table 1.2), while it can also be utilized in a general 
sense encompassing fiscal, economic, and financial policy areas related to the distinct category of 
“economy” (i.e. the first pillar of the EU) rather than “foreign affairs” (i.e. the second pillar of the EU) 
or “police and justice affairs” (i.e. the third pillar of the EU) (for the EU’s pillar structure, see 
footnote 111 of this dissertation, and the pillar structure was repealed by the Lisbon Treaty, see 
footnote 2 of this dissertation). Throughout this dissertation, if not otherwise indicated, the general 
meaning of “economic governance” is applied, covering fiscal, economic and financial policy areas.   
11 Almunia (16 January 2013, BBC Hardtalk); Issing (1 October 2012, BBC Hardtalk). Joaquίn 
Almunia (1948 — ) is a vice President of the European Commission and the competition 
Commissioner since February 2010; Otmar Issing (1936 — ), serving as a member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB from its creation in 1998 to 2006, has been the Chairman of the Advisory Board of 
the House of Finance (Goethe University of Frankfurt) since 2007, and the President of the Center for 
Financial Studies since 2006.  
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“Europe is now more than ever a constitutional project” (Habermas 2012, 1) emerge. 
So here rises the research question of this dissertation: Along with the EU’s new 
measures and developments to counter the eurozone sovereign debt crisis after the 
2008 global financial crisis, what path are the EU and EMU embarking on? This main 
research question (MRQ) can be re-stated by several sub-research questions (SRQs): Is 
the EU on the way towards a political union/political integration (SRQ1)? Do the 
current developments of the EU signify supranationalism over nationalism (SRQ2)? 
Why did the EU and member states agree to take these new measures (SRQ3)? What 
are the implications and consequences of the new developments of the EU during the 
crisis (SRQ4)? What are the prospects for the EU and EMU in the future (SRQ5)?
12
 
To answer these questions, this dissertation has recourse to European integration 
theories, which provide conceptual tools and analytical frameworks to understand and 
explain the European integration process (i.e. a philosophical relationship between 
ontology and epistemology).
13
 Equipped with the selected EU integration theories, this 
dissertation explores their predictions on the basis of case studies, which suggests other 
SRQs related to the MRQ. 
The necessity and the main reason to resort to European integration theories to 
understand and explain the outcomes of EU decision-making is due to the fact that 
analyses of political processes do not situate in a theoretical vacuum. Rather, they are 
always based on certain assumptions and concerns: on the one hand, “empirical 
findings are always inspired by some theoretical perspective, perhaps without the 
researcher being aware of it”, while on the other hand, “[t]heoretical frameworks 
structure our observations and are useful in terms of choosing variables and collecting 
data for conducting empirical research” (Niemann 2006, 1). In a philosophical sense, 
human beings understand, grasp and change the ontological external world under the 
help of various epistemic tools. In the context of the EU, for one thing, the sovereign 
debt crisis happens — it is going on with new stories each day and both the EU and 
                                                 
12 To answer the main research question (MRQ) of this dissertation, several sub-research questions 
(SRQs) highly relevant to finding the answers to MRQ are raised. For the convenience of narrating, 
organizing, and summarizing, the SRQs put forward in the chapter Introduction are numbered “SRQ1, 
SRQ2, SRQ3, …”; accordingly, the last chapter Conclusions offers answers to each numbered 
question on the basis of the research results of this dissertation, and finally, answers to the MRQ are 
given.  
13  For more discussions of these issues, see, for example, “Box 4.1 Ontology”, “Box 4.2 
Epistemology” and “Box 4.3 Methodology” in Bache et al. (2012, 65-67); “Basic Ontology” in 
Niemann (2006, 24-27) and “Epistemology” (2006, 52-53).    
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national governments are making their efforts with the hope to end this crisis as early 
as possible; for another, there are already abundant theoretical accounts and predictions 
on the European integration project in academic circles. All these lead to another SRQ 
of this dissertation: What is the explanatory and predictive power of different European 
integration theories when assessing the EU’s recent developments during the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis (or in a broader sense during the post-2008 crisis era) (SRQ6)? 
That is, do the causal mechanisms provided by the three EU integration theories 
account for EU recent developments well? Are there any other variables or new causal 
mechanisms that should be added to the existing theoretical frameworks? What sort of 
light do the academic discussions shed on the current crisis and on the various 
measures adopted by the EU to combat this crisis? This dissertation is to apply 
theoretical reflections to empirical phenomena so as to understand the EU in the 
post-2008 crisis era and particularly the on-going euro area sovereign debt crisis better, 
as well as to make possible contributions to the existing academic debates on both 
theoretical framework constructions and EU developing trends. Accordingly, this 
dissertation first will offer a literature review of European integration theories, from 
which hypotheses about the EU’s development during the post-2008 crisis era 
thematically dominated by the eurozone sovereign debt crisis are derived; then it will 
take the new measures, policies, and mechanisms adopted by the EU to solve the crisis 
as cases to validate or falsify these hypotheses; if the causal chains suggested by the 
hypotheses drawn from each integration theory are present in the selected cases, the 
hypotheses will be vindicated, and if not, the hypotheses lack sufficient evidence to 
support and thus require further examinations and modifications; when a hypothesized 
mechanism fails wholly or partially in the case studies, the reasons causing such a 
failure will be probed, and thus new variables, hypothesized mechanisms or theoretical 
explanations are possibly developed; finally, regarding various discussions of how to 
end this crisis, theoretical reflections on the EU’s recent developments will cast light 
on the general developing trend of the EU and EMU in the future as well as possible 
constructive ideas to address the issue concerned, and this is also a way to strengthen 
the bridge between theory and practice where “academic research might contribute to 
the search for solutions in practice” (Hosli 2008, 5).  
To be specific, this dissertation will focus on three main European integration 
theories: neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and historical institutionalism (HI), 
whose explanatory and predictive powers are going to be tested by three cases of the 
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EU’s recent development during 2010-2012 combating the European sovereign debt 
crisis: the European Semester, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The selection of only three integration theories 
is because of the trade-off between numbers of theories and depth of literature reviews 
within the given space of a dissertation, and this dissertation goes to a detailed and 
deep literature review of a limited number of theories instead of a general and shallow 
literature review of many theories. Then why are these three theories chosen? As the 
oldest and most influential European integration theories, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism have offered two competing as well as complementary 
theoretical frameworks to account for the European integration process; in comparison, 
exploring institutional aspects of the EU from a historical point view, HI highlights and 
particularly focuses on the prominent feature of the institutionalized EU, which also 
represents a converged point where the two traditional rivals — neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism — meet. As for the selection of the three cases, the main 
consideration is that each of them falls into three distinctively different categories of 
approaches adopted by the EU to address the post-2008 crisis situation, while 
representing a typical measure of its category, and thus the cases selected bear enough 
variation. Each theory posits particular hypothesized causal mechanisms of ordered 
steps binding independent and dependent variables, and with the congruence method 
and the process-tracing technique, this dissertation has acquired the tools to confirm or 
reject the hypotheses, to possibly discover new variables or causal paths, and, more 
likely, to synthesize multiple causal chains linking the independent and dependent 
variables in a given hypothesis. The purpose of resorting to EU integration theories is 
to unravel the complicated EU project, to understand and to grasp the developing 
trends of the EU. Each hypothesis test and possible theoretical revision offers a 
particular explanation and/or prediction of the European integration project, and all 
together point to the answers to the MRQ of this dissertation: Along with the EU’s new 
measures and developments to counter the eurozone sovereign debt crisis after the 
2008 global financial crisis, what path are the EU and EMU embarking on?  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 A Summary of European Integration Theories 
The EU is multifaceted and complex, and so are the theories accounting for it. The 
EU’s evolution is accompanied by the vicissitudes of various theoretical schools. Diez 
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and Wiener (2009) divide the development of EU integration theories into three broad 
phases, from which a rough contour of European integration theories can be obtained 
as follows: 
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14 Diez and Wiener (2009) make a distinction between “theory” and “approach”: the former means 
“the field of theorizing the process and outcome of (European) integration”, while the latter refers to 
“the individual ways of dealing with integration, some, but not all of which may be classified as 
theories in the narrow sense” (2009, 3, their emphasis). In this dissertation, these two terms are used 
exchangeably in both senses. In comparison, Rosamond (2013) regards neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism as two grand integration theories, while other theorizings after the two as “new 
approaches”. From Rosamond’s (2013, 88) point of view, there are “five pathways beyond integration 
theory”: comparative political science, the governance approach, normative political theory, 
international relations, and critical theories. 
15 According to Haas (1971, 20-21), federalist approaches to European regional integration fall into 
two kinds: the activist/actor group and the theorist/observer group. The federalist activists, being 
more consistently ideological and emphasizing “the imputed need of peoples and nations”, concerned 
“developing a theory of action designed to realize a regional federation”, while the federalist theorists 
focused on “tracing and observing patterns of federal integration” (1971, 20); nevertheless, both of 
them have failed to account for “why and how actual integrative outcomes occur” — the main theme 
and task of neo-functionalism, as the former “despise(d) the recourse to functional means” while the 
latter “believe(d) in the federal end but may be willing to use functional means” (Haas 1971, 21, note 
22). Before the initiation of the European integration project in the 1950s, the federal entities like the 
US and West Germany were already there; nevertheless, the existing federalist ideas and propositions 
turned out to be weak in explaining the newly emerging entity in the European continent, so a new 
theory specialized in theorizing this novel project in Europe was demanded and born naturally. In 
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Sources: Own compilation on the basis of “Table 1.1 Three Phases in Integration Theory” by 
Diez and Wiener (2009, 7) and the Table of Contents by Wiener and Diez (2009). 
 
Table 1.1 illustrates the shifted research themes of European integration theories 
in different periods of time, from explaining the dynamics behind the European 
integration process in the 1960s to examining the consequences and impact of 
integration in the 1990s, which agrees with Rosamond’s (2010, 108) analysis that EU 
scholars, from the 1990s onwards, started to take the “Euro-polity” as an independent 
variable rather than a dependent variable. Still, Diez and Wiener (2009) give several 
cautions to their classification. Most importantly, these three phases and their 
theoretical implications do not suggest absolute clear cuts and endpoints among each 
theory and approach. Rather, they signify theoretical shifts to new approaches and 
research tendencies in certain periods of time, which in turn are also open for further 
debate. When a new tendency emerges, traditional approaches are not dying out; 
instead, they continue explaining the EU, on the basis of which their propositions are 
confirmed, rejected, or revised, and thereby over time form peculiar theoretical 
trajectories of the so-called “old”, “classical” or “traditional” European integration 
theories. As Diez and Wiener (2009, 17-18) point out, theories function differently: 
they can be explanatory/understanding, analytical/descriptive, or critical/normative; 
meanwhile, theories can be applied for different areas, dealing with polity (i.e. the 
political community and its institutions), policy (i.e. actual measures and theoretical 
analyses, comparisons or reflections on them) or politics (i.e. the process of 
policy-making and the daily strategies and behavior of various political actors) (Diez 
and Wiener 2009, 18-19). The combination of these two dimensions gives rise to a 
“mosaic of integration theory”; yet, the mosaic picture of current EU studies is far from 
completion, as the everyday-developing EU and newly emerging perspectives to the 
EU continuously add new “bricks and stones” to change this picture (Diez and Wiener 
2009, 19-20). Though newly born integration theories may not always perfectly fit into 
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the two-dimensional classification, Diez and Wiener’s categorization has reflected the 
nature and tendencies of current EU research. Each theory provides us with a special 
lens to view the EU; as the mosaic picture of integration theories becomes more 
colorful and diversified, we are equipped with more available conceptual tools to 
understand the EU. Along with the progress of the integration project and the newly 
developed integration theories, two older and traditional European integration theories 
— neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism — have been evolving and 
rejuvenated over time, providing a basis to understand the regional integration project 
as well as the new integration theories after them.  
 
1.2.2 The Focus on Neo-Functionalism, Intergovernmentalism and 
Historical Institutionalism (HI)  
Among the diversified approaches and theories of European integration, this 
dissertation only focuses on three of them: neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, 
and HI (a sub-school of new institutionalism), and certainly, there are promising 
studies of other theories and approaches along with the development of the EU. Within 
a limited space of this dissertation, there is a trade-off between the number of theories 
to discuss and the depth of the elaboration of each selected theory. Without a thorough 
and in-depth literature review, theories tend to be general, shallow and even superficial, 
and at the same time, hypotheses drawn from them seem to lack substantive contents to 
support. In contrast, a detailed and solid discussion of a theory not only reveals the 
trajectory of this theory — what it is, where it comes from and where it is going — 
thus enabling us to understand the theory better, but also possesses several merits that 
contribute to a rigorous theory test: first, it provides a comprehensive background for 
hypothesis derivation; second, it throws light on the general research methodology 
entailed in that theory, enlightening the common academic practice dealing with the 
theory; finally, it states causal chains linking independent and dependent variables and 
explains the indicators to measure these causal mechanisms more clearly and 
meticulously. So this dissertation limits itself to three main European integration 
theories and their updates: neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism as well as their 
converged point HI. The reasons to select neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism 
are as follows.  
First, neo-functionalism is the first attempt to theorize the European integration 





 Originally, they argued for different propositions, and the 
hypotheses derived from them may exhibit contrasting extremes on the same issue, so 
via the vindication or falsification of the possible contrasting hypotheses concerning 
the same issue, the explanatory and predictive powers of these two theories can be 
compared. Besides, as Hooghe (2001a, 3) suggests, theories of European integration by 
nature are macro-models which actually are “more impervious to testing”; therefore, in 
order to test integration theories, “one needs either credible competition from a rival 
macro-theory, or a means to carve up the larger theory into hypotheses pertaining to 
clearly delineated parts”. The selection of competitive neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism obviously meets the requirement to test macro-integration 
theories; moreover, as literature reviews and hypothesis derivation in chapter two, 
chapter three and also chapter four
17
 illustrate, each theory has been carved into 
several hypotheses (and some of them even have been divided into several 
sub-hypotheses) which make up the main propositions of each theory. Nevertheless, 
“[h]istory rarely defeats one theory or fully vindicates another” (Moravcsik 1998, 12), 
and it is almost impossible to prove one theory entirely correct or incorrect, so besides 
neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist potential contrasting positions on certain 
issues, the evaluation of these two theories should not be exclusively dichotomous. 
Rather, the two theories underscore different factors with different weights to explain 
the EU integration process. Theories from competing paradigms may encourage 
one-on-one testing of unicausal theories, but researchers should not ignore “the proper 
(and sometimes overlapping) scope of paradigms, or the construction of 
multi-paradigmatic syntheses”; this suggests that the unicausal theory testing should be 
combined with clarifying empirical scope conditions and making possible fruitful 
multi-theory syntheses (Moravcsik 2001, 1). Accordingly, this dissertation will not 
only test the causal mechanisms posited by the two rival theories to judge their 
explanatory and predictive power, but will also look at their convergent points, specify 
scope conditions for the effectiveness of hypothesized causal mechanisms, and bring 
together possible multi-causal chains (i.e. “equifinality” in the words of George and 
Bennett 2005) that link the independent and dependent variables in a given hypothesis. 
As a matter of fact, HI is a convergent point between the two competitive integration 
                                                 
16 Cf. chapter two and chapter three of this dissertation. 
17 Except otherwise indicated, when “chapter(s)” and “section(s)” are mentioned, they refer to the 
chapter(s) and section(s) in this dissertation.  
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theories, and chapter four specially focuses on HI.  
Second, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have dominated European 
integration theoretical discussions for such a long time that the two once formulated a 
classical dichotomy on the trend of European integration: supranationalism and 
nationalism, providing two classical models — a supranational model and an 
intergovernmental model — to account for European regional integration (Bromley 
2001, 13-17; Cini 2010; Rosamond 2010). Highlighting the intrinsic dialectical 
features of the European integration project — supranationalism and nationalism — the 
two macro-models have been continuously revised and updated alongside the 
development of the EU. On the one hand, various supranational institutions have been 
established, developed, and functioning within the EU arena, and supranational 
elements do exist; on the other hand, nation states are the foundations upon which the 
EU is built and from which it draws its legitimacy.
18
 Therefore, since the onset of the 
ECSC, the tension between supranationalism (i.e. the authority and competence at the 
supranational level) and nationalism (i.e. national sovereignty and interests) has been 
lingering there. Supranationalism-v.s.-nationalism is an inborn characteristic of the 
European integration project, and no wonder new institutional changes introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty mainly involve the relationship and competence between the EU and 
its member states.
19
 As the EU’s membership has increased to 27 by 2007 and to 28 by 
2013, the scenario of the competence division between the EU and its member states 
has become more complicated. Needless to say, it is worth examining the EU’s 
intrinsic characteristics against a new context.  
Third, apart from formulating the classical dichotomy and spotlighting the inborn 
nature of the EU, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, as the first two main 
efforts to theorize European integration, discuss the fundamental issues about the EU: 
What is the EU? What are the dynamics and driving forces behind the integration 
process? And where is it heading? These concerns are highly relevant to the MRQ of 
this dissertation, so a close examination of the two theories in current empirical 
contexts will help us to unravel these basic issues and thus to understand and grasp the 
developing trends of the EU after the 2008 crisis better. On the issue of the dynamics 
                                                 
18 The EU is based on the rule of law agreed upon by its participating nation states, which means that 
every action taken by the EU is founded on the Treaties that have been approved voluntarily and 
democratically by all EU member states. For instance, if a policy area is not cited in the EU Treaties, 
the Commission cannot propose a law in that area. See “EU Treaties” (European Union). 
19 See “Treaty of Lisbon, Questions and Answers” (European Union). 
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and driving forces pushing forward the integration project, neo-functionalism proposes 
“spillover effects” and emphasizes supranational actors alongside national governments, 
while intergovernmentalism argues for “interstate bargaining” and attributes national 
governments as the most important and prominent actors within the EU arena. Though 
offering different explanations, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism do have 
the following convergence (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 39): first, member states do 
not possess full autonomy in their preference formation and negotiation activities 
because of domestic circumstances and interest groups’ lobbies of their governments, 
and hence, the knowledge of domestic forces is a requirement to understand member 
state positions in negotiations; second, supranational institutions are more than mere 
administrators for interstate negotiations, and it is impossible to understand the EU 
without examining the behavior of these institutions; finally, the role and weight of 
different actors varies in different policy areas and different decision-making modes, 
and what is true in one policy area may not be applicable to another. As a matter of fact, 
these common grounds suggest some “common sense” for us when we study the EU: 
(1) there is autonomy of both supranational institutions and the participating member 
states, and the former suggests the necessity and significance of institutional studies on 
the EU (and as a matter of fact, HI, representing an institutionalist approach to the EU, 
is selected as the third theory to explain the EU as well as to be tested); (2) different 
actors in the EU arena may assume different role and weight in different policy 
formation. Such “common sense” has provided a useful epistemic lens for us to 
understand the EU better. Moreover, making up a pair of dialectic approaches, 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism also complement each other, so choosing 
the two will also enable us to have a more rounded understanding of the basic issues of 
the EU. 
Forth, though there are the limits and shortcomings of the classical debate 
between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism and both of them have failed 
accurately to explain some aspects of the EU (Risse-Kappen 1996), neo-functionalist 
and intergovernmentalist controversies actually have laid down foundations for new 
theorization in the later days, which starts to focus on the actual functioning of the EU 
rather than on its origination, raising different questions and offering answers from 
more diverse perspectives (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 41). Scholars tend to criticize 
the two traditional EU theories as being “actor-centered”, which means the two pay 
most attention to the prominent actors, the supranational institutions or the member 
35 
 
states, while saying little about the contextual factors that shape actors’ behavior, such 
as rules, traditions, and cultures (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 41). The theoretical 
weaknesses of the two macro-models, on the one hand, have prepared a ground for the 
exploding of new theories and approaches, pushing the development and flourishing of 
European integration theories from the stage of “explaining integration” to “analyzing 
governance” and then to “constructing the EU” (see Table 1.1). On the other hand, the 
explanatory impotence of the two also has encouraged scholars to adapt and revise 
their previous arguments and thus, as the literature review in chapter two and chapter 
three illustrates, has promoted the revival and updates of both theories. EU studies are 
in a state of flux, but still, the two classical approaches have exerted far-reaching 
influence on later theorization on the EU. For instance, multi-level governance (MLG) 
and policy network analysis are regarded as the theoretical cousins of 
neo-functionalism,
20
 while intergovernmentalism is generally held to represent the 
theoretical camp which takes nation states as gatekeepers (Pollack 1996, 429). Having 
been more or less building upon the neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist debate, 
later European integration theories and approaches show their indebtedness and 
connections to both theories. For instance, Pierson’s (1996, 1998) “path dependence” is 
classified as one of “locking-in” theories under the rubric of the evolution of 
intergovernmentalism (see chapter three), but it is also cited by neo-functionalists to 
support their arguments for EU supranational governance (see chapter two, section 
2.4.1). As a matter of fact, Pierson’s “path dependence” is one of the core propositions 
of HI which constitutes a sub-category of new institutionalism (see chapter four). So to 
discuss the two classical paradigms will shine light on later EU integration theories and 
approaches, while selecting HI as the third tested theory to carry out an institutionalist 
study will also reinforce our understanding of the two main theories as well as of the 
EU. All in all, the study of the “two overlapping meta-debates” (i.e. neo-functionalism 
and intergovernmentalism”) can “help us to think about the development of theory in 
EU studies” (Rosamond 2013, 86).  
Fifth, the research trend of EU studies from the middle of the 1990s is not to 
construct a one-size-fits-all grand theory to encapsulate the whole integration project, 
but rather to focus on certain elements or specific policy areas of the EU (Rosamond 
                                                 
20 Niemann (2006, 302-305) elaborates on recent approaches’ resemblance to neo-functionalism, 




2010, 105); consequently, “middle-range theories” have gained in popularity among 
scholars (Rosamond 2010, 108). In recent years, to seek a single theory to capture the 
EU’s dynamic evolution becomes impossible; rather, “different kinds of theories are 
appropriate for different pieces of the EU puzzle” (Sandholtz 1996, 427). 
Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, therefore, among various theoretical 
frameworks, make their shares of contributions to unraveling some parts of the EU 
puzzle, particularly by explaining the dynamics for the integration project. It is also 
true for HI which constitutes one of the approaches analyzing EU governance. Each 
theory and approach examine the EU from its own peculiar angles, focusing and 
highlighting different elements and aspects of the integration project, so bringing them 
together will help us resolve the EU puzzle better.  
Finally, it is worth emphasizing again that both neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, the two traditional European integration theories, alongside the 
EU’s development and newly rising theories and approaches, also evolve and develop. 
The limits and disadvantages of the two classical theories do not mean the end of them. 
Rather, having been tested by EU empirical developments, they are modified to 
accommodate the growth of the EU; at the same time, by absorbing advancements in 
other disciplines and theories, they get enriched. Over time, some of their propositions 
got revised, rejected or even abandoned, but they never died out; instead, adapting 
themselves to the new situations empirically and theoretically, they develop with 
renewed vigour to account for the EU (see, for instance, Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). 
To test their propositions with the EU’s new developments after the 2008 crisis, 
particularly during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, means to reify and reinterpret 
classical theories in a new context with the possibilities to make further theoretical 
developments, and this also applies to HI and other European integration theories and 
approaches. The recourse to EU integration theories and to test their propositions with 
new EU developments, in the end, serve the interest of a better understanding of the 
EU. 
After stating the considerations leading to the selection of the two classical 
models, the reasons to choose HI also become clear. First, HI is a point where the two 
competitive integration theories converge, so HI research, in one respect, addresses a 
basic issue in EU studies: supranational institutions and their autonomy, power and 
competence, and in another respect, it enlightens our understanding of the two rival 
classics. Second, as different theories are apt to account for the different part of the EU 
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puzzle, HI, as a sub-school of new institutionalism which specifically deals with 
“institutions”, unravels EU governance from a historical institutionalist perspective, 
thus differing itself from the two traditional theories’ primary concerns about 
integration dynamics. Moreover, new institutionalist research on the EU was born out 
of the classic neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist debate and it is believed to have 
overcome the impasse of such a dichotomy by offering new insights into the EU 
(Pollack 1996, 430). Finally, any European integration theories, as useful epistemic 
tools to understand the EU, need to be checked by EU empirical developments, and to 
test HI by the EU’s new developments during the euro area sovereign debt crisis 
suggests possible theoretical developments for HI. Apart from these considerations, the 
particular traits of HI make the selection of this theory more significant: (1) as one of 
the three schools of new institutionalism, HI possesses an eclectic feature of both two 
other schools — rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism; 
situating itself between the two extremes of rational choice and sociology, HI is 
moderate and inclusive, offering complementary rather than competitive explanations, 
so among the three new institutionalist variants, HI can represent new institutionalist 
approaches in general most (see chapter four); (2) in reality, various EU institutions 
were created and developed and the EU has become a highly institutionalized entity; 
EU institutions are the organs where EU decision-making takes place and where 
EU-level policies and functions have been carried out; at present, in order to solve the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis, the EU has adopted new policies and established new 
institutions, so carrying out an institutionalist study on the EU’s recent developments 
during the crisis is meaningful, and HI analyses of the EU’s new measures address the 
core issue of the integration project — institutionalized EU economic governance.  
In short, as Table 1.1 illustrates, theories accounting for the EU are diverse and 
sophisticated, and within a limited space, it is impossible and unrealistic to make a 
thorough and detailed literature review of all of them, so this dissertation only focuses 
on three European integration theories: neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and 
HI (a convergent point of the two classics and a sub-category of new institutionalism). 
Based on the arguments and assumptions of each theory, this dissertation formulates 
hypotheses on the EU, which will be tested by the cases of the EU’s developments 
after 2008, particularly during the current euro area sovereign debt crisis, and thus the 
three theories’ explanatory and predictive power will be checked. Subsequently, the 
vindication or falsification of each hypothesis provides answers to the research 
38 
 
questions of this dissertation and leads to a better understanding of the EU. It should 
also be noted that while it is possible and reasonable to compare the relative 
explanatory and predictive power of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, it is, 
in a strict sense, not suitable to compare the relative power among neo-functionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and HI, because they deal with different “topics”: the former two 
models seek answers to the dynamics and driving forces of EU integration, while the 
latter (HI and new institutionalism as a whole) is particularly dedicated to analyzing 
EU governance (see Table 1.1). Still, each theory’s explanatory and predictive power 
can be evaluated in the way that hypotheses derived from these theories will be 
confirmed or rejected by the same set of given cases. The relationship between theories 
and EU integration has been vividly illustrated by the metaphor of the blind men and 
an elephant: each theory seems to touch, emphasize and thus explain different aspects 
of the elephant of the integration process, so “any general explanation of integration 
cannot rest on a single theory, [...] but must rest on a multi-causal framework that 
orders a series of more narrowly focused theories” (Moravcsik 1998, 15). Accordingly, 
this dissertation in case analyses will also look at the possibilities to synthesize 
multi-causal chains posited by the three selected theories that (1) link the same 
independent and dependent variables and (2) contribute to a better understanding and a 
more rounded explanation of empirical cases. Different theories offer different lenses 
to view the EU, and each theory possesses its own value and merits as well as blind 
points and disadvantages, so a synthesis of causal mechanisms proposed by different 
theories will offer us a more inclusive and comprehensive theoretical lens to examine 
and understand empirical phenomena, and in the end, to answer the research questions 
raised in this dissertation. Without doubt, besides the selected three, there is promising 
and meaningful research with other European integration theories and approaches 
against the EU’s developments during the post-2008 crisis era, and by using the same 
set of cases, to test the explanatory and predictive power of each theory and approach 
listed in Table 1.1 is possible.  
 
1.2.3 Hypotheses Formulation  
Chapter two, chapter three and chapter four will consecutively describe 
neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, and HI in detail, including their origins, their 
core concepts, the critiques against them, their theoretical revisions and developments, 
and their particularities and contributions to EU studies. For the convenience of 
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narrating the theories and deriving hypotheses, neo-functionalist hypotheses in chapter 
two are formulated along with the proceeding of the literature review, while hypotheses 
of intergovernmentalism in chapter three and of HI in chapter four are drawn at the end 
of each literature review. After each hypothesis formation follow clarification, 
explanation and preliminary analyses and tests (if possible) of the hypothesis 
concerned.   
The value of a solid and detailed theoretical review mainly lies in two aspects: 
first, it “permits us to formulate more detailed and consistent explanations, to test them 
more rigorously and in ways that are replicable, and finally to generalize the results to 
other situations” (Moravcsik 1998, 18); second, it delineates evolutionary paths of 
these theories over time, which not only may indicate the turning points in EU history 
and a changing international context, but also shed light on the problems of and the 
debates on the EU today. Hoffmann (1995, 1) once commented that “many of the 
issues that trouble the EU today have plagued it from the beginning and have not been 
resolved”, and it is still true for the EU in the 21
st
 century, so tracing the trajectory of 
the theories would enable us to have a broader historical view on EU current issues, 
encouraging deep reflections on the newly adopted solutions to the crisis and the future 
of the regional integration project.  
 
1.3 Research Design and Methodology  
This dissertation will first present a literature review and then derive hypotheses from 
each theory. To test these hypotheses, this dissertation follows the general rules of 
theory tests in social sciences and relies on the case study methods elaborated by 
George and Bennett (2005): the congruence method and process-tracing.  
Waltz (1979, 13) suggests seven steps to test a theory:  
 
“1 State the theory being tested.” 
“2 Infer hypotheses from it.” 
“3 Subject the hypotheses to experimental or observational tests.” 
“4 In taking steps two and three, use the definitions of terms found in the 
theory being tested.” 
“5 Eliminate or control perturbing variables not included in the theory under 
test.” 
“6 Devise a number of distinct and demanding tests.” 
“7 If a test is not passed, ask whether the theory flunks completely, needs 





This dissertation generally follows the seven steps outlined above, among which 
the steps of (1), (2) and (4) are dealt with in the next three chapters (i.e. chapter two, 
chapter three, and chapter four), while the steps of (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are 
addressed in chapter six, chapter seven and chapter eight. As step (4) points out, it is 
important to make a clear statement of the meaning of the independent and dependent 
variables prescribed by the tested theory, and meanwhile, the significance of theory 
tests lies at the final step (7) where the tested theory possibly gets modified, revised 
and developed as new factors and/or causal mechanisms are explored. It should also be 
kept in mind that “a theory is made credible only in proportion to the variety and 
difficulty of the tests, and that no theory can ever be proved true” (Waltz 1979, 14), 
that is, every theory should be subject to further empirical tests and be open to further 
debate and possible revisions. 
 
1.3.1 The Congruence Method and Process-Tracing 
To test the derived hypotheses from each theory, this dissertation will carry out case 
studies resorting to the congruence method and process-tracing, which are taken as an 
alternative and supplement to comparative methods (George and Bennett 2005, 153).
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The congruence method is meant to test whether a theory is congruent or not congruent 
with the outcome in a case, while process-tracing aims at uncovering causal 
mechanisms posited by a theory coupling independent variables with dependent 
variables (George and Bennett 2005, 153). George and Bennett describe the 
congruence method as follows: 
 
“The essential characteristic of the congruence method is that the 
investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to 
explain or predict the outcome in a particular case. The theory posits a 
relation between variance in the independent variable and variance in the 
dependent variable; it can be deductive or take the form of an empirical 
generalization. The analyst first ascertains the value of the independent 
variable in the case at hand and then asks what prediction or expectation 
about the outcome of the dependent variable should follow from the theory. 
                                                 
21 Haverland and Blatter (2012) and Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that there are three different 
approaches to case study research: co-variational analysis, causal-process tracing and congruence 
analysis. The first one refers to cross-case comparisons, while the latter two — causal-process tracing 
and congruence analysis — are two variants of within-case analysis. Accordingly, this dissertation 
conducts within-case causal analysis to test the validity of EU integration theories. 
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If the outcome of the case is consistent with the theory’s prediction, the 
analyst can entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist.” 
(2005, 181) 
 
Nevertheless, in order to have a high quality congruence test, “an investigator 
must establish the level of concreteness and differentiation with which variance in the 
dependent variable will be measured”, and “[h]ow well this task is performed may well 
determine whether one can find congruence between the independent variable in the 
theory and outcomes on the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 182). 
Therefore, whenever a theoretical model is discussed and hypotheses are derived, the 
independent variable and dependent variables must be stated clearly, and the methods 
or scales of measuring the variance of the dependent variable should also be clarified as 
much as possible.  
A salient feature of the congruence method is that it “does not require a search 
for data that might establish a causal process from independent to dependent variables” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 182). Applying the congruence method, researchers do not 
need a great deal of data about the cases in study, because the congruence method 
“does not have to trace the causal process that leads from the independent variable to 
the case outcome” (George and Bennett 2005, 182), and therefore, it is necessary to 
combine the congruence method with process-tracing, as the latter “attempts to identify 
the intervening causal process — the causal chain and causal mechanism — between 
an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” 
(George and Bennett 2005, 206). Tracing the causal chains, on the one hand, helps 
narrow the list of potential spurious causes; on the other hand, it forces researchers to 
take equifinality (multiple causes) into account, that is, to consider possible alternative 
paths which also lead to the same outcome in a single case (George and Bennett 2005, 
182; 207). In such a way, with more cases, a typological theory can be developed so 
long as the repertoire of causal paths that are consistent with a given outcome and the 
conditions under which they occur are clearly mapped out (George and Bennett 2005, 
207). The usefulness of the process-tracing technique is further emphasized and 
explained by Panke (2012). Compared with correlation-based analyses which tell the 
ratio of corresponding variation between the independent and dependent variables, 
process-tracing, studying “the unfolding of an event over time” and examining “the 
chain of events”, gives explanations for the changes of the dependent variable(s) 
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caused by the independent variable(s) and specifies the causal chain(s) between the 
independent and dependent variables (Panke 2012, 129), answering both “why” and 
“how-come” questions (Panke 2012, 136). Deriving conclusions from large-n data for 
given topics is a distinct advantage of quantitative methods, while process-tracing 
offers complementary tools, notably in studies focused on a small number of cases. 
Moreover, Panke also suggests that qualitative researchers tend to overlook the in-case 
variation of independent and dependent variables, which actually is “a common feature 
of a case study” and “in effect increases the number of observations”, and the value of 
process-tracing is that, besides avoiding false conclusions based on spurious 
correlations, it “allows for definition of fine-grained observable implications of causal 
processes as well as outcomes, which enables qualitative researchers to test multiple 
hypotheses even in small-n settings and establish causality”, and with the 
process-tracing technique, “a single case study can be utilized to test multiple 
hypotheses” (Panke 2012, 126). Panke further sets up two requirements to utilize 
process-tracing: (1) “specify the causal mechanisms expected by each of the 
hypotheses”, and (2) “specify indicators for the mechanisms” (2012, 129). So basically, 
process-tracing adds one more step of causal explanations to the congruence test; 
accordingly, this dissertation will first clearly present the causal mechanisms linking 
the independent and dependent variables assumed by the derived hypotheses; second it 
will check whether these hypothesized mechanisms are present or absent in the selected 
cases, which will lead to the acceptance or rejection of the relevant hypotheses. The 
crucial factor that contributes to a credible hypothesis test is to have a clear prescription 
of the indicators and measurements for the causal chains, and one way to achieve this, 
as step (4) by Waltz (1979, 13) above suggests, is to “use the definitions offered by the 
tested theory”, so when narrating theories and formulating hypotheses, this dissertation 
will state indicators, measurements and term definitions as clearly as possible.  
 For each single case, there might be competitive explanations and predictions 
offered by the three distinctive theories on the causal processes thought to have taken 
place in the case (i.e. the hypothesized causal paths), which contain necessary steps of 
a particular order linking the posited independent and dependent variables. By applying 
congruence testing and process-tracing, this dissertation has the means to compare, 
confirm or reject the alternative hypotheses, to possibly discover new causal paths or to 
synthesize the multiple causal chains linking the independent and dependent variables 
in a single case. As the chapters of the literature review suggest, neither 
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neo-functionalism nor intergovernmentalism has ever been proved fully correct, while 
HI is only one of the three sub-categories of new institutionalism, and the other two 
schools of new institutionalism will explain the same case from different angles, so the 
aim of this dissertation is not going to prove one theory entirely correct or incorrect, 
but to test each theory’s propositions, and thus its relative explanatory and predictive 
power, against the same set of cases and to assess the relative importance of various 
factors in different cases. Therefore, besides possible rival propositions, other 
propositions stressing different factors from each theory may offer to-be-vindicated 
multi-causal mechanisms for case studies, and new causal chains or a synthesis of a 
typological theory is possible outside the already-existing causal explanations. If 
evidence in the cases consistently confirms the preeminence of certain factors, it is a 
conclusion rather than an assumption of the empirical analysis, which, of course, is 
subject to further empirical tests and possible theoretical revisions. All these hypothesis 
tests and theoretical constructions provide us effective epistemic tools to understand 
and grasp the EU today, and the case study results definitely offer answers to the MRQ 
and the SRQs of this dissertation. 
 
1.3.2 Defining Case Studies in this Dissertation 
After comparing several definitions of case studies, Gerring (2004, 342) proposes that 
a case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a 
larger class of (similar) units”, and a unit, explicitly or implicitly, “connotes a spatially 
bounded phenomenon — e.g., a nation state, revolution, political party, election, or 
person — observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time” (his 
emphasis). Accordingly this dissertation will focus on a spatially bounded phenomenon 
observed over a delimited period of time: the EU’s new measures dealing with the 
post-2008 crisis situation, especially countering the euro area sovereign debt crisis, 
which were adopted after the effectiveness of the Lisbon Treaty and became effective 
during 2010 to 2012. To clarify his definition of the case study method, Gerring 
distinguishes “units” from other terms: “[a] ‘population’ is comprised of a ‘sample’ 
(studied cases), as well as unstudied cases. A sample is comprised of several ‘units,’ 
and each unit is observed at discrete points in time, comprising ‘cases’. A case is 
comprised of several relevant dimensions (‘variables’), each of which is built upon an 
‘observation’ or observations” (2004, 342). These terms (i.e. population, sample, unit, 
case, and observation) are nested within each other, and to different propositions and in 
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different research designs, these terms are generally in flux (Gerring 2004, 342). 
Following Gerring’s logic, units constitute a sample as well as cases, and in this 
dissertation, the observed units are the EU’s new measures to address the post-2008 
crisis challenges, particularly to solve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which 
comprise the cases that serve as a litmus to test the three selected European integration 
theories. The intensive study of the selected cases of the EU’s new developments will 
cast an enlightening understanding of a larger class of the EU’s handlings of the crisis 
as well as the trends of EU economic governance. 
For Gerring, the case study method is “a particular way of defining cases, not a 
way of analyzing cases or a way of modeling causal relations” (Gerring 2004, 341), 
and such a view is shared by George and Bennett (2005). George and Bennett define a 
case as “an instance of a class of events” (2005, 17), while a case study is “a 
well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, 
rather than a historical instance event itself”, and such a selection, together with the 
to-be-tested theories, decides what kind of data will be relevant to the investigator’s 
research (2005, 18). The Lisbon Treaty, introducing a series of remarkable institutional 
reforms and coming into force from 1 December 2009, is regarded as the latest 
milestone of the integration project; the EU’s developments after the Lisbon Treaty, 
however, have many facets and dimensions, and this dissertation purposively selects 
the aspect of its economic governance, particularly its dealings with the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis after the 2008 global financial crisis. As the focus and thrust of 
the post-2008 crisis era, the euro area sovereign debt crisis firstly broke out in Greece 
in the fall of 2009, and it is not until May 2010 that the euro countries for the first time 
reached their agreement to provide bilateral loans to Greece; later, the bailouts for 
Ireland and Portugal, for Greece for the second time, and for Spanish banks and 
Cypriot banks, all were carried out after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. In 
recent years, the most urgent task for EU economic governance is to stop the spreading 
of the sovereign debt crisis and to end this crisis as soon as possible, so this dissertation 
selects the new measures implemented by the EU from 2010 to 2012 under the 
effectiveness of the Lisbon Treaty to combat the crisis as cases to examine the 
historical episode of EU economic governance after the Lisbon Treaty as well as after 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Thereby case studies in this dissertation have the 
following characteristic: addressing the post-2008 crisis situation, particularly the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the selected cases represent instances of EU economic 
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governance after the Lisbon Treaty as well as after the 2008 crisis, and thus they reflect 
the general nature and trends of EU economic governance after the Lisbon Treaty as 
well as after the 2008 crisis.  
 
1.3.3 An Overview of the EU’s New Measures and Strategies to Solve 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis is one of the consequences as well as an evolution 
of the 2008 global financial crisis originating from the US, and to solve the collective 
national debt crisis is the EU’s most dominant task during the post-2008 crisis era. The 
financial crisis this time, which is generally regarded as the worst one since the Great 
Depression in the 1930s, has affected the EU economy in two prominent ways: first, it 
causes the EU’s economic recession in the context of the global economic downturn; 
second, it triggers the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which first started in Greece in 
2009 and then spread to Ireland in 2010 and to Portugal 2011, with potential 
contagious spreading to other euro countries (e.g. Hosli et al. 2011a, 2011b; Pan et al. 
2011; Shi et al. 2011a, 2012; Yurtsever 2011). According to the EU website (see 
“European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism”, European Union), three negative 
impacts have been exerted by the global financial crisis on the economies of EU 
countries: (1) “the destabilisation of financial markets”, (2) “the downturn in economic 
growth”, and (3) “the deterioration in the budget deficits and debt positions of the 
Member States”. Obviously, the economic recession and the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis are interwoven with each other and mutually reinforcing. Against such a 
background, two thematic topics dominate the EU’s economic governance after the 
effectiveness of the Lisbon Treaty: (1) keeping financial stability across the EU and 
EMU against external and internal financial shocks, and (2) carrying out fiscal and 
economic reforms to correct national government excessive budget and deficit 
situations and to realize economic recovery and growth. Naturally, the issue of the euro 
countries’ sovereign debt crisis must be addressed in both the external and internal 
contexts.  
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis after the 2008 financial crisis has exposed the 
disadvantages of the euro system and EU economic governance as a whole, and 
accordingly, the EU and its member states are making efforts to address the revealed 
problems so as to solve the crisis and to improve EU economic governance. Based on 
the information provided by EU institutions’ official websites (the Commission’s 
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website in particular) and inspired by Hosli et al. (2011b) and Yurtsever (2011), an 
overview of the EU’s and its member states’ efforts to deal with the post-2008 crisis 
situation, mainly about combating the euro area sovereign debt crisis, is conducted as 
follows: 
 
Table 1.2 The EU’s New Measures to Solve the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Factors contributing to 
the crisis, being 
classified into three 













I Fiscal and economic aspects 
(A) Member states’ 
high budget deficit and 
debt rates, much above 
3% and 60% of Gross 
Domestic Product 
(GDP) respectively, 
the criteria prescribed 
by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) 




deficits and debts 




(1) To meet the fiscal criteria laid down by the 
SGP, member states need to make budget cuts and 
take austerity measures, and meanwhile to carry 
out domestic reforms to realize economic growth 
and employment creation; 
(2) The EU and its member states set up 
economic strategies and priorities, such as Europe 




























of EMU and 
even the EU. 
(B) The general 
economic recession 
across EU countries 
and worldwide after 
the global financial 
crisis of 2008 
originating from the 
US; 
(C) The SGP rules 
have not been strictly 
enforced: an excessive 
deficit may ultimately 
result in a fine of as 
much as 0.5 percent of 
a member state’s GDP, 
but the EU has never 
imposed such financial 
sanctions against the 
euro states who have 
violated the SGP 
Powerless fiscal 




(3) New rules and regulations on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro 
area entered into force on 13 December 2011 (i.e. 
the so-called “six-pack”), composed of four main 
components: (a) stronger preventive and 
corrective action through a reinforced SGP and 
deeper fiscal coordination; (b) minimum 
requirements for national budgetary frameworks; 
(c) preventing and correcting macroeconomic and 
competitiveness imbalances; (d) enforcement of 
sanctions strengthened by the expanded use of 
“reverse qualified majority voting” (RQMV)
22
;  
                                                 
22 Firstly suggested by the Task Force Report (21 October 2010), RQMV is introduced to strengthen 
the enforcement of the SGP. It means that when imposing sanctions, “a Commission proposal will be 
considered adopted unless the Council overturns it by a qualified majority”, see “A New EU 
Economic Governance-A Comprehensive Commission Package of Proposals” (European 
Commission). The article of Van Aken and Artige (2013) reflects a history of the practice of reverse 
voting modes: reverse consensus was introduced in the dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995; reverse simple majority was introduced in the EU’s antidumping policy 
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limits; (4) On 23 November 2011, the Commission 
proposes another two new Regulations to further 
strengthen budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
(i.e. COM(2011) 821 Final and COM(2011) 819 
Final); later, the so-called “two-pack” became 
effective as of 30 May 2013; 
(5) On 20 June 2012, Communication on 
Common Principles for National Fiscal 
Correction Mechanisms (COM(2012) 342 Final) 
suggested seven common principles for the 
contracting parties of the TSCG (Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance) in EMU 
to design automatically-triggered national fiscal 
correction mechanisms; 
(6) The European Semester, a new mechanism 
of coordinating national economic and fiscal 
policies, started from 1 January 2011, the 
implementation of which requires and implies the 
convergence of public accounting systems, 
forecasting methods, and numerical fiscal rules 
and transparency;  
(7) The TSCG (also popularly known as the 
“Fiscal Compact”) entered into force on 1 
January 2013, aiming at strengthening fiscal 
discipline in the euro area by the “balanced 
budget rule” and the automatic correction 
mechanism. 
(D) The euro 
system encompasses 
common monetary 
policy conducted by 







(E) EMU, as its 
name suggests, should 
be built on two pillars: 
the economic pillar 
and the monetary 
pillar. The function of 
the Monetary pillar 
(i.e. to keep price 
stability in the euro 
area) is fulfilled by the 
ECB, but the economic 
pillar, composed of 
three parts: the fiscal 
regime enshrined in 
the SGP, national 
frameworks of 
economic 
policy-making, and the 
system of mutual 
surveillance, is lamed, 
and thus the EU/EMU 
has failed to 
implement sound and 
sustainable fiscal 


















II Financial supervision aspects 
(F) The eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis is 
triggered by the 2008 
global financial crisis 













(8) The EU established the ESRB for 
macro-prudential oversight and three European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs: the EBA, the 
EIOPA and the ESMA, which superseded three 
existing supervisory committees: the CEBS, the 
CEIOPS and the CESR, respectively) for 
micro-prudential oversight of the EU financial 
system; the ESRB and the three ESAs entered into 
force from 1 January 2011; (see section 1.3.4) 
(9) The EU tightened existing rules and 
 
                                                                                                                            
in 2004, and reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) was introduced in the “six-pack” in 2011 (i.e. 
the sanction mechanism of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) of the SGP’s corrective arm) and 
the new Fiscal Compact contained in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), 
which, binding to all euro member states plus 8 other EU member states (without the UK and the 
Czech Republic), entered into force on 1 January 2013 and “introduces RQMV in all the key steps of 
the EDP procedure under strict deadlines” (Van Aken and Artige 2013, 31; see also Appendix 1). 
According to the database used by Van Aken and Artige, the EU’s practice of reverse majority voting 
can be traced back to 2002 (2013, 5). 
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 established new regulations on financial services 
(e.g. banking, insurance, and securities) to reduce 
short-term financial risks; 
(10) Bank stress tests were carried out to 
overhaul the financial resistance ability of the 
major banks across the EU;  
(11) In September 2012, the Commission put 
forward proposals on a single supervisory 
mechanism (SSM) for all eurozone banks, making 
the first step towards the establishment of an 
integrated “bank union” lead by the ECB; 
(G) The world’s 
three big credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) — 
Moody’s, Fitch, and 
Standard & Poor’s — 
all are American 
companies. They are 
criticized for their 
failures to predict the 
US subprime mortgage 
crisis in 2007 which in 
turn causes the global 
financial crisis in 
2008, and they are also 
blamed for adding oil 
onto the fire of the 
European sovereign 
debt crisis.  
The role of the 
CRAs during 
the financial and 
the sovereign 
debt crisis. 
(12) Stricter EU rules on CRAs are on the way of 
formulation. On 16 January 2013, the EP approved 
new rules prescribing when and how CRAs may 
rate sovereign debts and private firms’ financial 
health, and meanwhile private investors were 
enabled to sue CRAs for their negligence; 
(13) On 14 March 2013, the European Council 
reached Conclusions on the ongoing work to build 
a sounder structure for EMU, including developing 
(a) common banking supervision (i.e. the SSM) 
with stricter rules on capital requirements for 
banks, (b) bank resolution and deposit guarantee 
schemes, (c) single resolution mechanism, and (d) 
Euro Summit rules of procedure; it was agreed that 
to establish the banking union is “the most pressing 
priority”.  
 
III Direct financial assistance and crisis management aspects 
(H) The increasing 
yield rates of 
government bonds 
make it difficult and 
unsustainable for 
member states to 
finance from the 
markets and the 
troubled member states 
lack capital liquidity 
capacity; these 
debt-ridden countries 
are posed on the edge 
of sovereign debt 




countries in a 
debt crisis; 
(14) Strategies aiming at easing severe tensions 
in the euro area sovereign debt market and 
restoring investors’ confidence are adopted: (a) in 
May 2010, the financial assistance mechanisms — 
the EFSM (European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism) and the EFSF (European Financial 
Stability Facility) — were agreed to be established, 
and the two constituted a temporary European 
Stabilisation Mechanism (the temporary ESM);* 
(b) in October 2012, after the Treaty revision and 
national ratification, the permanent financial 
assistance mechanism to euro member states — 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) — was 
inaugurated, replacing the temporary ESM; (c) the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) also agreed to 
provide loans accompanying financial assistance to 
the euro states; (d) the ECB took initiatives to 
purchase national debts on secondary markets by 
the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) 
and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) 
(two indirect ways to purchasing the treasury 
bonds of national governments); (see Appendix 2)  
(15) Commission Green Paper on the Feasibility 
of Introducing Stability Bonds (COM(2011) 818 
Final) were proposed for a debate on the joint 






(I) When the crisis 
first broke out in 
Greece in the fall of 
2009, for a long time, 
there were a lot of 
controversies on 
whether and how to 
help Greece and to 
deal with the on-going 
Exposing a 
vacuum in the 
European 
integration 
project: even the 
latest Lisbon 
Treaty hasn’t 




be put into the 







sovereign debt crisis in 
the euro states. 
mechanism or 





as the sovereign 
debt crisis.  
issuance of debt in the euro area;  
(16) Financial assistance was granted to Greece 
twice: €110 billion in May 2010 (bilateral loans) 
and €130 billion in March 2012 (financed by the 
EFSF+the IMF); besides, in July 2011, the Task 
Force for Greece was launched by the 
Commission, which consisted of EU officials and 
national experts with the aim of providing 
technical assistance to help the Greek government 
implement reforms and absorb different available 
EU funds better;  
(17) With the help of the temporary financial 
backstop mechanisms — the EFSM+the EFSF+the 
IMF, Ireland (December 2010) has been granted 
€85 billion (i.e. €22.5 billion (the EFSM)+€22.5 
billion (the EFSF+bilateral loans from the United 
Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Sweden)+€22.5 
billion (the IMF)+€17.5 billion (Ireland)), and 
Portugal (May 2011) €78 billion (i.e. €26 billion 
each from the EFSM, the EFSF and the IMF);  
(18) Financial assistance for the recapitalisation 
of financial institutions in Spain was reached in 
July 2012: up to €100 billion via the EFSF which is 
subsequently taken over by the permanent ESM;  
(19) Balance-of-Payments (BoP) assistance is 
available for non-euro area member states to ease 
their external financing constraints, and three 
countries (Latvia, Hungary and Romania) have 
received financial assistance under the BoP 
programs;  
(20) ESM financial assistance facility agreement 
(FFA) for Cyprus up to €10 billion was granted in 
May 2013 (€9 billion (the ESM) + €1 billion (the 
IMF)); 
(21) All financial assistance programs are 
conditioned by the beneficiary countries’ fiscal, 
economic and financial reform, mainly including 
the following promises from national governments: 
(a) to reduce government debts and deficits, (b) to 
promote growth and jobs, and (c) to keep financial 
stability;  
(22) From 1 July 2013, the ESM becomes the 
sole mechanism for new financial assistance 
programmes to the euro countries, while the EFSF 
stops engaging in new financing programmes or 
entering into new loan facility agreements, but still 
remaining active in financing the ongoing 
programmes for Portugal, Ireland (which officially 
exited the EFSF programme on 8 December 2013) 
and Greece. 
Notes: Table 1.2 only lists the main measures adopted by the EU and its member states to 
deal with the post-2008 crisis situation, particularly the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
Appendix 1 on the evolution of the SGP’s preventive arm provides some background 
information and explanations to Table 1.2, while for more details and other EU efforts and 
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initiatives, please visit the official websites of EU institutions, such as the Commission’s and 
the ECB’s.  
* On 9 May 2010, the Ecofin Council adopted the temporary European Stabilization 
Mechanism (ESM) with a total volume of up to € 500 billion, which consists of two parts. 
First, €440 billion would be provided by the euro area member states by means of a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), guaranteed on a pro rata basis by participating Member States, in a 
coordinated manner. This first part is called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and would expire after three years. Second, €60 billion would be raised by the Commission 
and guaranteed by the EU budget based on the relevant articles of EU Treaties (i.e. Article 
122.2 TFEU), and this part is called the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). 
Alongside the EFSF and the EFSM, the IMF would also provide up to € 250 billion, and thus 
through the temporary ESM, almost €750 billion could be mobilized (see Shi et al. 2011a). 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of Hosli et al. (2011b), Yurtsever (2011), the websites 
of EU institutions (the Commission, the ECB, the European Council and the Council of the 
European Union) and the official websites of the EFSF, the ESM and the ESRB.  
 
Similar to the three types of general categorization in Table 1.2, the Commission 
also has classified the EU’s new developments since the financial crisis into three 
broad categories (see Table 1.3), which actually suggests a simplified version of Table 
1.2.  
 
Table 1.3 New EU Economic Governance Evolving through the Financial Crisis 
“The crisis exposed fundamental problems and unsustainable trends in many European countries. 
It also made clear just how interdependent the EU’s economies are. Greater economic policy 
coordination across the EU will help us to address these problems and boost growth and job 
creation in future.” 
 
New EU economic governance 
(based on three main blocks) 
Block I Block II Block III 
A reinforced economic 
agenda with closer EU 
surveillance: 
 The Europe 2020 
strategy; 
 The Euro Plus Pact; 
 The SGP Reforms via 
the “six-pack” and 
“two-pack”; 
 The Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP);  
 The European 
Action to safeguard the stability of 
the euro area:  
 In May 2010, setting up the 
temporary ESM (i.e. the 
EFSM and the EFSF) to help 
euro member states plagued 
by the sovereign debt crisis; 
 Establishing the permanent 
ESM, which entered into 
force in October 2012;  
 Providing financial support, 
closely cooperated with the 
IMF, with conditions on 
Action to repair the financial 
sector: 
 Establishing new rules 
and agencies to detect 
and prevent financial 
problems earlier (e.g. 
the ESRB and the three 
ESAs);  
 Making sure all 
financial actors are 
under proper regulation 
and supervision;  
 More initiatives 
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Semester.  rigorous national fiscal 
consolidation and economic 
reforms. 
to block the loopholes 
in the financial market 
and system (e.g. to 
ensure banks across the 
EU possessing 
sufficient capital 
reserves to withstand 
future financial shocks). 
Main themes 
Fiscal discipline and 
economic growth.  
Establishing assistant mechanisms 
to provide urgent “financial blood” 
to the euro states while promoting 
national economic reforms.  
Patching up the loopholes in 




“Emerging stronger from the crisis” and “more united than ever”: finding solutions to the crisis 
after 2008, the EU reinforces its economic goverance and EMU, “paving the way towards a strong 
political union”. 
Sources: Adapted from “Economic Governance” (European Commission). 
 
As far as the new developments of the EU during the post-2008 crisis era are 
concerned, several points are worth emphasizing. First, the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis was so severe that the troubled nation states cannot solve it by themselves, and as 
the sovereign debt issue became a common challenge, seeking solutions at the 
supranational level became natural, necessary and unavoidable. Second, representing 
the overall interests of the EU, the Commission has fulfilled its functions well, actively 
tabling relevant proposals to deal with the crisis. Third, all the newly adopted policies 
and implemented measures can be divided into two kinds: (a) those totally created from 
scratch, and (b) those revising and strengthening the existing rules. Fourth, though the 
new measures mirror the development of the regional organization at the macro-level, 
their addressees are the various actors at the micro-level and the concrete 
implementation of the new rules and regulations require member states’ and the 
addressees’ cooperation and commitments. Fifth, the sovereign debt issue cannot be 
treated in isolation; rather, to solve the crisis is a complex project, demanding 
communication, coordination and cooperation of EU economic, fiscal and financial 
policies, which are interwoven with each other at both the EU and the national level. 
Finally, the classification of the three categories presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 does 
not mean an absolute clear-cut system, but rather, it is a way to conceptualize and grasp 
the social phenomena of the EU’s responses and actions to the crisis so as to facilitate 
our understanding and research. Needless to say, the three interconnected categories 
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are mutually reinforcing and the effective solution to the euro area sovereign debt crisis 
must be born out of the sound coordination and cooperation among them. In short, the 
post-2008 crisis era dominated by the eurozone sovereign debt crisis has exposed the 
potential disadvantages of the EU and EMU, and those new developments demonstrate 
the EU’s efforts in patching up the loopholes in the integration project as well as 
strengthening and advancing EU economic governance. 
 
1.3.4 The Selection of Three Cases  
Among these new initiatives and strategies of the EU to deal with the post-2008 global 
financial crisis era themed by the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, three new measures 
are selected as cases for the research in this dissertation:  
(1) The “European Semester”, implemented from 1 January 2011; 
Prior to 2011, EU member states would coordinate their economic policy plans 
after adopting their national budgets, and at that time, the existing procedures of policy 
coordination were carried out independently from each other. The economic recession 
in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the outbreak of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis in autumn 2009 have illustrated the importance and urgency of achieving 
better economic policy coordination and bringing broader macro-economic policies 
under surveillance. Accordingly, the European Semester was created to synchronize 
and streamline the procedures of coordinating national budgets, economic growth and 
employment plans in line with the Union’s objectives as well as to prevent excessive 
macro-economic imbalances. The European Semester is one of the earliest initiatives 
put forward by the Task Force chaired by Herman Van Rompuy, which was 
established by the European Council meeting decision on 25-26 March 2010 during the 
height of the Greek sovereign debt crisis with the purpose of exploring all possible 
legal options to boost EU economic governance. On 17 June 2010, the European 
Council agreed on introducing the European Semester from 2011 onwards, and 
accordingly as follow-ups to this European Council decision, the Ecofin Council (i.e. 
Council of Ministers of Economics and Finance) on 13 July 2010 exchanged views on 
putting member states’ budgetary and structural policies under the European 
Semester’s surveillance; in September 2010, the Ecofin Council adopted the 
Commission’s proposal on the issue concerned, and consequently, the European 
Semester became effective on 1 January 2011. This new mechanism prescribes a clear 
timetable to coordinate individual national policies from the beginning of each year for 
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a six-month period (the so-called “European semester”) before member states adopt 
their next year’s budgets in the second half of the year (the so-called “national 
semester”): the time when member states receive EU-level advice and guidance (i.e. 
Annual Growth Survey (AGS)), when they submit their policy plans (i.e. Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs) and National Reform Programmes (NRPs)) to be 
assessed at the EU level, when they are given individual recommendations (i.e. 
country-specific recommendations (CSRs)) on their national budgetary and reform 
policies, and when, if necessary, they receive recommendations to correct 
macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, under this new policy coordination and 
surveillance mechanism, during the first six months annually from 2011 onwards, EU 
member state fiscal situations and economic policies are reviewed, based on which any 
incoordination and newly emerging imbalanced situations will be detected and relevant 
recommendations will be given and then taken into account before member states 
finalize their budgets and reform programmes; in such a way, the EU dimension gets 
embedded in national policy-making.
23
 To summarize, the European Semester means 
“[a] six-month period each year when EU Member States’ budgetary, macro-economic 
and structural policies are coordinated so as to allow these countries to translate EU 
considerations into their national budgetary processes and into other aspects of their 
economic policymaking” (“Glossary”, ESM). 
(2) The ESRB, starting from 1 January 2011;  
The global financial crisis in 2008 exposes that the EU urgently needs an EU-wide 
financial supervision system to assess and prevent potential systemic risks so as to keep 
financial stability within the EU and to mitigate negative impacts of financial turmoil 
on the EU’s internal market and real economy (see ESRB Regulation (i.e. Regulation 
(EU) No 1092/2010) (10) and Article 3; also see Council Regulation (EU) No 
1096/2010, (1)). In November 2008, European Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso requested a group of high level experts, chaired by Mr Jacques de Larosière 
(the former Managing Director of the IMF), to make recommendations to establish a 
more efficient, integrated and sustainable financial supervisory framework. On 25 
February 2009, the de Larosière group submitted its final report, proposing two key 
recommendations: to establish a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) for 
                                                 
23 See, for example, “The European Semester” (European Commission) and “Special Reports, the 
European Semester” (Council of the European Union).  
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macro-prudential supervision and to establish a European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) for micro-prudential supervision. The first one shall supervise EU 
macro-economic aspects and give early risk warnings and directions to EU supervisors, 
while the second one shall provide complete and accurate information of 
micro-prudential developments to the first (see de Larosière Report 25 February 2009, 
57; also see ESRB Regulation (24)).
24
 Based on these two suggestions, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) for EU macro-prudential supervision and the European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) for micro-prudential supervision are 
established.
25
 The de Larosière Report (39) highlighted that “[t]he present EU 
supervisory arrangements place too much emphasis on the supervision of individual 
firms, and too little on the macro-prudential side”, and also “too little […] on 
inter-linkages between developments in the broader macroeconomic environment and 
the financial system” (ESRB Regulation, (11)), so the ESRB, created as a Union level 
body, means to make up those weak points by carrying out macro-prudential oversight 
of the EU financial system as a whole with the objectives of “avoid(ing) periods of 
widespread financial distress” and “contribut(ing) to the prevention or mitigation of 
                                                 
24 In contrast to micro-prudential supervision whose main objective “is to supervise and limit the 
distress of individual financial institutions, thus protecting the customers of the institution in 
question”, macro-prudential supervision means to “limit the distress of the financial system as a 
whole in order to protect the overall economy from significant losses in real output” (de Larosière 
Report, 38). 
25 When firstly mentioned in the de Larosière Report (57), the acronym ESFS stood for “European 
System of Financial Supervision”; later on 23 September 2009 in the legislative draft put forward by 
the Commission, the ESFS represented the “European System of Financial Supervisors”, and it was 
agreed that the ESFS, consisting of a network of national financial supervisors working in tandem 
with the three new European supervisory authorities (i.e. ESAs of the EBA, the EIOPA and the 
ESMA), should be responsible for micro-prudential supervision of national firms (see COM(2009) 
499 Final 23 September 2009, 2). In both the de Larosière Report and the Commission’s proposal, the 
ESFS refers to national financial supervisors together with the three new EU-level micro-prudential 
supervisory authorities, but later when the Ecofin Council adopted the Financial Supervision: Council 
Adopts Legal Texts Establishing the European Systemic Risk Board and Three New Supervisory 
Authorities, the term ESFS referred to the whole EU financial framework, as it is clearly stated: “[t]he 
four new bodies (i.e. the ESRB and the three ESAs) will be part of a European system of financial 
supervisors, which will include the supervisory authorities of the member states” (Council of the 
European Union-16452/10 PRESSE 303, 17 November 2010, 1). So in a broad sense, the ESFS, 
which originally only stood for the micro-prudential supervision framework parallel to the ESRB (or 
the ESRC), is used to indicate both the macro and micro supervisory authorities within the EU; 
consequently, the ESFS subsumes the ESRB, as ESRB Regulation (14) also prescribes that “[a] 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) should be established, bringing together the actors 
of financial supervision at national level and at the level of the Union, to act as a network”, which 
“should comprise the ESRB and three micro-supervisory authorities […] (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the ‘ESAs’)” (see also ESRB Regulation Article 1; “Establishment of the ESRB”, 
ESRB). As a result, an EU-wide financial supervision system has gradually been formed.  
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systemic risks to financial stability in the Union” as well as “to the smooth functioning 
of the internal market and thereby ensur(ing) a sustainable contribution of the financial 
sector to economic growth” (ESRB Regulation Article 3 (1)). On 16 December 2010, 
two legislations establishing the ESRB entered into force: (a) Regulation (EU) No 
1092/2010 (ESRB Regulation — legislative acts) and (b) Council Regulation (EU) No 
1096/2010 (“Conferring Specific Tasks upon the ECB” — non-legislative acts)
26
. 
Moreover, on 20 January 2011, the ESRB adopted ESRB Decision 2011/C 58/04 to 
specify the ESRB rules of procedure. 
(3) The ESM, becoming effective as of 8 October 2012;  
Developed after the temporary European Stabilization Mechanism (i.e. the 
EFSM and the EFSF) established in May 2010, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), with its main features built on the EFSF, is a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism providing loans and other forms of financial assistance for the euro 
countries via different debt instruments, so as to ensure financial stability of the euro 
area as well as the EU. On 17 December 2010, the European Council agreed to create a 
permanent stability mechanism. On 25 March 2011, the European Council adopted 
Decision-2011/199/EU to amend Article 136 TFEU so as to lay down the legal basis 
for the creation of the permanent stability mechanism for the euro states. The Treaty 
revision naturally requires all EU members’ national ratification with different 
constitutional requirements. On 11 July 2011, the finance ministers of 17 euro countries 
signed the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty). Later, 
on 2 February 2012, the ESM Treaty got amended and signed again. On 27 September 
2012, the ESM Treaty, after national ratification by the euro area states, entered into 
force. On 8 October 2012, the ESM was inaugurated.
27
 The financial assistance 
provided by the ESM does not mean fiscal transfers, but shall function as “a liquidity 
bridge that allows euro area countries in distress to ‘buy time’ to take the necessary 
                                                 
26 See “Establishment of the ESRB” (ESRB). 
27 See “About the ESM” (ESM), “European Stability Mechanism Treaty Signed” (Council of the 
European Union 2 February 2012), and the ESM Treaty. The modifications to the original version of 
the ESM Treaty are about incorporating the decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government of 
the euro countries on 21 July and 9 December 2011 aiming at improving ESM effectiveness. For the 
main changes made by the amended ESM treaty, see ESM Treaty Factsheet (2 February 2012). 
Though the establishment of the ESM was conditional upon the amendment of Article 136 (3) TFEU, 
which was subject to national ratification and finally entered into force on 1st May 2013 after the 
Czech Republic’s completion of ratification on 3 April 2013, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
clarified that “the ratification of the ESM treaty can be concluded before the entry into force of the 
136(3) amendment” (Novak 15 January 2014, 4).  
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measures to restore fiscal sustainability and competitiveness in the medium term” (ECB 
Monthly Bulletin July 2011, 71). 
The reasons to choose these three are as follows:  
First, as the classification of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 suggests, each of the three comes 
from the three different distinguishable categories, representing the EU’s intentions to 
address the effects of the 2008 crisis from three different rationales and approaches 
respectively: (a) strengthening fiscal and economic surveillance and coordination 
among EU member states while promoting economic growth and job creation via the 
European Semester, (b) establishing the ESRB responsible for EU-wide 
macro-prudential oversight to repair one of the loopholes of the financial sector so as to 
keep the financial stability, and (c) setting up the permanent crisis management 
mechanism ESM to provide direct financial assistance to the troubled euro states so as 
to ease the liquidity problems and boost investors’ confidence in EU financial markets. 
Obviously, the three types of policies are mutually supportive and reinforcing, as 
approach (c) also contributes to maintaining financial stability (approach b) and the 
recovery of the economy (approach a). Clearly standing for three different policy 
dimensions of distinctive rationales — fiscal and economic policy, financial 
supervision, and the practical crisis assistance mechanism, the three selected cases, 
therefore, bear enough variations for theory tests so far as their nature, purposes and 
functions are concerned, and such variance “is valuable because the theoretical scope 
of models is more thoroughly challenged and ascertained on diverse settings” 
(Niemann 2006, 4). Besides, the three cases ensure variation of the dependent variables, 
which is important to minimize the bias of case selection.  
Second, representing the EU’s new developments after the global financial crisis, 
the three themselves are typical in their own categories as being the EU’s responses to 
the external and internal challenges. To begin with, the European Semester is a newly 
invented mechanism of the EU to supervise and coordinate national government 
economic and fiscal policy planning, by which policy guidance at the EU level gets 
embedded in national policy-making through the SCPs and the NRPs; besides, it 
possesses another two distinct characteristics: (a) it was born from the adoption and 
implementation of one of the earliest proposals put forward by the Task Force chaired 
by European Council President Van Rompuy, so the selection of this case also provides 
an opportunity to examine the functioning of the newly established post by the Lisbon 
Treaty; (b) stressing both fiscal supervision and economic growth, the European 
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Semester is an inclusive policy coordination and supervision framework, under which 
Europe 2020, the Euro Plus Pact, the preventive arms of the SGP and the MIP,
28
 and 
the country-specific minimum benchmark figure demanded by the “balanced budget 
rule” of the TSCG, all have been integrated under the same umbrella (see Table 8.4). 
As a result, this new policy supervision and coordination mechanism covers national 
fiscal policy, growth-enhancing economic reforms, macroeconomic imbalance 
problems and financial sector issues, implying a more inclusive and comprehensive 
study of EU economic governance. As for the case of the ESRB which is constructed 
as a macro-prudential financial supervision system for the whole EU, compared with 
the micro-prudential supervision framework composed of national supervisory 
authorities and the three ESAs — the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which replace the former three supervisory 
committees at the EU level: the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), 
the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee 
(CEIOPS), the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), respectively,
29
 
the ESRB is a totally novel institution placed under the leadership of the President of 
the ECB and located at the ECB. The ESRB is supposed to cooperate closely with the 
micro-prudential supervisory bodies of the ESAs and national supervisory authorities, 
international financial organizations (e.g. the IMF and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)) and other macro-prudential oversight bodies in other countries.
30
 With regard 
                                                 
28 As Table 5.3, footnote 123 and Appendix 1 of this dissertation suggest, the European Semester was 
created on the basis of the preventive arm of the SGP, but it operates separately from the preventive 
and corrective sanction mechanisms of the SGP. As a consequence, the Commission clearly explains 
that member states cannot be fined or taken to court if they fail to implement the European Semester’s 
recommendations, see European Commission-MEMO/12/386 (30 May 2012). For an overview of the 
origins and recent developments of the SGP, see, for example, Hosli and Pan (2014).  
29 The ESFS and its relations with the ESRB are defined by ESRB Regulation Article 1(2) as follows: 
“The ESRB shall be part of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the purpose of 
which is to ensure the supervision of the Union’s financial system”, and Article 1(3) states the 
composition of the ESFS: (a) the ESRB; (b) the EBA established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010; 
(c) the EIOPA established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010; (d) the ESMA established by 
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010; (e) the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (i.e. 
the EBA, the EIOPA and the ESMA) provided for by Article 54 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 
of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010; (f) the competent or 
supervisory authorities in the Member States as specified in the Union acts referred to in Article 1(2) 
of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 
1095/2010. 
30 See ESRB Regulation Articles 3 (2) (g)-(j) and 15 (2).  
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to the third case, the creation of the permanent ESM involves Treaty revisions and 
national ratification for the Treaty revisions by all EU member states and for the ESM 
Treaty by all euro member states. The permanent ESM fulfills the vacuum of crisis 
resolution mechanisms in the EU/EMU project. All in all, as Cœuré (23 September 
2012), a member of the executive board of the ECB, points out, Europe is 
“experiencing an institutional transformation”, and thus an intensive study of the 
institutional changes in each of the three categories offers sharp insights into the 
developing EU and its future.  
Finally, to resolve the on-going sovereign debt crisis — the dominant thematic 
topic of EU economic governance after the 2008 global financial crisis — requires 
efforts from both EU institutions at the macro-level and member states at the 
micro-level. The three selected cases, like other new EU measures to deal with the 
crisis, reflect a demand of mutual communication and cooperation between the EU and 
its member states. A close analysis of them will reveal the interactions among various 
actors at different levels within the EU, and thus enable us to have a better 
understanding of the daily working mechanisms and institutional procedures of the EU. 
 
1.3.5 Sources of Evidence for the Selected Cases 
The observations on those cases will rely on two types of sources: primary and 
secondary literature. The primary literature includes regulations, documents, data, 
figures and press releases published by EU institutions (e.g. the Council of the 
European Union, the Commission, the EP, and the ECB), national governments, and 
(trans)national organizations and companies, all of which are available on each 
institution’s, government’s and organization’s official websites. The secondary 
literature is composed of articles from academic journals, think tanks (e.g. Notre 
Europe, Centre for European Reform, and Robert Schuman Foundation), and reputable 
news agencies (e.g. BBC, Spiegel, and CNN), which offer recounting, comments and 
analyses. Consequently, this dissertation resorts to quite lot of internet websites due to 
the sources of the evidence for the cases, but it limits to the EU official websites and 
the reliable press and media as much as possible. These two types of literature once 
have been labeled by Moravcsik as “hard” and “soft” sources, respectively, as the 
primary (“hard”) sources provide “direct evidence of decision making”, while the 
secondary (“soft”) sources offer “public statements and journalistic or academic 
commentary in which authors have less incentive to report motivations accurately” 
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(1998, 10). So when it comes to the analyses of decision-making or actors’ strategies, 
this dissertation will go to the “hard” sources if possible and available.  
 
1.3.6 The “Most-Likely” Approach: Strengths and Shortcomings of 
Case Studies 
EU recent developments after the 2008 global financial crisis demonstrate that EU 
member states’ cooperation gets closer and the European integration process is on the 
way. This regional integration project started from the economic cooperation among 
European nation states, and the new measures adopted and implemented by the EU to 
address the post-2008 crisis era are the concrete examples and expressions of such 
cooperation in the new era against new backgrounds. These new EU meassures make 
up the “most-likely” cases to test European integration theories, because these theories, 
targeting accounting for the EU’s developments, grow out of the EU empirical practice 
and their hypothesized causal mechanisms based on the EU integration process and 
results are expected “most-likely” to be found in the new developments of the EU. 
Representing the EU’s initiatives to meet the new challenges as well as the outcomes 
of the EU integration process, the three selected cases, therefore, formulate a 
“most-likely” research design, which Ross (2004, 37) explains as follows: “a scholar 
examines in depth a single case in which a hypothesized causal relationship is believed 
‘most-likely’ to be found; if it is present, the hypothesis is pronounced plausible, and if 
not, it is deemed ‘falsified’”. Accordingly, in this dissertation, hypotheses are derived 
from each theory to be tested; if evidence of a hypothesized causality is present, the 
hypothesis is vindicated, and if not, the hypothesis is falsified. Both the vindication and 
rejection of the hypotheses will lead to the answers to the MRQ and SRQs put forward 
by this dissertation. 
As for the pros and cons of a “most-likely” research design of case studies, Ross 
states clearly: 
 
“Similar to other small-N methods, the most-likely approach has valuable 
properties: it plays close attention to the validity of concepts and to causal 
linkages; it helps account for variables that are difficult to measure; and it is 
sensitive to case-specific factors. The heightened attention to validity, 
however, has a cost: because the sample is biased, the finding cannot be 
generalized to some larger set of unexamined cases. Still, a systematic study 
of most-likely cases can probe and refine the plausibility of existing 





Ross’s evaluation has pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of case studies, 
on which George and Bennett (2005) also make a detailed elaboration. The merits of 
the case study method include “conceptual validity”, “deriving new hypotheses”, and 
“exploring causal mechanisms” (George and Bennett 2005, 19-22), whereas the 
limitations and potential pitfalls of case studies indicate possible “case selection bias”, 
only tentative conclusions on “identifying scope conditions and ‘necessity’” (i.e. “on 
how much gradations of a particular variable affect the outcome in a particular case or 
how much they generally contribute to the outcomes on a class or type of cases”), “lack 
of representativeness”, “potential lack of independence of cases” (George and Bennett 
2005, 22-34). Due to the strengths and weaknesses of different research methods, there 
is an increasing trend to resort to the complementarity and combination of various 
methods, such as case studies, statistical methods, and formal models (George and 
Bennett 2005, 34-35). Coming from three different categories, the three selected cases 
for hypotheses tests in this dissertation also are the typical representatives of each 
category, so they bear adequate variations and thus the potential problems of “case 
selection bias”, “lack of representativeness”, and “potential lack of independence of 
cases” more or less have been overcome; moreover, the problem of “determining such 
relative causal weights for variables [...] with any precision in a single case or a small 
number of cases” could be properly addressed by “process-tracing evidence and 
congruence tests” (George and Bennett 2005, 27).
31
 As a matter of fact, one of the core 
arguments threading through George and Bennett (2005) is that all the potential 
weaknesses of case studies can be countered by the congruence method and 
process-tracing in a most-likely research design to test a theory’s explanatory and 
predictive power where causal mechanisms under certain conditions are explored (i.e. 
being confirmed, refuted, refined or uncovered) with the possibility to develop new 
hypotheses and theories which are open to further debate and modifications. Following 
George and Bennett’s (2005) instruction, case study research in this dissertation, which 
aims at checking the explanatory and predictive value contained in the three main 
integration theories so as to understand the EU and answer the MRQ and SRQs raised 
                                                 
31 In Panke’s (2012, 137) opinion, case studies with the process-tracing methodology are of high 
internal validity but of a limited external validity (the potential for generalization); nevertheless, this 
downside of single case studies can be complemented by increasing the number of cases within a 
research design.  
61 
 
in the dissertation, can be fully justified.  
 
1.3.7 Three Methodological Principles 
In his book The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik employs three research techniques: “the 
formulation of concrete and falsifiable hypotheses from competing theories, the 
disaggregation of case studies to multiply observations, and the reliance whenever 
possible on primary sources” (1998, 19). Similarly, case studies in this dissertation also 
rely on three methodological principles. First, hypotheses drawn from the three theories 
are tested consistently by each case, that is, each case tests the same set of hypotheses 
— this actually corresponds with Panke’s (2012) arguments of testing multiple 
hypotheses by a single case with process-tracing; second, each case is disaggregated 
into sufficient observations in light of the hypothesized causal chains linking the 
independent and dependent variables so as to test the derived hypotheses; third, 
evidence presented in the cases comes from primary and secondary literature, and this 
dissertation will stick to the primary literature whenever it is available, thus trying to 
avoid potentially controversial descriptions of, for example, actors’ motivations, 
calculations, or strategies as well as new causal relationships.  
 
1.4 Summary 
To summarize, the post-2008 crisis era saw a sort of “institutional and policy explosion” 
of the EU, as a series of new measures were proposed, debated, adopted, and 
implemented so as to address the EU member states’ fiscal, financial and economic 
crisis after 2008 as well as to strengthen EU economic governance. Then the research 
question is naturally posed: Along with the EU’s new measures and developments to 
counter the eurozone sovereign debt crisis after the 2008 global financial crisis, what 
path are the EU and EMU embarking on? This is the main research question (MRQ) of 
this dissertation, and five sub-research questions (SRQs) are put forward to study 
different parts of the MRQ. To unravel the development of the EU, this dissertation 
resorts to three main EU integration theories — neo-functionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and HI — whose propositions are expected to explain the EU’s 
recent developments and give predictions about the EU in the future. This leads to 
another specific SRQ of this dissertation, focused on theories of European integration: 
What is the explanatory and predictive power of three different European integration 
theories when studying the EU’s recent developments after 2008 (SRQ6)? That is, do 
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the causal mechanisms offered by the three EU integration theories account for EU 
recent developments well? Are there any other variables or new causal mechanisms 
that should be added to the existing theoretical frameworks? What sort of light do the 
academic discussions shed on the current crisis and on the various measures adopted by 
the EU to combat this crisis? Relying on the congruence method and the 
process-tracing technique, hypotheses derived from the three theories on the EU’s 
developments after 2008 will be tested, based on which new variables might be added, 
new hypotheses formulated, and predictions made. The acceptance, rejection or 
revisions to the hypotheses, on the one hand, make a possible contribution to the 
on-going debated EU studies and the ever developing European integration theories, 
and on the other hand, provide answers to the SRQs of this dissertation, which finally 
lead to the answers to the MRQ.  
Accordingly, apart from the introduction and conclusions, the main body of this 
dissertation is divided into three parts: chapter two, chapter three and chapter four each 
present the literature review and hypotheses derivation for the three integration 
theories; chapter five first gives a summary of the hypotheses formulated and to be 
tested in this dissertation, then it illustrates the relationships among the hypotheses and 
their sub-hypotheses, and finally it offers a general description of the three selected 
cases; chapter six, chapter seven and chapter eight carry out case studies and 
hypotheses tests, each chapter for each theory with research results, new findings and 
predictions presented in Propositions; lastly, chapter nine draws conclusions of the 
research in this dissertation and answers the SRQs and MRQ, as well as points out 
research limitations and considers possible research for the future. One of the main 
findings of this dissertation is that the crisis is also an opportunity for the EU to 
develop and mature, and to address collective issues and challenges from holistic 
approaches is a tendency of EU economic governance in the future, which, tending to 
cut across different policy areas, requires effective communication, coordination and 
cooperation among EU institutions and national agencies. The rationale behind 
collective EU-level solutions is to achieve more than the sum of individual parts, 
bringing about maximal synergistic effects among each individual member state as 
well as individual EU institutions and policies.   
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2 Chapter Two: Neo-Functionalism 
Neo-functionalism is often considered as the first theory to account for European 
integration (Jensen 2010). Starting from Ernst B. Haas’s book The Uniting of Europe: 
Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 published in 1958, 
neo-functionalism made its debut on the stage of international relations (IR) theories; it 
differs from former IR theories by giving prominence to supranational institutions and 
non-state actors (such as interest groups and political parties), which are held as the 
important driving forces behind regional integration, besides national states (Jensen 
2010, 71-73). Initiating the first theorizing of European regional cooperation, Haas’s 
book of 1958 is regarded as “the founding moment” of EU studies (Rosamond 2005, 
238). Originally, via constructing a theoretical framework to explain the process of 
European integration starting from the ECSC, Haas aimed at formulating a scientific 
grand theory which was capable of accounting for regional cooperation elsewhere after 
the Second World War.
32
 But as soon as neo-functionalism took the European 
integration project as its case study, the fate and evolution of this theory was 
inextricably bounded to the vicissitudes of this enterprise in practice (Jensen 2010, 72). 
Neo-functionalism contends that economic integration leads to political 
integration, and supranational institutions will gradually develop and gain their own 
political agenda, which over time will “tend to triumph over interests formulated by 
member states” (Jensen 2010, 75). Compared with traditional IR approaches which 
stress the gains and losses among national states, such as realist “zero-sum” games, 
neo-functionalism claims that there should be a win-win situation for all that involve in 
processes of economic and political integration (Jensen 2010, 74-75). Though 
neo-functionalists like Haas (1971) would say that neo-functionalism does not support 
                                                 
32 See also Niemann and Schmitter (2009, 47). Haas once hoped that his findings could “serve as 
propositions concerning the formation of political communities” (Haas 1958, xv) which share similar 
economic patterns and political ideologies with open industrial economies, pluralist societies, and 
democratic political systems (1958, xv-xvi). As for his theory’s potential application, he stated 
clearly: “Hence, I would have little hesitation in applying the technique of analysis here used to the 
study of integration under NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Scandinavian setting, the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, or Canadian-United States relations. I would 
hesitate to claim validity for it in the study of regional political integration in Latin America, the 
Middle East, or South-East Asia” (Haas 1958, xvi).  
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a political agenda of federalism similar to that of the US, to argue that economic 
integration will lead to political integration obviously demonstrates neo-functionalists’ 
pro-integration assumptions (Jensen 2010, 72; 78), and such a pro-integration stance 
has been criticized by interdependence theorists as neo-functionalist “teleological and 
regional orientation” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 8-9). 
  
2.1 The Core Concepts of Neo-Functionalism 
For half of a century, neo-functionalism, tested by the EU’s successes, stagnation, and 
sometimes failures, has been modified and developed by its proponents such as 
Lindberg (1963), Schmitter (1969), Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 1971), Nye (1971), 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998), Rosamond (2005), 
Niemann (2006), and Jensen (2000, 2010). As a result, according to Jensen (2010), 
three kinds of distinctive neo-functionalist propositions on the dynamics of the 
European integration process have been formulated: (1) the spillover thesis, (2) the 
elite socialization thesis, and (3) the supranational interest group thesis. These three 
approaches have formed the core thinking of neo-functionalist theory. 
 
2.1.1 Spillover  
Above all, “spillover” is generally considered as the key concept to understand the 
propositions of neo-functionalism, and the term “spillover” is utilized in two senses: (1) 
to describe the occurrence of (further) integration, and (2) to “identify the driving force 
and inherent logic of integration via increased functional/economic interdependence” 
(Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 49). Haas first applied the term “spillover” to present 
his assumptions that economic integration in one sector, for example, in coal and steel, 
will trigger other economic and political cooperation; consequently, “[t]he ‘spillover’ 
effect in sector integration is believed to lead inevitably to full economic unity” (1958, 
283) and European economic integration will “complete the ‘spillover’ from ECSC to 
Euratom and its promise of independence from oil imports, from sector common 
markets to the General Common Market” (298). As sector integration “begets its own 
impetus toward extension to the entire economy” (1958, 297), Haas defined it as “the 
expansive logic of sector integration” (1958, 283-317; 1967b, 321). Later Lindberg 
formulated the concept of spillover as follows: “the initial task and grant of power to 
the central institutions creates a situation or a series of situations that can be dealt with 
only by further expanding the task and the grant of power” (1963, 10). In Theories of 
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European Integration, Rosamond defined “spillover” as “the way in which the creation 
and deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further 
economic integration within and beyond that sector, and greater authoritative capacity 
at the European level” (2000, 60). From Haas (1958) to Lindberg (1963), and to 
Rosamond (2000), the idea of spillover suggests two layers of integration: the 
economic dimension and the political dimension, with the latter being mentioned as a 
“full economic unity”, “(the) grant of power to the central institutions” and “greater 
authoritative capacity at the European level”, respectively. In addition, the concept of 
spillover implicitly assumes that “economic growth would continue unabated in the 
capitalist world, and that all member states would benefit more or less equally from 
that growth” (Niemann and Schmitter, 52). Anyhow, “spillover” is a dynamic process 
“where cooperation in one field necessitates cooperation in another” (Jensen 2010, 73), 
that is, cooperation in one policy area would take cooperation in other related 
neighboring policy areas as a prerequisite, and a new political agenda will be generated 
and must be fulfilled properly so as to realize the original planned cooperation. In such 
a way, European integration is viewed as “a self-perpetuating process”: as soon as the 
first integrative steps get started, those integrative initiatives are moving ahead towards 
further integration (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 34), and meanwhile, integration in the 
economic fields will spill over into the political areas, promoting a kind of political 
integration, as “integration processes, once started in a field of ‘low politics’, will 
create a dynamic of their own and sooner or later affect other policy fields” (Diez 1999, 
605). So “spillover” indicates both economic and political cooperation. Cameron (1992) 
dissects the spillover dynamic into several analytical phases:  
 
(1) “Supranational institutions are assigned tasks that are inherently 
expansive.” 
(2) “Interest groups, political parties, and other national political elites 
begin to press for a strengthening and expansion of the functions of 
supranational institutions so that they can perform those tasks.” 
(3) “As those new functions are carried out, support builds for the 
strengthened supranational institutions among both elites and the mass 
public.” 
(4) “Thus, to the extent that inherently expansive tasks are assigned to 
supranational institutions, the responsibilities and powers of, and 
support for, those supranational institutions will tend to increase in a 




The above four steps suggest the ideal effects and consequences entailed in 
spillover for the integration process. An “inherently expansive” task means the task at 
issue is functionally interdependent from other issues, and its fulfillment requires 
cooperation in other related policy areas (Lindberg 1963, 10; Niemann and Schmitter 
2009, 51), and this suggests the possibility, and quite often the necessity, to enlarge the 
competence and functions of existing institutions or to establish new institutions so as 
to carry out the initial tasks. From the neo-functionalist point of view, the expansion of 
supranational institutions’ functions and powers is the logical development of 
economic integration, during which the power of governments is “constrained by rules 
whose production they do not control” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998,18) and thus 
causes “unintended” consequences for “the actors involved in decision making” 
(Jensen 2010, 77). Therefore, the reinforcement and expansion of existing 
supranational institutions or the establishment of new institutions can be taken as the 
most direct and visible evidence of spillover effects. As far as the EU’s newly 
established mechanisms to deal with the sovereign debt crisis are concerned, spillover 
is happening to the EU and EU economic integration is on the way. 
 
2.1.1.1 From Economic Integration to Political Integration 
As spillover is in effect, economic integration will lead to political integration, 
“whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” and “[t]he end 
result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed 
over the pre-existing ones” (Haas 1958, 16). Political integration is a key concept for 
neo-functionalists; however, there are disagreements among neo-functionalists on 
Haas’s proposition of actors’ loyalty transferring to the new center (Niemann 2006, 13; 
Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 46; Jensen 2010, 75), and even at the initial stage of 
neo-functionalism, Lindberg (1963, 6) suggests that political actors “shift their 
expectations and political activities” rather than shift their loyalties (i.e. “shifts in 
values and any reference to a political Community end point”) to the new center (see 
also Niemann 2006, 14-15). As for Haas himself, he gradually changed his first 
position, taking out loyalty transferring from the defining characteristics of political 




“Contrary to the conventional reading and misinterpretation of 
neo-functionalism, Haas actually held that such a shift in loyalties need(s) 
not be absolute or permanent, allowing for multiple loyalties (Haas 1958, 14). 
In addition, soon after devising his original definition of integration, Haas 
downplayed the previously amalgamated endpoints (Haas 1960), and also 
abandoned shifting loyalties as a defining characteristic of integration. 
Instead, he emphasized the transfer of authority and legitimacy (Haas 1970, 
627-8, 633).” (Note 4, in Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 64; their emphasis) 
 
So the loyalty transferring should not be taken as an indicator to gauge 
integration, and “[t]he essence of political integration”, Lindberg argues, “is that 
governments begin to do together what they used to do individually; namely, they set 
up collective decision making processes that in greater or lesser degree handle actions, 
engage in behaviors, and make allocations of goods or values that used to be done (or 
not done) autonomously by governments and their agents” (Lindberg 1971, 59). 
Collective decision-making, therefore, is the core of political integration. Combining 
“A Scale of the Locus of Decision-Making” by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 69; 
see also Lindberg 1971, 69) and “Stage of Decision Process” by Lindberg (1971, 
71-72) with “Table 1: Political Integration” by Jensen (2000, 78), a scale to measure 
the degree of political integration can be illustrated as in Table 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1 The Scale of Political Integration 
Political integration indicator: collective 
decision-making 
Locus of activity Degree of political 
integration 
Score 
Mode 0: All policy decisions are made by 
national processes and no decision behavior in 
the collective system. No collective 
administration of policy. 





Mode 1: A narrow range of problems is carried 
to specific policies or rules, or a few important 
problem areas are involved but decisions are 
only made into goals or general policies. Very 
little direct administration by the collective 
system; national governments have almost 









some at collective 
level.  
Level 1 1 
Mode 2: A few important areas are regarded as 
common and approached as such, but decisive 
issues are still subject to national processes. (A 
few important problems are carried to specific 
Policy decisions 
on both, but 
national activity 
predominates. 
Level 2 2 
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Notes: Level 1-6 indicates a low-high degree of political integration. On the scale of 0-6, no 
political integration is given the score of 0, and the degree of political integration increases 
from the score of 1 to 6, where full political integration bears the highest score of 6.  
Sources: Own compilation based on Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 69), Lindberg (1971, 
69-72) and Jensen (2000, 78). 
 
In neo-functionalist logic, European economic integration leads to European 
political integration. Accompanying its economic success during the 1980s, the 
Community’s “[p]olitical integration has moved forward in fits and starts” (William 
Wallace 1990, 3), while throughout the 1990s, there was increasing political 
integration in EU social policy and labour market areas (Jensen 2000). The condition 
for political integration, as William Wallace once pointed out, is that it results from 
economic cooperation accompanied by “high levels of economic and social 
policies or rules, or decisive problems dealt with 
at the collective level are as many as that at the 
national level, but only in the formation of goals 
or general policy). 
Mode 3: Within a given issue area, problems 
dealt with collectivity are equivalent in number 
or importance to these subject to national 
systems alone.  
Both, roughly 
equal. 
Level 3 3 
Mode 4: Collective administration exists for 
most of the policies; data is gathered and 
alternatives are generated in the collective 
system. The most decisive problems are decided 
collectively in the form of policies and rules, but 
important areas are still subject to autonomous 
national activities, where collective decisions are 
reached only to goals or broad policies. (Most 
decisions must be taken jointly, but substantial 
decisions are still taken autonomously at the 
national level). 
Both, community 




Level 4 4 
Mode 5: Only a narrow range of problems is still 
decided upon in national systems autonomously. 
The great bulk of recognition, communication 
and problem solving take places in the European 
system. All problems are dealt with 
authoritatively, but implementing policies and 
rules is still subject to governmental discretion. 
Both, the 
community 
dominates, with a 
small national 
role. 
Level 5 5 
Mode 6: Distinction between internal policy and 
collective policy disappears. All policy decisions 
and all the implementation of rules take place in 
collectivity. 




interaction” (1990, 9). As the economic and social interactions among EU member 
states and EU citizens become more frequent and deeper against the trend of 
globalization, it is expected that EU political integration will also get intensified and 
broadened. Following these arguments, this dissertation formulates its first hypothesis: 
H1: European economic integration, via spillover effects, leads to European 
political integration; with more intense economic cooperation and social interaction 
among member states, the degree of political integration increases.  
As analyzed above, the expansion of existing supranational institutions or the 
establishment of new institutions can be taken as the most direct and visible evidence 
of spillover effects; accordingly, the three selected cases in this dissertation, 
representing the EU’s newly established mechanisms to solve the sovereign debt 
problem, suggest the effectiveness of the neo-functionalist spillover dynamic. Along 
with the Community’s development, there are increasing numbers of national issues 
dealt with on the basis of various collective decision-making modes at the EU level, 
and this fact shows that European political integration is happening, just to different 
degrees. If H1 is correct, then in case studies we should observe certain collective 
decision-making modes indicating political integration in the newly developed policies 
and mechanisms, and meanwhile, these collective decision modes entailed in the 
selected cases should also show a rising level of political integration compared with 
previous practices along with the rising level of economic and social interactions. 
Though William Wallace (1990) does not specify the indicators for the “high levels of 
economic and social interaction”, the measurement of them can be indicated by the 
data on trade and personnel mobility in the Community across EU national states. This 
hypothesis test is going to ascertain the nature of political integration, and the 
connection among economic cooperation, social interaction, and the degree of political 
integration.  
 
2.1.1.2 Functional Spillover  
Three kinds of spillover processes are further differentiated by neo-functionalist 
writers: functional (or technical) spillover, political spillover, and cultivated spillover 





 Functional spillover refers to a situation in which a 
successful cooperation in one sector requires support and cooperation in other adjacent 
sectors (Jensen 2010, 72-73). The creation of the Single Market is a good example to 
illustrate the rationales behind the functional spillover dynamic. In order to forge an 
internal integrated market to realize the free movement of goods, labor, capital and 
services, national states must reach agreements on various existing regulations and 
standards on, for example, payments, working hours, and the working environment. In 
addition, as the Single Market means the cancellation of border checks among member 
states, further coordination in police affairs and immigration policies is necessary and 
required. Furthermore, along with the establishment of the Single Market, transnational 
trade increases, and so does the vulnerability of national economies to the fluctuations 
of national currencies. To reduce financial risks and transaction costs related to 
expanding trade, EMU was created as a functional logical necessity to streamline the 
Single Market and protect national economies. The functional spillover mechanism, 
which consists of the first sub-hypothesis of spillover effects, can be stated as follows 
in the context of the euro area sovereign debt crisis: 
H1a': To solve the debt crisis (i.e. a fiscal issue) requires support and 
cooperation in other related areas and thus pushes further integration in both the 
original and these related areas. 
As Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 illustrate, in order to solve the sovereign debt crisis, 
there should and must be coordination among fiscal, economic and financial policies. 
                                                 
33 These three terminologies were not put forward by the first-generation neo-functionalists (see 
Niemann 2006, 29-30). Adopting from Stephen A. George who calls the third category “the role of 
the Commission” (George 1985, 27) or “Commission leadership” (George 1985, 24), 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991) first makes such a three-fold distinction from previous neo-functionalist 
literature which is believed to lack explicit and exact definitions of “spillover” (see note 17 in 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). In fact, the term “cultivated spillover” was put forward by Nye as early 
as in 1971 from Haas’s general idea of “spillover”, as Nye (1971, 200) writes: “Haas used the term to 
cover both perceived linkages between problems arising out of their inherent technical characteristics 
and linkages deliberately created or overstated by political actors (what might be called ‘cultivated 
spillover’).” Other scholars may make their own distinctions in these three categories with different 
names and emphasis. For example, Burley and Mattli divide the three as “functional spillover, 
political spillover, and upgrading of common interests” (1993, 55-56; 65-69); Jensen (2000) states 
that there are four integration dynamics described by traditional neo-functionalists: (1) functional 
spillover; (2) the formation of coalitions and cultivated spillover; (3) shifts in loyalty preferences and 
elite socializing; and (4) the approval of, or political support from, internationalized/supranational 
interest groups (2000, 84), based on which Jensen puts forward a new form of dynamics for the EU: 
institutional/legalistic spillover. Later Jensen (2010) adapted his previous classifications, arguing for 
three kinds of spillover and the three theses of EU dynamics. 
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The three selected cases — the European Semester, the ESRB, and the ESM — 
indicate that functional spillover is effective: to solve the debt crisis, basically a fiscal 
issue, requires and thus promotes cooperation in other policy areas. Niemann (2006, 62) 
proposes the following detailed operational processes to identify the functional 
spillover dynamic: (1) there is an original goal A; (2) there is a functional 
interdependence between issue A and issue B; (3) actions taken in the area of B, which 
may require further action, must affect issue A and this is necessary to achieve the 
original goal A; and (4) the salience of issue A determines the strength of the 
functional requirement, and besides B, if no other means can be adopted to reach the 
original objective A, the functional connection between A and B tends to be strong. So 
the case studies in this dissertation will use these indicators to examine the 
effectiveness and magnitude of the functional spillover effect.  
In accounting for the transitional history from the ECSC to EMU, functional 
spillover is properly justified, and additionally, two types of economic integration 
results have been identified: negative integration and positive integration 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 5). The former means the removal of barriers on exchange 
and discrimination of trade, while the latter refers to “the formation and application of 
coordinated and common policies in order to fulfill economic and welfare objectives 
other than the removal of discrimination”, and it is argued that these two together 
comprise European economic integration which will lead to an economic union (Pinder 
1968, 90).
34
 Blauberger (2009, 1044, note 1) suggests the distinction between the two 
in the way that “[p]olicies of negative integration aim at goals of market-making [...] 
by abolishing national barriers to free trade or protecting undistorted competition” 
while “policies of positive integration aim at both goals of market-making and 
market-correction by defining common European rules.” So basically, negative 
integration indicates deregulation of national discrimination and trade barriers, while 
                                                 
34 The two terms can be traced back to Tinbergen’s (1954, 122) “negative integration” and “positive 
policy of integration” (or “positive action”), from which Pinder makes his adaptations. Tinbergen 
distinguishes these two terms on the basis of whether policy instruments are to be eliminated or new 
policies are formed, whereas Pinder judges on the basis of whether the purpose is to remove 
discrimination or to maximize welfare in other ways (see note 3 in Pinder 1968). Hoffmann (1964, 88) 
also argued for the two different ways to promote integration, and he claimed “[o]n the whole it has 
been easier for the Six to agree on ‘negative’ than on ‘positive’ policies, i.e. to eliminate tariffs, 
quotas, obstacles to competition or to mobility, than to take measures that require a more painful, 




positive integration moves further to formulate common rules at the EU level; if 
negative integration means deregulation, then positive integration implies reregulation 
(Wolf 2011, 16). According to Tranholm-Mikkelsen, negative integration will, in one 
respect, result in reducing state sovereign autonomy because it deprives member states 
of a number of policy instruments which “have been, or will be, prohibited by EC law 
as market distorting” (1991,12), and in another respect, it causes problems such as 
“social dumping” (i.e., a downward spiraling of worker’s rights and social benefits), 
uneven wealth distribution, and the aggravation of the disparities between center and 
periphery; the way to solve these potential problems, however, is either through 
spillback — “retreating from the original commitment to the internal market” — or 
spillover — “going further with positive integration” (1991, 12-13). For Lelieveldt and 
Princen (2011, 189-192), creating the common market via negative integration would 
suggest a long way of “a cumbersome procedure”, as each time relevant actors (e.g. 
individuals, companies, member states, the Commission) would go to the Court to ask 
for adjudicating on the cases of possible “unjustified barriers to trade”; besides, for 
some cases, the abolishment of national laws “may threaten other values, such as 
environmental or consumer protection”; therefore, the alternative of positive 
integration (“also known as harmonization or the approximation of laws”) by adopting 
EU legislation to set up EU wide norms and standards appears more attractive, as new 
EU laws tell what the member states shall adopt instead of eliminating national laws 
and telling then what cannot be adopted. Viewed in a historical perspective, the EU’s 
development from the 1950s onwards exhibits the general trends of “going further with 
positive integration” in spite of political crises and the harsh economic environment 
sometimes, and member states become to realize that international cooperation is 
irreversible and it is a precondition for them to maximize economic, social and security 
benefits. Nevertheless, due to the diversity of member states, moving from negative to 
positive integration would be difficult, for such moves involve reaching agreements on 
common substantive policies (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 17). In case studies, this 
dissertation will also check the way functional spillover was realized: via negative 
integration or positive integration or both, and the functional spillover hypothesis H1a' 
can be reformulated as follows: 
H1a: Solving the debt crisis (i.e. a fiscal issue) requires support and cooperation 
in other related areas and thus pushes further integration in both the original and 




2.1.1.3 Political Spillover 
Whereas functional spillover focuses on the technical aspects of European integration, 
political spillover, on the other hand, concentrates on “a more deliberated political 
process” initiated by actors such as governmental elites, interest groups, political 
parties or private agents, because these actors believe they could get more benefits via 
further integration (Jensen 2010, 76). It is argued that in order to solve common 
problems successfully, supranational cooperation turns out to be a must, so national 
actors prefer European-level solutions to those at the national level and these actors 
become the supportive forces for European integration. The political spillover process, 
therefore, is “the process of adaptive behavior”, which implies “the incremental 
shifting of expectations, the changing of values, and the coalescing at the supranational 
level of national interest groups and political parties in response to sectoral integration” 
(Burley and Mattli 1993, 55). One often-cited example of interest groups’ influence is 
the activities of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) (e.g. Cowles 1995, 
Sandholtz and Zysman 1989): during the 1980s, the ERT actively pushed for the 
creation of the Single Market and then in the 1990s and the 2000s, it promoted the 
accession of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to the EU, because the 
ERT held that an integrated and larger single market promises huge profits to industrial 
companies; accompanying those activities, the expectations and interests of national 
actors involved in the ERT obviously have been diverting to the supranational level 
(Jensen 2010, 76). Besides the interest group pro-integrative activities and values, the 
role of individual leaders are also emphasized by neo-functionalist political spillover 
propositions. For instance, Tranholm-Mikkelsen particularly stresses the political 
impetus injected by interest group leaders, as these elites believe that supranational 
solutions serve their interests better and thus shift their activities, expectations and even 
loyalties to the new center — a phenomenon described by Tranholm-Mikkelsen as “a 
learning process” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 5; see also Haas 1958, 16; 1961, 365-67; 
Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 49). In comparison to the learning processes, there are 
“socialization processes”, that is, as EU institutions, working groups, and 
sub-committees are proliferating, contact and communication among national officials 
and Commission officials also increase and become intensified, which leads to “a 
complex system of bureaucratic interpenetration” and “interaction patterns” within the 
framework of supranational institutions where consensus among national agents is 
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fostered (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 50). The socialization process of the 
building-up of consensus suggests a supranational problem-solving mode among 
national delegates, which Haas calls “a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which 
the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to 
attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests” (Haas 1967a, 
66). In short, political spillover assumes a pro-integrative position, attitude, and role of 
both governmental and non-governmental actors towards further integration. In recent 
years, as each individual member state normally cannot solve global challenges and 
collective issues (e.g. climate change, global warming, pollution, and nuclear 
non-proliferation) on its own and partnership and cooperation are the world trend to 
do so, one should expect political spillover to be a more common phenomenon in the 
EU. All in all, political spillover “is the result of deliberate pressure exerted by national 
interests because they expect to benefit from further integrative steps” (Lelieveldt and 
Princen 2011, 36), and concerning the current eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the 
political spillover mechanism suggests the following: 
H1b: Confronted with the collective sovereign debt problem, national interest 
actors, both governmental and non-governmental, support further integration and 
promote European-level solutions over national-level means because to do so brings 
more benefits.  
Can we indeed put governmental actors and interest groups into one category? 
This dissertation put them together in H1b because the connotation of “political 
spillover” refers to attitudes, opinions and activities of various ACTORS towards the 
EU integration process. Regarding the three types of spillover, functional spillover 
deals with the technical aspects of European integration, cultivated spillover focuses on 
EU institutions, and in comparison, political spillover particularly highlights the 
subjectivity of ACTORS; moreover, placing them together, this dissertation will 
examine whether the positions of governmental actors are in line with or contradict 
those of interest groups so far as the issue of the sovereign debt crisis is concerned. To 
test H1b, this dissertation will mainly focus on the political leaders of the member 
states and national/transnational interest groups, which typically represent 
governmental and non-governmental attitudes towards the EU’s actions to deal with 
the debt crisis respectively. As argued previously, loyalty transferring is not “a defining 
characteristic of integration”, and moreover, it is empirically difficult to trace EU 
decision-makers’ and national elites’ loyalty transferring (see section 2.1.2), but still, 
75 
 
the general positions of governmental elites and interest group leaders (i.e. 
non-governmental elites) and their attitudes towards the solutions to the crisis can be 
ascertained as the indicators of the effectiveness of political spillover. If the political 
spillover mechanism suggested by H1b has occurred, there should be evidence in the 
cases to show national actors’ interests, activities, or expectations as regards 
supranational decisions and policies. Besides, the general explanation — “to do so 
brings more benefits” — should be specified case by case. Furthermore, when looking 
for actors’ support for supranational solutions, this dissertation, as suggested by 
Niemann (2006, 66), will also examine (1) the connection between actors’ supportive 
attitudes to a policy and the degree of political integration of that policy area, (2) 
whether member state positions are in line with or contradict or shift towards that of 
organized interests, and (3) if possible, the level of national actors’ support for 
supranational solutions at different points in time, which can be used to indicate the 
potential intensification of learning and socialization processes. As for the positions of 
governmental elites, this dissertation will focus on the heads of state or government of 
the EU member states in the European Council and the Ministers in the Council of the 
European Union, while for the attitudes of national/transnational interest groups, this 
dissertation will select BusinessEurope and the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) as the research nodes. The choosing of those two non-governmental interest 
groups is based on two major considerations: first, as “the overarching EU business 
group” and “the federation of European labour unions” respectively, BusinessEurope 
and the ETUC are the most important and typical cross-border organizations for 
employers and employees within the EU vis-à-vis the European institutions (Lelieveldt 
and Princen 2011, 136), which in one respect, represent the broad interests of 
companies and workers in Europe, and in another respect, offer a comparison of policy 
orientations between two rival interest groups; second, the eurozone as well as the 
whole EU sovereign debt crisis has been exerting huge impact on both industries and 
employment rates, directly affecting the benefits and welfare of both employers and 
employees, so to examine their positions toward the EU’s new measures is also a way 




                                                 
35 The representative and importance of the two transnational interest groups over others are 
supported by their memberships and missions, which are available at their official websites. 
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Against the euro area sovereign debt crisis, it is meaningful to observe the 
activities of the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy who is also 
the President of the Euro Summit and thus is expected to play a leading role in 
eurozone governance (see “Euro Summit President”, Eurozone Portal). As political 
spillover captures deliberate political processes initiated by various actors, obviously, 
facing serious financial and economic challenges, Van Rompuy actively engages in 
promoting solutions to the crisis at the EU level, which illustrates elites’ and leaders’ 
support for further integration. Without doubt, the nature and function of the European 
Council and its President are already expressions of the dynamic of political spillover, 
which are prescribed by the first part of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 15.
36
 With the 
enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has obtained the legal status 
as one of the EU’s official institutions, and the activities of its leader (i.e. Van Rompuy) 
as well as of the European Council can also be studied from the perspective of 
“cultivated spillover”.  
 
2.1.1.4 Cultivated Spillover 
Cultivated spillover focuses primarily on a different dimension of European 
integration: the role of supranational institutions. It has been argued that relying on 
formal powers or informal means, supranational institutions, such as the European 
Commission, the EP and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), have played an active 
role in fostering and thus cultivating further integration (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 
36). One way to promote collective interests is via “package deals”, that is, via binding 
heterogeneous issues together to a single composite item. During intergovernmental 
negotiations, by initiating “package deals”, supranational institutions (prominently 
represented by the European Commission) urge the member states to make concessions 
to support each other so as to get their different interests in different policy areas 
safeguarded, via unanimous or majority voting modes (Jensen 2010, 76; see also Haas 
                                                 
36 According to the first part of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 15, the European Council should inject 
impetus to EU development, outline general political directions and define priorities for the EU, while 
“[t]he President of the European Council: (a) shall chair it and drive forward its work; (b) shall ensure 
the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President 
of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council; (c) shall endeavour 
to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council; (d) shall present a report to the 
European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council”.  
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1967a, 65-66, Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 116-17).
37
 Via “splitting the difference” 
among national bargaining positions, the essence of the package deals is to push 
negotiations moving beyond a “minimum common denominator” to an “upgrading of 
the common interest”, with the result of redefining the conflict as well as expanding the 
power of the supranational agencies (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 6).
38
 The swaps of 
concessions among member states posit that participants in negotiations are rational 
actors who feel that by conceding something, they can gain something else without 
jeopardizing those areas where consensus prevails (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 50), 
and swapping concessions occurs under “the services of an institutionalized 
autonomous mediator”, where participants “refrain from vetoing proposals and […] 
seek compromise, which in turn bolster the power base of the central institutions” 
(Burley and Mattli 1993, 56). In contrast to functional spillover, the main force to forge 
package deals does not originate by technological necessity, but from “political and 
ideological projections and political possibilities” (Nye 1971, 202). Member states 
must balance their gains and losses during such bargaining processes, but evidently, 
supranational institutions have assumed driving-engine roles in facilitating negotiations 
and maximizing bargaining outcomes. To summarize, the rationale behind cultivated 
spillover is like this: rational actors seek a common stand by splitting the differences 
and swapping concessions under the auspices of supranational institutions such as the 
Commission so as to safeguard each other’s specific interests. As a result, common 
interests get upgraded and supranational institutions gradually extend their mandate “as 
commensurate with the increasing breadth and depth of integration, thus providing the 
process with yet more impetus” (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 50).  
Many researchers throughout the 1990s have already illustrated the 
pro-integrative role of the Commission. Bornschier and Fielder (1995), Cameron 
(1992), Cowles (1995), and Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) have highlighted the 
leadership role of the Commission on the internal market programme; Peterson (1991), 
Pollack (1994) and Sandholtz (1992a) on technology policy; Sandholtz (1992b) on 
                                                 
37 Haas describes this as “to swap concessions in related fields” (Haas 1967a, 65), while Lindberg 
and Scheingold call it “coalition formation” (1970, 117) which is regarded as the dynamic properties 
of the Community system (1970, 116).  
38 Originally, Haas (e.g. 1961; 1967a, 65-66) called it “upgrading common interests”, and sometimes 
the term “upgrading of the common interest” or “upgrading common interests” is used as a substitute 
for “cultivated spillover” to describe the third element of the neo-functionalist dynamics of 
integration (e.g. Burley and Mattli 1993). 
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information technology; Sandholtz (1993a) on telecommunications; Matlary (1997) on 
energy; Jabko (1999) on the establishment of EMU; O’Reilly and Stone Sweet (1998) 
on air transport policy; Marks (1993) on structural policy; Sbragia (1993a) on 
environmental policy; Cram (1993), Eichener (1992) and Majone (1994) on social 
policy; Ross (1993) on industrial policy; and Hooghe (1996) and Marks (1996) on 
cohesion policy.
39
 An early study of the Commission by Cram (1993), for example, 
points out that as far as the EC’s social policy regulation is concerned, the Commission 
is an active integrative force rather than a neutral bureaucracy, as the Commission 
tends to maximize its initiative power by various ways, such as exploring both 
non-binding soft law and process law,
40
 carrying out research programs, and pursuing 
the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) on issues of worker’s health and safety 
rules, so as to prepare the ground for future regulatory policy action (Cram 1993, 
143-144). As a result, the Commission has developed a degree of autonomy of its own, 
pursuing sets of goals of its particular interest (Cram 1993, 136). Cram (1993, 135; 137; 
141-42) attributes the Commission’s opportunistic nature of preparing the ground for 
future regulatory action to the relatively costless budget expenditure on regulatory 
policy-making from the Commission’s side. Based on previous debates and the 
traditional neo-functionalist propositions on the Commission’s pro-integration role, 
Jensen (2000) probes into EC social and labour market policy and puts forward a new 
neo-functionalist spillover mechanism: legalistic/institutional spillover, with the 
conclusion that the Commission acts as an initiator and “dynamo” as assumed by 
neo-functionalism rather than just a mediator, as expected by 
intergovernmentalist-oriented theories.
41
 Jensen’s legalistic/institutional spillover is a 
further development and clarification of neo-functionalist cultivated spillover, as it 
specifies how the Commission links its new proposals to the original objective:  
                                                 
39 The literature review here is based on Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (1996, 365) and Niemann and 
Schmitter (2009, 61). 
40 Cram divides the existing EC social legislation into four categories and thus outlines four patterns 
for EC social policy development: “1. Process – establishing rules and procedures at a Community 
level, setting up Committees and organisations. 2. EC action/direct expenditure – requiring direct 
Community expenditure and intervention, e.g. through the European Social Fund. 3. Regulatory – 
setting standards, establishing rules of conduct with which national governments, businesses and 
individuals must comply. 4. Soft law – non-binding legislation which nevertheless has political 
significance”(1993, 138). Cram (1993, 145) explains that the fourth category includes EC 
Recommendations, Opinions and Declarations.  
41 The hypothesis derivation of the legalistic/institutional spillover effect is formulated later in this 




“Following the adoption of the Social Charter by the Member States in 1989, 
the Commission drew up its action plan, which was intended to ensure that 
the Charter was implemented. The plan has served — since 1990 — as a 
basis for regulation-oriented initiatives implemented by the Commission in 
the field of social and labour market policy. It originally listed 47 proposals 
for measures, all of which have now been implemented in one form or 
another. 
[...]  
One example of the Commission’s dynamic and integrating behavior was its 
choice of legal basis for a number of proposals related to social and labour 
market policy submitted in connection with the action plan.” (Jensen 2000, 
86-87)  
 
Originally, the adoption of the action plan was to secure the implementation of 
the Social Charter; taking such opportunity, the Commission presented its proposals 
related to social and labour market policy by connecting them to the action plan which 
takes QMV instead of unanimity as the legal basis. For instance, when tabling 
proposals on atypical work, the Commission chose Art. 100A (single market) and 118 
A (working environment) of the SEA as the legal basis, and consequently, QMV, 
rather than unanimity, in the Council of Ministers was applied to adopt the 
Commission’s proposals in both cases; however, the Commission’s approach was 
contested by interest groups, companies, and employers’ associations (e.g. the 
European employers’ organization UNICE
42
) disagreed, who argued that the atypical 
work proposals were related to workers’ rights and interests, and hence they should be 
covered by Art. 100A para.2 of unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers (Jensen 
2000, 87). Anyhow, the Commission, via linking proposals to the original goal, 
deliberately selected QMV rather than unanimity as the legal basis for member states to 
reach agreement, thus exhibiting a pro-integrative position. As a result, the 
Commission’s such initiatives, according to Jensen (2000, 88), have strengthened and 
promoted the supranational tendency of the EU in the following ways: (1) the use of 
QMV rather than unanimity increases the chances for the relevant proposals to be 
adopted, and the veto exercised by a single member government is then utterly 
impossible; (2) the application of QMV enables the Commission to have more freedom 
to set pro-integration agenda and more maneuver room to build coalitions with some of 
                                                 
42 UNICE stands for Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne, which was officially 




the key member states or with the international trade union movement so as to create 
and prepare “an improved treaty basis for future initiatives”; (3) when QMV voting 
procedures are used in the Council, the EP is involved, consulted, and even making 
decisions together with the Council (i.e. the co-decision procedure), so along with the 
increasing application of QMV, the EP gradually exerts greater influence, and this is 
believed to be a main reason for the EP’s always-supporting stance to the 
Commission’s usually “offensive” strategies; and (4) as the case of social and labour 
market policy shows, the Commission, by drawing out proposals that may contradict 
other actors’ interpretations of the legal basis provided by the Community Treaty, 
sends a clear signal to the member states: there are the limitations of the current Treaty, 
so if member states want to achieve their original goal, “then the Treaty should be 
amended so as to facilitate closer integration” (Jensen 2000, 88). 
To sum up, the Commission, by various creative ways, such as binding different 
national interests in different policy areas via “package deals”, exploring non-binding 
soft law or process law, carrying out research programs, or linking new proposals to 
the original objective to deliberately choose QMV as the legal basis so as to be adopted, 
has been acting not only as a mediator but also as a political entrepreneur to promote 
negotiators to reach agreements and thus push EU integration further (Jensen 2010, 77; 
Schmitter 2005, 266). The EU’s history does demonstrate that the Commission has 
been successfully cultivating both functional and political spillover continuously 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 15), and by using its agenda-setting powers effectively, 
the Commission has advanced regional integration and increased its own weight in 
policy reform (Ross 1995). The results of cultivated spillover, as Keohane and 
Hoffmann (1990, 296) once indicated, are that EU supranational institutions’ 
authorities gradually extend (typically represented by the Commission) and meanwhile 
joint decision-making is incrementally deepened, which implies that there is mutual 
support among supranational institutions. To wrap up, the discussions above on the 









Table 2.2 An Overview of Political Spillover Effects Initiated by the Commission 
Pro-Integrative Approaches by the Commission Possible Consequences and Impacts  
Strategy 1: Formulating “package deals”; 
Strategy 2: Exploring binding process law 
and/or non-binding soft law; 
Strategy 3: Carrying out research programs; 
Strategy 4: Pursuing QMV by linking new 
proposals to the original objectives;  
(Extension possible)  
 Some other actors may oppose the 
Commission’s proposals, while the 
Commission builds coalitions with some 
key national governments and/or interest 
groups; 
 Along with the increasing application of 
QMV and the co-decision procedure, the 
EP exerts greater influence, which tends to 
support the Commission’s proposals 
suggesting the involvement of the EP in 
decision-making; 
 The Commission expands its power and 
autonomy; 
 The Commission’s proposals may signal 
the limits of the current legal basis 
prescribed by EU Treaties for member 
states to reach certain goals in certain 
policy areas, preparing the ground and 
planting the seeds for pro-integrative 
initiatives in the future; 
(Extension possible) 
     Sources: Own compilation on the basis of the literature review of this section. 
 
Based on Table 2.2 and in the context of the ongoing euro area sovereign debt 
crisis, the cultivated spillover mechanism can be captured as follows: 
H1c': By making proposals for the solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, the 
Commission takes pro-integrative approaches to address the crisis; as a consequence, 
the Commission, while building coalitions with the key member states and/or interest 
groups, expands its power and autonomy, and meanwhile, the EP tends to support the 
Commission’s proposals which imply the application of QMV where the EP is 
involved. 
The purposes of this hypothesis test are to examine the following aspects: (1) 
When the Commission puts forward proposals to solve the debt crisis, does it take an 
obvious pro-integration stance? And in what a specific way does the Commission act 
as a promoting force for EU integration? In other words, is any of the pro-integrative 
approaches listed in Table 2.2 present in the selected cases? If not, what are the new 
strategies adopted by the Commission to foster European integration? The various 
ways the Commission can resort to have formulated a sort of “scheme” (see Table 2.2), 
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and by looking into the Commission’s agenda-setting behavior in these cases, the first 
half of H1c will confirm or develop the elements of the overview of Table 2.2; (2) Was 
there any opposition to the Commission’s proposals? Did the Commission establish 
certain coalitions (patterns) with certain actors? (3) Did the Commission expand its 
power and autonomy after the proposals were adopted and implemented? Or did the 
proposals prepare the ground for the Commission’s further initiatives? And (4) what 
were the EP’s positions as regards the Commission’s proposals? If the EP always 
supported the Commission’s “offensive” proposals which suggested the use of QMV 
rather than unanimity to reach decisions, a new element should be introduced into the 
cultivated spillover hypothesis: mutual support among EU supranational institutions to 
“cultivate” integration. As the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, 
the co-decision procedure (i.e. the decision-making procedure involving the EP, with 
subsequent QMV in the Council) has become the OLP, and the EP became a constant 
factor in EU decision-making for most policy areas; in line with the neo-functionalist 
cultivated spillover thesis, the EP as a supranational EU institution should hence also 
act as a driving force for European integration.
43
 Accordingly, H1c' can be 
reformulated as follows:  
H1c": By making proposals for the solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, the 
Commission takes pro-integrative approaches to address the crisis; as a consequence, 
the Commission, while building coalitions with the key member states and/or interest 
groups, expands its power and autonomy, and meanwhile, the EP also takes 
pro-integration positions and tends to support the Commission’s proposals. 
In addition to testing neo-functionalist cultivated spillover effects generated by 
the Commission, the reformulated H1c will also examine cultivated spillover effects 
generated by the EP: first, whether and how does the EP demonstrate its 
pro-integration role? Second, does the EP always support the Commission? If so, then 
we can say that there is mutual support between the Commission and the EP to 
promote integration; if not, what is the divergence between the Commission and the EP 
and what are the reasons that cause such divergence? As the co-decision procedure has 
                                                 
43  Box 5.4 of Jensen (2013, 65) summarizes neo-functionalist expectations on the EU main 
institutions, among which the EP “is expected to have a supranational orientation and to be the natural 
ally of the European Commission. Although MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) are elected 
by the nationals of their home country, they are divided politically and ideologically in their daily 
work. Neo-functionalists expect MEPs to develop loyalties towards the EU and the ‘European idea’, 
so that they will often (although not always) defend European interests against national interests.”  
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become the OLP after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, QMV obviously is no 
longer the prominent factor accounting for the EP’s always-supporting stance for the 
Commission; third, is there any sign suggesting that the EP is also seeking to extend its 
power and authority? The reformulation of H1c is due to legislative procedures 
changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty can be taken as an 
intervening factor; as the EP co-decides with the Council of Minister, H1c actually 
studies the position and role of the Commission, the EP and the Council who are the 
actors involved in EU legislative procedures concerning the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis.  
It is worth mentioning that as the European Council has obtained a legal basis 
via the Lisbon Treaty as one of the seven EU official institutions, the study of 
cultivated spillover should also extend to this EU institution. There is no need to 
elaborate the cultivated spillover effects of the European Council, however, as 
providing the EU with necessary integration impetus is one of its prescribed functions. 
With the common practices of the co-decision procedure, three main EU institutions 
are involved in EU legislation: “[i]n principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and 
the Parliament and Council adopt them. The Commission and the member countries 
then implement them, and the Commission ensures that the laws are properly applied 
and implemented” (“EU Institutions and Other Bodies”, European Union). What is 
interesting here is the role of the European Council under the leadership of its President: 
what are the suggestions the European Council and its President make to the 
Commission? Though the European Council has no power to pass laws, it does set up 
the political agenda and provide the general directions for the EU, thus exerting its 
influence over the Commission’s proposals and even the EP’s and the Council’s 
co-decision. In a general sense, the European Council delineates and frames the 
potential activity grounds for EU legislative procedures. So the case studies of this 
dissertation will also examine the linkages between the European Council guidelines 
and the concrete Commission proposals so as to (1) specify the origin as well as the 
originality of the Commission’s proposals, and (2) evaluate the influence the European 
Council has exerted on the Commission proposal formation. To sum up, H1c' can be 
further reformulated as follows: 
H1c: By making proposals for the solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, the 
Commission, under the framework laid down by the European Council, takes 
pro-integrative approaches to address the crisis; as a consequence, the Commission, 
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while building coalitions with the key member states and/or interest groups, expands 
its power and autonomy, and meanwhile, the EP also takes pro-integration positions 
and tends to support the Commission’s proposals. 
Combining functional, political and cultivated spillover together, Burley and 
Mattli (1993) have set an example to test and confirm the three types of spillover 
mechanisms in accounting for the building-up of the EC legal system, hence 
advocating EC legal integration: functional spillover is the logic of law, where the 
Court gradually extends its juridical power by establishing new decisions to address 
whatever obstacles so as to secure the common market; political spillover exhibits a 
trend of “transnational incrementalism” where member states follow the Court’s legal 
prescription positively; and finally, the upgrading of common interest dynamics has 
ever been effective in the way that the Court servers as an arbiter more than a mediator, 
continually “justify(ing) its decisions in light of the common interests of the members 
as enshrined in both specific and general objectives of the original Rome treaty” 
(Burley and Mattli 1993, 69). After applying former neo-functionalists propositions to 
analyze the development of the EC’s legal system, Burley and Mattli clearly state: “the 
legal integration of the community corresponds remarkably closely to the original 
neo-functionalist model developed by Ernst Haas in the late 1950s” and “the 
independent variables posited by neo-functionalist theory provide a convincing and 
parsimonious explanation of legal integration” (Burley and Mattli 1993, 43). Mattli and 
Slaughter (1995, 1998) further support the ECJ’s cultivating role in the EU project.  
 
2.1.1.5 Conditions for Spillover  
The three different types of spillover — functional, political, and cultivated — have 
spotlighted three important dimensions of the European integration project: technical 
necessities and operation, national interest group actors, and supranational institutions. 
Are there any particular context requirements needed for spillover to take place? It has 
been claimed that early versions of neo-functionalism are devoid of “a comprehensive, 
refined and integrated specification of the conditions under which spillover may occur” 
(Niemann 2006, 21; see also Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 52). Nevertheless, 
Schmitter (2005) suggests that the criticisms of Haas’s failing to address the conditions 
for the occurrence of spillover are a misreading. From Schmitter’s point of view, Haas 
actually has discussed the necessary conditions for spillover, only without an explicit 
hypothetic formulation, and Schmitter makes a summary of Haas’s hints on spillover 
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conditions: (1) “increase in economic interdependence between member countries”; (2) 
“crises of sufficient magnitude due to unintended consequences”; (3) “development of 
political competence and autonomy for intervention by regional bureaucrats”; and (4) 
“emergence of interest associations capable of acting on the regional level independent 
of national constraints” (2005, 258). 
These four can be taken as the criteria to assess whether there are mature 
conditions for the spillover effect to take place. Schmitter further contends that as the 
integration process expands into other initially unattended areas (which he terms 
“engrenage”)
44
 and affects more actors (which he terms “politicization”), however, 
the likelihood of controversiality and difficulty in reaching agreement also increases, 
which could lead to the expectation of a slowing-down integration progress over time 
(2005, 261; 263). In the process of “engrenage”, the EU is already engaging in nearly 
all policy areas and only few areas such as a common energy policy and certain aspects 
of transport infrastructure seem to have potential spillover effects; moreover, the 
expansion of EU membership to twenty-seven and more in the future, the diversity and 
heterogeneity of member state interests make reaching agreements and package deals 
much more difficult (Schmitter 2005, 268). In the process of “politicization”, when 
common citizens, political parties, large social movements, national politicians and 
civil servants, regional officials and other invisible interest representatives all together 
begin to include the EU into their political agenda and pursue their interests at the EU 
level, the monopolized decision-making in Brussels shall be challenged, and the 
integration progress is not viewed as an “all winners” game, but “winners and losers” 
within member states (Schmitter 2005, 268).
45
 So from a neo-functionalist perspective, 
there is still a risk of “self-disconfirming” (Schmitter 2005, 263), and the 
“unanticipated functional interdependencies may have exhausted itself [sic]” 
                                                 
44 Niemann (2006, 18-19) gives a detailed explanation of the term “engrenage”. Different scholars 
would define this term in different ways and the various notions of “engrenage” “can be seen as a 
variation of functional spillover” (note 35, in Niemann 2006, 18-19; see also note 7, in Niemann and 
Schmitter 2009, 64). “Engrenage” is quite often treated as a synonym for the “socialization process”, 
as Niemann (1998, 436) writes: “Engrenage, the process whereby national civil servants through their 
increasing involvement with each other are encouraged to take integrative decisions, has also been 
termed ‘socialization process’”. This is different from Schmitter’s definition of “engrenage” 
discussed here. 
45 This actually is in line with Nye’s early argument: “the low-cost integration and technocratic style 
decision-making procedures are unlikely to last very long and certainly not until a widespread popular 
support or a powerful coalition of intensely concerned interests have [sic] developed to the point at 
which they determine the decisions of political decision-makers” (1971, 224). 
86 
 
(Schmitter 2005, 268). Put simply, spillover is not without limits. Nevertheless, the 
neo-functionalist spillover thesis may remain “the most insightful and helpful in 
understanding its (the EU’s) underlying dynamics” (Schmitter 2005, 265). Schmitter’s 
propositions on the conditions and the limits of spillover are the development and 
extension of former neo-functionalism, which can be stated in hypothesis form as 
follows:  
H2: The presence of four factors (i.e. increasing economic interdependence 
between member states, crises of sufficient magnitude as unintended consequences, 
regional bureaucrats’ competence and autonomy to intervene, interest associations’ 
capability to deal with problems independently from national constraints) contributes 
to the occurrence of spillover; however, the integration process tends to slow down due 
to the increase of “engrenage” and “politicization”.  
The four factors look reasonable, and as far as the serious challenges brought by 
the euro area sovereign debt crisis to the EU are concerned, those factors are very 
likely to be present and effective. Haas and Schmitter do not specify the indicators for 
the four conditions of spillover, and hence this dissertation proposes the following 
measurement in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. 1. The economic 
interdependence between the member states can be assessed on the basis of internal 
trade statistics. 2. The magnitude of the crisis on the basis of (a) the growth rates of the 
GDP, (b) government budget deficit and debt rates, (c) inflation rates, (d) 
unemployment rates, and (e) bond yield rates for governments to finance from the 
market. 3. Regional bureaucrats’ competence and autonomy to intervene on the basis of 
the integrative proposals and activities of EU institutions and their leaders, such as by 
the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, the President of the ECB, 
Mario Draghi, and the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. 4. 
Interest associations’ independent capability on the basis of transnational interest 
groups’ policies and activities, such as BusinessEurope and the ETUC. These four 
factors show neo-functionalists’ concerns with member states’ economic 
interdependence and reliance on each other, the vicious impact of a crisis and its 
logical demand for further integration, supranational institutions’ and their leaders’ 
pro-integration role, and the assumed non-governmental organizations’ proactive role 
towards EU integration, respectively. What needs to be further specified is “crises of 
sufficient magnitude as unintended consequences”, which could be internal and/or 
external, institutional and/or non-institutional. Concretely, through case studies, the 
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presence of each factor and the interactions among them will be examined. As for the 
slowed-down claim, the EU’s initiatives and developments presented in Table 1.2 and 
1.3 disconfirm such a hypothesized prediction, while the explanatory chain of “due to 
the increase of ‘engrenage’ and ‘politicization’” should get clarified. Put in another 
way, why does a slowed-down of the EU not happen if the policy areas for member 
states to reach agreement are going to be exhausted and there are decreasing policy 
areas left for member states to reach agreement (i.e. engrenage), and if the participation 
of various national actors pursuing their political rights at the EU level increases (i.e. 
politicization)? 
Schmitter’s (2005) four-factor summary offers a tentative contextual explanation 
for the general phenomenon of spillover, and a more detailed elaboration of the 
conditions for the three types of spillover has been developed by Niemann and 
Schmitter (2009; cf. Niemann 2006, Schmitter 2004). To start with, the set of 
conditions for functional spillover is proposed as follows: (1) functional pressures have 
to be perceived by actors as compelling and persuasive, that is, the original task and 
objectives therein are salient and the interdependence with other areas to take further 
action is strong — a case in point to illustrate this is the spillover effect from the single 
market to the policy domain of justice and home affairs (JHA) such as the border 
control and asylum policy) (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 57); (2) decision-makers, 
restricted by their time horizons, anticipate that: (a) further integration in one area 
should not cause problems in other areas, which in turn shall trigger further unintended 
integration, or (b) the benefit of the first step of further integration is “sufficiently 
salient that it outweighs the concerns about later spillover effects into other areas” 
(Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 58). Normally, functional spillover mechanisms 
become effective under condition (b), but still, there are examples when condition (b) 
is not met while the features of condition (a) arise. For instance, negotiations at the 
Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which intended to bring services 
under the scope of the Common Commercial Policy failed because some member 
states feared that to apply Article 113 to trade in services would “foster the process of 
internal Community liberalization in the area of services and [...] the Commission 
could use the backdoor of Article 113 to regulate in areas which fell under member 
states’ competence”, so such an integration step of expanding the scope of Article 113 
was believed to be going to cause an undesired spillover effect in other areas in the 
near future: internal Community services liberalization — a result that was judged by 
88 
 
national governments as more costly than the benefits brought by extending the policy 
scope (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 58). Additionally, functional spillover happens 
most likely in the areas of “high issue density”, that is, a high presence of the 
connections and interdependencies between issue areas. As Pierson’s (1996, 137-138; 
1998, 39-41) figure “the growth of issue density” illustrates, the number of possible 
connections and interactions among actors and policies increase geometrically along 
with the increase of issue areas at the European level. With two issue areas, there is 
only one possible connection between the two issues, but with four issue areas, the 
possible connections increase to six, and then with an expansion to eight, the number 
of potential connections goes up to twenty-eight; therefore, as the EU proceeds with 
new issues, areas and policies, the potential for functional spillover processes also 
grows (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 58). This implies a perpetual motion for 
functional spillover as there are always newly rising issues, problems and challenges 
for the EU to deal with. A number of studies have highlighted the effectiveness of 
functional spillover from the 1992 program, for example, to EMU (Mutimer 1989), to 
the area of social policy (Pierson and Leibfried, 1995) and to the domain of energy 
policy (Matlary 1997).  
Second, when interest groups and national governments tend to seek solutions at 
the EU level rather than at the domestic level, there is political spillover. As for the 
political spillover dynamic of non-governmental elites, the conditions include: (1) “the 
potential gains from European integration are high”; (2) “interest groups can easily 
ascertain the benefits of EU activity”; (3) “the relevant issue area has for some time 
been governed by the EU/EC, so that organized interests had a chance to familiarize 
themselves with the Community policy process, to coordinate on the European level, 
and for learning processes to occur”; and (4) “functional spillover pressures or — as 
some of the revised neo-functionalist approaches would allow for — internationally 
induced incentives drive or reinforce the rationale for seeking supranational solutions” 
(Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 59). As for the political spillover concerning 
governmental elites, that learning and socialization processes leading to their turning to 
supranational solutions: (1) “need time to develop”; (2) “tend to be significantly 
constrained if important members of a working group/committee are distrusted”; (3) 
“are impaired when issues become politicized”; (4) “can be offset in the case of 
adverse bureaucratic pressures in national ministries and administrations”; (5) “tend to 
be obstructed when negotiations are rather technical in nature and negotiations do not 
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possess enough expertise”; (6) “may be impeded when officials are a priori against 
changing their norms and habits and feel that they have been dragged into EU/EC 
cooperation” (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 60).  
Apart from the typical example of the ERT’s pro-integration stance on the Single 
Market and EU eastern enlargement (Cowles 1995), cases to vindicate interest groups’ 
and non-governmental elites’ political spillover include aspects such as the 
pro-integrative stance of the transnational community of European central bankers to 
help the debate on EMU at Maastricht (Cameron 1995), and business and consumer 
groups’ support to transfer national competence concerning air transport to the 
Community (O’Reilly and Stone Sweet, 1998). Still, there are also cases where the 
political spillover dynamic is less substantial, as Niemann (1998, 2006) argues that 
relevant interest groups such as the Fédération Européenne des Associations de 
Conseils en Organisation (FEACO) was a rather weak player with regard to the 
PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies), 
which did not correspond to neo-functionalist predictions, and the 1996-97 Amsterdam 
IGC negotiations on the extension of the Common Commercial Policy’s scope to the 
area of services also saw little organized group interests at the EU level. The main 
reason to hinder interest groups’ involvement in both cases, explained by Niemann and 
Schmitter (2009, 59), is the opaqueness and complexity of rules and decision-making 
procedures, which obscured interest groups’ perceptions of the benefits of 
supranational governance and caused their confusion about where to start lobbying. 
Nevertheless, Niemann’s (1998, 2006) case study of the PHARE programme prove that 
there were political spillover effects among governmental elites as the conditions listed 
above were largely met and favorable to fostering socialization and learning processes; 
by contrast, the case of the 1996-97 intergovernmental negotiations on the reform of 
EU trade policy does not indicate the impact of political spillover among governmental 
elites, as the above conditions were partly/largely not met (Niemann and Schmitter 
2009, 60). Moreover, studies have suggested the following: over time the Council 
committees tend to develop an esprit de corps of their own, and national officials who 
participate intensively in EU committees also tend to enact supranational allegiances 
(Trondal 2002); there is intense informal communication and cooperation among 
national delegates who tend to adopt common attitudes towards different negotiation 
patterns (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998); national institutions and the domestic 
environment, similar to the supranational institutions of the EU, also have a 
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socialization function, affecting actors’ adoption of supranational conceptions (Beyers 
2005); national elites involved in EU decision-making have an overall willingness to 
make a change in their positions, reflecting a considerable degree of collective 
responsibility (Egeberg 1999, 471).  
Finally, in terms of the conditions for cultivated spillover, the main focus, 
according to Niemann and Schmitter, is on the entrepreneurship of the Commission, 
and the favorable factors fostering cultivated spillover of the Commission include: (1) 
“its ability to forge internal cohesion”; (2) “the Commission’s capacity to shape the 
agenda — not only where it has an exclusive right of initiative, but also in the second 
and third pillars and at IGCs — for example by proactively tabling proposals, skillful 
timing of proposals, and maintaining close ties with the Presidency”; (3) “the 
cultivation of relations with member governments, interest groups, or other actors, i.e. 
securing support for its policies by making use of its strategic position of being 
centrally located within a web of policy networks and relationships”; (4) “its ability to 
build consensus and broker compromises, often while upgrading common interests”; (5) 
“the instrumentalization of functional (and exogenous) spillover pressures, i.e. 
promoting further integration by drawing on such rationales in the debate”; (6) “the 
Commission’s capacity to know the limits of its entrepreneurial leadership so as not to 
overplay its hand vis-à-vis the member states” (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 60-61). 
Besides, other factors can also affect the cultivated spillover dynamic of the 
Commission: powerful member states’ support, interest group allies, and the historical 
context where “institutions may register the greatest impact on policy outcomes in 
periods of swiftly changing events, uncertainty and incomplete information and during 
periods of policy adaptation” (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 61). As the literature 
review in section 2.1.1.4 has shown, lots of studies have demonstrated the 
Commission’s proactive and integrative entrepreneurship, and many of the cases do 
largely meet the favorable conditions that foster the Commission’s cultivated spillover 
dynamic as suggested by Niemann and Schmitter. Still, there are cases where the 
Commission’s cultivated spillover effects are constrained due to the absence of 
favorable conditions, and one example in point is the failure of the Amsterdam IGC 
negotiations on the Common Commercial Policy, where the favorable conditions for 
cultivated spillover were largely absent as “the Commission lacked internal coherence, 
overplayed its hand and was largely unsupported by interest groups or key member 
states”, and consequently, the Commission’s influence in this case was rather limited 
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(Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 61).  
All the conditions/factors discussed above draw up the overview of aspects that 
contribute to the effectiveness of the three classic spillover mechanisms posited by 
neo-functionalists (Table 2.3). Case studies of this dissertation will first check the 
presence (or absence) of the proposed conditions and then try to ascertain the 
relationship among them. Neo-functionalism is an old but evolving theory, and the 
potential for developing neo-functionalism lies “not least in further specifying the 
conditions under which the different types of spillover pressure are likely to unfold” 
(Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 64).  
 
Table 2.3 Conditions Fostering Spillover 
General Conditions for Spillover Effects and Proposed Measurement 
Factors Measurement 
1. Increasing economic 
interdependence; 
Internal trade data;  
(Extension possible) 
2. Crises of sufficient 
magnitude; 
 Institutional aspects: crises due to unintended 
institutional consequences; 
 Non-institutional /economic and financial aspects: 
(1) GDP growth rates; 
(2) Government budget deficit and debt rates; 
(3) Inflation rates; 
(4) Unemployment rates; 
(5) Bond yields for governments to finance from the 
market; 
(Extension possible) 
3. Regional bureaucrats’ 
competence and autonomy to 
intervene; 
Supranational institutions’ and their leaders’ pro-integration 
attitudes and activities:  
e.g. The Commission and its President José Manuel Barroso;  
The ECB and its President Mario Draghi;  
The European Council and its President Herman Van 
Rompuy;  
(Extension possible) 
4. Interest associations’ 
capability to deal with 
problems independently from 
national constraints; 
Non-governmental organizations’ independent 
integration-oriented positions, policies and activities: 
e.g. BusinessEurope and the ETUC 
(Extension possible) 
 
Favorable Conditions for Each of the Three Spillover Mechanisms 
5. Conditions for functional 
spillover 
(1) Compelling and persuasive technical pressures to 
complete the original task and objectives; 
(2) Decision-makers anticipate that (a) further integration in 
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the concerned area shall not cause problems in other 
areas, which in turn shall trigger further unintended 
integration, and/or (b) the benefit of further integration is 
salient and outweighs the concerns about later spillover 
effects into other areas; 
(3) High presence of the connections and interdependencies 
between issue areas (i.e. “high issue density”); 
(Extension possible) 
6. Conditions for political 
spillover 
 Representing the stance of nation states’ and 
governmental elites’ turning to supranational solutions: 
(1) Involves time to be developed; 
(2) Will be heavily constrained when important 
members of a working group or committee are 
distrusted; 
(3) Will be impaired, offset and obstructed if issues are 
politicized, adverse bureaucratic pressures permeate 
in national ministries and administrations, and/or 
issues in negotiations are rather technical, which 
require special expertise that negotiators lack; 
(4) Will be impeded if officials reluctantly and resist to 
adapt their norms and habits to EU integration;  
 Non-governmental elites representing positions of 
interest groups tend to support supranational solutions 
when: 
(5) Further integration brings more benefits and interest 
groups can ascertain those potential gains; 
(6) The issue of concern for further integration has 
already been under EU governance for a while, thus 
learning processes may happen and interest groups 
have the time to become familiar with relevant rules 
and existing policy-making processes, and thus can 
better exert influence and coordinate at the EU 
dimension; 
(7) Functional spillover pressures and international 
incentives and worldwide trends of cooperation and 
partnership reinforce the rationale of seeking 
solutions at the EU level;  
(Extension possible) 
7. Conditions for cultivated 
spillover (of EU institutions, 
typically represented by the 
Commission) 
 
For the Commission: 
(1) The ability to forge internal cohesion; 
(2) The capacity to table pro-integrative proposals and shape 
its own agenda;  
(3) By formulating a coalition with some actors (e.g. 
powerful member states, interest groups) to secure 
adequate support for its proposed policies;  
93 
 
(4) The ability to foster consensus and broker compromises 
by various means (e.g. package deals);  
(5) Making use of functional and exogenous pressures (e.g. 
the historical context of the period of crisis, dramatic 
changes, uncertainty and incomplete information, and 
policy adaptation) as the rationales to promote future 
integration; 
(6) Having knowledge about the limits of its entrepreneurial 
leadership, avoiding to overplay its hand vis-à-vis the 
member states; 
(Extension possible) 
    Sources: Own compilation on the basis of the Schmitter (2005), Niemann (2006), Niemann and 
Schmitter (2009).  
 
2.1.2 Elite Socialization and Supranational Interest Groups 
As for the thesis of elite socialization and the thesis of supranational interest groups, 
both emphasize the trends of supranationalism over nationalism. The former asserts 
that officials and politicians, the so-called elites who participate in EU 
decision-making, tend to shift their loyalties from their national states to the European 
institutions. For example, Haas (1958, chs. 5 and 6) stresses the role of 
non-governmental elites, while Lindberg (1963, ch.4) concentrates on governmental 
elites (see also Niemann 2006, 15; Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 48). The latter argues 
that interest groups, in a supranational context, try to match their activities with the 
regional integration development, placing their demands on national governments and 
pressing for more integration. By doing so, they also become Europeanized (Jensen 
2010, 77-79). It was estimated that at the end of the 1990s, in the EU, “thirteen of the 
seventeen most important policy domains are […] influenced by transnational groups” 
(Fligstein and McNichol 1998, 88). These two theses underscore the forces that support 
further integration, contending that governmental and non-governmental elites and 
relevant interest groups tend to hold that a further step of integration will bring more 
benefits, and such a positive perception leads those actors to “move part of their 
activity to a higher level of aggregation and therefore gradually shift their focus and 
expectations to European institutions” (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 49). Since the 
leader(s) of an interest group can be seen as the speaker(s) and promoter(s) for that 
group’s position and policy towards the integration process, interest group stances on 
further integration can also be traced from their leaders’ attitudes towards issues 
concerned. As a matter of fact, the elite socialization thesis and the supranational 
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interest group thesis can be viewed as extended elaborations of “political spillover”, 
and consequently their basic propositions can be tested under the rubric of political 
spillover.  
Though political spillover and the thesis of elite socialization are “closely related” 
(Jensen 2010, 76; 2013, 63), “it is difficult”, as Jensen once commented, “to conduct an 
empirical study of the neo-functionalist thesis of elite socialization. As Taylor suggests, 
it will always be possible to argue that shared experience generates shared attitudes. 
[…] my analysis fails to provide an adequate basis for confirmation of the 
neo-functionalist thesis of elite socialization” (Jensen 2000, 88-89). To detect an 
official’s loyalty transferring accurately, this dissertation argues, one needs to trace and 
compare his/her attitudes at different times towards similar and even the same issues. 
That is, the loyalty shift assertion, in a strict sense, should be set in a structured 
comparison of the opinions of the same subject on EU general integration or on a 
specific policy and issue at two (or more) different points of time. Meanwhile, under 
the influence of many other factors — being internal and external, national and 
international — officials’ attitudes are subject to changes, and the exact mechanisms 
behind these changes are difficult to be defined. Literally, politicians’ attitudes and 
positions towards a specific EU issue can be ascertained via interviews or 
questionnaires, but loyalty “shift”/“transferring” indicates a comparison with previous 
or later data involving a certain time gap. In an extreme sense, it is decision-makers’ 
current choices, not their past loyalties or future intentions, that influence the EU’s 
policy-making. Moreover, an individual official’s loyalty normally cannot exert a 
decisive impact on EU outcomes, but rather, a collective stance of a committee and 
group stands out as an important force. In such logic, to examine the shifting of 
loyalties turns out to be impractical and trivial, and this may account for the reason 
why Haas (1970, 1971) abandoned loyalty shifts as a defining characteristic of 
integration. Normally, neo-functionalist followers, such as Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
(1998) prefer to treat loyalty transferring as an open question, while the rival 
intergovernmentalists tend to reject this proposition (e.g. Scharpf 1988) or argue for 
multiple loyalties (e.g. Wessels 1997). Niemann (1998, 436) possibly gives a more 
cogent and appropriate comment on loyalty transferring, as he says: “[d]espite the high 
level of cross-border bureaucratic interaction, it is doubtful that a change of loyalties to 
Brussels has occurred. However, there is some evidence for increasingly favorable 
attitudes of certain civil servants vis-à-vis the European project” (Niemann 1998, 436). 
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So this dissertation will not deal with individual official’s loyalty shifts/transferring. 
However, what we should not ignore is national citizens’ attitudes: citizens’ support 
and position changes towards the EU are important, meaningful and even decisive for 
the fate of the EU. As discussed in section 2.1.1 about the analytical dissection of the 
spillover dynamic by Cameron 1992, neo-functionalism assumes that spillover effects 
connote both elites’ and public support for the supranational institutions. All the three 
new measures represent EU approaches to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis and they 
are initiated, pushed and supported by the EU officials/elites. Due to the seriousness of 
the current crisis, individual nation states cannot address it on their own, and the resort 
to supranational means becomes a natural and unavoidable choice for national 
governments; against such a background and following the neo-functionalist logic (e.g. 
Cameron 1992, 25), this dissertation proposes that:  
H1d: As the inherently expansive task (i.e. to solve the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis) is assigned to EU supranational institutions, the autonomy and power of EU 
institutions — typically represented by the Commission — expand; meanwhile, 
European citizens’ support for the EU project also tends to increase. 
The first half of this hypothesis displays a sort of overlap with the latter part of 
H1c, and the purpose of the testing of this hypothesis is to see whether functional 
spillover will trigger a proportionate increase in both the powers of supranational 
institutions and the support of elites and national citizens for the EU project. It should 
be noted, however, that even if neo-functionalist assumptions are correct (i.e. elites’ 
and national citizens’ support for the EU tends to increase as functional spillover is in 
effect), there will be a limit to an “increasing room” of support rates, that is, after 
reaching a certain level or “plateau”, a further increase of support rates might become 
difficult or even impossible. In an extreme theoretical sense, if the support rates already 
reach 100%, the proposed “increasing trends” shall be inaccurate. But for now, this 
dissertation expects that there still is an “increasing room” for the support rates, and the 
second half of this hypothesis is to see whether the EU’s initiatives and efforts to 
address the crisis help to enhance its credibility and thus promote support for the EU 
project. If the support rates constantly display a pattern of “stability”, this dissertation 
will make a tentative assumption on the “plateau” level. In addition, by assessing the 





 checking whether there is an obvious “disconnect between 
elites and masses” (Rosamond 2013, 88). Finally, what needs to elaborate and specify 
is the term “support for the EU project”: as far as the theme of this dissertation is 
concerned, case studies will focus on the support for EMU (and the euro) and EU 
solutions to address the crisis.  
To summarize, as the three theses of spillover, elite socialization and the 
supranational interest group illustrate, neo-functionalism emphasizes the role of 
supranational institutions and non-governmental actors, advocating a supranational 
tendency for EU integration. The essence of supranationality, as Haas claims, “lies in 
the tendency for economic and social decisions to ‘spill over’ into the realm of the 
political, to arise from and further influence the political aspirations of the major 
groupings and parties in democratic societies”, that is, supranationality has exhibited an 
“indirect penetration” from the economy to politics (Haas 1967a, 65). Moreover, 
supranationality is built upon common interests and must be realized through certain 
supranational institutions, as Haas argued that “the upgrading of the parties’ common 
interests relies heavily on the services of an institutionalized mediator, whether a single 
person or a board of experts, with an autonomous range of powers” (Haas 1961, 368), 
and one of the lessons drawn from European integration is that “institutionally, 
supranational bodies most readily lend themselves to accommodation on the basis of 
upgrading common interests” (Haas 1961, 377, his emphasis). Obviously, 
supranational institutions assume indispensable functions during the EU integration 
process, and hence Haas has also been regarded as a pioneer in theorizing the logic of 
institutionalization at the supranational level (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 5-6).  
 
2.2 Theoretical Roots of Neo-Functionalism: Functionalism  
Neo-functionalism, as its name suggests, can be traced back and compared with an 
antecedent integration theory: functionalism.
47
 The idea of functionalism starts from 
David Mitrany’s work A Working Peace System (1943),
48
 in which he proposes ways 
                                                 
46 Cini and Borragán (2013, 401) describe “permissive consensus” as “[t]he political context that 
allowed elites in the post-1945 period to engage in European integration, without involving Europe’s 
citizens”. 
47 Niemann and Schmitter (2009, 45-46) suggest that neo-functionalism finds its theoretical roots at 
the juncture between functionalist, federalist and communication theories and also draws inspirations 
indirectly from the “group theorists” of American politics.  
48 The evolution of functionalism can be studied through Mitrany’s chronological works: The 
Progress of International Government (1932), “A War-Time Submission: Territorial, Ideological or 
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to do away with wars and conflicts between national states: to set up world 
organizations not based on national territories but on functional tasks. Different 
organizations should be designed according to the requirements of different 
governmental tasks; in the way of carrying out specific tasks across national frontiers, 
these organizations could bring more welfare rewards to citizens than those obtainable 
within the national states — the rationale of such a functionalist approach is that form 
follows function (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 35). As a result, there would be a 
proliferation of international or transnational organizations to serve different purposes. 
Mitrany’s time witnessed the cruelties of the First and the Second World Wars, so the 
intention of functionalism was to reduce nation states’ conflicts and to realize world 
peace. As soon as governmental tasks are organized and fulfilled properly, it was 
believed that citizens would gradually transfer their loyalties to these newly formed 
organizations, because they would learn and experience the greater benefits of 
international cooperation, and thereby reduce their nationalist chauvinism which often 
leads to warfare between states. Believing nationalism was the root of war holocausts, 
Mitrany rejected organizations of governments in the federal form,
49
 because this 
might just reproduce another sort of nationalism at a higher level (Lelieveldt and 
Princen 2011, 35; see also Taylor 1974, x, Mitrany 1944, 5-7; 1965, 123-34). Besides, 
Mitrany also disagreed with the idea to forge an association of nations, like the League 
of Nations, because he believed that this kind of loose association would still 
perpetuate the traditional link between authority and a definite territory (Mitrany 1975, 
125).  
                                                                                                                            
Functional International Organisation?” (1941), and A Working Peace System (1943). For more about 
Mitrany’s later works and his functionalist approach see Imber’s (1984) “Re-Reading Mitrany: A 
Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty”. 
49 After the two destructive World Wars, many efforts and research were dedicated to eliminating 
wars and ensuring world peace, and the US has always been taken as a comparative model to explore 
such possibilities. For example, Deutsch et al. (1957) suggest that “‘integration’ does not necessarily 
mean the merging of peoples or governmental units into a single unit”, but also could be achieved by 
another two ways: “amalgamation” and “the pluralistic security-community”. The first one refers to 
“the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some 
type of common government after amalgamation”, as the US is an illustrative example, while in the 
second form, countries still retain their legal independence with separate governments, as the 
combined territory of the US and Canada would suggest. To maintain peace, any political community, 
being amalgamated or pluralistic, must become a security-community, that is, must achieve 
integration. “Integration” and “amalgamation” overlap, but not completely: amalgamation can be 
without integration, and vice versa (Deutsch et al. 1957, 5-7). For Jean Monnet, the architect of the 
ECSC, two routes were available at that time to realize continental peace: federalism and military 
unification; he chose “a second-best indirect solution”: integrate the two industrial sectors, coal and 




2.2.1 Mitrany’s Functionalism 
When Mitrany formulated his functionalist ideas, the dominant trend of IR theorization 
was the normative school represented by Norman Angell; nevertheless, the normative 
idealistic approach got discredited by increasing anarchy in the international society 
during the 1930s, which stimulated the revival of a realist approach led by Hans 
Morgenthau; functionalism at that time received little attention (Taylor 1974, xii). As a 
new phase in IR theorization in the 1950s, two developments heralded the resurgence 
of functionalism: behaviouralism and scholars’ attention to the problem of world order 
(Taylor 1974, xiii-xvi). Traditionally, nation states quite often compete and fight for 
military security and natural resources, so the dominant themes in IR literature are 
conflicts and cooperation, swords and ploughshares, war and peace; however, Mitrany 
offered another alternative: the development of a “working peace system” (Taylor 
1974, xi). Mitrany attributed the root of violence and wars to people’s dissatisfaction 
with their social and economic circumstances, so if people are given a “moderate 
sufficiency of what they want and ought to have they will keep the peace” (Mitrany 
1944, 15; see also Taylor 1974, xi). Following such logic, Mitrany proposes a 
transnational “working” system to meet people’s demands and to serve them better and 
more efficiently than national governments can. Mitrany argues that in a modern 
society, international organizations, no matter in what kind of form and manner, in one 
aspect, must do the same things as national governments do; endowed with 
autonomous tasks and powers, functional bodies, in another respect, would not merely 
discuss but must do things jointly so as to enlarge and co-ordinate the social scope of 
authority in the hope of overcoming “the deep-seated division between the needs of 
material unity and stubborn national loyalties” (Mitrany 1975, 125-126). Functionalism 
is a theory of action (Cornett and Caporaso 1992, 237). Then what are the principles to 
divide and assign tasks to the international organizations? Mitrany (1941, 115) puts 
forward “a natural organic selection” to bind together common interests under the 
essential principle that  
 
“activities would be selected specifically and organized separately, each 
according to its nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to 
the needs of the moment. It would allow, therefore, all freedom for practical 
variation in the organization of the several functions, as well as in the 
working of a particular function as needs and conditions altered.” (Mitrany 




This suggests that there is no fixed rule or rigid pattern to allocate different 
functional segments to different international organizations, so on the one hand, these 
organizations are open and flexible to the changes of human needs, which may emerge, 
alter or vanish over time across space without commitments to any particular integrated 
end state (Rosamond 2000, 34), while on the other hand, there might be an overlapping 
of these functional bodies (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 35). The purpose of this 
approach is to prioritize human needs or maximize public welfare as opposed to “the 
sanctity of the nation-states or the celebration of any particular ideological credo”, and 
to realize this, human beings must be rational about their needs and choices and be 
creative to construct institutions that can perform the functions assigned to them; 
therefore, function determines structure, hence the term “functionalism” (Rosamond 
2000, 33). Moreover, functionalism connotes technical self-determination, that is, 
function determines organs as well as the political instrument most suitable to its 
activities, which “by the same means provides for its reform at every stage” (Mitrany 
1941, 118). To entrust the real tasks of the government to international organizations 
on the basis of social needs and political developments, national sovereignty, not by 
conquest or revolution, but by consent, must be gradually transferred to a new world 
authority, and the new authority’s status depends on “how far the transfer of 
sovereignty from national groups is both willing and continuous”; nevertheless, 
“[s]overeignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through 
a function” (Mitrany 1975, 128). Mitrany regards this transfer as a sharing rather than 
the surrender of sovereignty: by pooling sovereign authority, separate national states 
would perform tasks jointly and better (Mitrany 1975, 129). Countries’ participation in 
an international organization is decided by the weight of their interests and resources, 
and all would benefit from the general service of this organization even if they have no 
part in its control (Mitrany 1941, 119). In this way, the dilemma that “we can neither 
ignore the deep roots of nationality in search for material efficiency, nor deny the 
urgent cry for social betterment for the sake of a hollow independence” gets resolved; 
without offending “the sentiment of nationality or the pride of sovereignty”, the 
functional approach can also offer the weakest countries an equal opportunity to enjoy 
the benefits brought by any functional activities they participate in and assure 
non-domination of stronger countries (Mitrany 1965, 139). Neither would national 
countries be supplanted — instead, they become links in a functional system (Mitrany 
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1941, 122), nor are they formally separated sovereign entities — instead, they are of 
“material interdependence” (Mitrany 1933, 101; also see Rosamond 2000, 34-35). 
Besides, the functional structure entails a union of people not of the states, so citizens 
can be the democratic representation for a specific function (Mitrany 1941, 119).  
As for the federal system, Mitrany believes it is both rigid and limiting: it binds a 
few things to be done in common while also maintaining a separate status quo through 
constitutions which are difficult to change. So in Mitrany’s opinion, politically, the 
federal idea goes too far: it cannot be realized on a world scale, while economically and 
socially, it goes not far enough: it offers less to realize “a unified peaceful 
development” (Mitrany 1975, 129). The essence of Mitrany’s proposal is to develop a 
working instrument of world governance — “a universal league’’ (Mitrany 1933, 116) 
— so as to realize world peace. As a response to the problem of the so-called 
democratic accountability, Mitrany distinguishes two aims/functions of international 
organizations: one is “to create a forum for the expression of progressive world 
opinion”, and the other is “to build up an effective instrument of common policy”, and 
being over-zealous in the first one would debilitate the second (Mitrany 1975, 131). So 
Mitrany argues that if we want to build up an effective world system where power can 
be restrained, voting democracy may need to yield to working democracy (Mitrany 
1975, 132).  
 
2.2.2 Evaluation of Functionalism 
Functionalism takes a positive view on human nature and believes a rational and 
peaceful progress is a possibility; it stretches the liberal-idealist tradition of IR from 
Kant through Woodrow Wilson and beyond, putting non-governmental organizations 
as a central object of study and challenging the traditional state-centric view of “power 
politics” (Rosamond 2000, 31). Functionalism offers a new way of thinking to 
construct post-war order; nevertheless, there are also criticisms to this approach, which, 
according to Rosamond (2000, 38-42), fall into four categories. 
First, functionalism holds that the determination of needs is objective and 
technocratic, but to make such a decision could be a fundamentally political task, 
which is difficult to operate with the laissez-fair capitalist market logic: complex 
coordination among sectors and fierce market competition mean there are both losers 
and winners. Second, functionalism was attacked for its rational-technocratic argument 
on human being’s rational choices and governments’ rational movements towards 
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maximizing citizens’ welfare and happiness; by separating welfare from power, it 
underestimates the continuing salience of politics. Besides, it assumes that the 
fulfillment of needs will automatically generate support for the institutions that carry 
out the task, but it does not specify the mechanism through which the needs should be 
identified first and it also lacks a theory of communicative action to explain how actors 
would come to believe certain things about the world. Third, functionalism has not 
been shown to be predictive as its advocates suggest, and reality has not been unfurling 
in the way that Mitrany has envisaged, so it may be treated just as a theory of political 
intervention. Finally, functionalism has been criticized for lacking scientific rigor as 
some scholars argued that “there is no foundational theoretical statement in 
functionalism” (Rosamond 2000, 41), which, however, can be accounted by Mitrany’s 
multiple roles as being a journalist, corporate consultant and foreign affairs analyst 
whose intended audience are not always academic researchers, but from Mitrany’s 
point of view, theoretical rigor may cause problems as it “denoted practical rigidity and 
creative closure” (Rosamond 2000, 42).  
Despite those criticisms, the influence of functionalism was far-reaching, and it 
is regarded as the “intellectual ancestor” for many other diverse approaches to 
international order such as interdependence theory, the world society image of IR, 
linkage politics and regime theory (Taylor 1990a, 125). It also anticipated works on 
transnationalism and governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). 
Mostly, it laid the foundations for neo-functionalism, the first integration theory 
specialized in accounting for the EC.  
 
2.2.3 Neo-Functionalism and Functionalism: Continuity and Difference 
2.2.3.1 The Influence of Functionalism on Neo-Functionalism  
Functionalism and neo-functionalism share similarities. Above all, both are dedicated 
to find solutions to avoid the calamity of wars among the traditionally-defined national 
states and thus to maintain European/world peace. Besides, both theories emphasize the 
supremacy of citizens’ welfare, advocating welfare-dominated policies of international 
organizations. History has proven the European integration project’s success in 
maintaining peace, stability and realizing prosperity among its member states for more 
than 60 years. Moreover, both functionalism and neo-functionalism represented a new 
way of thinking different from traditional ideal federalism, architecting a new path to 
post-war unity by incremental and strategic means rather than by pursuing a 
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constitutional design; meanwhile, functionalism offered an innovative and distinctive 
approach beyond conventional categories to do IR research (Rosamond 2000, 39; 51). 
Consequently, the traditional state-centric approach to IR gives its way to supranational 
institutions and officials, multinational interest groups and political parties. As 
functionalism was the starting point for Haas and Lindberg to develop 
neo-functionalism (Taylor 1974, xiii), the indebtedness of neo-functionalism to 
functionalism is quite noticeable.  
First, the functionalist “emphasis on the technocratic fulfillment of needs as the 
basis for more profound and lasting systems of peace, along with the evolutionary 
logic” anticipated neo-functionalist arguments on “spillover” (Rosamond 2000, 38-39). 
According to Cornett and Caporaso (1992), a functionalist action strategy consists of 
three steps: “(1) identify areas of society where people can cooperate, (2) arrange 
cooperative behavior functionally — not along territorial lines, and (3) take advantage 
of inter-sectoral imbalances to extend cooperative arrangements into related areas once 
initial cooperation has taken root”; the final stage involves “cooperation on many 
different fronts along with appropriate political institutions” (Cornett and Caporaso 
1992, 237). These three steps prepared neo-functionalist spillover arguments, as 
Cornett and Caporaso maintain that “[t]he key to the process-level component of 
functionalist theory lies in the concept of spillover” which “refers to the purported 
self-expansive tendency of integration within pluralistic socioeconomic environments” 
(Cornett and Caporaso 1992, 238). The authors further distinguish two types of 
spillover contained in functionalism: the first one is about the integration tendency 
transmitting from one sector to another, such as tariff reductions in trade putting 
demands on exchange rate policy; the second one refers to the integration movement 
from economic issues to political ones, such as informal and private cooperation 
becoming institutionalized (Cornett and Caporaso 1992, 238). These two types of the 
functionalist integration rationale herald the two layers of the core concept of 
neo-functionalist spillover: economic and political integration.  
Second, functionalist propositions on the way to organize governmental tasks 
based on their functions and the consequent effects of functional division were 
inherited and further developed by neo-functionalism as follows: (1) to carry out 
governmental tasks, establishing supranational institutions is necessary; (2) in the 
process of transnational cooperation, citizens transfer their loyalties to the new higher 
authority; (3) functionalist advocating for citizens’ democratic representation in 
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functional bodies is the precursor to the EP, as Mitrany once asserted that “‘[t]he sum 
of these functions’, not any preconceived formula, must in the end shape the character 
of an eventual European executive, and hence also of an European parliament” 
(Mitrany 1965, 132). In such a way, the neo-functionalist approach can be taken as an 
expansion of the logic of functionalism. 
 
2.2.3.2 The Differences and Disagreements between Neo-Functionalism and 
Functionalism 
Besides the similarities, neo-functionalism is different from functionalism in several 
respects. With spillover effects, European cooperation, in the neo-functionalist 
approach, leads to a regional political system, with which functionalism disagrees at 
least on two points. 
First, politically, functionalists believe that a new political community will 
simply recreate all traditional problems of the international society on a larger scale 
(Taylor 1974, xiv). The ultimate future of Europe, from Haas’s point of view, is not a 
federation, confederation or intergovernmental organization, but a supranationality, 
that is, a “supranational scheme of government at the regional level” which “bears a 
very striking resemblance to the prevailing nature of government at the level of the 
industrial nation in everything but constitutional terminology”, serving as “the 
appropriated regional counterpart to the national state which no longer feels capable of 
realizing welfare aims within its own narrow borders, which has made its peace with 
the fact of interdependence in an industrial and egalitarian age” (Haas 1967a, 71). In 
contrast, Mitrany opposes any schemes for a world government or any state-like 
entities dispensing world governance, because a political Union or a “United States of 
Europe” by nature must be nationalistic too, which “must impede, and may defeat, the 
great historic quest for a general system of peace and development” (Mitrany 1965, 
145). Mitrany further explains:  
 
“Under the pressures of a planned and radical social transformation it is 
bound to shape towards a centralized system — closed, exclusive, 
competitive; and whatever else it may do, such a system would hardly be 
suited to mediate between the new ideological divisions, or temper the raw 
nationalism of the new states so as to steer them towards the greener pastures 
of a mutual international community.” (Mitrany 1965, 145) 
 
For Mitrany, the result of functional developments would “not create a new 
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system”, but rather “merely rationalize and develop what is already there” and 
“[e]verywhere social activities […] are organized and continually reorganized in that 
way” (Mitrany 1941, 118). In such a sense, “functionalism is not really a theory of 
integration at all because the term ‘integration’ is suggestive of a particular institutional 
end stage” (Rosamond 2000, 34). Regional unions, from the vantage point of 
functionalism, are similar to the state building-up process, reproducing territorial 
state-like functions at a higher level with unchanged decision-making systems 
transferred from component national states, which would lead to the domination of the 
powerful states as the old IR themes suggest (Mitrany 1943). 
Second, geographically, functionalism rejects “the territorial closure implicit” in 
a European regional scheme, and as a matter of fact, Mitrany questioned the definition 
of “Europe” in terms of its geographic boundaries, for the territorial logic of the 
European unions would create potential “interregional antagonisms” by differentiating 
between members and outsiders (Mitrany 1965; Rosamond 2000, 37). In other words, 
geographical unions connote exclusion and separation. Meanwhile, among the member 
states of a regional union, there lacks a kind of “natural cohesiveness” between nations, 
and it is also difficult to construct an “imagined community” for the new union 
(Rosamond 2000, 38), and this would imply an identity problem for the new 
authorities. In short, functionalism regards any European integration project, in 
Rosamond’s words, as being both “atavistic” and “recidivist”: the former for 
generating interregional antagonism, and the latter for repeating governance on the 
basis of “the anachronistic foundations of statehood and territory” at a higher level 
(Rosamond 2000, 38). Naturally, Mitrany (1965) approved the technical and functional 
logic behind the development of the ECSC and the Euratom, but he did not think the 
ECSC and the Euratom should be developed into any defined institutions such as the 
EEC. European integration, therefore, from the functionalist point of view, has 
gradually evolved beyond the functional logic into a formal process which duplicates 
the old problems at a supranational level with a new version.  
The above two lead to the third major difference: though having opened a new 
door for IR research on non-governmental factors, functionalism provides “a weak 
account of power and institutions” (Cornett and Caporaso 1992, 238). Functionalists 
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such as Mitrany and Jean Monnet
50
 contend that power and institutions are 
inextricably tied with sovereignty and national prestige, and such a belief leads them to 
highlight technical integration potentials while undervaluing the importance of the 
political consensus and struggles behind the technical integrative experiments. By 
comparison, neo-functionalists, while acknowledging functionalist insights on social 
and economic cooperation and integration, attach great importance to supranational 
institutions (Cornett and Caporaso 1992, 238). Besides, neo-functionalism also stresses 
politicians’ initiatives which would be termed “elite socialization”, as Haas points out 
that “the ‘purely’ economic decisions always acquire political significance in the minds 
of the participants” (1967a, 65) and in the modern industrial system, everything is 
political (1967a, 71). Niemann and Schmitter (2009, 46) offer the following summary: 
“[l]ike functionalism, neo-functionalism emphasizes the mechanisms of technocratic 
decision-making, incremental change, and learning processes”, but different to 
functionalism, “neo-functionalists attached considerable importance to the autonomous 
influence of supranational institutions and the emerging role of organized interests”, 
and “[m]oreover, where Mitrany attached importance to changes in popular support, 
neo-functionalists privilege changes in elite attitudes.” 
 
2.3 Critiques of Neo-Functionalism  
Neo-functionalism, once being ambitious to provide a grand framework to summarize 
and explain the dynamics of regional integration in any context (Rosamond 2005, 243; 
see also Barrera and Haas 1969; Haas 1961, 1967b; Haas and Schmitter 1964), has 
been criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds, with the main critiques 
coming from Haas (1975, 1976), Keohane and Hoffmann (1991), Keohane and Nye 
(1975, 1977), Moravcsik (1993, 1998, 2005), Risse (2005), Taylor (1990, 1993), and 
Schmitter (2005).  
 
 
                                                 
50 Jean Monnet (1888-1979), one of the founding fathers and architects of the EC, is regarded as 
another important precursor to neo-functionalism. Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991, 3) suggests that 
neo-functionalist ideas have already got an embryonic form in the Schuman Plan (1950) promoted by 
Monnet. Rosamond (2000, 51-54) discusses Monnet’s role in the process of building up the 
Community. Schmitter (2005, 256) clearly states that Haas’s neo-functionalism is the synthesis of 
both Mitrany’s conception of functionalism and Monnet’s pragmatic strategy for running the ECSC 
and developing it into the EEC. Niemann and Schmitter (2009, 46) also regard Monnet as an 
important intellectual antecedent of neo-functionalism. 
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2.3.1 Neo-Functionalism’s Failure to Capture EC Political Stagnation 
during the 1970s  
On empirical grounds, the neo-functionalist approach as a whole was discredited by the 
general sluggishness in the pace of European integration in the 1970s when political 
integration did not happen as neo-functionalists had predicted: “neo-functionalism 
appears to mispredict both the trajectory and the process of EC evolution” (Moravcsik 
1993a, 475-76). Neo-functionalist failure to capture the reality of the EC in the 1970s, 
according to Schmitter (2005), was caused by neo-functionalism’s intrinsic “dual 
paradox”. The first paradox is that the integration process starts with member states’ 
willingness to cede certain national autonomy or sovereignty, so naturally nation states 
prefer to “converge upon some relatively non-controversial and apparently separable 
issue arena where tangible gains from co-operation were sufficient to warrant giving up 
some portion of their respective autonomy to a common institution”; however, if so, 
“there was little reason to expect any further expansion”, and the regional organization 
would keep its stagnant inter-statist structure; furthermore, the finitude of 
non-controversial and separable policy areas also suggest the limitation and potential 
exhaustion of integration. The second paradox is that national politicians, on the one 
hand, realize that there are rising costs for their countries to retreat from the integration 
process where they have been reaping great benefits, while on the other hand, they are 
also aware that in the long run, sovereignty would be diminished, so with such an 
anticipation, they might rationally refuse to be involved in the first place, as the de 
Gaullian case illustrates, and also design their institutions to avoid or minimize 
sovereignty shrinkage (Schmitter 2005, 262-63). Apart from the two paradoxes to 
explain the stagnating pace of the EU, another argument is that it takes some time for 
the underlying functional interdependencies to become manifest and mature to push 
actors to take pro-integrative stances and measures (Schmitter 2005, 257; 266). 
Additionally, the adverse economic environment during the 1970s also contributed to 
the political stagnation and the trend of intergovernmental decision-making by member 
states; under unfavorable economic circumstances, nation states “have appeared both 
uncertain and defensive and frequently unwilling to take the Community option” 
(Webb 1983, 21; also see Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 52).  
Since neo-functionalist prediction of a progressive and linear integration process 
was refuted by reality and consequently abandoned by scholars, new concepts and 
theories arose, trying to encapsulate the European integration project better. For 
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example, Taylor (1993) put forward a new concept, “consociationalism”,
51
 to suggest 
that functional cooperation may be both positive and negative for the integration 
process: being positive “in the sense that links are fostered, attitudes modified, and 
community strengthened”, while being negative in the sense that segmental autonomy 
may get reinforced (Taylor 1993, 84). The idea of “consociationalism” indicates “an 
end situation which has built into it pressures for the maintenance of segmental 
autonomy within a cooperative system, i.e., a symbiotic arrangement” (Taylor 1993, 
84). Therefore, for one thing, to strengthen functional integrative systems “may help to 
sharpen rather than soften the cleavages in the existing society of nations” (Taylor 
1993, 85); for another, the concept of consociationalism implies a symbiotic 
relationship between separate national states (the participating segments) and the 
supranational entity EC (the collectivity), where the two depend on each other as 
mutually sustaining parallel evolving powers (Taylor 1993, 92; 252). Taylor believes 
that as regional federalism might merely reproduce old problems of the international 
society, the EC’s consociational structure and symbiotic relationship between member 
states and supranational institutions avoid repeating the old story (1993, 255). Taylor 
argues that the processes of consociationalism proceed alongside the neo-functionalist 
dynamics of integration (Taylor 1993, 90), and the result of European integration is 
that “the sovereignty of states has not been challenged fundamentally” — though the 
conditions for sovereignty have been changing — in spite of “the appearance of 
schemes for advanced federalism in the European Community” (1993, 1), because 
“[t]he symbiotic relationship between the region and the member states encourages 
governments to see the strengthening of the region as a way of enhancing their own 
sovereignty” (1990c, 246). Taylor’s theory of “consociationalism” and “symbiosis” 
could be viewed as a reconciliation as well as a synthesis of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. 
In addition to the stagnant scenarios in EC politics, there are another three 
“pieces of reality” that traditional neo-functionalism has failed to address. First, as it 
concentrates on sectoral spillover and various actors’ activities, it overlooks the 
functionalist power expansion of the ECJ in the 1970s when there was political 
                                                 
51 The idea of consociationalism could be traced back to Lijphart’s “consociational democracy” 
(1968, 1969, 1977). It is utilized to characterize the stable democracies of the Low Countries, 
Switzerland and Austria nevertheless with fragmented subcultures, where “the centrifugal tendencies 
inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of 
the different segments of the population” (Lijphart 1977, 1).  
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stagnation of the EC. This part is supplemented by later neo-functionalists when 
neo-functionalism revived in the 1990s. Second, neo-functionalism has not recognized 
or problematized the significance of the expansion of EC membership, and “[a]ll the 
discussion about ‘widening v.s. deepening’ is taking place in a theoretical vacuum that 
neo-functionalism is incapable of filling” (Schmitter 2005, 267). Finally, regional 
integration also provides a forum for minorities and their leaders to voice their specific 
interests as “[t]he minority seeks to consolidate direct contacts with regional level 
organization” and “direct links between local groups and the Community” are being 
built up, but traditional neo-functionalism seems to neglect “this observable political 
fact” of minority’s separate representation in the EC (Taylor 1993, 86). While pointing 
out this deficiency of neo-functionalism, Taylor claims that his theory of 
“consociationalism”, which proposes a symbiotic relationship between the participating 
segments and the collectivity, can account for “the observed pattern of behavior of the 
minorities in the European Community” (1993, 87); later Cini and Borragán (2010a, 
440, emphasis added) directly define the term “consociationalism” as “a political 
model which brings together distinct communities in shared decision-making, whilst 
protecting the interests of the minority”. 
 
2.3.2 Criticism of Neo-Functionalist Core Concepts 
On theoretical grounds, according to Jensen (2010), criticism of neo-functionalism 
could fall into four categories. The first kind of objections addresses neo-functionalist 
core theses, mainly focusing on the spillover thesis and the elite socialization thesis. 
 
2.3.2.1 Spillback and Countervailing Forces  
As early as in the very beginning of the 1970s, neo-functionalist proponents Lindberg 
and Scheingold have put forward the disintegrative counterpart of the concept of 
spillover: the “spillback” — “a situation in which there is a withdrawal from a set of 
specific obligations” and “[r]ules are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed” with the 
result that “[t]he scope of Community action and its institutional capacities decrease” 
(1970, 137). Haas (1971) also has been aware that integrative activities may result in 
“self-encapsulation” or “spill-around”, and he explained: in some areas, there is a lack 
of new demands by actors after successful accomplishments, which will lead to a state 
of self-encapsulation (e.g., activities relating to public health, transportation, 
telecommunication, and the protection of human rights); by comparison, the term 
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“spill-around” means in some areas, integrative activities will lead to the creation of 
rival organizations defying political centralization, which might or might not contribute 
to the overall integration process (Haas 1971, 11).
52
 Later, Tranholm-Mikkelsen 
clarified and summarized the counter-integrative factors as “countervailing forces” that 
lie on the other side of the equation of the dynamics of European integration: (1) 
nationalism, represented by “dramatic-political” actors such as de Gaulle in the 1960s 
and Thatcher in the 1980s; and (2) diversity of member states, in the social, economic, 
political and administrative sphere (1991, 16-17). In addition to spillover dynamics and 
countervailing forces in the equation, there are other factors which may either promote 
or impede integration, such as the external security environment, security within the 
Community, or member states’ interdependent relationship with other countries outside 
the Community (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 17-18). Therefore, integration is 
 
“a dialectical process determined by the twin forces of a ‘logic of integration’ 
and a ‘logic of disintegration’. The ‘logic of integration’ contains the logic of 
spill-over, but it also encompasses aspects of interdependence and security. 
The ‘logic of disintegration’ consists of adherence to the symbols of 
sovereignty, the diversity of the member states and other aspects of 
interdependence and security.” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 18) 
 
Viewing integration as a dialectical process denies the “automaticity” of 
spillover and deprives the predictive power of neo-functionalism, but the future pace 
and direction of integration can be assessed on the basis of the strength of the two 
forces (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 18).
53
 Agreeing with the proposition of “a 
                                                 
52 At the same period of time, Schmitter (1971, 241-242) offered a different explanation of the two 
terms and he distinguished all together six alternatives to spillover in terms of an actor’s strategies: (1) 
spillover (i.e. “to increase both the scope and level of his commitment concomitantly”); (2) 
spill-around (i.e. “to increase only the scope while holding the level of authority constant or within 
the zone of indifference”; (3) buildup (i.e. “to agree to increase the decisional autonomy or capacity 
of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas”); (4) retrench (e.g. “to increase the 
level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institution(s) from certain areas”); (5) muddle-about (e.g. 
“to let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but 
decrease their actual capacity to allocate values”); (6) spill-back (i.e. “ to retreat on both dimensions, 
possibly returning to the status quo ante initiation”); and (7) encapsulate (i.e. “to respond to crisis by 
marginal modifications within the zone of indifference”).  
53 Schmitter argues that some of Haas’s ideas have been misrepresented and distorted, and one of the 
fallacious inferences from neo-functionalism is that “spillover occurs automatically” (Schmitter 2005, 
257-258; 261). To claim that the statement— “spillover occurs automatically” — is a 
misinterpretation of Haas’s ideas can be justified by Haas’s own writing: “[t]he spillover process, 
though rooted in the structures and motives of the post-capitalist welfare state, is far from automatic” 
(Haas 1967a, 77). This dissertation, however, would like to treat Haas’s (1967a) disconfirmation of 
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dialectical process”, Niemann (2006, 47-51) further developed the concept of 
“countervailing forces” in his revised neo-functionalist framework which embraced 
three kinds of disintegrative forces: sovereignty-consciousness, domestic constraints 
and diversities, and a negative integrative climate. First, sovereignty-consciousness 
encapsulates actors’ unwillingness and opposition to delegate sovereignty/competences 
to EU supranational institutions and it is “linked to (national) traditions, identities and 
ideologies and may be cultivated through political culture and symbolisms”, which 
may exhibit themselves in the extreme form of nationalism and can impede the EU’s 
development as during de Gaulle’s and Thatcher’s period of time. The incorporation of 
this countervailing force into revised neo-functionalism suggests the drop of the 
original neo-functionalist “end of ideology” argument,
54
 and according to this 
perspective, nationalism still accounts for the outcomes of the European regional 
project (Niemann 2006, 48). Second, domestic constraints and diversities are proposed 
to signify national governments’ reduced autonomy to act due to the direct constraints 
posed by domestic actors (such as lobby groups, opposition parties, and the 
media/public pressure) or indirect constraints from domestic structural limitations 
(such as a country’s economy, demography, legal tradition or administrative structure) 
(Niemann 2006, 48-49), which are “exacerbated by the economic, cultural, legal, 
demographic or other diversities between member states” (Niemann and Schmitter 
2009, 56). These domestic constraints and diversities “may entail considerable 
adjustment costs for some and thus obstruct integrative endeavours” (Niemann and 
                                                                                                                            
spillover’s automaticity as a clarification and revision of his original thinking, that is, the so-called 
“fallacious inferences” might be “correct inferences” from Haas’s earliest works. This dissertation 
holds that Haas’s (1958) work does imply an automatic spillover process without clear specification, 
and such suggestive automaticity was further reinforced by Lindberg as he defined “spillover” as “a 
situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original 
goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn creates a further condition and a 
need for more action, and so forth” (Lindberg 1963, 10). Rosamond (2005, 244) also pointed out that 
the initial thoughts of “spillover” embedded in The Uniting of Europe do suggest automaticity in the 
sense that “the logic of integration is somehow self-sustaining, rational and teleological”, and Haas’s 
(1967a) disconfirmation came at a time when the assumption of automatic spillover encountered 
severe empirical troubles when de Gaulle recalibrated the development of the Community into a more 
overtly intergovernmental direction (Rosamond 2005, 245). Haas himself also noted that 
decision-making within the Community in the middle of 1960s demonstrated the tempo of spillover 
slowed down and “the initial ėlan of the supranational style was dissipated” (Haas 1967a, 77). In such 
a way, Haas actually revised his ideas. In light of neo-functionalism, the statement “spillover is an 
automatic process” suggests that the European integration process was viewed as a self-sustaining or 
self-perpetuating process without taking the external environment into consideration.  
54 Cf. section 2.3.3. 
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Schmitter 2009, 56). The inclusion of this countervailing force into the revised 
neo-functionalist framework can make up one deficiency of neo-functionalism: 
domestic constraints and diversities can help to explain member states’ variation in 
choices for integration (Niemann 2006, 49). Finally, a negative integrative climate is 
utilized by politicians to take public attitudes and opinions, especially during the 
national election period, on European integration into account. As a worsening 
economic situation tends to provoke an unsupportive climate for the Community in 
general, the accommodation of this countervailing force is against “the erroneous 
neo-functionalist assumption that growth would continue unabated in Western Europe” 
(Niemann 2006, 49). Overlapping with the factor of “domestic constraints” (such as 
electoral pressure), the “negative integrative climate” is conceptualized as a broad 
variable to take the role of the public into account in the integration process (Niemann 
2006, 49-50).  
Representing disintegrative pressures as opposed to the integrative pressures 
generated by spillover, countervailing forces may either lead to stagnation (staying at 
the status quo or remaining at a standstill) or cause reversal of integration (spilling 
back and retreating from previous commitments) (Niemann 2006, 47). To take 
countervailing forces into account and thus to understand the European project as a 
dialectic process of both a “logic of integration” and a “logic of disintegration” is 
helpful to ascertain the relative strength and the causal significance of the dynamics of 
integration (Niemann 2006, 47). The dialectic process is an equation made up of 
spillover effects which serve as dynamics of European integration on the one side, and 
of countervailing forces which discourage further integration on the other side. As a 
result, a particular mode of decision-making or the integration process is the outcome 
of, and also can be explained by, “[t]he strength, variation and interplay of various 
pressures on both sides of the equation” (Niemann 2006, 50). Moreover, empirical 
analyses suggest that there is no so-called “unitary” national interest. Rather, national 
interests and the interests of national decision-makers are influenced by various 
domestic, intrastate and international factors, and “[i]n short, the interest perceptions of 
national (and other) decision-makers involved in EU decision-making are decisively 
shaped by the various spillover and countervailing pressures” (Niemann 2006, 51). 
Based on the achievement of the EU and the breadth and depth of European integration 
so far, it is reasonable to conclude that the countervailing forces are not strong enough 
to counterbalance the integrative spillover effects, and it is supposed that the 
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integrative process will further continue despite possible unforeseen spillback forces 
such as further enlargement and unfavorable international situations. In addition, it is 
also assumed that over time diversity among member states is likely to diminish 
because of the learning and socializing processes where the EU increasingly exerts its 
influence on constructing actors’ preferences, norms and identities, which, however, 
might be at the same time offset to different degrees by other countervailing 
developments (Niemann 2006, 51). 
In addition to the concept of spillback and countervailing forces, some scholars 
suggest there are limits to the spillover effect. For example, Keohane and Hoffmann 
(1990, 290-293) admit spillover does exist and happen, but successful spillover 
requires prior intergovernmental agreements. When those agreements are fresh and 
viable, pressures for further cooperation in initial policy areas as well as in related 
areas appear, but those pressures do not automatically lead to common policies and 
institution creation, and the materialization of the spillover pressure depends on a new 
round of intergovernmental bargains. What will happen next will be determined by 
various factors: national domestic politics, the external environment, at the time 
Western Europe’s economic situation, political leaders of nation states, and the 
supranational institutions (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, 293). Meanwhile, apart from 
centripetal momentums, the Community also shares centrifugal forces coming from 
poorly coordinated national and sectoral bureaucratic coalitions (Keohane and 
Hoffmann 1990, 293). To sum up, EU integration is a dialectic process of the logic of 
integration and the logic of disintegration, and the EU’s developments can be viewed 
as the result of an equation where integration forces outweigh disintegration forces, as 
shown in Figure 2.1. 
Niemann (2006, 7) attributes the failure of the 1996-97 Amsterdam IGC to 
modernize Article 113 as a weak spillover dynamic with strong countervailing 
pressures. Figure 2.1 suggests that the EU’s developments or failures can be explained 
by either stronger spillover effects or stronger countervailing forces, which can be 
further calculated by the presence and prominence/strength of selected factors 









developments         Integration logic/forces             Disintegration logic/forces 
 





 Domestic constraints and diversity of 
member states (e.g. lobby groups, opposition 
parties, the media/public pressure, a 
country’s economy, demography, legal 
tradition, and administrative structure) 
 Negative integrative climate (economic 
recession and citizens’ low support for 
integration, electoral pressure) 
 Unforeseen spillback forces (e.g. 
further enlargement and unfavorable 
international situations) 
 Poorly coordinated national and 
sectoral bureaucratic coalitions 





Factors that influence integration and disintegration: 
intergovernmental agreements, external environments, economic situation, government leaders, 
supranational institutions 
(Extension possible) 
Figure 2.1 An Equation Accounting for EU Integration 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), Haas (1971), 
Schmitter (1971), Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, Niemann 
(2006), and Niemann and Schmitter (2009). 
 
2.3.2.2 Disconfirmation of Elite Socialization and Loyalty Transferring 
Assumptions  
With the concept of consociationalism, Taylor (1990, 1993) challenged the idea of elite 
socialization and denied the trends of transferring national loyalties to supranational 
institutions. Instead, Taylor suggested that it is the interests of the member states who, 
by sending national politicians and civil servants to supranational institutions such as 
the Commission, intensify EU political integration, as he argues that there is “an 
increasing determination to insist upon proportionality in the central institutions, and 
indeed an increasing tendency for particular elites to identify their nationals in those 
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institutions as their representatives”, leading “the tendency for the collegiate principle 
in the Commission to become weaker […] and for state governments to act as if 
Commissioners from their states were their representatives” (Taylor 1990b, 180; 
Taylor 1993, 89). The Commission is acting as “an umpire rather than a promoter of 
any specific ideology” (Taylor 1990b, 179; Taylor 1993, 88) and meanwhile “pressures 
to enlarge the role of the Commission as umpire are increased rather than diminished 
as integration proceeds” (Taylor 1990b, 180; Taylor 1993, 89). In the context of 
consociationalism, the integration process “sharpens the identity of the cartel of elites” 
and “encourages the clearer definition of minorities and the articulation of their 
separate interests in the larger framework” (Taylor 1993, 87). Hooghe (2002) argues 
that civil servants in EU supranational institutions tend to be more nationally oriented 
when issues of vital political interests to member states are concerned. Moreover, 
research also shows that, besides the insulated elites, public opinion, party competition, 
and the mass media are also vital to European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2007). 
Loyalty transfer implies an underlying neo-functionalist reasoning: those who 
profit most from the EU integration process should be the most supportive of the EU 
enterprise, like women and farmers who, during the integration process, have obtained 
an equal pay and treatment as men within EU’s labor market or received huge 
agricultural subsidies under the common agricultural policy (CAP). Risse’s (2005) 
research, however, disconfirms this proposition, and shows that women in general are 
less supportive of the EU than men are, and farmers’ satisfaction with the EU’s 
performance also turns out to be rather low (Risse 2005, 297). Risse’s findings suggest 
that material benefits do not naturally lead to loyalty transfer, because “socialization 
into European identity works not so much through transnational processes or through 
exposure to European institutions, but on the national levels in a process whereby 
Europeanness or ‘becoming European’ is gradually being embedded in understandings 
of national identities” (Risse 2005, 305). Risse applies his research results to explain 
the double puzzle of European integration: “the persistent balance in the EU’s 
constitution-building between supranational and intergovernmental institutions, on the 
one hand, and the lagging behind of foreign/defense affairs in European integration, on 
the other”, as European identity is built upon and must be understood from national 
processes and “the compatibility between European identity and national identities 
varies by country in a similar way as national constitutional traditions resonate with 
European integration to rather different degrees” (Risse 2005, 305). In short, Risse’s 
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argument is against neo-functionalist predictions on the trends of shifting loyalties 
from national levels to supranational institutions. It also demonstrates that there is a big 
gap in support of the EU between the elites and common people. 
 
2.3.3 Haas’s Self-Critiques and Revisions  
The second kind of negation to neo-functionalism came from Haas himself. As the core 
concept “spillover” failed to encapsulate the EC in the 1970s, Haas took recourse to 
another approach to explain European integration: theories of interdependence 
developed by Keohane and Nye (1975, 1977). According to Keohane and Nye (1977), 
“dependence” is “a state of being determined or significantly affected by external 
forces”, and “interdependence” suggests mutual relations among those dependences; in 
world politics, interdependence, as a result of international transactions, “refers to 
situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 8). The key to understanding such 
interdependence is the involved “costs”, as Keohane and Nye state: “interdependent 
relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it 
is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the 
costs. This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the 
relationship” (1977, 9-10). Interdependent relationships, therefore, are not necessarily 
mutually beneficial, and this leads to other arguments: first, increasing joint benefits 
gained from an interdependent relationship do not guarantee a conflict-free 
distribution, and “large-net-benefit cooperation” does not exclude competition; second, 
interdependence is not “evenly balanced mutual dependence”, and there are 
asymmetries in dependence for different actors where powers and processes of political 
bargaining emanate (Keohane and Nye 1977, 10-11). As the world is extensively 
interdependent, world politics is characterized by international regimes of “networks of 
rules, norms and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects”, where 
relationships of interdependence often occur and have been defined and affected 
(Keohane and Nye 1977, 19). 
While having a lot in common with neo-functionalism,
55
 interdependence theory 
                                                 
55  Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991, 8) compares the similarities between neo-functionalism and 
interdependence theory: both “are usually associated with the so-called ‘pluralist’ or ‘cobweb’ image 
of international relations. Both downplay the significance of formal state boundaries; both stress the 
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differentiates itself most from neo-functionalism in the aspect that it does not prescribe 
or envisage the outcome of international cooperation or integration: interdependence is 
a condition, not a process; it is shaped by political acts that are not predicted by theory 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 8-9). Interdependence theory, as argued by Taylor, 
actually implies contradictory propositions at two different levels: at the regional level, 
it suggests “a concentration of power, and the placing of functions within common 
frameworks”, while at the global level, it shows “the way in which powers might be 
disaggregated, and administrations and national interests fragmented by 
transgovernmental or transnational coalitions” (Taylor 1993, 2). The harsh reality of 
the 1970s pushed Haas to part with neo-functionalism to the degree that “the study of 
regional integration should be both included in and subordinated to the study of 
changing patterns of interdependence” (Haas 1976, 208). As a result, the notion of 
“integration” was defined as “institutionalized procedures devised by governments for 
coping with the condition of interdependence: coping, it must be stressed, may take the 
form of increasing, decreasing, or maintaining interdependence” (Haas 1976, 210, his 
emphasis). For Haas, in the 1970s, the EC once of a distinctive “supranational” style 
evolved into “a huge regional bureaucratic appendage to an intergovernmental 
conference in permanent session” (Haas 1975, 6; quoted in Jensen 2010, 80). In fact, as 
early as in the 1960s, Haas had already observed that “[d]isintegration and nationalist 
immobilisme appear to dominate, rather than the advance of regional government” 
(1967a, 62, his emphasis), and meanwhile, the automaticity of spillover got changed 
from a status of certainty to probability (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 9; see also Haas 
1967a, 77). As a response to the drama of de Gaulle’s policies and Hoffmann’s 
criticism, Haas admitted the smooth functioning of integration requires certain 
conditions: the goals pursued by statesmen and non-governmental elites must be 
“‘incremental-economic’ rather than ‘dramatic-political’” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 
9). These pragmatical and technocratic policy-making steps led to what Haas calls “the 
end of ideology” (Haas 1967b, 334), that is, the doctrines and ideologies emanating 
from the political thought of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century could not adequately 
describe the dramatic economic and social changes as well as European regional 
integration since 1945 (Haas 1967a, 62), which implies that “as societies became richer, 
                                                                                                                            
importance of non-governmental actors in world politics; and both emphasize the prevalence of 
non-military issues in the dealings among non-socialist, developed states”. 
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they would become more concerned with the pursuit of wealth rather than with 
nationalist, socialist or religious ideals” (Niemann 2006, 16). 
As for the “contrived” or “deliberate” package deals, Haas admitted that as the 
political linkage of package deals became longer and more complex, the uncertainty 
surrounding the EC’s integration process also increased so much that policies designed 
by virtue of deliberate issue linkage could be “fated to fail” (Haas 1976, 209). 
Furthermore, by switching to interdependence theory, Haas also acknowledged another 
shortcoming of the original neo-functionalist theory: it focuses too narrowly on the 
regional integration process/entity while ignoring other external factors; the European 
integration project is only a part of the world economy, which cannot be insulated from 
the external changing environment (Jensen 2010, 80; Niemann 2006, 22).  
 
2.3.4 Critiques of Supranationalism by Intergovernmentalism 
The third set of criticisms is directed against neo-functionalists’ “excessive” emphasis 
on the supranational components in the European integration process. This kind of 
critique argues that the core of regional integration lies in cooperation among national 
states involved, and regional integration forms such as the EC/EU should be considered 
as intergovernmental organizations. The initial critics of this kind were Stanley 
Hoffmann (1966) and Roger Hansen (1969). While Hoffmann (1966) put forward the 
logic of diversity opposing the neo-functionalist logic of integration, Roger Hansen 
(1969), while asserting that neo-functionalism had neglected the effects of external 
structural imperatives on member states’ integration preferences at the EU level, 
refuted neo-functionalists’ proposition that societal pluralism is a precondition to 
European integration. Haas believed that a “New Europe” had to be built on the basis 
of “capitalism, industrialism and pluralistic democracy” (Haas 1967a, 62),
56
 but from 
Hansen’s point of view, societal pluralism is a disintegrative force retarding the 
integration process because “sophisticated societies are better able to receive messages 
about potential threats (such as those posed by supranational institutions) to their 
integrity” (Rosamond 2005, 248). In line with Hansen’s argument, neo-functionalist 
theory was criticized to be of a typical American optimism, which simply believes that 
“problem-solving and resolution of conflicting interests within a pluralist political 
                                                 
56 Deutsch et al. (1957, 200) possess a similar opinion, and they assert that policies of pluralism 
which increase “the machinery and traditions of mutual consultation, communication, and 
cooperation” seem to be the most effective approach to promote integration. 
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system could overcome the obstacles to European union” (William Wallace 1982, 58). 
National states and national interests, Hoffmann and Hansen would say, are the key to 
answering all the questions of integration, and these kinds of objections to 
neo-functionalism can be classified under the rubric of liberal 
intergovernmentalism.
57
Though traditional intergovernmentalism is on the opposite 
side of neo-functionalism, it is true that without cooperation and engagement of 
national states, any integration progress is impossible. This also leads to the revelation 
of another weakness of neo-functionalism: an inadequate account of domestic political 
processes and structures (Niemann 2006, 23; Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 53).  
 
2.3.5 Critiques of Neo-functionalism’s Elitist Nature 
Finally, neo-functionalism was attacked for its elitist nature which implies that 
European citizens were not considered to be actively involved in the integration 
process; without mass participation, the so-called “integration model” is undemocratic 
(Jensen 2010, 81). This also applies to the debate on the EU’s “democratic deficit”, and 
the fact that national referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected the EU 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005 shows another weakness in the theory of 
neo-functionalism: democratic accountability. The fathers of neo-functionalism, like 
Haas and Lindberg, did not attach much importance to the role of public opinion and 
citizen’s support for the integration project; rather they reached the conclusion that 
“there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in favor of European integration (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970, 41) and that this would suffice to sustain it” (Niemann and Schmitter 
2009, 48). The EU project is not only planned, set up, and pushed forward by political 
elites, but also needs the understanding and support of the ordinary citizens of Europe. 
 
2.4 Neo-Functionalism’s Renaissance during the 1990s 
Along with the European integration progress in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the 
creation of the Single Market and the establishment of the EU with the three-pillar 
structure, neo-functionalism gained a renaissance after years of obsolescence.
58
 
                                                 
57 See chapter three of this dissertation. 
58 Schmitter (2005, 264) has attributed the EC’s turnaround development in the mid-1980s to two 
changes in the European policy environment: one is the rising competitive power of other regions and 
countries, especially Japan; the other is that national states became incapable of achieving desired 
macro-economic outcomes, or even worse, got undesired outcomes as regards economic growth and 
monetary stability, as, for example, demonstrated by the Socialist government of François Mitterrand 
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Mostly, the Community’s development during this period has soundly justified the 
“spillover” effects as advocated by neo-functionalism. As Taylor observes, EC 
integration in the 1980s gained new momentum where “a new balance between the 
autonomy of the states and the integration of the European Community had been 
struck” (Taylor 1993, 75), and to understand the EC better, students need to return to 
the long-time unfashionable theory: neo-functionalism (Taylor 1993, 77). In 1991, 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen’s paper: “Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A 
Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC” signaled the “re-opening of 
the debate on neo-functionalism as an approach to the study of the EC” 
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 2).
59
 This theoretical revival trend was represented by, for 
example, Sandholtz (1996), Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997; 1998), Stone Sweet and 
Brunell (1998), Stone Sweet (2004), and Niemann (2006). Though neo-functionalism 
offers no clear direction for theoretical revisions and modifications and some 
neo-functionalist concepts are of limited usefulness to researchers (Niemann 2006, 23), 
neo-functionalist core ideas such as spillover effects and supranational tendencies 




2.4.1 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s Supranational Governance and 
“Transaction-Based” Theory 
2.4.1.1 Towards Supranational Governance: The Process of Institutionalization  
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) argue that though the traditional dialectical 
distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism is no longer sufficient 
to capture European integration, the two forge a continuum that can explain EU 
different policy areas effectively, with intergovernmental politics and supranational 
politics located at the left and right ends, respectively. From left to right, this 
                                                                                                                            
(1981–83). Schmitter emphasizes the external pressures pushing actors to be more integrative, such as 
the oil shocks and the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the 1970s, to the degree that “[m]uch 
of what has happened since the mid-1970s can better be attributed to external trends and shocks than 
to purely internal processes and functional engrenages” (Schmitter 2005, 266-67).  
59 Tranholm-Mikkelsen’s paper won the F.S. Northedge Essay Competition (established in 1986) of 
1991, and the quotation here is also the editors’ comment on Tranholm-Mikkelsen’s paper (see 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 1). 
60 It is worth pointing out that besides neo-functionalism, other theories and approaches were also 
applied to explain the re-launching of West European integration during the 1980s and 1990s. For 
instance, Cornett and Caporaso (1992) compared different explanations offered by neo-classical 
economic theory, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism to 
“EC 1992”, each theoretical tool approaching the Community from different perspectives. 
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continuum can measure the mode of governance of any given policy sector in the EU 
with the growing presence and intensity of three factors: EC rules, EC organizations 
and transnational society, as some areas are characterized by (more or less) 
supranationalism and others by (more or less) intergovernmentalism (1998, 8-9). Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz illustrate the continuum as follows: 
 
Figure 2.2 Patterns and Trends of Governance in the European Union 
Notes: From left to right, the presence of three factors (1) supranational organizations, (2) 
supranational rules, and (3) transnational society increases; this continuum is used to measure 
the influence of the three factors on EU policy-making processes and outcomes within any 
given policy sector as well as the developing trend of EU supranational governance. 
Sources: Adapted from Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998, 8). 
 
On the left pole, intergovernmental politics means the central players in 
policy-making are the national executives of the member states, who reach policy 
agreements via bargaining which in turn is shaped by the relative powers of member 
states as well as the state preferences originating from various domestic groups; the 
mode of intergovernmental politics is applicable, for instance, in the Council of 
Ministers, and governance at the EC level serves as “a passive structure that enhances 
the efficiency of interstate bargaining” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 8). By 
contrast, on the right pole, supranational politics refers to a governance mode of 
centralized-governmental structures, where “organizations constituted at the 
supranational level possess jurisdiction over specific policy domains within the 
territory comprised by the member states” and thus the behavior of all actors, including 
the member states, is constrained (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 8). Moving from 
the left end to the right suggests a momentum towards supranational governance.  
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz define supranational governance as “the competence 
of the European Community to make binding rules in any given policy domain” (1998, 
1) as a consequence of rising levels of transnational exchanges in trade and investment 
as well as the development of Euro-groups, networks and associations (1998, 2). 
 







Supranational governance happens because rising exchange costs activate governments 
to “adjust their policy positions in ways that favor the expansion of supranational 
governance” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 4). The behavior and processes of 
these transnational exchanges, on the one hand, are “decisively shaped by the 
institutional context of the EC”, while on the other hand, tend to “produce or reinforce 
supranational rule-making” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 2). As a result, along 
with “the expansion of transnational society, the pro-integrative activities of 
supranational organizations, and the growing density of supranational rules”, the 
processes of transnational exchange, while sustaining and getting embedded in 
intergovernmental bargaining and decision-making, “gradually, but inevitable, reduce 
the capacity of the member-states to control outcomes” (1998, 5). The prominent 
formal characteristic of supranational governance is its “centralized governmental 
structure”, that is, institutions at the supranational level, such as the European 
Commission, the ECJ, while the essence of supranational governance lies in the 
supranational institutions’ juridical power over the national member states in specific 
policy domains, whereby “supranational organizations are capable of constraining the 
behavior of all actors, including the member-states, within those domains” (Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 8). Therefore, the indicator to measure the degree of 
supranational governance is the binding power of EC rules on its member states, and 
this measurement is furthermore based on three interrelated dimensions: (1) “EC rules: 
the legal, and less informal, constraints on behavior produced by interactions among 
political actors operating at the European level”, (2) “EC organizations: those 
governmental structures, operating at the European level, that produce, execute, and 
interpret EC rules”, and (3) “Transnational society: those non-governmental actors who 
engage in intra-EC exchanges — social, economic, political — and thereby influence, 
directly or indirectly, policy-making processes and outcomes at the European level” 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 9). The presence and intensity of each of the three 
factors increase along the scale from left to right, so from point 1 to point 5, one should 
observe the following aspects and developments (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 
10).  
First, the presence and the degree of clarity and formalization of EC rules 
increase. At point 1, rules are few and their binding powers are weak as “they do not 
trump individual governmental interests that conflict with them”; as we move towards 
the right end, the presence of informal and formal rules increases and the binding 
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powers of EC rules grow. At point 5, rules are “highly formal, codified in treaty law, 
secondary legislation, and the ECJ’s jurisprudence” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 
10). In any given policy area, rules “grow more dense and elaborate” in “governing the 
interactions of all actors” along the continuum from left to right (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998, 10).  
Second, EC supranational institutions’ influence on policy-making processes and 
outcomes increases, that is, the autonomy of supranational bodies increases. Autonomy 
means EC institutions’ “capacity to define and pursue, on an ongoing basis, a 
politically relevant agenda” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 10). At point 1, EC 
institutions only facilitate intergovernmental negotiations and logistically lower the 
transaction costs for involved governments. At point 3, EC institutions may succeed in 
policy innovation — a form of relative but meaningful autonomy. At point 5, EC 
institutions can innovate even when facing member states’ indifference or hostility — a 
form of substantial autonomy. As soon as supranational organizations obtain 
autonomy, they acquire and exert the ability to “shape not only specific policy 
outcomes, but also the rules that channel policy-making behaviors” (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998, 11). Therefore, EU institutional autonomy can be measured by the 
actions the Commission initiates, the policy outcomes the EU finally realizes, and the 
decision-making rules the Council applies. 
Third, the presence and influence of transnational actors (e.g. interest groups, 
businesses, knowledge-based elites) on policy-making processes and outcomes 
increase. At point 1, national executives, who “mediate between domestic actors and 
supranational organizations and rules” have the ultimate say (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998, 10), while at point 5, transnational actors exert their influence, 
targeting national or supranational bodies and often playing one level off against the 
other. 
These three dimensions are considered to be the “crucial indicators of levels of 
integration in the EC”, which can help explain the unevenness of integration across 
policy areas, the degree of the EU’s supranational governance competence, and the 
dynamic nature of European integration over time (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 
304; 1998, 9). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz claim that this scale is useful for two 
purposes. First, it can be used to compare different degrees of supranational 
governance and development in various policy areas, as from left to right along the 
continuum, there is a growing presence and intensity of each of the three factors. For 
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example, policy sectors located at point 2 show a tendency towards intergovernmental 
politics, while those at point 4 exhibit strong features of supranationalism. Second, the 
scale can be used to measure the degree of EC integration, which means to measure the 
degree of EC institutionalization, as “integration” is defined as “the process by which 
the horizontal and vertical linkages between social, economic, and political actors 
emerge and evolve” and “these linkages […] are constructed and sustained by EC 
rules”, that is, they are institutionalized to different extents (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1998, 9).  
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz label those three — organizations, rules, 
transnational society — as “the supranational trio”, which mutually reinforce each 
other in the following logic: “[a]n expansion of the tasks or autonomy of supranational 
organizations creates opportunities for political action, which actors and groups will 
seek to exploit, thus expanding transnational society”; as “societal actors adjust their 
behaviors in response to new supranational rules, these rules can gradually be locked in” 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 11). The dynamics of European integration consist 
of the mutual reinforcement of the three factors, as a movement in one dimension tends 
to push the other two also to move — this is what Stone Sweet and Sandholtz call “an 
internal dynamic of institutionalization” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 11). Rules 
and rule-making are the core of the logic of institutionalization, and once the process 
towards the supranational pole begins, it is difficult to reverse what has already 
occurred, because current supranational settings and rules shape the context for 
subsequent interactions, defining actors’ objectives and interests, possible means to 
pursue self-interests, and dispute resolution mechanisms (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1998, 16-17); moreover, current supranational rules “delineate the contours of future 
policy debates as well as the normative and organizational terms in which they will be 
decided” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 17) — those views actually reflect the 
ideas of HI (cf. chapter four of this dissertation). Put simply, institutionalization is the 
process of rule creation, application and interpretation by those who live under them 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 16), and the binding force and intensity of the 
presence of rules are the indicators of the degree and strength of institutionalization. In 
the EU context, the EU Treaties directly created by the member states enjoy the legal 
status as primary Union law, and naturally, policy domains prescribed by the Treaties 
move more quickly towards supranational governance than other policy areas which 
are not contained in the Treaties. This supports the research result of Fligsten and 
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McNichol (1998, 85) that “[m]ost of the arenas in which the EU built competencies 
were laid down in the Treaty of Rome and the original language and definitions gave 
rise to organizational structures oriented towards producing legislation in those 
domains” — a tendency Fligstein and McNichol term “a path dependent fashion”. To 
sum up, the degree of EU supranational governance is corresponding to the EU’s 
process of institutionalization: if supranational governance is taken as a trend or result, 
institutionalization is the process and dynamic leading to such a supranational trend or 
outcome. Both the degree of the EU’s supranational governance and strength of 
institutionalization can be measured by the binding powers and the intensity of the 
presence of EU rules of the three interrelated dimensions: supranational bodies’ 
autonomy, the presence and the degree of clarity and formalization of EC rules, and the 
presence and influence of transnational actors on policy-making processes and 
outcomes.  
 
2.4.1.2 The Mechanism behind Institutionalization: Transaction-Based Theory  
An important deviation made by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz from traditional 
neo-functionalism is that they do not use the term “spillover” to explain European 
integration and the formation of supranational institutions within the EU. Instead, they 
develop a new approach called “transaction-based theory” for their research. The 
starting presumption is that societal actors, especially non-state actors, depend on 
European transactions: as there are expanding transactions across EU borders, 
transactors’ demands for regulation at the European level — European standards, rules, 
and dispute resolution mechanisms — definitely increase, which leads to the process of 
institutionalization and the establishment of supranational governance (Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz 1998, 11-12). Nevertheless, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) do not 
offer an unequivocal definition of what they call “transactions” and “transactors”, but 
they mention the term here and there: “exchange across national borders”, 
“transnational economic interests”, “intra-EC exchange”, “rules and organizations have 
favored economic actors with a stake in cross-border transactions (trade, investment, 
production, distribution)”, “transnational exchange (e.g. trade, investment, the 
development of Euro-groups, networks, and associations” (1998, 2); Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz emphasize that “transaction-based theory” is the foundation on which they 




“Our starting point is society, in particular, non-state actors who engage in 
transactions and communications across national border, within Europe. 
These are the people who need European standards, rules, and dispute 
resolution mechanisms — who need supranational governance. In the 
beginning, the causal mechanism is quite simple: increasing levels of 
cross-border transactions and communications by societal actors will 
increase the perceived need for European-level rules, coordination, and 
regulation.” (1998, 11) 
 
Therefore, “transactions” is quite an inclusive term to refer to any form of 
exchange across national borders, and the main feature of “transactions” is economic 
interests, while “transactors” are persons involved in transaction activities and 
demanding supranational rules and governance. Transactions and transactors are case 
specific, as the examples after Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s (1998) chapter illustrate: 
when Sandholtz (1998) applies the transactions-based theory to the 
telecommunications sector, transaction activities are defined in the area of transnational 
telecommunications illustrated by the figures and tables titled “Annual Percentage 
Change in EU Population, Intra-EU Trade, and Intra-EU Telephone Traffic” (138), 
“Correlations between Intra-EU Cross-Border Telephone Traffic and Trade, GDP, and 
Population” and “Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis: Intra-EU 
Cross-Border Telephone Traffic” (139), with the transactors interested in promoting 
pan-European telecommunications (i.e. equipment manufacturers, business users, new 
services providers, and alternative infrastructures), while Cameron (1998), who 
contends that the extension of supranational authorities of monetary and exchange-rate 
policy from the creation of the EEC to EMU was ultimately caused by increased 
economic interdependence among member states who then demanded tension 
resolutions at the EU level over monetary and exchange-rate issues alongside the 
progressive expansion of the single internal market (Cameron 1998, 190), utilizes the 
data of “Trade Dependence of the EU Member States, 1958-1995” (193), “The 
Concentration of EU Trade within the EU, 1958-1995” (194), “Realignments in the 
European Monetary System (EMS), March 1979-August 1992” (201), “The Balance of 
Trade within the European Community, 1973-1990: Cumulative Surplus (+) or Deficit 
(-) with Other EC Member States (in $bn.)” (203), “Growth and Unemployment in the 
European Union, 1995-1997” (207), and “Public Support in the EU for Introduction of 
a Single Currency, October-November 1996” (212). So the specification of 
transactions and transactors and accordingly, the relevant statistics, are subject to 
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specific policy areas and research topics, but a commonality stands out: cross-border 
economic activities among member states, that is, intra-EU trade and the mutual 
dependence of economies.  
European integration, indeed, has a “spillover mechanism”, but it is of 
transactions, by transactions and for transactions. The rationale is like this: “As the 
most obvious hindrances to cross-national exchange are removed, or their effects 
reduced by the transaction-cost-reduction behavior of supranational organizations and 
rules, new obstacles to such transactions are revealed and become salient”, and the new 
emerging obstacles must be tackled properly due to the demand of transactions and 
transactors (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 15). Three causal factors are behind this 
integration logic: transnational exchange, supranational organization, and EC rules 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; 1998, 25). This transaction-based theory is held to 
have explained the uneven integration speed for different EU policy areas, as “variation 
in the levels of cross-border interactions and in the consequent need for supranational 
coordination and rules” has decided the degrees of supranational governance for 
different issue areas (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 14). The higher are the intensity 
and values of cross-nation transactions, the stronger is the demand for the coordination 
of rules and dispute resolution mechanisms at the EU level; the lower the intensity and 
values of cross-border transactions, the less, weak or fewer demand there is for 
supranational rules and governance. So naturally “the EC has moved farthest towards 
the supranational pole with respect to managing the internal market”; by contrast, for 
the Community’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), “few societal 
transactors find its absence costly” and “[t]here is therefore minimal social demand for 
integration in that policy domain” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 14). In addition, 
“higher levels of transactions push the EC to legislate, the Court to clarify the rules, 
and interests to organize” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 14), and it is not 
surprising that the Commission exercises greater autonomy in the policy areas where 
transaction levels are high than in other areas where they are relatively low. Pollack’s 
research (1998) supports this argument as he finds that the Commission assumes more 
power in competition policy than in structural funds or in external trade, while within 
competition policy, the Commission has gained more authority in telecommunications 
than in the energy sector. This shows that a low level of cross-frontier transactions does 
not push supranational governance in the policy domains which though have ever been 
prescribed by the EU Treaties, whereas a high level of transactions leads to the creation 
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and growth of supranational governance even in a new area which has not been 
mentioned by the EU Treaties previously (e.g. the telecommunications sector) (Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 17-18). Because the impetus behind the newly established 
rules is to facilitate cross-border transactions, the new rules definitely will promote a 
higher level of transactions after their application, which in turn leads to new demands 
for new rules to facilitate transactions further, with transactors’ interests 
accumulatingly entrenched in the supranational rules and causing “a high degree of 
‘stickiness’ in movement along the continuum” towards supranational governance 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 19). So transaction-based theory expects more EC 
rules as there is an increasing level of transnational exchange (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997, 310). Along with new rules, policies and mechanisms, expanding 
transactions push forward the EU’s institutionalization process.  
In addition to their deviation from the concept of “spillover”, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz do not agree with Haas’s argument on political actors’ loyalty transferring 
from the national to the European level. Rather, they treat it as an open question, and 
supranational governance does not necessarily lead to “an ultimate shift in 
identification” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 6). Still, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz’s supranational governance argument is based on the rationales provided by 
neo-functionalism where “integration is the process by which the EC gradually but 
comprehensively replaces the nation-state in all of its functions” (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998, 4), with the result that “member-state governments become less and 
less proactive, and more and more reactive to changes in the supranational environment 
to which they belong” (1998, 6).
61
 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz state clearly that the 
three ingredients of their theory “are prefigured in neo-functionalism: the development 
of transnational society, the role of supranational organizations with meaningful 
autonomous capacity to pursue integrative agenda, and the focus on European 
rule-making to resolve international policy externalities” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1998, 6). The history of the Community in the 1980s and 1990s appears to have 
justified transaction-based theory as Treaty revisions were a response to the demand for 
more cooperation at the European level caused by the growth in transactions across 
                                                 
61 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz acknowledge their indebtedness to Deutsch’s ideas (e.g. Deutsch et al. 
1957; Deutsch 1966) on social exchange, communication and transaction, and to Haas’s thinking 
about the relationship between global interdependence, political choice, and the development of 
supranational institutions (see Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, 5).  
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national borders, while from another perspective, Treaty revisions are also “partially 
precipitated by the limits of the institutions and organizations of the EC to deal with 
these activities” (Fligstein and McNichol 1998, 86). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s 
“supranational governance”, however, attracted two kinds of criticism: first, it neglects 
the potential effects of external changes, and second, it again falls into the old 
“neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist” dichotomist pit as it privileges certain actors 
(i.e. supranational institutions) and concentrates only on a partial empirical aspect (i.e. 
day-to-day developments) of the EU (Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 54). The first kind 
of criticism appears justifiable, and as a matter of fact, later Niemann’s (2006) new 
concept of “exogenous spillover” can be regarded as a revision and supplement to this 
weakness of neo-functionalism, but the second type of criticism seems not to be fully 
justified as the dichotomous neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist debate serves as a 
source for later new approaches and theories on the EU.  
In sum, based on transaction-based theory, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s 
propositions on the dynamics of European integration (i.e. the internal dynamic of 
institutionalization) and supranational governance can be captured by the following 
hypothesis:  
H3: Rising cross-border transactions increase transactors’ demand for more 
regulation at the EU level (i.e. European standards, rules, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms), and this leads to the process of EU institutionalization where the degree 
of EU supranational governance increases while member-states’ capacity to control 
policy outcomes decreases, as the presence and the degree of clarity and formalization 
of EU rules, the Commission’s autonomy, and the presence and influence of 
transnational actors on policy-making increase and get mutually reinforced.  
If this mechanism is valid, then in case studies there should be evidence that: (1) 
cross-border transactions expand in one area while the absence of regulations in that 
area at the EU level is costly for transactors; (2) transactors demand more regulation at 
the supranational level; (3) the tasks or autonomy of EU institutions expand (such as 
the Commission exercising greater autonomy and/or the Court clarifying the rules); (4) 
transactors exploit the opportunity to influence the policy-making processes and the 
outcomes reflect transactors’ preferences; (5) EU rules are introduced, reinforced, 
revised or further clarified; (6) the application of new rules facilitates cross-border 
transactions, and the level and value of transactions increase after the implementation 
of new rules; (7) transactors adjust their behavior to adhere to the new rules and the 
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new rules are normalized as being “givens”; (8) when the urgent or most obvious 
hindrances to cross-national exchange are alleviated or removed, other related or new 
rising obstacles to transnational transactions become salient and pressing, and as a 
consequence, transactors demand more regulation at the EU level to facilitate 
transactions further; (9) as transactors’ interests accumulatingly get entrenched in EU 
supranational rules, the EU moves along the scale towards a high degree of 
supranational governance; (10) EU supranational governance is realized through the 
process of institutionalization, exhibiting a path dependent fashion which is difficult to 
reverse as current supranational rules not only provide means for transactors to pursue 
their interests and the mechanisms to resolve their disputes, but also shape the context 
for their subsequent interactions and delineate the normative and institutional contours 
of EU future policy; (11) there is a trade-off between supranational governance and 
intergovernmental politics, that is, increasing supranational governance implies 
decreasing control of member states on policy outcomes, a process by which nation 
state functions are gradually replaced by supranational institutions, national 
governments become reactive rather than proactive to changes in the supranational 
environment, and national executives gradually lose an ultimate say on policy 
formation. In short, the higher intensity and values of transnational exchange there are, 
the more and elaborated EU rules are; transactions are the engine to push forward the 
process of EU institutionalization and a higher degree of supranational governance, 
which also explain the degree of variation in supranational governance in difference 
areas and growing supranational governance in some areas which may have not been 
mentioned by the EU Treaties previously. Hypothesis 3 can be dissected into three 
sub-hypotheses of the internal dynamic of institutionalization, the trade-off between 
increasing supranational governance and member state control over EU policy-making, 
and the irreversible trend of EU supranational governance, each of which, against the 
background of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, can be stated as follows:  
H3a: Increasing cross-border transactions among euro states demand more 
regulation at the EU level (i.e. European standards, rules, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms), leading to a process of EU institutionalization where rules are 
introduced or reinforced on the basis of the mutual enforcement among EU institutions, 
EU rules, and transnational society. 
H3b: Along with the process of institutionalization during the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis, EU supranational governance increases while national capacity 
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to control economic and monetary policy outcomes is reduced.  
H3c: During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the EU’s new developments, 
which result from increasing cross-border transactions and transactors’ demand for 
more regulation at the EU level, lead to a higher degree of EU supranational 
governance, which is hard to reverse as current supranational rules both define 
transactors’ means to pursue their interests and dispute resolution mechanisms that 
shape the context for subsequent interactions and delineate the normative and 
institutional contours of future policy.  
The mechanism suggested by H3a consists of consecutive steps of (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9), while H3b indicates a causal chain connecting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(7) (8) (9) (11). H3c, stating a causal relationship with the sequence of (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10), actually is an expression of the idea of path dependence of HI, and 
its test can also be carried out under the banner of Pierson’s path dependence or HI. 
Obviously, the ultimate forces underlying H3 as well as H3a, H3b, and H3c are 
transnational economic activities and trade interdependence among member states, as 
the common causal chains of (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9), summarizing the 
propositions of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s transactions-based theory, start from the 
expansion of cross-nation trade. Compared with H1, H3 can be seen as an extension of 
H1, exhibiting the continuity of neo-functionalist core arguments: supranational 
tendency and supranational governance, where transnational economic trade is the 
cornerstone of both H1 and H3. The core of political integration is EU collective 
decision-making, which is actually a part of EU rules, so theoretically, if there is any 
European political integration, there should also be EU supranational governance, 
and if political integration increases, so does the degree of EU supranational 
governance. In case analyses, this dissertation will also explore the connection between 
H1 and H3.  
 
2.4.1.3 Pierson’s HI and Pollack’s Principal-Agent Analysis 
When Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998, 19) explain their arguments of transactors’ 
entrenched interests for EC rules and the “stickiness” of the EC’s movement towards 
supranational governance along the continuum, they resort to “two logics”: Pierson’s 





 and Pollack’s (1998) principal-agent analysis to the Commission’s 
autonomy, both of which support and reinforce Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s 
supranational governance arguments. Pierson’s HI contains two themes: first, the EC’s 
political development must be viewed through time — it is historical; second, the 
temporal process of the EU is defined by and embedded in institutional rules, 
structures, or norms — it is institutionalist (Pierson 1998, 29). Once institutional and 
policy changes are there, actors will adapt themselves to these changes, which may 
cause unexpected or undesired outcomes that are difficult to unwind; meanwhile, 
adaptations to previous decisions will raise the “sunk costs” for governments to exit 
from supranational governance. As a result, a reversal of a supranational governance 
course is unattractive and difficult (Pierson 1998, 45). In comparison, Pollack employs 
a principal-agent model to explore the relationship between the Commission and 
national governments as far as structural policy, competition policy and external trade 
policy are concerned. According to Pollack’s principal-agent model, member 
governments have delegated their powers to the Commission, and the Commission de 
facto has gained independent preferences for policy-making and policy implementation, 
possessing considerable autonomy to pursue its “more European” interests, but such 
preferences and autonomy “have been constrained in particular by the preferences of 
the member governments, by the varying possibilities for sanctioning available to 
dissatisfied member governments, by the information available to the Commission and 
the member governments at different points in time, and by the Commission’s varying 
ability to strike up alliances with transnational actors and with other supranational 
organizations such as the European Court of Justice” (Pollack 1998, 224; see also 
Pollack 1997). Pollack’s argument is another way to assert the existence and influence 
of EU supranational governance and EU supranational institutions’ autonomy, which is 
conditioned by the state of policy institutionalization at a given time and may vary in 
degree for different policy areas. As a consequence of the process of 
institutionalization and supranational governance, Treaty amendments and expansion 
are necessary and possible, and once a shift towards supranational governance has 
occurred, the supranational tendency is hard to reverse. 
 
                                                 




2.4.2 Supranational Governance and the European Court of Justice 
Having been building up its supranational authority and supremacy over national legal 
systems over time, the ECJ is frequently taken as an example to illustrate the EU’s 
supranational governance and its institutional autonomy (e.g., Burley and Mattli, 1993; 
Stone Sweet 2004; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). For instance, Burley and Mattli 
(1993) argue that in the EC there is a “legal integration” process in which EC law has 
gradually penetrated member states’ domestic law via two principal ways: (1) formal 
penetration — the expansion of supranational legal acts (i.e. Treaty law and secondary 
community law) taking precedence over domestic law and the increasing numbers and 
types of cases in which individuals resort to community law directly in their national 
courts; (2) substantive penetration — the spillover effect of legal regulation from the 
economic domain to social and political areas such as political participation rights and 
occupational health and safety. Accompanying those penetration processes is the legal 
uniformity in interpreting EC law (Burley and Mattli 1993, 43). Burley and Mattli 
(1993, 65-69) claim that neo-functionalism’s three dynamics (i.e. functional, political 
and cultivated spillover) are working well in the building-up of the EC legal system 
and are appropriate to account for the EC’s legal integration (see also section 2.1.1.4). 
They point out that during the 1960s and 1970s, the ECJ has set up its legal doctrines 
over national legal affairs and thus has propelled European political integration. The 
reason for the effectiveness of law is the perception of the separation between law and 
politics, where legal integration is regarded as “a nominally nonpolitical sphere” 
(Burley and Mattli 1993, 69). Nevertheless, from Burley and Mattli’s point of view, 
law is a mask and shield, which “hides and protects the promotion of one particular set 
of political objectives against contending objectives in the purely political sphere”; in 
fact, legal decisions are inevitably of political significance, and as a result, gradually 
“economic integration might ultimately lead to political integration” (1993, 72). Burley 
and Mattli conclude that the Court does have the power to pursue its own 
pro-integration agenda, and meanwhile, the autonomy of the Court embarks on a 
particular developing path which is difficult for member states to monitor or control 
(Burley and Mattli 1993, 74). Burley and Mattli acknowledge their affinities to 
neo-functionalism and especially express their indebtedness to Haas’s neo-functionalist 
ideas (Burley and Mattli 1993, 43), and they believe “neo-functionalism offers a 
genuine political theory of an important dimension of European integration” (Burley 
and Mattli 1993, 76).  
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Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998) also propose a theory of European legal 
integration. They list three causal factors that contribute to EU legal integration: 
transnational exchange, triadic (i.e., of two disputants and a dispute resolver) dispute 
resolution, and the production of legal norms, based on which they argue that “on 
crucial points, intergovernmentalists have gotten it wrong” (Stone Sweet and Brunell 
1998, 63). According to Stone Sweet and Brunell, these three factors, while being 
analytically independent, exert interdependent effects on each other and the theoretical 
logic for the supranational polity is as follows: transnational exchange (factor 1) leads 
to transnational social frictions and disputes, which, in one respect, promote dispute 
resolutions (transnational triadic dispute resolution — factor 2), and in another respect, 
demand for normative solutions (transnational rules — factor 3) because these frictions 
and disputes expose problems which require collective action, and thereby 
supranational governance is established; once the causal connections between the three 
factors have been forged, the legal system will gain self-sustaining and expansionary 
dynamics to move further (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, 64-65). Stone Sweet and 
Brunell highlight the Treaty system’s transformative power of constitutionalization — 
“the process by which the EC treaties have evolved from a set of legal arrangements 
binding upon sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring 
judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public 
and private, within EC territory” (e.g., Article 177 of the Rome Treaty establishes and 
explains a preliminary reference to the ECJ) — which make the EC of 
intergovernmental cooperation evolve into “a multi-tiered system of governance 
founded on higher law constitutionalism” (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, 65). As a 
consequence, within the EC, “the operation of the legal system has progressively 
reduced the capacity of national governments to control policy outcomes, while it has 
enhanced the policy influence of the EC’s supranational institutions, national judges, 
and private actors” (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, 77).  
The arguments of Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Brunell are in line with Haas’s 
initial propositions, as Stone Sweet writes: “[o]ur results provide broad support for 
some of the core claims of ‘neofunctionalist’ theory, first developed by Ernst Haas 
(1958; 1961). […] We formalized these insights as hypotheses, gathered data on the 
processes commonly associated with European integration, and tested out hypotheses 
in diverse ways. The evidence supports Haas’s basic intuitions” (Stone Sweet 2005, 6). 
One thing is in common with neo-functionalists: analyzing the EU project from the 
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economic interests of transnational exchange (e.g. for Haas, the starting research point 
is economic integration, for Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, cross-border transactions, and 
for Stone Sweet and Brunell, transnational exchange). This could be justified by the 
nature and purposes of the Community, which is “DESIRING to contribute […] to the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade” (The Treaty of Rome, p.2); 
“[t]he Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in 
goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs 
duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the 
adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries” (The 
Treaty of Rome, Article 9, emphasis added). As for political integration as argued by 
Haas (Haas 1958; 1961), the “loyalty transfer” and the establishment of “a new 
political community” might be doubted or only partially confirmed, but the EU’s 
supranational jurisdiction over national legal systems has happened, and it is 
acknowledged by some political scientists that “legal integration had significantly 
outpaced economic and political integration” (Mattli and Slaughter 1998, 177). The 
supranational tendency is fully confirmed as regards EU juridical development.  
 
2.5 Neo-Functionalism’s Development in the New 
Millennium 
2.5.1 Jensen’s Institutional/Legalistic Spillover 
In its revival trend since the 1990s, neo-functionalism has been developed, enriched 
and invigorated. Jensen (2000) applies the traditional neo-functionalist concept of 
“spillover” to analyze the EU’s social and labour market issues since the mid-1980s. 





reaches the conclusion that there is increasing political integration in EU social policy 
and labour market fields, and on the basis of the neo-functionalist concept of spillover, 
he develops and supplements traditional neo-functionalism by introducing a new 
integration dynamic — “institutional/legalistic spillover” — to illustrate and capture 
the increasingly significant integrative effects of the treaty negotiations on the 
development of co-operation in these areas. This new form of dynamic mechanism, 
derived from the amendments to EC Treaties (see Jensen 2000, 86-87), can be stated in 
                                                 
63 See “Figure 3.2. A Scale of the Locus of Decision-Making” by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 




hypothesis form as follows:
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H4: When institutional and legal rules and procedures are applied in the policy 
areas where political integration has reached the most advanced stage of development 
(i.e. decisions by QMV in the Council), there is a spillover effect of these rules and 
procedures which tend to affect other related areas where political integration is least 
developed (i.e. unanimity in the Council) as the Commission tends to choose the use of 
QMV as its proposals’ legal bases for member states to reach agreement and thus 
arouses member states’ attention to the limits of current decision-making of unanimity. 
Jensen confirms the validity of H4 by the evidence that three Treaty revisions in 
a decade, from the SEA (1986), to the TEU (1992), and then to the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1997), gradually but steadily extended the legal/institutional basis for EU cooperation: 
the QMV mode in the Council of Ministers was applied for an increasing number of 
issues, while the use of unanimity was constrained into less areas. According to Jensen 
(2000, 86), roughly speaking, in the original Treaty of Rome, unanimity is the norm for 
decision-making; nevertheless, along with the three treaty revisions from the middle of 
the 1980s to the end of the1990s, decisions reached by QMV expanded, spilling over 
from the creation of the Single Market to other policy areas, and at the same time, the 
practice of the veto by member states has been abolished in many cases. Obviously, 
Jensen uses the decision-making mode in the Council of the Ministers to measure the 
degree of EU political integration, and he regards the application of QMV in the 
Council for EU decision-making as the most advanced stage for the cooperation among 
member states while the practice of national veto and the unanimous voting mode as 
the least developed form of EU political integration. Jensen’s institutional/legalistic 
spillover expects more application of QMV in newly revised EU treaties (e.g. the 
Lisbon Treaty of 2009) and also in less politically integrated policy areas, because the 
Commission, acting as a promoter rather than a mediator, tends to formulate its 
proposals in reference to the legal basis of using QMV rather than unanimity for 
member states to reach agreement. Due to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
from 1 December 2009 onwards, the co-decision procedure, where the EP co-decides 
with the Council using QMV, has obtained the legal status of the OLP and extended 
into most EU policy decision-making areas — just like the OLP (“ordinary legislative 
                                                 
64 Jensen (2000) does not explicitly formulate his institutional/legalistic spillover as a testable 
hypothesis, and here this dissertation puts forward the hypothesis as an effort to summarize and 
conceptualize Jensen’s arguments (especially Jensen 2000, 86-87). 
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procedure”) name suggests, “ordinary” means the “[d]ecision-making procedure that is 
most commonly used in the EU for adopting legislation” (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 
301).
65
 Such a fact justifies Jensen’s institutional/legalistic spillover, and it also shows 
that the decision-making mode prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty is both the fundamental 
basis as well as the ultimate limit for current EU policy-making, as Jensen (2000, 90) 
argues that institutional/legalistic spillover also indicates that “political integration of 
specific areas of policy (e.g. social and labour market policy) is subordinate to more 
general legalistic and institutional principles in the Community”. The rationale behind 
institutional/legalistic spillover is like this: in order to facilitate the adoption of certain 
policies and realize a closer union, current limits of policy-making by unanimity should 
be broken through; as a result, Treaty amendments to broaden the legal basis for QMV 
decision-making are necessary and unavoidable. A good example to support this, 
Jensen (2000, 88) says, is that the Commission drew member states’ attention to the 
limitations of the SEA when they were negotiating revisions to the EU Treaties. In 
light of institutional/legalistic spillover, we can expect that after the Lisbon Treaty, if 
there is be any grand treaty revisions, QMV should be applied for even more policy 
areas than what are prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty. In short, the core idea of Jensen 
(2000) is that institutional/legalistic spillover causes the expansion of the use of QMV 
in the Council, and at the same time it also signals an increasing degree of EU political 
integration.  
Clearly, H4 — Jensen’s institutional/legalistic spillover — deals with the voting 
mode changes in the Council between EU Treaty revisions, assuming a progressive 
expansion of QMV; accordingly, this dissertation will test this spillover mechanism by 
examining the QMV changes in the Lisbon Treaty. At first glance, 
institutional/legalistic spillover appears to be in effect, as the Lisbon Treaty legalized 
the co-decision procedure as the OLP covering most policy areas; as a consequence, 
the use of QMV gets expanded into more policy areas and the degree of EU political 
integration increases. Nevertheless, the process leading to institutional/legalistic 
                                                 
65 Piris (2010) gives a comprehensive legal and political analysis on the Lisbon Treaty, and for 
detailed information on the changes of legal bases introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, see the 
Appendices 4-8 in Piris (2010, 365-97). One thing deserves mentioning: not only are there legal bases 
switched from unanimity to QMV, but also from QMV to unanimity in the Council (i.e. related to the 
enhanced co-operation in CFSP) (see Piris 2010, 394). Moreover, unanimity or common agreement 
continues in a number of important areas (around eighty cases), “such as taxation, social security and 
social policy, (…) the multiannual financial framework, (…) as well as most of the measures in CFSP 
including defence” (Piris 2010, 213).  
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spillover of the Lisbon Treaty (i.e. “as the Commission tends to choose the use of QMV 
as its proposals’ legal bases for member states to reach agreement and thus arouses 
member states’ attention to the limits of current decision-making of unanimity.”) still 
needs to be confirmed, which suggests the study and comparison of the legal basis of 
Commission proposals before (i.e. under the Nice Treaty) and after the Lisbon Treaty. 
As for the research of this dissertation, we will see whether there were any differences 
if the three new measures selected as cases studies would be proposed with different 
legal bases by the Commission before the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, when H4 posits 
that QMV expands from the most advanced political integrated area to the least 
politically integrated area, it implies the following: (1) in the Council of Ministers 
which represents nation state’s interests, QMV is the most advanced form of European 
nation states’ cooperation and unanimity is the least developed form of political 
integration; and (2) political integration of specific policy areas is subordinated to EU 
general legalistic and institutional principles, that is, no policy-making should be 
beyond the decision-making mode of QMV prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty, and the 
form of QMV laid down in the Lisbon Treaty should represent the highest degree of 
EU political integration up to now. In case studies, we will examine whether there is 
any supporting evidence for those. 
Two points need to be clarified and elaborated further. First, when arguing for 
institutional/legalistic spillover, Jensen (2000) focuses on EU Treaty revisions and the 
role of supranational actors (in particular the Commission) in promoting co-operation 
of social and labour market policies, thus exploring “the integrative effects of the treaty 
negotiations on the development of co-operation”(71); however, EU decision-making 
is multi-faceted and complex. According to Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg (2013, 
201), EU decision-making can be grouped into two basic types: the first type refers to 
those of “history-making”, such as treaty changes and setting out strategies for the 
whole EU for a period of years; the second type is about those of daily law-making 
(see Table 2.4). Jensen’s research reflects the characteristics of both types of 
decision-making, particularly analyzing the Commission’s pro-integrative role in the 
Community’s legislative process, which, however, in light of Table 2.4, only deals with 
the most characteristic policy-making within the EU: the Community method. Second, 
describing as well as prescribing decision-making in the Council, the term “QMV” has 
different variations as it developed through EU history. QMV simply means the 
“[d]ecision-making rule in the Council which requires a majority that is substantially 
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larger than a simple majority of (50%+1), but does not require unanimity” (Lelieveldt 
and Princen 2011, 302). As Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg (2013, 202-204) stress, 
the Community method at the EU level starts from a two-fold power separation 
between the Commission and the Council, with a unanimous rule in the Council, which 
over time evolves into a three-fold power separation between the Commission, the 
Council and the EP; alongside the evolution, two significant components have been 
introduced into the Community method: QMV in the Council and a powerful 
legislative role of the EP. Accordingly, decision-making of the Council has undergone 
two stages: from the Rome Treaty to the 1970s, “unanimity in the Council was the 
decision rule in all legislative decisions”; in the mid-1980s, the process of making 
changes to the Community method as well as the Council decision rules was initiated 
due to the requirement to complete the European single market (Warleigh-Lack and 
Drachenberg 2013, 202). Nevertheless, when Jensen said “[r]oughly speaking, in the 
original Treaty of Rome, unanimity was the norm for adopting proposals on 
co-operation between the member states, whereas the three revisions referred to above 
(i.e. the SEA, the EU Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty) have led to a situation in 
which decisions (on a very wide range of issues) are reached by a qualified majority” 
(2000, 86), it does not mean the term QMV was invented in the later days; in fact, the 
Treaty of Rome has already laid down both decision-making rules for the Council. For 
example,  
 
“The Commission shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such 
negotiations shall be undertaken before the end of the second year after the 
entry into force of this Treaty and be concluded before the end of the first 
stage. 
If, for certain products, no agreement can be reached within these periods, 
the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, acting unanimously 
until the end of the second stage and by a qualified majority thereafter, 
determine the duties in the common customs tariff.” (The Treaty of Rome, 
Article 20) 
 
In practice, however, during the empty chair crisis caused by De Galle’s vetoes, 
“[t]ensions further increased when de Gaulle objected to a scheduled change in 
decision-making rules in the Council that would introduce a new rule for making 
decisions, called qualified majority voting (QMV)” (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 
13-14), and it is not until in the 1980s that QMV was “effectively introduced” into the 
139 
 
Council as the member states agreed to give up their veto powers and national 
sovereignty in some areas so as to realize market integration (Warleigh-Lack and 
Drachenberg 2013, 202). Since the Treaty of Rome of 1957, QMV, embodying an 
attempt to strike a balance between larger and smaller member states and based on 
weighted votes attributed to member states, implies two rules needed to be specified: (1) 
how to distribute votes among the member states, and (2) the threshold to adopt a 
decision (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 97), so along with Community enlargement, the 
power distribution entailed in QMV also gets changed.
66
 The current QMV in the 
Council (of EU-27) is defined by the Nice Treaty, which requires “a triple majority”: (a) 
a minimum 255 votes out of the 345, (b) a simple majority of member states (14 out of 
27 member states), and (c) those member states represent at least 62% of the EU 
population (see e.g. Piris 2010, 213-14; Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 97; see also Table 
6.23). After the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a new regime of QMV called 
a “double majority” with two thresholds of (a) at least 55% of the members of the 
Council and (b) at least 65% of the EU population; besides, a decision can be blocked 
by a minority group of at least four member states (Article 16 (4) TEU).
67
 This new 
voting system will enter into force on 1 November 2014, but there is a transitional 
period from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 during which the current QMV is still 
applicable at the request of a member state (Lisbon Treaty, Protocols of (No 9) and (No 
36)); this means the new QMV method will become fully effective from 1 April 2017. 
The most prominent impact introduced by the new QMV regime is the changes of 
member state voting weights. For instance, the voting weight of Germany will almost 
double to 16%, while Ireland’s voting weight will be reduced from 2% to less than 1% 
(Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 98).
68
 Despite the fact that the voting weights of 
member states evolve and change over time, in reality, formal voting does not take 
place often in the Council and around 90% of the Council decisions are adopted by 
informal consensus; still, the distribution of votes plays in the background of Council 
negotiations, as a nation state’s bargaining position largely depends upon its capacity to 
forge a blocking minority (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 98-99). 
                                                 
66 See “Box 28. Evolution of the Weight of Council Members’ Votes since 1957” in Piris (2010, 
218-19). 
67 For more details about the rules that may lead to a blockade in the Council, see Article 238(2) 
TFEU; more explanation relating to the implementation of Article 16(4) TEU, see “Box 30. The 2009 
‘Ioannina-Bis’ Mechanism” in Piris (2010, 224). 





Table 2.4 EU Daily Decision-Making: Policy-Making Patterns, Decision-Making Procedures, and 






Key features of 
policy-making pattern: 
different degree of the 
involvement of EU 
main institutions (a. the 
Commission; b. the 
Council; c. the EP; d. 
the Court of Justice of 
the European Union 
(CJEU)) 
The spectrum of 
decision-making 
procedures (legislative 
procedures): between the 
community method (A) and 
the intergovernmental 
method (B) 
Types of decisions 
(the legal tool-kit): four 
basic instruments and 









a: taking policy lead 
and monopolizing 
drafting and tabling of 
legislative proposal;  
b&c: usually get 
involved in the OLP 
where the EP jointly 
decides with the 
Council using QMV; if 
not, the EP must be 
consulted before any 
final decision can be 
taken; 








A: a way of making 
decisions in which the 
EU’s supranational 
institutions play an 
important role, 
typically referring to 
the OLP (i.e the 
co-decision 
procedure), where 
a: exclusive (i.e sole) 
right of initiative;  
b: a QMV decision 
rule; 
c: full power of 
amemdment and 
consent;  
Roughly alongside the 
policy-making pattern 
and the spectrum of 
decision-making, four 
basic legal instruments, 
that is, Regulations (I), 
Directives (II), 
Decisions (III), and 
Recommendations and 
Opinions (IV), as a 
whole or partially, are 
applicable to most EU 
policy areas with 
different degrees of 
binding powers upon 
the member states; 
                                                 
69 Lelieveldt and Princen (2011, 79-104) make a distinction between “types of decisions taken within 
the EU” and “types of decision-making procedures existing in the EU”. The first category refers to a 
range of different types of legal instruments which differ in the degree of the binding power to the 
member states, represented by the four basic legal instruments prescribed by Article 288 TFEU: 
Regulations, Directives, Decisions, and Recommendations and Opinions; the second category 
includes the “ordinary legislative procedure”(OLP) and “special legislative procedures”. In 
comparison, Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg (2013) argue for EU “policy-making patterns” from 
another perspective, and they mention the four basic legal instruments as four types of EU legal acts. 
It should be emphasized once more that EU decision-making is multilevel, diversified, and 
complicated, and there is no “one-size-fits-all” summary of various forms of EU decision-making, 
and for different categorizations, there are always exceptions and special cases. For instance, 
normally, the European Council has no formal role in the legislative procedures, but it can act as an 
“appeal body” by unanimity for the Council, and the decisions of the CFSP can be adopted by the 
Council and/or the European Council; as no legislation can be adopted under the CFSP, strictly 
speaking, decision-making procedures under the CFSP are not “special legislative procedures” 




over all legislation.  b&c: have to agree to 
a proposal before it 
can be aported, and 
can adopt 
amendments to the 
proposal; 
Generally, in policy 
areas of taxation and 
budget, judicial and 
police cooperation, 
and foreign policy, the 
OLP is complemented 
with additonal safety 
valves or is replaced 
by another 
procedures. 
I,II and III: having the 
legally binding power 
to different addressees: 
I: binding in its entirety 
and applicable in all 
member states; II: 
binding upon each 
member state who 
needs to choose 
national forms and 
methods to transpose 
EU legislation into 
domestic law; III: 
binding in its entirety, 
but concerning 
inividual cases;  
I & II: constituting the 
EU’s legislative 
acts/two types of 
legislation, meaning 
creating a fixed legal 
framework across all 
member states or 
allowing variations 
between member states;  
IV: no binding force, 
which may assume 
other names, such as 
“(broad) guidelines” by 
the Council. 
 
2: The regulatory 
mode 




 EU institutions 




a: agenda setter, 
engaging with 
stakeholders, experts, 
and agencies to develop 
regulations; 
b&c: co-legislate; 
d: playing significant 






a: agenda setter and 
overseeing 
implementation; 
b: main legislator, 
deciding mainly by 
unanimity; 
c: being the key actor 
in deciding the Budget; 









a: not an exclusive 
agenda setter, member 
states also having the 
right of policy 
initiation;  
b: decisions by 
unanimity (also in the 
European Council);  
c: in weak consultative 
position (in regard to 
consent to international 
agreements); 















B: a way of making 
decisions where 
member state 
governments play a 
central role; various 
other legislative 
procedures, 
collectively known as 
“special legislative 
procedures”, where, to 
a greater or lesser 
extent, 
a: has to share its right 
of initiative with 
Special legal 
instruments beyond the 
basic four are applied, 
such as those for the 
CFSP (which only have 
legal effects “between” 
rather than “within” the 
member states and 
where the CJEU does 
not have the 











b: makes decisions by 
unanimity; 
c: has only an 
advisory role or no 




aspects of fiscal 
policy) 
 The Open 
Method of 
Coordination (OMC) is 
the main policy-making 
instrument 




in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity  
a: playing increasingly 
important monitoring 
and agenda-setting role; 
b: setting policy goals 
and guidelines by 
unanimity; 
a&b: member states 
submit to the 
Commission and the 
Council annual reports 
on their progress; 
c: being excluded; 
d: playing a marginal 
role. 
 
Introduced in March 2000 
by the Lisbon Strategy*, 
the OMC is a 
policy-making procedure 
that does not yield any 




convergence via processes 
of benchmarking and 
policy learning (no 
penalties and relying on the 
incentives of “peer 
pressure”);  
The OMC fills the gaps of 
the policy areas where 
member states do not want 
to be bounded by EU 
legislation, while realizing 
that policy coordination is 
necessary to achieve 
economic ambitions, thus 
being strongly of 
intergovernmental nature. 
 
No binding decisions 
are allowed, so the 
OMC never takes the 
form of regulations (I), 
directives (II), or 
decisions (III). 
The working mechanism of the OMC, largely driven by the member states 
themselves assembled in the Council and assuming various forms in different 
policy areas: 
 The Council determines the objectives to be achieved in an area as well as 
the indicators to measure the attainment of those objectives;  
 Each member state formulates an action plan for reaching the objectives; 
 Based on those indicators, the performance of each member state is 
“benchmarked” (i.e. being assessed and compared to the performance of 
other member states); 
As being “soft law” measures but never taking the form of directives, regulations 
or decisions, the OMC takes place in policy areas of national competence, such as 
employment, social protection, social inclusion, education, youth and training. 
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The EP and CJEU play no role in the OMC process.  
  
 
Three decision-making procedures (the ordinary, special, OMC)  
 
Two general categories 
and applications of 
decisions and legal 
instruments  
Differ in the power distribution and role of the EU’s three main institutions 
a: exclusive (“sole”) right of initiative or not; b: unanimous or a QMV 
decision rule; c: consent required or not  
Category 1: normal 
types, the four basics 
(I,II,III,IV), applicable 
for most decisions and 
policy areas; for some 
policy areas, all types 
of the four are aviable 
(e.g. the establishment 
of the single market), 
while in other areas, 
not all of them are 
applicable (e.g. in the 
social policy area, the 
EU can adopt 
Directives, not 
Regulations, and for the 
sensitive issues relating 
to social exclusion and 
social protection within 
the social policy, EU 
legislation is not 
allowed, that is, no EU 
binding legislation is 
there at all);  
Category 2: Other 
types: special legal 
instruments for cetain 
policy areas (e.g. for 
the CFSP). 
 
      A                                                    B  
     
greater power to                 greater power to national governments 
supranational institutions                                                                               
The Community Method: The Intergovernmental Method: 






procedures” (in most cases 
combining an advisory EP 









   
Example: decision-making procedures in EU social policy 
Ordinary Special OMC 
 Occupational safety 
and health 
 Working conditions  
 Information and 
consultation of workers 
 Equality between male 
and female workers 
 Integration of persons 

























   
Legislation allowed (but only Directives in this field) NO 
legislation 
The differention between legislative and non-legislative acts is made through the type of adoption 
procedure and not through the denomination of the act. The ordinary and special legislative 
procedures result in legisative acts and otherwise the act does not belong to the cateory of legislative 
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acts (Article 289(3) TFEU). 
The closer to member state vital interest or more politically sensitive an issue is, the more likely the 
Council decides unanimously, and the smaller the role of the Commsision and the EP will be. In the 
OMC, the EP and the CJEU play no role. 
No legislation can be adopted without the consent of the Council, while the role of the Commission 
and the EP varies among different issues. 
 
The logic behind and navigating the maze of EU decision-making 
(1) Fostering EU-wide approaches to 
issues; 
(2) Protecting member state sovereignty;  
Allowing for variation in the balance between 
common EU policies and the national 
government powers. 
(3) Installing an element of democracy by the participation of the EP. 
Notes: the lowercase letters a, b, c, d stand for the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the 
EP, and the CJEU (the ECJ), the uppercase letters A and B for the Community method and 
the intergovernmental method, the Roman numbers I, II, III, and IV for the four basic 
decision types and legal instruments, representing Regulations, Directives, Decisions, and 
Recommendations and Opinions, respectively. 
The OMC and the Lisbon strategy *: The origins of the OMC can be traced back to the 
European Employment Strategy, “where it provided a new framework for cooperation 
between Member States by directing national policies towards common objectives in areas 
which fall within the competence of the Member States, such as employment, social 
protection, social inclusion, education, youth and training”. As an intergovernmental 
instrument of “soft coordination” with peer evaluation pressures, the OMC tends to assign the 
Commission a survellience role and be used “as a reporting device rather than one of policy 
development”. (European Commission-SEC (2010) 114 Final, 21) 
Sources: Own compilation and adaptation from Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg (2013, 203), 
Lelieveldt and Princen (2011, 79-104), Piris (2010, 92-94), and the European Commission 
website of Glossary: 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm>.  
 
Obviously, EU policy-making is diversified and multileveled, where EU main 
institutions are involved in different degrees and assume different weights. In light of 
the propositions of H4, the Community method of the OLP (which includes patterns 1 
and 2 in Table 2.4) stands for the most advanced stage of political integration of the EU 
up to now, as the EP and the Council co-legislate where the Council adopts the 
decision rule of QMV, so Table 2.4 appears to have confirmed H4, but still the 
mechanisms suggested by H4 require a closer examination in the case studies before 
drawing conclusions. Moreover, according to the categorization of Table 2.4, if the 
policies originally covered by patterns 3, 4 and 5 with unanimity in the Council get 
changed into QMV rules, H4 then will be vindicated to be correct. As the topic of this 
dissertation is related to employment and fiscal policy, case studies of this dissertation 
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will check whether the policy-making patterns for and of the EU’s new measures 
indicate any movement from unanimity to QMV. Originally, Jensen’s 
institutional/legalistic spillover (H4) intends to hypothesize and explain the 
developments between EU treaty revisions, but this dissertation will test whether H4 is 
also effective in accounting for the EU’s new developments during the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis. Last but not least, when putting forward institutional/legalistic 
spillover, Jensen makes use of the evidence of increasing political integration in the 
social and labour market fields to support his argument, but he finds that traditional 
neo-functional spillover concepts are inadequate to account for such developments, so 
he puts forward institutional/legalistic spillover as a supplement to the traditional 
spillover theses. Hence, carrying out the test of H4 also implies the correctness of H1, 
and from Jensen’s (2000) vantage point, institutional/legalistic spillover accompanies 
EU political integration. 
 
2.5.2 Niemann’s Revised Neo-functionalist Framework and Exogenous 
Spillover 
Adopting early neo-functionalist ideas, Arne Niemann (2006) develops a new 
neo-functionalist framework to analyze the PHARE programme, the reform of the 
Common Commercial Policy, and the communitarisation of visa, asylum and 
immigration policy. To be specific, Niemann revises early neo-functionalist 
assumptions in the following way: first, he rejects neo-functionalism as “a grand 
theory”
70
; instead, he takes it as a useful “partial theory” in a wider sense to account for 
only some parts of the EU; second, he dismisses European integration as an automatic 
and exclusively dynamic process, but rather views it as a dialectical process of both 
dynamics and countervailing forces defined by certain conditions; third, he proposes 
the components of countervailing forces: sovereignty-consciousness, domestic 
constraints and diversities, and a negative integrative climate, which mainly account 
for nationalism, variation among member states in choices for integration, and 
unfavorable opinions of European integration during economic recession, respectively; 
fourth, while admitting elites play a primary role to enhance European integration, he 
                                                 
70 Risse-Kappen mentions this is neo-functionalism’s “n=1” problem, which hopes to make an 
integration theory sui generis to explain the EU, while liberal intergovernmentalism, from 
Risse-Kappen’s point of view, does avoid this problem, as “it is linked to general theories of domestic 
preference formation, bargaining, and international cooperation” (1996, 56). 
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also emphasizes the publics’ impact on the evolution of EU integration in a wider view, 
pointing out that electoral pressure is an important aspect of domestic constraints and a 
negative integrative climate; finally, Niemann not only accepts neo-functionalism as 
being a soft rational-choice ontology, but also takes constructivism as a complementary 
building brick to his revised neo-functionalist framework, departing from 
actor-centeredness to attributing structures and agents an equal ontological status where 
structures and agents mutually constitute each other (Niemann 2006, 27-29; 52). To 
facilitate his hypotheses tests, Niemann further clarifies the dynamics of integration — 
the concept of spillover — via adding another two new forms of spillover into the 
traditional distinction between functional, political and cultivated spillover: exogenous 
spillover and social spillover.  
Exogenous spillover extends the concept of spillover to outside factors which 
affect the behavior of actors and structures at both the EU level and the national 
domestic level, and thereby the EU project is analyzed in a global context instead of 
being viewed by the traditional neo-functionalists as an insulated entity from the 
outside (Niemann 2006, 32).
71
 Haas’s turning to theories of interdependence in the 
1970s suggests his awareness to include some exogenous factors into the 
neo-functionalist framework; Niemann contends that exogenous factors, though 
constituting obstacles to further integration, generally serve as integrative forces, and 
he offers the following logic: first, some exogenous events are threats or shocks to the 
EU’s stability and development, but they are also regarded as being conducive to 
regional integration as the external threats and shocks push closer cooperation among 
member states to find common solutions — cases in point include the Cold War 
pushing the creation of the EC in the 1950s, and US and Japanese economic 
                                                 
71 There is a trajectory of Niemann’s thinking on “exogenous spillover”, which can be traced back to 
his early argument on “induced spillover” (a term coined by Geoffrey Edwards) in 1998. Niemann 
(1998, 431-32) expresses his indebtedness to traditional neo-functionalists, as he explains: at the very 
beginning, Haas (1958, 313-17) uses the “geographical spillover effect” to conceptualize the possible 
enlargement of the Community; later in line with Haas’s idea, Schmitter (1969, 165) develops an 
“externalization hypothesis” to suggest the Community’s “collective external position” against 
nonparticipant third parties, a concept that connects the Community to the external environment. 
Schmitter (1969, 165) contends that the formation of a common external policy comes from voluntary 
motives (i.e. responses to the inducements, such as to enhance the bargaining power of the 
Community) and involuntary motives (i.e. responses to the threats of others, such as 
extra-Community demands and unforeseen threats to Community interests) (see also Niemann 1998, 
431-32). Niemann (1998, 432) says that his “induced spillover” describes Schmitter’s “involuntary 
motives” and thus belongs to a sub-hypothesis of Schmitter’s externalization hypothesis. All those 
exhibit the continuity and evolution of the old and new neo-functionalism.  
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competition to the EC in the 1980s promoting the creation of the Single Market and the 
agreement on the 1992 programme (Niemann 2006, 33)
72
; second, the nature and 
magnitude of many problems, such as migration, environmental destruction, climate 
change, terrorist attacks, go beyond an individual state’s potential governance and 
competence and thus require a collective approach to those issues, and regional 
integration can actually act as an effective buffer against uncertain or serious external 
shocks and damages; at the same time, due to more global problems and increasing 
regional interdependencies, national governments’ power to deliver the economic, 
social and other well-being to their citizens has been decreased during the process of 
globalization, and EU countries tend to circumvent this disadvantage via closer 
cooperation at the European level (Niemann 2006, 33); third, once common policies 
are developed, participating states will find themselves compelled (which may 
contradict their original intentions) to take a collective external position and common 
policies against non-participant third parties so as to “increase the collective bargaining 
power of the Community vis-à-vis the outside world as well as involuntary motives 
such as the demands of the extra-Community environment reacting to (successful) 
developments within the regional integration project”, and this is “likely to rely 
increasingly on the new central institutions” (Niemann 2006, 34); finally, actors’ 
preferences are not given, and “[t]he external environment/system, just like EU 
membership, to some extent, constitutes decision-makers’ preferences”, that is, 
exogenous spillover exerts a certain structural pressure (Niemann 2006, 34). The final 
logic is difficult to trace in empirical cases, but the introduction and adaptation of 
“internationally prevailing policy paradigms and discourses” into the EU project by 
internal actors can serve as an indicator to show the wider external context’s impact on 
EU decision-makers. A case in point is that the agreement to create the Single Market 
and to liberalize many policy areas shows Community leaders’ gradual acceptance of 
Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal economic ideas (Niemann 2006, 34). All in all, the logic of 
                                                 
72 It is worthy to note that Schmitter (2004), as a former student of Haas and a devoted disciple of 
neo-functionalism, also highlights this shortcoming of traditional neo-functionalism and shares the 
same opinion with Niemann that external pressures are not just an impediment but also a potentially 
facilitating force to push forward the integration process. Schmitter (2004) puts forward “initiating 
cycles” and “priming cycles” to account for the changes of member states in between decision cycles, 
where national actors become more receptive as regional integration proceeds through crises, as he 
argues: “With each successive crisis resolved as the common institutions emerge from the initiation 
cycles, regional-level rules (…) gain in significance to the point that they begin to overshadow the 
opinions and actions of national governments, associations and individuals” (Schmitter 2004, 61). 
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exogenous spillover, linking the EC’s internal development to the changes of the 
external environment, in hypothesis form suggests the following: 
H5: Because problems are beyond individual states’ potential ability (which is 
also decreased by national interdependencies) to address and a regional integrated 
block can serve as a buffer against the harsh external environment, exogenous threats 
and crises push the EU integration process forward rather than impede it, as member 
states cooperate closely at the EU level to seek common solutions with the result that 
participating member states, who might rely on the new central institutions, forge a 
collective common position against non-participant third parties so as to increase the 
EU’s collective bargaining power and/or its ability to meet the outside world demand, 
and/or with the result that EU decision-makers’ preferences are shaped by a wider 
internationally prevailing policy paradigms and discourses. 
H5 is a summary of Niemann’s four logics of exogenous spillover, each arguing 
for the general nature and effectiveness of exogenous spillover, the factors contributing 
to exogenous spillover, the possible results of the exogenous spillover effect, and the 
structural impact of the external environment on internal actors’ preferences and 
choices, respectively, which suggest that the overall exogenous spillover mechanism 
can be further dissected into four sub-hypotheses. In the context of the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis which was triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis, H5, the 
mechanism of exogenous spillover, can be tested on the basis of the following four 
sub-hypotheses: 
H5a: The exogenous threats and crises imposed by the global financial crisis of 
2008 as well as the world-wide economic recession afterwards push the EU integration 
process forward rather than impede it, as member states seek closer cooperation at the 
EU level to forge common solutions to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis triggered by 
the global financial crisis.  
H5b: The reasons for EU countries to seek common solutions at the 
supranational level are due to two facts: (1) the nature and magnitude of the global 
financial crisis, economic recession and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis go beyond 
each state’s individual capacity to cope with and the EU acts as an effective buffer to 
the external financial turmoil and economic crisis; (2) against the trend of 
globalization, increasing economic interdependence among EU member states 
decreases the power of individual national governments to solve the sovereign debt 
crisis, as national economies and the financial market become more sensitive and 
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susceptible to each other’s economic and financial disturbance. 
H5c: Along with the adoption and implementation of the common measures, 
participating states forge collective external positions, which may contradict their 
original intentions, against non-participant third parties so as to increase the EU’s 
collective bargaining power and/or its ability to meet the outside world demand, and 
as the expression and realization of the common external positions increasingly rely on 
EU supranational institutions, national government reliance on EU (new) institutions 
also increases.  
H5d: The external environment exerts structural pressures on EU 
decision-makers’ choices for the solutions to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, that is, 
EU decision-makers’ preferences are shaped by wider internationally prevailing policy 
paradigms and discourses. 
As far as the nature, magnitude and impact of the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis as well as the EU’s efforts to solve the crisis are 
concerned (see Table 1.2 and 1.3), H5a and H5b appear to be correct, but still the 
mechanisms presented in H5a and H5b need to be closely examined in the framework 
of case studies. If H5 is valid, then all four sub-hypotheses should be vindicated in case 
studies, and this dissertation will check whether there is evidence in the selected cases 
to justify all the causal chains posited by exogenous spillover.  
Compared with exogenous spillover, “social spillover”, a concept that is split off 
from political spillover, is used to explain learning and socialization processes 
(Niemann 2006, 5).
73
 From early neo-functionalist literature, Niemann specifies two 
propositions of traditional neo-functionalism about the idea of social spillover: 
“emphasis on the quality of interaction, reflexive learning and the role of 
communication” and “learning and socialization not constant but subject to conditions”, 
based on which Niemann makes his extension by incorporating the concept of 
                                                 
73 Niemann (2006, 37) explains his use of “socialization” in two ways: “the induction of new 
members […] into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a society” (Barnes, Carter and Skidmore 
1980, 35), and complementarily, “the process by which actors internalize norms which then influence 
how they see themselves and what they perceive as their interests” (Risse and Wiener 1999, 778). It is 
also worthy to note that Moravcsik (1998, 489) once analytically split the neo-functionalist term 
“spillover” into two categories: “social spillover” and “political spillover”: the former refers to the 
situations where previous decisions can induce changes — economic, ideological or ideational 
adjustments — in national preferences, which then promote further integration, whereas the latter is 
attributed to describe the processes in which “international institutions may alter the terms under 
which governments negotiate new bargains” (Moravcsik 1998, 489). 
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communicative and norm regulated action (2006, 53). The idea of social spillover 
actually can be considered as a sub-hypothesis of political spillover, which highlights 
the social interaction of agents and the mutual influence between decision-makers’ 
norms and values and a wider structural environment.  
 
2.6 Summary: The Features of Neo-Functionalism’s Revival 
During and After the 1990s  
Neo-functionalism’s new development during and after the 1990s indicates its 
openness and dynamics, and there is an “apparent possibility of developing and 
modifying neo-functionalism in a meaningful way” and “many of the more recent 
micro-level concepts can sensibly be accommodated within the larger neo-functionalist 
framework” (Niemann 2006, 3). After examining neo-functionalist literature in two 
decades, Jensen points out the prominent characteristic of this neo-functionalist revival 
trend. When scholars reuse neo-functionalist theory, they do not take it as a grand 
theory to explain the whole integration project like the former neo-functionalists once 
did; rather, they accept it as a partial theory only applicable for some aspects of the 
European integration process (Jensen 2010, 82). Through adapting and revising 
previous neo-functionalist ideas, scholars have formed new insightful frameworks to 
explain the EU project’s various policy areas, such as defense policy (Guay 1996), 
social and labour market policy (Jensen 2000), telecommunications policy (Sandholtz 
1998), competition policy (McGowan 2007), attitudes among European civil servants 
(Hooghe 2001b; 2002), and transnational civil liberties (Newman 2008).
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Neo-functionalism’s renaissance and new developments show the theoretical validity 
and power of the core concept of neo-functionalism: spillover, based on which later 
scholars reevaluated and reformulated neo-functionalist propositions according to their 
research topics and purposes, and the theory itself got revitalized. In the 2004 edition 
of The Uniting of Europe, Haas offers his reflections on neo-functionalism against the 
new trends in IR and political theories, whereby he incorporates the elements of 
constructivism and institutionalism into his previous neo-functionalist propositions; in 
the introduction of this newly edited book, he discusses the benefits of an 
institutionalist thinking on neo-functionalism, stating that neo-functionalism “can 
become part of a respectable constructivism” (Haas 2004, xvii; quoted in Niemann and 
                                                 
74 This literature review is based on from Jensen 2010 (82-83). 
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Schmitter 56) while by absorbing and adapting to new thoughts, traditional 
neo-functionalism “has a new lease on life” and is “no longer obsolescent” (Haas 2004, 
liii; quoted in Niemann and Schmitter 56). Drawing new insights from institutionalism 
and constructivism, the revised neo-functionalism manages to bridge as well as go 
beyond the old divide of the classical neo-functionalist-intergovernmental debate 
(Niemann 2006, 11). To sum up, neo-functionalism’s development from the 1990s 
onwards exhibits two features: the first one is to be taken as a partial theory to be 
selected to explain certain aspects of the EU, and the second one is taking the 
shortcomings of traditional neo-functionalism into account to complement as well as 
absorb new ideas from other disciplines to develop. As a result, the revised 
neo-functionalist framework becomes more adaptive and useful to explain European 
integration.  
Nevertheless, offering a summary of neo-functionalism is not an easy task, as the 
theory means different things to different scholars while the original theoretical 
accounts were revised and modified by a number of writers (Niemann 2006, 13; 
Niemann and Schmitter 2009, 46), but still, from the above literature review, a vital 
characteristic of neo-functionalism emerges: the concept of spillover, which has 
originally been put forward by traditional neo-functionalism and become modified and 
expanded along the vicissitudes of the European integration project. Case studies of 
this dissertation will test the validity of neo-functionalist core assumptions by the EU’s 
new challenges during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which shall lead to the 
further confirmation, rejection, modification or new development of this classic 







3 Chapter Three: Intergovernmentalism  
As soon as the stagnant political scenario appeared, neo-functionalism, the first and 
most thorough theory to explain the European integration project, was challenged, 
doubted and even abandoned by scholars. Neo-functionalism’s failure to capture the 
EC’s reality in the 1960s and 1970s lead to the emergence of another new integration 
theory focused on the European integration project: intergovernmentalism. The origin 
of intergovernmentalism was destined that it is different from as well as competing to 
the neo-functionalist emphasis on supranationalism; as a matter of fact, it stands at the 
opposite end of neo-functionalism — intergovernmentalism is a theory of 
state-centrism — so much that the two theories have formulated the so-called classical 
dichotomous approaches to understand and explain European integration (Cini 2010; 
Rosamond 2010). Throughout the 1990s, theoretical disagreements on the EU have 
always been disputes between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists (Stone 
Sweet and Brunell 1998, 63).
75
 So it is also useful to take neo-functionalism as a lens 
to understand intergovernmentalist propositions, and vice versa. The two theories’ 
contrasting assumptions emanate from their different starting points: neo-functionalism 
views the EU as a process which has its own dynamics, while intergovernmentalism 
tends to look into the isolated historical events especially the grand negotiations among 
member states of the EU (Niemann 2006, 15).  
Intergovernmentalist studies on the European integration project were initiated 
by Stanley Hoffmann, typically represented by his journal article “Obstinate or 
Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe” in 1966 (e.g. 
Cini 2010, 90-93; Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 37-38). Encountering various criticisms, 
intergovernmentalism underwent modifications and revisions from the 1970s onwards, 
developing into several variants which may not always have been named 
“intergovernmentalism” but shared the basic premises of “state-centrism” (Cini 2010): 
                                                 
75 Stone Sweet and Brunell claim that previous intergovernmentalists and supranationalists have 
forged different imageries to the EU: intergovernmentalists’ imagery is drawn from the international 
regime literature, such as Garrett 1992, Keohane and Hoffmann 1991, Moravcsik 1991, 1993, Taylor 
1983, while supranationalists’ imagery is often federalist, inspired by writers such as Burley and 
Mattli 1993, Leibfried and Pierson 1995, Sandholtz 1993b, 1996, Sbragia 1993b, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997 (see Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, 63). 
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nation states’ autonomy has not been challenged by European integration (e.g. Mann, 
1993; Milward 1992; Streeck, 1996). The main assumptions of state-centrists, 
according to Marks et al. (1996, 342), can be summarized as follows: (1) national 
sovereignty is untouched or even strengthened through participation in the EU; (2) the 
EU is driven by intergovernmental bargains among its member states; (3) the 
negotiated results represent the lowest common denominator of the wishes and 
preference of member states; (4) the function of supranational actors is to streamline 
and assist national negotiations; (5) policy outcomes reflect national executives’ 
interests and relative power; (6) supranational actors have little independence. 
However, those state-centric propositions have been proven to be problematic when 
they came to explain the EU in the 21
st
 century, and some of them were rejected and 
abandoned by intergovernmentalist descendants, especially by the revised liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI). 
Having been indebted to Hoffmann’s work and along with the Community’s 
development, intergovernmentalist variants in later days, according to Cini (2010), can 
be categorized into four groups: the first group emphasizes a confederal characteristic 
of the EU; the second highlights the importance of domestic politics; the third one, in 
light of institutionalist research, argues for how national states, still being the central 
actors, have been “locked into” the European integration process; and finally, 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) theory of European integration, standing 
out as an influential theory, constitutes the fourth group of the variation of classical 
intergovernmentalism. It is worth pointing out that Hoffmann’s initiation and the four 
categories of intergovernmentalist variants are characterized by the consecutive 
historical periods of European regional integration, mirroring the pace and the general 
trend of the EU process in different times. Accompanying the Community’s 
development, intergovernmentalism, like neo-functionalism as an integration theory, 
underwent modifications and revisions, and its later descendant and representative — 
LI theory — actually denies some of the previous intergovernmentalist state-centrist 
assumptions. Before delving into the thoughts of Hoffmann and the literature of the 
four camps of intergovernmentalism, this chapter first presents an elaboration of the 





3.1 Three Core Concepts of Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism, as the words “inter” and “government” suggest, is a theory that 
highlights the role of nation states and governments. In accounting for the European 
integration process, it is state-centric, privileging the role of each national member state 
in promoting the development of the EU, arguing that it is the interests and actions of 
nation states that drive European integration (Cini 2010, 87; Hix 1999, 15). It views 
integration as a zero-sum game where the winner takes all as “on a vital issue, losses 
are not compensated by gains on other (and especially not on other less vital) issues: 
nobody wants to be fooled” (Hoffmann 1966, 882); consequently, European integration, 
in this perspective, is limited to certain policy areas while leaving fundamental issues 
of national sovereignty untouched (Cini 2010, 87). The core ideas of 
intergovernmentalism can be summarized as “cooperation”, “sovereignty” and 
“delegation” (Cini 2010, 88-90). 
First of all, intergovernmentalists prefer to talk about European “cooperation”, 
rather than European “integration”. There are always benefits and costs for member 
states to be involved in the EU project, so naturally nation states’ participation in the 
EU, in terms of depth and width, is based on their pragmatic calculation of gains and 
losses; cooperation has nothing to do with ideology or idealism, but purely with 
national governments’ rational choices to seek solutions to common problems that they 
are all facing in modern times (Cini 2010, 89) — such views actually have been 
revised by Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) when they specified the scope 
conditions for the application of LI: geo-politics or ideology could play prominent 
roles in national preference formation for non-economic issue areas. So despite the 
EU’s highly institutionalized form, intergovernmentalists tend to see nothing special 
about it, and member states’ involvement in the EU is just one example in the general 
trend of international cooperation. Normally, intergovernmentalists do not consider 
what has happened to the EU as a process, because all cooperation occurs in fits and 
starts based on the pragmatic calculation and realistic consideration of problem 
solution. As a result, intergovernmentalism has not provided an ultimate goal for the 
EU: being a kind of European political community, a federal state or any other regime 
form (Cini 2010, 89). Not surprisingly, the idea of cooperation, rather than integration, 
leads some intergovernmentalists to predict the decease of the EU at the end of the 





 In the perspective of intergovernmentalism, cooperation among European nation 
states will not lead to a supranational state, but rather “an international order, controlled 
by intergovernmental relations between sovereign nation states, that serves as a 
domestic order for a transnational economy” (Streeck 1996, 64).  
Second, the concept of the sovereignty of nation states lies at the heart of 
intergovernmentalism. Sovereignty might be defined as “the right to hold and exercise 
authority” (McCormick 2005, 10) or “the legal capacity of national decision makers to 
take decisions without being subject to external restraints” (Nugent 2010, 428); quite 
often, the notion of sovereignty is taken as a synonym for “independence” (Cini 2010, 
89). Traditional intergovernmentalists contend that when member states participate in 
the EU, they do not cede their sovereignties, because nation states cooperate with each 
other in situations and conditions they can control, and it is the existence of such 
control that “allows all the participating states to decide the extent and nature of this 
cooperation”, leaving national sovereignty not directly undermined (Nugent 2010, 428). 
Besides, the EC’s unique institutional structure “is acceptable to national governments 
only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, 
permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable” (Moravcsik 1993a, 507). In the 
EU arena, nation states are still by far the most important actors, and the history of the 
EU is a pooling or sharing of sovereignty, as opposed to the neo-functionalist argument 
of transferring sovereignty from the national to the supranational level (Keohane and 
Hoffmann 1990, 277) — Moravcsik’s LI, as a later representative variant of traditional 
intergovernmentalism, however, has accepted the usage of “transferring sovereignty to 
international institutions” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 72; see also e.g. 
Moravcsik 1998, 9; 492). What matters most to the analysis of the dynamics of the 
Community, despite the revival of supranationality after the SEA and the loss of 
national sovereignty to the Community institutions, are the bargains among the major 
players (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, 295); still, “states will make further surrenders 
of sovereignty if, but only if, they have to in the attempt to survive” (Milward 1992, 
                                                 
76  This shows the affinity between neo-realism and intergovernmentalism. From a neo-realist 
viewpoint, state security depends ultimately on the policies of others rather than on their own, so 
cooperation among Western European states thus has relied significantly on the US-Soviet bipolarity, 
which is regarded as a necessary condition for European integration. As the bipolar competition came 
to an end at the beginning of the 1990s, neo-realism also predicted that cooperation would become 
less attractive as the international system was moving back towards multipolarity, and the future of 
Europe is, therefore, heading towards instability (Grieco 1995, 28).  
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446). As for the role of elites, intergovernmentalists regard the governmental elites as 
the key actors and “the motivation for integration is the preservation of executive 
capacity at the national level, not its erosion” (Rosamond 2000, 139). Thus sovereignty 
still rests with EU member states. 
The above two conceptions of “cooperation” and “sovereignty” lead to the third 
core assumption of intergovernmentalism: as EU institutions are set up to facilitate 
intergovernmental cooperation, there is a “delegation” of sovereignty rather than the 
transfer of sovereignty. Intergovernmentalists admit there is a transfer of certain 
functions from the state executives and even from the national parliaments to the 
supranational level only for the sake of increasing the efficiency and credibility of 
cooperation. EU institutions, especially the Commission, do not assume independence 
or autonomy in EU policy-making — they are just little more than the servants of the 
member states and even when the facts suggest that the supranational institutions have 
played a more important role in sensitive policy areas, their functions are severely 
curtailed (Cini 2010, 90). This is what Pierson would term “the instrumentality of 
institutions” (Pierson 1998, 32-33). However, neo-functionalist research has tabled 
evidence for the pro-integrative role of EU institutions, the Commission and the ECJ in 
particular (see chapter two of this dissertation), and as a matter of fact, Moravcsik (e.g. 
1998), a successor of traditional intergovernmentalism, has acknowledged the 
autonomy of EU institutions.
77
 As for institutional structures and their functional 
extension, intergovernmentalism contends that participating member states will 
carefully weigh long-term costs and benefits — the benefits are calculated as the 
transaction-cost-reductions brought by EC institutions, while the costs refer to “any 
risk of lost autonomy” (Pierson 1998, 33), and EC supranational institutions are agents 
rather than autonomous actors (Pierson 1998, 37). So from an intergovernmentalist 
point of view, only the Council of Ministers and the European Council really matter as 
they represent national governments and thus are the real power center for the 
European integration project (Scharpf 1988, 243). Moreover, when 
“intergovernmentalism” is taken as an integration model to prescribe rather than as an 
integration theory to explain the EU, it tends to advocate reducing the role of 
supranational institutions while promoting a greater role for the Council and the 
European Council, even to the degree to suggest “a reinstatement of unanimous voting 
                                                 
77 For the detailed explanation, see section 3.7.2. 
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in the Council and the repatriation of European policies to the national level” (Cini 
2010, 88). Naturally, when explaining the direction and the pace of EU integration, 
intergovernmentalism makes its inferences mainly from the decisions and actions taken 
by the governments of EU member states (Nugent 2010, 433). This gives rise to what 
Pierson calls “the centrality of intergovernmental bargains”, which depicts 
intergovernmentalists’ overwhelming focus on explaining the “grand bargains” that 
established the Community’s basic features of institutional design, such as the Rome 
Treaty, the SEA (e.g. Moravcsik 1991; Garrett 1992) and the Maastricht Treaty (e.g. 
Garrett 1993; Lange 1993; Martin 1993) while paying almost no attention to EC 
political developments during the periods between these bargains (e.g. Pierson 1998, 
33). Additionally, despite the fact that the competence and influence of the EP have 
grown substantially since the 1980s (even obtaining co-decision legislative power with 
the Council), member states are still in a privileged position within the EU, for it is the 
member states who can change the general institutional framework of the EU via treaty 
reform and even potentially withdraw from the EU (Cini 2010, 5). 
To summarize, traditional intergovernmentalism is state-centric, privileging 
national governments’ foundational and decisive role in European regional cooperation; 
nevertheless, corresponding to the EU’s growth, the traditional core concepts of 
intergovernmentalism got modified and certain propositions have been abandoned. Still, 
from the intergovernmentalist perspective, the contemporary European integration 
project, evolving from the ECSC in the 1950s until today, is “the result of deliberate 
state choice” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 86).  
 
3.2 Theoretical Roots of Intergovernmentalism: Realism, 
Neo-Realism, Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism 
3.2.1 Realism and Neo-Realism  
Intergovernmentalism derives from classical theories of IR, notably from realist or 
neo-realist analyses of interstate bargaining (Cini 2010, 87). Traditional realism argues 
that the whole world is anarchic — there is no global authority being capable of 
keeping the world order — and nation states are self-interested, rational, unitary actors 
who “define their interests based on an evaluation of their position in the system of 
states” (Cini 2010, 88; see also Rosamond 2000, 131). In light of realism, the primary 
interest of a state is to survive and “states are motivated by the relentless search for 
power in their mutual relations in order to protect their security” (Taylor 1993, 4). This 
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implies zero-sum games in the sense that “the quest for security by any state by 
necessity leaves all other states less secure” (Rosamond 2000, 132). The key words to 
understand realism, therefore, are anarchism, nation states’ interests, power and 
security. From the vantage point of realism, nation states “are the key actors in 
international affairs and the key political relations between states are channeled 
primarily via national governments”; in contrast to neo-functionalism, realism holds 
that supranational and non-governmental actors have only limited importance and 
influence (Nugent 2010, 432-433).  
Developing from realism, neo-realism not only argues for the anarchic nature of 
the world order, but also sees a potential to realize a world order on the basis of 
international cooperation. In Theory of International Politics (1979), a representative 
book of neo-realist IR, Waltz introduces structural factors to explain international 
relations, instead of referring to human nature or the inherent properties of states 
(Rosamond 2000, 132). After pointing out the deficiencies of reductionist theories (i.e. 
to know the whole through the study of individual parts), Waltz offers a systematic 
approach to international politics (1979, 38-59), which consists of two dimensions. 
First, a system is composed of interacting units; second, the system has a structure and 
it is the system-level components that enable the interacting units to form into a distinct 
set rather than a mere collection, from which two different types of changes are 
distinguished: changes of structure and changes taking place within the structure 
(Waltz 1979, 40). In light of Waltz’s systematic approach, neo-realism is “a theory of 
how the structural properties of anarchy provide a particular set of limitations upon 
possibilities for action in international politics” (Rosamond 2000, 132; see also Stone 
1994, 449). Such an emphasis on the systematic level, however, does not diffuse 
neo-realism’s state-centrism, as neo-realists view the EU as “a mechanism for interstate 
cooperation that fulfilled the survival imperatives of a group of West European states 
[…] driven by the preferences of the most powerful states” (Rosamond 2000, 133). The 
first concern of states is their security and independence, and having been “sensitive to 
costs”, states tend to choose instrumental policy options that can guard and promote 
their security and independence (Grieco 1995, 27). In short, the hard core of 
neo-realism is made up of three assumptions: (1) nation states are the key actors in 
world politics; (2) they are conceived as unitary entities with instrumental rationality; 
(3) their preferences and choices are largely shaped by inter-state anarchy. In addition, 
neo-realism also holds that interstate negotiations are zero-sum games, which take 
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place in the arena of a regime with the outcomes shaped by, as well as reflecting, the 
distribution of state power within that regime. Due to the different external and internal 
environment for each state, the convergence of national interests and policy preferences 
is rare, so any attempt to build “a community beyond the state” is difficult (Cini 2010, 
88, her emphasis). There are two assumptions inferred from neo-realism: the first one 
is that “states find it hard (but not impossible) to work together because of fears about 
cheating, dependency, and relative gains”, and the second one is that “international 
institutions are unable to dampen these state fears substantially, and therefore states do 
not ascribe much importance to them” (Grieco 1995, 27).
78
 So the purpose to establish 
international institutions, such as the EU, is to “reduce the level of anarchy within the 
states system [sic]” (Cini 2010, 88) and institutional establishments are just “the 
by-product of a particular distribution of world power in the post-World War II era” 
(Grieco 1995, 27). 
                                                 
78 Neo-realism as a theory is also in the process of revision and development (see Rosamond 2000, 
133-135). Grieco (1995) applies neo-realism to analyze the Maastricht Treaty and EMU, from which 
he identifies four serious problems of the neo-realist approach to IR: (1) neo-realist assumptions of 
the instrumental rationality of states’ behavior and the limited importance of international institutions 
to states are put in doubt; (2) anarchy is not the major structural feature of Western Europe, and it is 
also not the key factor that shapes national preferences; (3) neither have member states decreased 
their support to the EC nor have they sought to rectify the ever growing asymmetric power and 
influence of Germany, as neo-realism posits that the purpose of cooperation is to balance against a 
more powerful third party; (4) other competing theories have generated more empirically plausible 
premises than neo-realism has done. Confronted with those theoretical challenges, Grieco put forward 
a revised neo-realist argument — the “voice opportunities” hypothesis: “If states share a common 
interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the 
weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide 
sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least 
ameliorate their domination by stronger partners” (Grieco 1995, 34). Thus EC institutional structures 
can be explained as a way for weaker states to secure mutual gains and to avoid becoming a vassal of 
the stronger partners (Grieco 1995, 34); the so-called “institutional rule trajectory” of EMU sketched 
by the Maastricht Treaty could induce and ensure a greater symmetry in voice opportunities for all 
member states in economic and monetary affairs (Grieco 1995, 36). The reason for the collective 
national decision to move from the EMS towards EMU is because the EMS has “become 
emphatically dominated by Germany”, and the creation of EMU provided member states 
opportunities to address previous asymmetries; meanwhile, the ideas of adopting competing 
currencies or a “hard ECU” (European Currency Unit) proposed by the UK got little support, because 
both proposals would continue Germany’s domination and control over European monetary policy 
(Grieco 1995, 37). Then why did Germany accept the would-be constraints on its power within 
EMU? Apart from the explanation from German domestic institutions, there are another two main 
reasons: first, EMU was shaped mainly by German propositions, such as setting price stability as the 
ECB’s primary goal, and Germany could also defend its interests via EMU institutional procedures; 
second, Germany needed a more effective EC coalition against its economic competitor — Japan 




Realist and neo-realist state-centralism was inherited by intergovernmentalism, 
as Hoffmann declares clearly: “[t]he critical issue for every student of world order is 
the fate of the nation-state” (1966, 862). Intergovernmentalism shares neo-realist ideas 
that member states agree to cede or delegate authorities to supranational institutions 
only because these organizations serve their national interests best, in such a way that 
“[i]f the states wish, they can recall or revoke that authority”(Cameron 1992, 28). But 
the intergovernmentalist conception of the state is more sophisticated than that of 
realists, as Hoffmann claims that states, more than just “black boxes”, represent 
communities of identities and belongings (Cini 2010, 92; O’Neill 1996, 60): states are 
“constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and political experiences, and 
domestic forces and rulers all play a role” (Hoffmann 1995, 5). National interests, from 
an intergovernmentalist perspective, therefore cannot be simply reduced into power 
and status, but should include various historical, cultural and political factors (Cini 
2010, 92; Hoffmann 1995, 5). This idea has been emphasized and illustrated by 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig’s (2009) re-account of national preference formation 
of the LI model. 
 
3.2.2 Liberalism and Neo-liberalism 
Another theory, neo-liberalism, is regarded as a source to the variants of 
intergovernmentalism, such as the domestic politics approach and Moravcsik’s LI (Cini 
2010, 94). Neo-liberalism differentiates itself from neo-realism in three ways: first, 
neo-liberalism views states not as being “like units”, but polities of differently 
composed constituents which influence the totality of a state at the systemic level; 
second, “several games”, rather than “one undifferentiated game”, are conducted 
variously in international politics due to the unit-level variation; finally, the “state of 
nature” of international politics does not refer to wars, but cooperation among states 
(Stone 1994, 459). Consequently,  
 
“Neorealism is a theory primarily about how states use power to bargain, 
threaten, and war with one another; neoliberalism is a theory about how state 
preferences are formed in the first place, before the bargaining begins. The 
overall mix of state preferences is the key variable of neoliberalism, not the 
distribution of capabilities: viewed as process, international politics work 
from the bottom up (whereas neorealist politics work from the system-level 




Cini (2010) further points out the difference between neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism when those two IR theories are applied to EU studies: 
 
“Whereas neo-realism is focused exclusively on politics between nations, 
neo-liberalism draws attention to the content of the “black box” of domestic 
politics and tries to address from where national interests originate. It 
therefore places the national polity, rather than just national executives, or 
governments, at the heart of the European integration project.” (Cini 2010, 
94) 
 
Neo-liberalism, as its name suggests, develops from classic liberalism, and 
Moravcsik (1993b) identifies his theoretical links to traditional liberalism. From 
Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Norman Angell, 
Joseph Schumpeter to John Maynard Keynes, traditional liberal thinkers can be divided 
into four groups: republican liberalism, pluralist liberalism, commercial liberalism and 
regulatory liberalism; however, these liberalisms, though providing distinct theoretical 
criticisms of realism, stand separately and fragmentarily, and Moravcsik tries to 
propose a single and coherent framework for them (Moravcsik 1993b, 1; 1997; 
2001).
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 The basic premise of liberalism, Moravcsik contends, is that states are 
embedded in a social context of a specific domestic and international environment, 
which decisively constrains states’ actions (1993b, 7). Moravcsik suggests three core 
assumptions of liberalism: (1) “the fundamental actors in politics are members of 
domestic society, understood as individuals and privately-constituted groups seeking to 
promote their independent interests” (Moravcsik 1993b, 6-7); (2) “all governments 
represent some segment of domestic society, whose interests are reflected in state 
policy” (Moravcsik 1993b, 9); (3) “the behavior of states — and hence levels of 
international conflict and cooperation — reflect the nature and configuration of state 
preferences” (Moravcsik 1993b, 10). 
Three variables are derived from those three core assumptions: “the 
representativeness of domestic institutions”, “the level of social equality and cohesion”, 
and “the extent of transnational economic interaction” (Moravcsik 1993b, 16; see also 
Stone 1994, 460). The core assumptions of liberalism characterize its difference to 
realism: the former emphasizes domestic preference formation, while the latter 
interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1993b, 11). All in all, liberalism takes preference 
                                                 
79 Moravcsik (1997) further distinguishes three major variants of liberal theory: ideational liberalism, 
commercial liberalism, and republican liberalism. 
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formation as a key determinant of interstate bargaining outcomes (Moravcsik 1993b, 
13). Moravcsik proposes three advantages of liberalism over realism: first, it offers a 
historical rather than a static or cyclical view on international politics; second, it “goes 
beyond explanations of aggregate levels of cooperation and conflict” and “predicts the 
substantive content of state policies”; and finally, it has both an unit-level and a 
systemic dimension (Moravcsik 1993b, 36-37). Nevertheless, Moravcsik advocates “a 
productive synthesis” of both liberalism and realism, as he writes:  
 
“By formulating Liberalism as a theory of the formation and interaction of 
state preferences and Realism as a theory about the effect of the strategic 
environment on interstate bargaining, the two become theoretically 
compatible. Both theories share a common underlying model of international 
politics […] based on the assumption of rational state action in international 
bargaining, but shifting preferences.” (Moravcsik 1993b, 37) 
 
The synthetic result is a hybrid paradigm that Moravcsik calls “minimalist 
liberalism”: the priority of preferences over capabilities (Moravcsik 1993b, 14-16).
80
 
No wonder Forster comments that the core ideas of LI are “essentially neo-realist with 
an interdependence corrective”, as it “grafts liberal interdependence theories onto 
regime theory” (1998, 349). When explaining the intellectual sources to his 
“intergovernmental institutionalism” (Moravcsik 1991) (the precursor to his later LI), 
Moravcsik says his theory is consistent with Robert Keohane’s “modified structural 
realist” proposition, which stresses the traditional notion of national interests and 
power (Moravcsik 1991, 21). While affirming his realist foundations, Moravcsik states 
his theoretical difference from modified structural realism: regime (i.e. EC) reform is 
caused not only by the changes of power distributions but also by the changes of state 
interests, because the changing state interests could be decisive to the European 
integration process in which, nevertheless, the shifts in the relative power of states may 
not be traced (Moravcsik 1991, 27). Compared with classic realism, Moravcsik 
contends that economic interests rather than geopolitical interests are essential to the 
formation of national preferences, which, at the same time, vary from issue to issue and 
are in flux due to different group coalitions in domestic politics; furthermore, interstate 
                                                 
80 In comparison, Moravcsik describes “maximalist liberalism” as follows: “[i]nterstate conflict is 
likely when the underlying conflict of interest between the social groups represented by each state is 
high, while cooperation is more likely when conflict of interest between the social groups represented 
by each state is low” (Moravcsik 1993b, 13).  
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bargaining can result in positive-sum rather than simple zero-sum outcomes (Hix 2005, 
16).  
This section explains the theoretical roots for traditional intergovernmentalism 
and its variants, and the section thereafter will present the evolutionary trajectory of 
intergovernmentalism from Hoffmann’s (1966) the “logic of diversity” to Taylor’s 
(1975; 1982) and Wallace’s (1982) confederalism, Bulmer’s (1983) domestic politics 
approach, Putnam’s (1988) “two-level games”, then to the theories of the “locking-in” 
of states which are typically represented by Scharpf’s (1988) joint-decision trap, 
Wessels’s (1997) fusion thesis and Pierson’s (1996, 1998, 2000) path dependence, and 
finally to Moravcsik’s (1991, 1993, 1998) LI and Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig’s 
(2009) modifications and supplements to LI. The hypotheses on intergovernmentalism 
will be derived on the basis of the revised LI model suggested by Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig (2009).  
 
3.3 Hoffmann’s Intergovernmentalism and the Critiques 
Generally, the systematic intergovernmentalist studies on the European integration 
project are believed to start with Hoffmann (1966) (e.g. Cini 2010; Lelieveldt and 
Princen 2011; Rosamond, 2000) as Cini (2010, 90) once commented that “[i]t was 
Stanley Hoffmann who laid the foundations of the intergovernmentalist approach to 
European integration”. While observing de Gaullism within the Community in the 
mid-1960s, Hoffmann (1966) argued that neo-functionalism had failed to grasp the 
enduring impact of national interests on the European integration process. From 
Hoffmann’s perspective, a nation state not only is “a form of social organization”, but 
also “a factor of international non-integration” (Hoffmann 1966, 862). National 
interests, as the core of IR theory, are the multiplied results of specific national 
situations and different outlooks (nationalist or non-nationalist) of the foreign 
policy-makers, which Hoffmann formulates as follows: “N.I. = National situation X 
outlook of the foreign policy-makers” (Hoffmann 1966, 869). As a consequence, the 
propelling power for European integration is “severely constrained by the associates’ 
views and splits on ends and means” (Hoffmann 1966, 881). Moreover, “[c]oming 
from diverse pasts, moved by diverse tempers, living in different parts of the house, 
inescapably yet differently subjected and attracted to the outside world” (Hoffmann 
1966, 865), the Community’s member states have various responses to their domestic 
and external environments, so it is difficult to forge converged national interests to 
build up a community beyond nation states. Based on those analyses, Hoffmann argues 
for the “logic of diversity” as the fundamental dynamic principle among member states 




Table 3.1 Hoffmann’s Comparison of the “Logic of Diversity” with the “Logic of Integration” 
 The neo-functionalist “logic of 
integration” 
The intergovernmentalist “logic of 
diversity” 
Spillover effects The necessity of functional 
integration of social sectors and the 
actions of the supranational agents 
push European integration forward. 
National situations are enmeshed in 
one supranational entity where 
national consciousness has been 
impregnated by an awareness of the 
higher interests in union. The 
freedom of movement of the 
national governments has been 
gradually restricted.  
(the neo-functionalist “spillover” 
thesis) 
The degree of the “spillover” process 
and the scope of functional integration 






Ambiguity (i.e. national diversity) 
helps rather than hinders EU 
integration, as each “ingredient” can 
hope that its influence will prevail at 
the end; a “blender” synthesizes and 
overcomes individual different 
tastes, and presumably replaces them 
with one.  
In areas crucial to the national interest, 
nations prefer the certainty or the 
self-controlled uncertainty of national 
self-reliance to the uncontrolled 




Integration is a win-win game: 
member states’ overall gain will 
exceed their occasional losses, and it 
is also possible to fool each member 
state some of the time. 
 
Integration is a zero-sum game: on a 
vital issue, losses are not compensated 
by gains on other (and especially not on 
other less vital) issues; nobody wants to 
be fooled.  
The supranational 
function process 
The logic of integration deems the 
uncertainties of the supranational 
function process creative.  
 
The logic of diversity sees the 
uncertainties of the supranational 
function process as destructive past a 
certain threshold: the functional 
integration’s gamble can be won only if 
the method had sufficient potency to 
promise a permanent excess of gains 
over losses, and of hopes over 
frustrations; and this may be true for 
economic integration while not for 
political integration (“high politics”). 




Obviously, Hoffmann rejects the neo-functionalist spillover thesis, highlights 
different national interests and preferences among member states, and emphasizes both 
the internal domestic arena and the global context where integration takes place as 
national diversity arises from the unique context of internal domestic politics and a 
country’s status in an international system; hence, national domestic politics and the 
external environment are regarded as two “inexorable centrifugal forces placing limits 
on European integration” which have been neglected by neo-functionalism (Cini 2010, 
91; see also Rosamond 2000, 76). From Hoffmann’s point of view, the European 
integration project, due to the “logic of diversity” and the limits of functional methods, 
would halt when member states started quarrelling over what integration is for 
(Hoffmann 1966, 886) and the prospect for European integration “might simply be the 
agglomeration of many smaller nation-states into fewer, bigger ones” (Hoffmann 1966, 
911). Hoffmann emphasized three things. First, interstate cooperation may lead to the 
set-up of European institutions with a varying degree of autonomy, power, and 
legitimacy, but no transfer of allegiance or loyalty advocated by neo-functionalism 
happens, and meanwhile, the authority of these institutions is “limited, conditional, 
dependent, and reversible” (Hoffmann 1966, 909). Second, while looking forward to 
gaining benefits from European integration, member states assume various roles, as an 
initiator, a pace-setter, a supervisor, and in some cases, a destroyer in the process; the 
nation state is “still the highest possessor of power” (Hoffmann 1966, 909) — they 
give the justification for his article title: nation states are “obstinate” rather than 
“obsolete”. Nation states, from Hoffmann’s point of view, are “modified but 
omnipotent”, ever being the core actors in European integration (O’Neill 1996, 60). 
Finally, Hoffmann makes a distinction between economic integration and political 
integration, with the former termed “low politics” and the latter “high politics” (Cini 
2010, 91).
81
 There are clear boundaries between the two types of politics: “high 
                                                 
81 Hoffmann unequivocally uses “high politics” to refer to political integration in his 1966 article, but 
gives no explicit and exact usage of the term “low politics”. In Hoffmann’s 1964 article (89-90), he 
distinguishes two different realms: the welfare area and the area of high politics. Nye (1971, 197) 
follows Hoffmann, writing that “[t]hese latter types of electoral or ‘support’ politicians tend to be 
guardians of the security and ‘pooled self-esteem’ aspects of national life that Stanley Hoffmann has 
referred to as ‘high politics’”, but Nye specifically uses the term “low politics”, as he argues: “[t]his is 
not to say that all economic issues are emotionally laden ‘high politics’ in less developed countries 
and technically soluble ‘low politics’ in developed settings”(1971, 228). Later when O’Neill (1996, 
65) accounted for Hoffmann’s ideas, he wrote: “[c]ommentators who have taken this line of thought 
have challenged Hoffmann’s rather dogmatic conviction that, while transnational cooperation and the 
sharing of functions might well occur in those ‘low’ policy or functional issue areas which did not 
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politics” refers to issues touching on national sovereignty and national identity (e.g. 
military defense and foreign policy), while “low politics” associates with less 
controversial and more technocratic policy areas (e.g. various economic sectors); the 
former is “impermeable” to integration, whereas functional spillover might occur in the 
latter (Cini 2010, 91-92; O’Neill 1996, 61). As a result, European integration is of “the 
dialectic of fragmentation and unity” (Hoffmann 1966, 908), and nation states’ 
resilience contributes to the coexistence of nation states with the European enterprise 
(O’Neill 1996, 64).  
Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism has been criticized in two ways. First, his 
rigid demarcation between high and low politics has been disproved by reality and 
rejected by scholars. The development of European Political Cooperation (EPC) (the 
forerunner of European foreign policy), the introduction of the single currency, the 
establishment of the CFSP, and the creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), all have demonstrated that there is a certain degree of integration in the 
so-called “impermeable” high politics. Particularly, the CFSP and EMU are regarded as 
“instances where member states willingly surrendered control over issues of central 
importance to national sovereignty” (Rosamond 2000, 79, his emphasis). In addition, 
comparative foreign policy analyses have suggested that “the distinction between ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ politics is flawed”, as at least high politics, such as foreign policy, “depends 
to a large degree on the nature of the political institution and domestic structures in 
general” (Risse-Kappen 1996, 57). Along with the progress of the EC, Hoffmann also 
admits that there are limits to the distinction between high and low politics (Cini 2010, 
92). Second, Hoffmann failed to see the novelty and the complexity of the European 
integration project, and intergovernmental bargains, immersed in unique domestic 
contexts, should not be simply reduced to a set of national interests (Rosamond 2000, 
79); meanwhile, he played down the constraints imposed on states by the external 
factors as well as the increasing “interdependence” among national states: states cannot 
always act unconstrained, and at least some regional issues or global problems require 
common solutions (Cini 2010, 92; O’Neill 1996, 65-68). In spite of these weak points, 
                                                                                                                            
challenge to any great extent fundamental national interests, the scope for such integration in the more 
sensitive areas of ‘high’ politics remained slight”. He continues: “[t]he case for holding out for such a 
rigid demarcation between those areas of low political significance available for integration and core 
national interests, was questioned on the basis of accumulated evidence from students of 
contemporary political economy” (O’Neill, 1996, 65). This suggests the distinctive contrast of “high” 
and “low” politics. 
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Hoffmann’s theory has exerted a great impact on later research: it has broken new 
ground for various intergovernmentalist approaches to the EC in later days, especially 




In response to the very changes of circumstances and new institutional procedures 
adopted by the EC during the 1970s, such as the development the EPC and the 
formalization of the European Council (the latter becomes an EU institution since the 
Lisbon Treaty), another new approach to the EC, confederalism, emerged. It was 
mainly developed by Paul Taylor (1975; 1982) and is regarded as “the most cogent 
attempt” to make a theoretical revision to intergovernmentalism (O’Neill 1996, 70).  
Confederalism is a perspective on a special form of intergovernmental 
arrangements where “national sovereignty remains intact despite the establishment of a 
common institutional framework” (Cini 2010, 93), and a confederation is always taken 
as the antithesis of a federation
82
 (O’Neill 1996, 70-71). Compared with 
intergovernmentalism, confederalism recognizes the distinctive institutionalized nature 
of the EC and regards these institutional devices as practical procedures to smooth 
conduct of interstate relations and to facilitate cooperation among member states 
(O’Neill 1996, 71). The European integration project, therefore, is seen as a kind of 
international club where member states rationally regroup themselves in order to 
survive the ravages of global changes and to cope with common exigent pressures and 
problems better, yet keeping their distinctive and abinding national interests precluded 
from deeper integration (O’Neill 1996, 71). Taylor elaborates: 
 
“Each state perceived the benefits of membership in the club for its own 
interests but also, in the existing institutional context, was reminded of the 
costs of moving towards greater “supranationalism” in the procedures for 
                                                 
82 Regarded as two distinct ways to organize political systems and providing two different political 
models, a confederation “involves a loose grouping of states, characterized by the fact that the centre 
has fewer powers than the states or regions” (Cini and Borragán 2010a, 440), whereas a federation 
“involves the constitutionally-defined sharing of functions between a federal centre and the states”, 
which “will usually have a bicameral parliament, a constitutional court and a Constitution” (Cini and 
Borragán 2010a, 444). William Wallace (1982, 60-61) discusses the definition of a federation and 
suggests the distinction between a federation and an international regime “lies in the presence or 
absence of authority and resources at the centre which effectively limit the behavior of the member 
states and which impose obligations on them which are generally accepted”.  
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coordinating foreign policy. The state of each member in diversity was 
increased by the very procedures that were intended to assist with 
coordination. […] In reinforcing the governments’ propensity to stress their 
immediate separate interests within the common system, the problems of 
tackling “positive” integration were increased: governments become less 
willing to make the kind of mutual commitment necessary in those 
politically more sensitive areas.” (Taylor 1982, 764) 
 
Taylor (1975, 336) divides the European integration process into three 
chronological stages: the Federal phase (from 1950 to 1954), the neo-functional phase 
(from 1955 to 1969), and confederal phase (after 1969). As European integration 
entered a confederation phase, it carried three major features: “first, the broadly 
defensive stance of the governments in their conduct of relations with the Brussels 
institutions; second, the appearance of a system of political interaction which may be 
called a ‘managed Gesellschaft’; and third, the oscillation between advanced schemes 
for integration and retreats into nationalism which can be seen in the stated intentions 
of governments” (Taylor 1975, 336). So in light of confederalism, governments 
confronted with an increasing range of regional constraints are expected to become 
more defensive to their sovereignties, because the process of losing authorities to the 
European Community and the influence of nongovernmental international 
organizations have pushed members states to be more watchful and alert (Taylor 1975, 
337). The governmental defensive style decides the inborn nature of the institutions of 
the Community: the Commission was created for the purpose that it would “draw up 
detailed proposals to which governments could respond at greater leisure” (Taylor 1975, 
339), and the powers of the Brussels institutions “are exercised within the framework 
of policies agreed on by national governments and only with their approval” (Taylor 
1975, 343). Therefore, the development of EC institutions does not pose a fundamental 
challenge to the existence of national governments.  
Regional integration in Europe, from the confederalist point of view, is a political 
strategy of European nation states to pursue their own national interests, and a way for 
them to maximize their common interests and their global leverage through collective 
action; the bottom line of integration is the inviolability of national sovereignty 
(O’Neill 1996, 74-75). A confederal Europe has been forged by regional cooperation 
where “the scope of integration is extensive (a wide range of matters has been brought 
within the integrated area), but the level of integration is low” (Taylor 1975, 343). 
Although there is an integration tendency in the juridical aspect of the EC, 
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confederalists stick to the belief that “the critical boundaries between the domestic and 
Community competencies remained intact” (O’Neill 1996, 75), as Taylor argued, “the 
Community legal system was indeed unique, and might be justifiably called 
supranational, but it was still an expression of the states’ adjustment to new conditions. 
[…] the supranational elements helped states to survive rather than placed them in new 
integrated structures” (Taylor 1983, 53). 
Obviously, confederalism, like the intergovernmental model, also holds that the 
states are the central actors in regional integration, and “further progress towards 
integration was the reassertion of the separate identity of the government actors and 
their engagement in a higher level of diplomacy than had hitherto been the case” 
(Taylor 1975, 349). States are strengthened via integration. As the confederal phase of 
European integration is “decentralized but highly interdependent, potentially autarchic 
but in practice united by entrenched practices of consultation” (Taylor 1975, 343), 
confederalists believe that European integration will not ultimately lead to a European 
unification, but a Community which, due to the paradox of the need for more effective 
common action and the inability or unwillingness of the member states to concede their 
authorities (William Wallace 1982, 68), “is stuck, between sovereignty and integration” 
(William Wallace 1982, 67). The success of neo-functionalism’s explanation of the 
early development of the Community “depended upon national governments not 
noticing — in effect — the gradual draining away of their lifeblood to Brussels” 
(William Wallace 1982, 64-65). The Community, complementing rather than displacing 
national activities, is neither supranational nor international, but “extranational” and 
“alongside”, not above or below, the nation state (William Wallace 1982, 65-66; see 
also Pinder 1981). The fate of the Community is predicted to drift towards an 
international regime if the Community’s authority is continuously undermined by 
worse external and internal situations (William Wallace 1982, 68), and such a view is 
similar to the neo-funcitonalist prediction on the future of the Community though 
traditional neo-functionalists neglect domestic factors and the external enviroment.
83
 
All in all, confederalists view institutions as primarily being functional and technical, 
which, nevertheless, leads to the critiques against the approach itself: it focuses on 
                                                 
83  Different to Taylor’s rejection of the EC’s legal integration, William Wallace values the 
importance of supranational law in differentiating confederalism from intergovernmentalism (see Cini 




institutions rather than on processes, on structures rather than on functions — it looks 
like a theory of formality, so it lacks the power to account for the political status and 
the dynamics of the Community (O’Neill 1996, 73). Nevertheless, confederalism has 
its merits: it bridges the gulf between two previous mutually exclusive paradigms — 
supranationalism and state-centrism; it sees European integration as a two-way process, 
opening up a new line of debate of the intrinsic paradoxes (nationalism v.s. 
supranationalism) embedded in regional integration politics (O’Neill 1996, 77-78). In 
line with confederalism, later Taylor (1993) put forward a new concept, 
“consociationalism”, arguing that there is a symbiotic relationship between the member 
states and the EC where, though the processes of consociationalism proceed alongside 
the neo-functionalist dynamics of integration, national sovereignty has not been 
challenged fundamentally and states are also strengthened via integration (see also 
chapter two of this dissertation). The gap between the traditional dialectical 
dichotomous approaches is further filled, as Taylor’s consociationalism acknowledges 
the value of supranational institutions and admits certain propositions of 
neo-functionalism.  
 
3.5 The Domestic Politics Approach 
The domestic politics approach, which focuses on the impact of domestic politics on 
EC policy-making, is another theoretical development and revision of the previous 
intergovermentalism (Bulmer 1983). Though not considered as a theory of European 
integration per se, the domestic politics approach is the origin of today’s so-called 
“Europeanization” literature, and it links Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism to later 
state-centric theories, especially LI (Cini 2010, 94).  
From the 1970s, European studies began to focus on various EC policy-making 
patterns in different policy areas, yet until to the early 1980s, there still lacked research 
on “the linkages between the domestic and EC tiers” (Bulmer 1983, 349). Bulmer 
defines the term “domestic politics” in three ways (Bulmer 1983, 352-353). First, it is 
used to explain how policy-making at the EC level is affected by the behavior within 
the member states where various domestic sources have shaped different national 
negotiation positions. Second, it highlights the fact that “the lower decisional tier of the 
EC” is influenced by the policy environment that differs between and within member 
states for different policy areas. Third, it emphasizes nation states’ positions or 
strategies in an increasingly interdependent world of various international regimes and 
172 
 
regional organizations: nation states decide at which level to defend their interests, that 
is, whether the EC is the best choice when there are economic crises and uncertainties.  
Bulmer’s analysis adds another dimension to Taylor’s confederalism, as Bulmer 
examines the links between national domestic politics and the Community and tries to 
explain how the former vitally affects policy-making of the latter. There are two 
aspects of those links: one is the domestic policy-making structures and the other is the 
attitudes of the member states towards the EC (Bulmer 1983, 350). Bulmer combines 
these two to analyze the behavior of individual national states within the EC and adopts 
the concept of “policy style” as an analytical framework to examine different policy 
environments for nation states (Bulmer 1983, 352). Originally, Richardson et al. (1982, 
13) defined the term “policy style” as “the interaction between (a) the government’s 
approach to problem-solving and (b) the relationship between government and other 
actors in the policy process” (see also Bulmer 1983, 352). Bulmer borrows the idea of 
“policy style” to explain both national policy-making and the integration process, and 
argues that integration follows the logic of decision-making processes — not vice versa 
as claimed by neo-functionalism — which originate from the power structures of the 
nation states (1983, 353). Altogether, Bulmer (1983, 354) puts forward five 
assumptions for the domestic politics approch: (1) “The national polity is the basic unit 
in the European Community”; (2) “Each national polity has a different set of social and 
economic conditions that shapes its national interests and policy content”; (3) 
“European policy only represents one facet of a national polity’s activity”; (4) “In 
formal terms the national governments hold a key position at the junction of national 
politics and Community politics”; (5) “The concept of policy style is employed to 
analyze the relationships between government and other domestic political forces 
vis-à-vis European policy”. 
Though domestic politics research uses “national polity”
84
 instead of “national 
government” so as not to pre-suppose intergovernmentalism (Bulmer 1983, 356), these 
five assumptions serve as detailed evidence to support intergovernmentalist 
state-centrism. The domestic politics approach contributes to European studies in the 
way that it connects specific national cases with the policy-making results at the 
supranantional level, and more importantly, it provides a coherent way to measure the 
relations between the two levels, which is absent in classical intergovernmentalism 
(Cini 2010, 94). 
                                                 




3.6 The “Locking-in” of States 
Another kind of evolution of intergovernmentalism is the approach of the “locking-in” 
of states, which emphasizes the importance of institutional factors and explains “how 
states have become locked into the European integration process” (Cini 2010, 95, her 
emphasis). These types of theories and research methods draw on literature from 
transnational relations through the lens of comparative politics, especially from the 
concept of “interlocking politics” (Politikverflechtung) which, in German federalism 
studies, focuses on “interactions between different levels of government” (Cini 2010, 
95), “particularly horizontal and vertical linkages among state and non-state actors on 
the regional and national levels” (Risse-Kappen 1996, 61). To be more specific, 
“interlocking politics” is defined as “the establishment of intermediating structures 
linking the politics — namely, the decision processes — and policies — the substantive 
responsibilities — of initially autonomous organizations” (Lehmbruch 1989, quoted in 
Risse-Kappen 1996, 61). Indebted to the idea of “interlocking politics”, theories of the 
“locking-in” of states are represented by Scharpf’s joint-decision trap, Wessels’s fusion 
thesis, and Pierson’s path dependence (Cini 2010, 95-96).  
 
3.6.1 Scharpf’s Joint-Decision Trap 
Scharpf views the European integration progress until the 1980s as a paradox of 
“frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress”, which should be 
systematically examined and analyzed from the Community’s decision pattern: the 
“joint-decision trap”, a term first ascribed to West Germany’s institutional context of 
federal-Länder (states) relations and then utilized by Scharpf to describe the EC’s 
“characteristic pattern of policy choices under certain institutional conditions” (Scharpf 
1988, 242).  
Compared with the US federal model where the federal government, while 
carrying out nationalized functions effectively, formally functions independently from 
each American state, German federalism has offered an idea as well as practice of 
sharing many of the important governing functions between the Länder governments 
and the federal government, which, Scharpf believes, is comparable to explain the 
relations of the EC and its member states despite the fact that the EC’s relations with its 
member states are much weaker than that of the German federal government with its 
Länder (Scharpf 1988, 242-245). Scharpf offers a parallelism between European and 
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German institutions. Just like the most prominent feature of the German institutions, 
labeled as “Politikverflechtung”, where member governments are directly participating 
in central decisions and unanimous consent prevails at the federal level,
85
 EC 
policy-making is also characterized by these two conditions: (1) individual states’ 
direct participation in EC policy-making and (2) the unanimous voting mode to reach 
agreements, based on which Scharpf puts forward his “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf 
1988, 244). The “joint-decision trap” entails “two simple and powerful conditions” of 
institutional arrangements: one is that “central government decisions are directly 
dependent upon the agreement of constituent governments”; the other is “the 
agreement of constituent governments must be unanimous or nearly unanimous”, and it 
is these institutional structures that cause the substantive deficiencies (i.e. inefficient, 
inflexible, unnecessary, and quite undemocratic) of joint policy-making in both West 
Germany and the EC (Scharpf 1988, 254). Two features characterize the “joint 
decisions”: one is intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, and the other is the 
unanimity rule (Scharpf 1988, 254). The first one opposes federal or supranational 
decision-making rules, while the second one rejects the majoritarian decision-making 
system, and the EC’s policy outcomes follow from these rules (Pollack 1996, 440). 
After distinguishing and analyzing the specific combination of a decision style (i.e. 
“problem solving”, “bargaining” or “confrontation”) with a decision rule (i.e. 
“unanimous”, “majority” or “unilateral/hierarchical” assent) which determines the 
capacity of the decision system, Scharpf concludes that “it is the combination of the 
unanimity rule and a bargaining style which explains the pathologies of public policy 
associated with joint decisions in Germany and in Europe” (Scharpf 1988, 265).  
Here rises the vulnerability/trap of the joint-decision systems if no agreement 
sets in: “they may be incapable of reaching effective agreement, and they may lose the 
independent capabilities for action of their member governments”, and consequently, 
“their overall problem-solving capacity may decline” (Scharpf 1988, 258). In an 
ongoing joint-decision system, the exit option is foreclosed, and non-agreement would 
“assure the continuation of existing common policies” and thus formulate a “fault 
condition” (Scharpf 1988, 257, his emphasis; see also Pollack 1996, 440). Alter (1998) 
offers a concise summary of Scharpf’s theory: “a joint-decision trap emerges when (1) 
the decision making of the central government (the Council in the case of the EU) is 
                                                 
85 For more literature references to “Politikverflechtung”, see Scharpf (1988, 244). 
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directly dependent on the agreement of constituent parts (the member states), (2) when 
the agreement of the constituent parts must be unanimous or nearly unanimous, and (3) 
when the default outcome of no agreement is that the status quo policy continues” 
(Alter 1998, 137). 
As for the EC, “joint-decision traps” illustrate situations “where governments are 
locked into undesirable policies by the need to muster unanimous support for any new 
legislation or treaty amendment” (Moravcsik 1998, 491). National member states, as 
not entirely being satisfied by what integration has offered, are trapped in the 
Community without escape so long as retreating from integration is not an option, and 
this may cause the slowed-down of the integration process (Cini 2010, 95). As a matter 
of fact, the “joint-decision trap” is “an institutional arrangement whose policy 
outcomes have an inherent (non-accidental) tendency to be sub-optimal” (Scharpf 1988, 
271). 
The joint-decision trap makes it difficult for the Community to reform its 
existing policies and institutions. As unanimous intergovernmental voting is required to 
make changes, member states are “locked” into existing policies and institutions and 
even some of these may manifest inefficiency or unfairness, such as the persistence of 
the CAP despite the ever-growing agricultural product surpluses and the Community 
budgetary system in the 1970s and early 1980s (Scharpf 1988, Pollack 1996, 441). So 
once being created, policies and institutions tend to “remain in place, rigid and 
inflexible, even in the face of a changing policy environment” (Pollack 1996, 440). 
Due to unexpected internal and external challenges, however, EC institutional changes 
are not impossible, which would imply the acceptance of short term losses for some 
member states (Scharpf 1988, 271). The vulnerability of the joint-decision systems also 
suggests the possibility to overcome this trap: a member state can adopt confrontational 
bargaining styles, like threatening to exit or exchanging something that others want, 
and then “intensely held interests by one state can lead to hard bargaining and reform 
of entrenched policies if the state will subjugate other issues to a single goal” (Alter 
1998, 140).  
Scharpf argues that previous neo-functionalism, though having made “several 
varieties of ad hoc explanations” by including “background” or “historical uniqueness 
of De Gaulle and his personal intervention” variables in the theory, does not treat 
institutional arrangements as a powerful independent variable (1988, 266). From 
Scharpf’s point of view, EC institutions do matter, and the “joint-decision trap” is set 
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up by the EC’s two institutional conditions where national governments are making 
European decisions which, nevertheless, require unanimity. Such a joint 
decision-making system is also attributable to the blocking of the EC’s further 
institutional evolution as it tends to preserve the institutional status quo and 
institutional reform is not a political priority (Scharpf 1988, 267). Besides, Scharpf 
disagrees with other neo-functionalist presumptions: in spite of an integration trend in 
Community law, national control exercised in the decision processes is not weakened, 
but gets strengthened (1988, 268); so long as national governments want to preserve 
their veto rights, learning processes, which may lead to institutional transformation 
suggested by neo-functionalism, will not happen (Scharpf 1988, 269); interest groups’ 
pro-integration pressures “seem to be blocked or seriously weakened”, as national 
governments are the final Community decision-makers, who mediate between interest 
groups and the Community and whom interest groups have to persuade, and the loyalty 
transfer claimed by neo-functionalists is unlikely to happen; moreover, due to “the 
pathological decision logic inherent in its basic institutional arrangements”, the 
dynamic process moving towards “a higher level of political integration” “have been 
retarded and, perhaps, reversed” (Scharpf 1988, 269). However, Risse-Kappen (1996) 
holds that as the EU evolves into a multi-level structure of governance in which 
informal networking could join the initiation and preparatory stages for 
intergovernmental negotiations, Scharpf’s “joint-decision trap” argument becomes not 
so convincing, because by exploring the informal networks through which deliberative 
processes can be systematically incorporated over formalized bargaining, this kind of 
trap can be avoided (Risse-Kappen 1996, 73). Furthermore, as the “joint-decision trap” 
is conditioned by three rules, intergovernmentalism, unanimity and the default 
condition of a status-quo, any changes in these three (e.g. from the unanimous voting 
mode to a supranational or QMV mode, the expiration of policies and institutions or 
their periodical reauthorization) could lead to the failure of Scharpf’s locking-in model 
(Pollack 1996, 441).  
 
3.6.2 Wessels’s Fusion Thesis 
In view of various paradigms and approaches to account for the EU, Wessels advocates 
a dynamic middle range theory to understand the integration process, that is, 
researchers “should look for indicators and factors to explain the evolution of a 
political system in a delimited area and over a delimited period of time — Western 
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Europe after World War II”, and moreover, it is “appropriate to pursue a 
macro-political approach using overall aggregate data —as far as they exist — to 
identify fundamental trends” (1997, 270); in other words, macro-political and 
micro-political approaches should be integrated into EU studies. Accordingly, Wessels 
(1997) combines macro-political approaches with aggregate data to test four different 
propositions regarding the dynamic integration process of the EU (i.e. how the EU has 
evolved and will develop) on the basis of previous academic discussions and their 
different readings of the Maastricht Treaty:  
(1) The neo-functional/neo-federal assumption of a linear growth of the EU. This 
hypothesis is drawn from Haas’s neo-functionalism (1964, 1968) and Schneider’s 
neo-federalism (1986) with the expectation of the EU forming a federal union in a 
rather smooth process (Wessels 1997, 273; see also Pinder, 1991, Schneider and 
Wessels, 1994). Consequently, the Maastricht Treaty is regarded as an incremental step, 
not a qualitative jump, forward to the federal union (Wessels 1997, 273).  
(2) The governance/pendulum view of cyclical ups and downs. This hypothesis 
is formulated on the basis of Helen Wallace’s pendulum thesis (Helen Wallace 1996, 
12), which depicts the European integration process as “some kind of cyclic up and 
down between ‘fusion and diffusion’” (Wessels 1997, 273, his emphasis; see also 
Helen Wallace 1996, 13). As a result, the Maastricht Treaty is taken as “a more 
permanent fixture” where these oscillating ups and downs would lead the EU to an 
“unstable equilibrium” (Wessels 1997, 273; see also William Wallace, 1996, 450). 
(3) The realist view of a declining development of the EU. This hypothesis 
comes from the literature of realism and stresses the idea of “geopolitical revolution” 
(e.g. William Wallace 1996, 443) where a “radical transformation of the political 
context” would cause the EU to disintegrate back to a nation-state system as in the old 
days. In light of such a realist view, the Maastricht Treaty is “already outdated at the 
time of its signature”, and there should be other clear evidence of the decline of the EU 
to prove its disintegration tendency (Wessels 1997, 273). 
(4) The fusion thesis of structural growth and differentiation. This is the 
hypothesis that Wessels tries to validate. He argues that the EU has witnessed 
“long-term trends of considerable structural growth and differentiation, which are 
sometimes overshadowed by cyclical ups and downs”, and the prominent feature of 
this process is the “fusion” of public instruments from several state levels linked with 
the respective Europeanization of national actors and institutions (Wessels 1997, 273).  
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In order to improve their problem-solving efficiency and effectiveness, member 
states, having been involved in ever-increasing interdependencies with each other 
against the background of globalization, will make rational choices turning to EU 
institutions so as to provide their citizens’ welfare services better, but still struggle to 
keep their ultimate say. As a result, the process and the fate of European integration are 
closely linked to the evolution of the member states (Wessels 1997, 273-74). Wessels 
uses the term “fusion” to characterize the European integration process: more than 
referring to “a horizontal ‘pooling of sovereignties’”, “fusion”, particularly drawing its 
inspiration from Scharpf’s works on “cooperative federalism” (1976) and 
“Politikverflechtung” (1985, 1988), means “a ‘merger’ of public resources located at 
several state-levels”, and consequently, the responsibilities and the accountability for 
specific policies are diffused and thus cannot be traced (Wessels 1997, 274).  
Wessels chooses five indicators to judge the EU as an evolving system from the 
1960s to the 1990s. They are:  
(1) Binding outputs. Judging from the large quantity of quasi-legislative and 
administrative outputs, such as the legislative outputs from the Council and the 
Commission, so-called “soft law”,
86
 and the Community’s budgetary means, the EU 
moved towards a high level plateau and beyond (Wessels 1997, 275-78). 
(2) Scope enlargement of public policies. The number of policy fields pursued 
by the EU has been increasing considerably, indicated by, for instance, the increasing 
number of ministerial compositions of the Council and of the working groups of the 
Council, which suggests the scope of the EU’s agenda set-ups is towards a state-like 
being (Wessels 1997, 278-79).  
(3) Transfer of competences. There is a tendency of transferring national 
competences for the operation of state-like public policies to the European level; 
however, this means a challenge to nation states, so the Maastricht Treaty introduced 
the subsidiarity clause to limit the transfer of competences. Still, via “package deals”, 
national interests are merged, leading the EU to evolve into a mixed system where 
there is “a messy and ambiguous vertical division of labor between the national level 
and the EU level, […] with a highly differentiated ‘mixture’ of public instruments 
                                                 
86 Wessels (1997, 276-77) explains that “soft law” refers to the declarations of the European Council 
or decisions taken in the second and the third pillar of the EU, “which are not subject to control by the 
Court, but have nevertheless some kind of binding character and further impact”; less binding 
agreements like action programmes also get presented in the first pillar. 
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located originally on several levels” (Wessels 1997, 279). 
(4) Institutional growth and procedural differentiation. There is a growth of EU 
institutions and increasing procedure differentiation within the EU policy cycle. Most 
notably, national governments and administrations are participating in all phases of the 
EU’s policy cycle comprehensively and intensively, and a process of Europeanization 
results (Wessels 1997, 280). Europeanization exerts its impact on nation states, leading 
member states into “a functional and sectoral decentralization” and “a political 
deparlamentarization” (Wessels 1997, 282). 
(5) Involvement of intermediary groups in channels of influence. There are 
widening and deepening channels for intermediary groups to access and exert influence, 
contributing to a feature of the EU: the asymmetrical involvement of various groups 
has been forging the EU as “a diversified, atomized and complex political space with 
many, though not all, national actors” (Wessels 1997, 282-84).  
All indicators above, combined with data analyses, have hit home the argument 
that the EU process is characterized by considerable growth and differentiation, 
exhibiting the trends of merging public resources at several state levels while causing 
“increasing complexities, a lack of transparency as well as difficulties in reversing 
current development” (Wessels 1997, 267). Wessels explains the observed trends as a 
dynamic “closer fusion” caused by “rational strategies of European welfare states faced 
with growing interdependencies and spillovers, furthered by the institutional logics of 
EU bodies” (Wessels 1997, 267). The fusion thesis formulates three patterns to explain 
the evolution of EU member states. Pattern one refers to the erosion of the virtuous 
circle where “the stability of parliamentary democracy, the evolution of the welfare and 
service state, and the growing economy have reinforced each other” (Wessels 1997, 
285). This virtuous circle has transformed into a vicious one as increasing 
interdependencies deprive national governments of means to fulfill their role and to 
maintain the balance between socio-economic performance and democratic legitimacy, 
that is, the emerging gap between “the high demands for allocative (regulatory), 
distributional (welfare) and stabilization (macroeconomic) policies of the state” and 
“the decreasing ability of governments to use effective instruments” leads to 
disappointment among the citizens and thus the loss of citizens’ support for the 
government and for political parties. As a “mutually reinforcing correlation between 
economic growth and political stability” is at stake, nation states resort to the EU to 
guarantee expected performance so as to ensure legitimate support and political 
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stability. Though nation states try to participate in EU decision-making directly and 
intensively so as to maintain their sovereignty, such turning to the EU would 
“undermine some fundamental pillars of its own constitutional foundation”, and “[f]or 
the sake of its own political stability, the state has to promote a process which leads to 
its very erosion” (Wessels 1997, 286). This leads to pattern two: how to break the 
vicious circle? The exits from the “multilevel dilemma” — institutional inefficiencies 
and sovereignty erosion — lie at the core of the fusion thesis which assumes that the 
EU, serving as an efficient and effective public instrument for its member states, is the 
“third way” for national governments to realize their own interests while rising above 
being seized-up “between a de facto erosion (intergovernmental exit from the 
multilevel dilemma) and a constitutional erosion (federal exit from the multilevel 
dilemma)” (Wessels 1997, 287). Through “fusing” both national and supranational 
instruments, nation states, as being the “masters of the treaties”, still maintain “a major 
say through broad and intensive participation” on the EU level while taking the 
advantage of EU institutions and procedures as effective public instruments to serve 
their citizens’ welfare (Wessels 1997, 287). This joint-policy-making pattern leads to 
pattern three: the spillover thesis does work and there is even a territorial spillover to 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as several former EFTA members (i.e. 
the UK, Denmark, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, and Finland) applied to join the 
Community while exiting from the EFTA and the fact is that “the governing elites of 
the EFTA countries […] seemed to be also more interested in trading off some of their 
de jure sovereignties for a guaranteed say in effective policy-making” (Wessels 1997, 
289). Pushing forces behind this pattern include independent institutions who “develop 
their own dynamics and turn into actors with their own weight and influence on the 
(EU) agenda and policy outcomes”, intermediary groups who increasingly and 
proactively join the integration process, and package deals of functional spillover 
effects, all of which contribute to “the inherent propensity of member states to enlarge 
the scope of EU activities” (Wessels 1997, 288). In a nutshell, the fusion thesis views 
the EU’s evolution through the adaptation and mutation of its member states which are 
in another process of state building, illustrating European nation states’ rational 
strategies of trading off some sovereignty so as to fulfill the function of welfare states 
better while still maintaining a decisive role in effective EU policy-making. The EU is 
a polity representing both the evolution of its member states and a novel form of 
representative government (Wessels 1997, 267).  
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Wessels admits that though the increasing role of supranational institutions does 
not lead to the substitution of national actors, but “[i]f anything, the growing 
significance of non-national actors is leading to a more intensive and differentiated 
incorporation of national actors in the whole EC process” (1997, 280-281). As for 
neo-functionalist propositions on loyalty transfer, Wessels disagrees and he argues that 
the EU political system is shaped by multiple loyalties held by people and European 
identity or loyalty is just one of them (Wessels 1997, 291). Besides, the fusion thesis 
indicates that a new kind of democratic system — indirect democracy — is exercised 
on a larger scale (Wessels 1997, 291).  
 
3.6.3 Pierson’s Path Dependence87 
While acknowledging the EU’s institutional arrangements for collective governance, 
Pierson defends intergovernmentalism by seeking “a more persuasive account of 
member state government constraints” to explain why “gaps emerge in COG (Chiefs of 
Government) control over the evolution of European organizations and public policies” 
(Pierson 1998, 29). Pierson’s acknowledgments of his indebtedness to 
neo-functionalism (which “has serious problems of its own”) highlight the theoretical 
limitations of intergovernmentalism, so from an ex post point of view, he adopts “HI” 
to account for the EU (Pierson 1998, 29). The term HI indicates that European 
integration should be explained from two angles: first, the EU is historical as its 
political development unfolds over time; second, the EU is institutionalist as its process 
and current developments are “embedded in institutions — whether these be formal 
rules, policy structures, or social norms” (Pierson 1998, 29; Pierson 2000, 264-65).  
Under the theoretical framework provided by HI, Pierson claims that when 
actors initiate their positions on the basis of the purpose to maximize their interests, 
institutional and policy reforms carried out by the actors also transform these actors’ or 
their successors’ initial positions with unanticipated or undesired consequences 
(Pierson 1998, 30). In contrast to the traditional intergovernmentalist view to treat EC 
institutions only as being functional bodies to serve national interests, Pierson stresses 
the difficulties to control institutional evolution, and it is necessary to take an 
                                                 
87 Pierson gives a full elaboration of HI in his 1996 article, which later has been integrated into the 
edited work of Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (1998) under the same title with a slight 
adaptation. The citations in this section come from Pierson (1998), which can also be referenced from 
Pierson (1996), but with different page numbers. When addressing the discussions of Pierson’s HI, 
scholars may refer to Pierson (1996).  
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“evolving” rather than a “snapshot” view to examine the EU (Pierson 1998, 30). 
Pierson states: 
 
“Just as a film often reveals meanings that cannot be discerned from a single 
photograph, a view of Europe’s development over time gives us a richer 
sense of the nature of the emerging European polity. At any given time, the 
diplomatic maneuvering among national governments looms large, and an 
intergovernmentalist perspective makes considerable sense. Seen as a 
historical process, however, the authority of national governments appears 
far more circumscribed, and both the interventions of other actors and the 
cumulative constraints of rule-based governance more considerable.” 
(Pierson 1998, 30-31) 
 
These suggest three basic positions of Pierson’s HI on the EU: (1) national 
governments always exert influence on EU policies (i.e. intergovernmentalist 
perspectives are helpful to explain the EU); (2) national control over EU policy-making 
is constrained; (3) the interventions of other actors and incremental institutional 
reinforcement assume considerable weights in explaining the EU. Pierson (1996, 1998) 
elaborates his propositions by answering two questions: Why do national governments 
lose control over EU institutions and policy-making? Why do they not regain it? 
Pierson’s answers to the two questions underscore HI’s core ideas: path dependence 
and a historical view of institutional evolution. 
To explain gaps in member state government control of EC institutions and 
policy-making, Pierson lists four factors: the partial autonomy of EC organizations, the 
restricted time-horizons of decision-makers, the large potential for unanticipated 
consequences, and the likelihood of shifts in COG preferences over time (1998, 34-43). 
Pierson argues for each factor as follows: first, the appearing autonomy of EC 
supranational institutions is more apparent than real because it is the result of 
“principles’ deft use of oversight” (Pierson 1998, 37); second, the creation of 
institutions is bounded by the time-horizons of political decision-makers who always 
only take a short-term effect into consideration, and the long-term institutional effects 
are the by-products of decision-makers’ purposive behavior (Pierson 1998, 39); third, 
the complex social process, the growth of issue density, the asymmetrical access to 
information, and the spillover effect in the “tightly coupled” government policies could 
lead to widespread unintended consequences (Pierson 1998, 39-41); and finally, a 
number of reasons such as changes in circumstances, new information and 
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governments of different partisan complexions can cause the shifts of COG policy 
preferences (Pierson 1998,41). Pierson’s four reasons actually have provided “a 
particularly rich set of assumptions about the preferences of member governments”, 
which can “help explain why member governments might agree to adopt EC policies 
and institutions that they (or their successors) might later come to regret” (Pollack 1996, 
442). Then how can member states address the control “gaps” where formal 
institutional set-ups and highly developed policies do not meet their expectations? 
According to Pierson, normally there are two ways: via competition or learning; 
however, both ways have been proved unrealistic because for the former, it is 
impossible to find a “market” to demonstrate that other international regimes may be 
better than the EC, whereas for the latter, it is also nearly impossible for member state 
governments to go back to re-design the institutions and policies; so once the gaps 
appear, they are hard to close (Pierson 1998, 42-43).  
From Pierson’s point of view, three factors in the context of the EC make it 
difficult for member states to regain the control over EC institutions and public policies: 
the resistance of supranational actors, institutional barriers to reform, and the rising 
price of exit (Pierson 1998, 43-50). Pierson lays great emphasis on the third factor: the 
rising cost of exit from the existing supranational institutional arrangements (i.e. “sunk 
costs”), from which he proposes his path dependence theory: initial choices and 
decisions have encouraged the emergence of certain social and economic networks, 
which make other once-possible alternatives costly to take and at the same time, also 
increase member states’ exiting costs from the current policy path where national 
governments are locked in (Pierson 1998, 46). To be more exact, 
 
“The evolution of EC policy over time may constrain member-state 
governments not only because institutional arrangements make a reversal of 
course difficult when COGs discover unanticipated consequences or their 
policy preferences change. Individual and organizational adaptations to 
previous decisions may also generate massive sunk costs that can make 
policy reversal unattractive. When actors adapt to the new rules of the game 
by making extensive commitments based on the expectation that these rules 
will continue, previous decisions may ‘lock-in’ member-state governments 
to policy options that they would not now choose to initiate. Put another way, 
social adaptation to EC organizations and policies drastically increases the 





Based on Pierson’s earlier (1994) work, Pollack (1996) incisively points out that 
the logic of “sunk costs” rests on the constraints from below, that is, societal actors at 
the micro-level incrementally build-up their vested interest in the maintenance of EU 
policies over time compared with the institutional constraints from above (i.e. the 
decision rules at the EU macro-level) (Pollack 1996, 442, his emphasis), which Pierson 
also terms micro-level adaptations (see Figure 3.1). Due to high sunk costs, previous 
decisions not only prescribe membership commitments but also reduce the room for 
member states to maneuver; consequently, “initial actions push individual behavior 
onto paths that are hard to reverse” (Pierson 1998, 47) and member states in the 
Community “find themselves locked into a system which narrows down the areas for 
possible change” (Shackleton 1993, 20, quoted from Pierson 1998, 47). Even if the 
member states find their agents have captured too much authority and then decide to 
regain the authority, the supranational actors can make use of their political resources 
to take autonomous actions through which they may become “more significant players 
in the next round of decision-making” (Pierson 1998, 48). In short, increasing sunk 
costs and the existing decision rules have made the price for reasserting control too 
high to be possible. Pollack (2009) reinforces those points and argues that “national 
constitutions and international treaties can create significant transaction costs and set 
high institutional thresholds (such as a supermajority or unanimous agreement) to later 
reforms” (Pollack 2009, 127). Via the process of constitutionalization and 
treaty-conclusion, institutions are resistant to change; additionally, the reward and 
penalty mechanisms prescribed by institutions, embedded in policies and supported by 
law, and the coercive power of the state make certain institutions and policies 
“remarkably durable”, because these “policy arrangements fundamentally shape the 
incentives and resources of political actors” (Pierson 2000, 259). As early as in the 
1990s, scholars have realized that national governments’ influence is “increasingly 
circumscribed and embedded in a dense, complex institutional environment that cannot 
easily be described in the language of interstate bargaining” (Pierson and Leibfried 
1995a, 6). The power of the member state, according to Pierson and Leibfried (1995a, 
10), is constrained and limited in four ways: (1) “the autonomous activity of EU 
organizations”, especially the Commission and the ECJ; (2) “the impact of previous 
policy commitments at the EU level, which lock member states into initiatives that they 
otherwise might not choose”, that is, the cumulative path dependence pressure from 
past policy decisions and treaty commitments; (3) “the growing scope and overlap of 
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issues (or ‘issue density’) in the European Union, which produces spillover to new 
initiatives and widespread unanticipated consequences”; and (4) “the activity of 
non-state actors, operating independently rather than exclusively through member 
states”. 
Later, Pierson (2000, 2004) gives a detailed elaboration of the concept of path 
dependence and restates the conditions for path dependence; against a broad theoretical 
background, Pierson’s path dependence derives from the historical-institutionalist 
school in political science (see chapter four of this dissertation). Hix (1999, 2005) 
summarizes HI into a three-step analytical model (T0-T1-T2) and corresponding to 
such three-step analysis, Pierson (1996, 149; 1998, 49) maps out “the path to European 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Designating T0 as the initial bargains of IGC, T2 as the next intergovernmental 
grand bargain and T1 as the time period between the two grand bargains, Figure 3.1 
highlights Pierson’s basic propositions: (1) unintended consequences: institutional and 
policy outcomes at T2 may not be predicted by national governments when they 
establish institutions or adopt policies at T0, and as the consequences of the bargain at 
time T0, there emerge considerable gaps in national government control which 
contribute to the altered context for T2; (2) a historical and institutionalist approach to 
the EU: the analyses of institutional and policy outcomes at T2 are put into a specific 
institutional context over a period of time — how decisions and choices in the past 
influence today’s policy-making (i.e a path dependent approach); (3) national 
governments’ control over the outcomes at T2 is circumscribed compared with that at 
T0 as certain national competences and powers are delegated to EU institutions. All of 
these propositions will be tested under the rubric of HI in chapter four of this 
dissertation. 
Pierson compares his HI analysis with neo-functionalism and traditional 
intergovernmentalism. Like neo-functionalism, Pierson argues, HI points to the 
significance of supranational actors, spillover effects and possible unintended outcomes, 
but it denies the neo-functionalist proposition that authority will be gradually 
transferred from nation states to supranational institutions; instead, HI maintains that 
the structured polity “restricts the options available to all political actors”, which offers 
explanations for the two questions that neo-functionalism has failed to answer: “why 
would member state governments lose control, and even if they did why would they 
not subsequently reassert it” (Pierson 1998, 48, his emphasis). Moreover, arguing that 
functionalist relative efficiency is not the only plausible causal explanation in political 
science, historical institutionalists normally go back and look into history. From the 
functionalist point of view, the outcome X (e.g., an institution, policy, or organization) 
exists because it serves the function Y, whereas from the HI perspective, it is possible 
for many other alternatives to lead to the outcome X, and the outcome X exists because 
of the dynamic of increasing returns or path dependence of a particular option — this 
option may originate by accident and the factors giving it an initial advantage may have 
disappeared (Pierson 2000, 263-264). Choices in the past do matter. While compared 
with intergovernmentalism which focuses on the initial bargain at T0, HI traces the 
consequences (T1) of “grand bargains” on EC treaties over time and puts 
intergovernmental bargains (T2) in an evolving historical context constrained by “their 
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predecessors and the micro-level reactions to those preceding decisions” (Pierson 1998, 
48-50). Nevertheless, the starting point of Pierson’s explanation is still state centric: 
nation states are the most important actors of the Community; they create supranational 
institutions only to serve their own purposes, but due to the locking-in effect of path 
dependence, national control is heavily circumscribed (Pierson 1998, 57). 
 
3.7 Moravcsik’s LI 
3.7.1 Putnam’s “Two-level Games” 
To understand Moravcsik’s influential theory — liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) — 
Putnam’s “two-level games” (1988) accounting for the dynamics of domestic and 
international politics played by nation states are the starting point (Cini 2010, 96). 
Putnam’s article (1988) puts forward a conceptual framework to understand how 
national diplomacy and domestic politics interact, filling the void of previous 
state-centric works which “do not purport to account for instances of reciprocal 
causation, nor do they examine cases in which the domestic politics of several 
countries became entangled internationally” (Putnam 1988, 433). Utilizing the 
metaphor of “two-level games”, Putnam combines both international and domestic 
spheres and explains the entanglements and interactions between the two. Putnam 
argues that many international negotiations should be interpreted as two-level games, 
as he argues, 
 
“At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central 
decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign.” (Putnam 1988, 434) 
 
By labeling the international level and the national level as Level I and Level II 
respectively, Putman proposes three sets of factors that could affect the win-set size 
which is crucial for nation states to ratify international agreements via formal domestic 





 These factors suggest the size of the win-set depends on: first, 
the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II 
constituents; second, Level II political institutions; and third, the strategies of the Level 
I negotiators (Putnam 1988, 441-452). Putnam advocates the analysis of the 
entanglements and reciprocal influence between domestic and international affairs. As 
a matter of fact, Putnam’s “two-level games” is an extension of Bulmer’s (1983) 
domestic politics approach. While Bulmer starts the connection between the two levels 
by emphasizing national domestic environments’ influence on Community 
policy-making, Putnam examines the interactions between the two levels, stressing 
domestic factors’ effects on national ratifications of the Treaties. The preferences, 
coalitions and institutions at the national level (Level II) posited by Putnam are 
comparable to Bulmer’s disaggregated analytical elments of domestic politics: member 
states’ attitudes and their domestic policy-making structures; meanwhile, both Putnam 
and Bulmer emphasize national sovereignty and the key role of nation states in 
formulating EC policies. Bulmer’s and Putnam’s approaches are precusors to 
Moravcsik’s LI. 
 
3.7.2 Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
The distinction and interaction between the levels in the “two-level games” left their 
imprints on Moravcsik’s theory. Defining the community as “a unique, multileveled, 
transnational political system” (Moravcsik 1998, 1), Moravcsik proposed that the 
dynamic of European integration is grounded in “state preferences, interstate 
bargaining, and institutional choice” (1998, 2), and policy coordination and 
cooperation at the EU level emerges “from a process of domestic political conflict” 
(1998, 3). Moravcsik borrows the idea of “two-level games” from Putnam, arguing that 
“national governments employ EC institutions as part of a ‘two-level’ strategy with the 
aim of permitting them to overcome domestic opposition more successfully” and 
“much EC decision-making has been difficult to explain except as a two-level game” 
(Moravcsik 1993a, 515). As a matter of fact, Moravcsik’s LI consists of two levels: 
national preference formation at the domestic level and interstate bargaining at the 
                                                 
88 Putnam writes: “we may define the ‘win-set’ for a given Level II constituency as the set of all 
possible Level I agreements that would ‘win’ — that is, gain the necessary majority among the 
constituents — when simply voted up or down”, and the win-set contours at Level II are important to 
understand the agreements reached at Level I (Putnam 1988, 437). 
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international level (Risse-Kappen 1996, 63). Compared with Hoffmann, as Lelieveldt 
and Princen (2011, 39) point out, “Moravcsik pays more attention to the role of 
domestic, economic influence on the positions of national governments in international 
negotiations and organizations.” Moravcsik’s book The Choice for Europe (1998) 
provides a cogent summary of his LI arguments.  
The research question for Moravcsik (1998) is why European national 
governments have surrendered some of their sovereign prerogatives within an 
international institution — the EU. Moravcsik makes a structured comparison across 
five grand bargains (i.e. five major decisions or five most salient negotiations) which 
he regards as the turning points in EC history: the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome 
signed in 1957, the consolidation of the Common Market and the CAP in the 1960s, the 
process towards European Monetary Integration from 1969-1983, the SEA negotiated 
in the mid-1980s, and the TEU signed in 1992. Moravcsik claims that three factors 
have contributed to European regional integration since 1955: patterns of commercial 
advantage, the relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives 
to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments (1998, 3). Moravcsik believes that 
those three constitute a theoretical framework which is generalizable to any 
international negotiation (1998, 9).  
Above all, the first factor — the consistently important converging economic 
interests — is of fundamental importance, as Moravcsik clearly states that “European 
integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who 
consistently pursued economic interests [...] that evolved slowly in response to 
structural incentives in the global economy” (Moravcsik 1998, 3). It is the economic 
interests rather than geopolitical interests that underlie national preferences (Moravcsik 
1998, 24). Not only is the EC shaped by the convergence of national preferences, but 
also is the outcome of interstate hard bargaining, which reflects the relative power of 
nation states and patterns of asymmetrical interdependence — a factor that “dictates the 
relative value of agreement to different governments” (Moravcsik 1998, 7). 
Asymmetrical interdependence rather than supranational entrepreneurship explains the 
efficiency and national distributional outcomes of interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 
1998, 24). Finally, to secure the negotiated agreement they’ve reached, national 





 The choice of governments to delegate and pool sovereignty in 
international institutions, for one thing, goes to various forms, ranging from 
extensively delegating proposal and implementation powers to supranational 
authorities to the adoption of different voting modes, such as unanimity, national veto, 
simple majority or QMV (Moravcsik 1998, 8); for another, it is the effort of a 
government to constrain and control other governments’ behavior so as to enhance the 
credibility of commitments (Moravcsik 1998, 9). European national governments have 
reaped huge joint gains from their cooperation, but quite often they are tempted to 
defect from previously agreed commitments; therefore, in order to guarantee the 
fulfillment of commitments, they prefer to delegate some governmental tasks to the 
Commission, and in certain policy areas, the QMV mode is applied (Moravcsik 1998, 
3-4). Governmental wishes to adhere to already-made agreements and to ensure a more 
credible commitment, rather than federalist ideology or centralized technocratic 
management, account for the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions 
(Moravcsik 1998, 24). Starting from the Treaty of Rome, European national 
governments have begun to employ supranational institutions to lock in reciprocal 
commitments which governments may be tempted to cheat on in later days (Moravcsik 
1998, 157). As a result, the EU, as a modern form of power politics, is “peacefully 
pursued by democratic states for largely economic reasons through the exploitation of 
asymmetrical interdependence and the manipulation of institutional commitments” 
(Moravcsik 1998, 5), and the major EC negotiations can be divided into a causal 
sequence of three stages: national preference formation, interstate bargaining, and 
institutional choice (Moravcsik 1998, 18; 20). Moravcsik labels his theory “liberal 
intergovernmentalism”,
90




                                                 
89 Moravcsik considers “pooling” and “delegating” as two forms of transferring national sovereignty, 
and the EC distinguishes itself from other international regimes “by pooling national sovereignty 
through qualified majority voting (QMV) rules and by delegating sovereign powers to 
semi-autonomous central institutions” (Moravcsik 1993a, 509). 
90 Moravcsik stresses his research findings support liberal theories of IR against realism, as “[t]he 
central claim of liberal international relations theory is that the pattern of underlying national 
preferences, not the distribution of power resources or institutionalized information, is the most 
fundamental determinant of state behavior in world politics” (Moravcsik 1998, 497). Besides, his 
liberal argument also counters realist relative gains-seeking, security externalities, hegemonic 
stability, and “relative capability” models (497-498). 
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“The central argument of this book — the ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ 
argument — holds that European integration was a series of rational 
adaptations by national leaders to constraints and opportunities stemming 
from the evolution of an interdependent world economy, the relative power 
of states in the international system and the potential for international 
institutions to bolster the credibility of interstate commitments.” (Moravcsik 
1998, 472) 
 
It is a liberal theory, for it emphasizes how economic interdependence influence 
national interests; it is an intergovernmentalist theory, for it stresses international 
bargains and negotiations (Moravcsik 1993a). Moravcsik’s LI consists of two separate 
dimensions: the supply side and the demand side. Both the national polity’s demand for 
cooperation and the supply of integration deriving from intergovernmental negotiations 
have forged European integration outcomes (Cini 2010, 97; Hix 2005, 16; see also 




Moravcsik contrasts his LI with neo-functionalism as follows: (1) domestic 
coalitional struggles v.s. domestic technocratic consensus; (2) the role of relative power 
v.s. the opportunities to upgrade the common interest; (3) passive institutions and the 
autonomy of national leaders v.s. the active role of supranational officials in shaping 
bargaining outcomes (Moravcsik 1993a, 518). As for the forces driving European 
integration forward, Moravcsik rejects neo-functionalist technocratic imperatives, 
federalist European idealism and geopolitical concerns held by the critics of 
neo-functionalism (1998, 4). Though neo-functionalists do stress the role of economic 
interests as the engine for European integration, from Moravcsik’s point of view, they 
fail to provide micro-foundations to explain precisely “what those interests are, how 
conflicts among them are resolved, by what means they are translated into policy, and 
when they require political integration”, that is, “neo-functionalism lacked explicit 
theories of interest-group politics, interstate bargaining, and international institutions” 
(Moravcsik 1998, 16). The fundamental weakness of neo-functionalism, therefore, is 
that it explains European integration in broad structural processes of dynamic 
endogenous effects (i.e. incremental feedback, unintended consequences, and the 
resulting change over time) without providing “a baseline theory of exogenous 
constraints (state economic interests, political constraints, and delegation) through 
                                                 




which dynamic change must take place” (Moravcsik 1998, 15) — an advocacy of the 
primacy of societal actors by liberal IR theory (Moravcsik 1997, 516-17). In other 
words, integration theory should be societal-actor-oriented, and Moravcsik’s theory 
highlights the micro-level of integration: the purposive choice of states and social 
actors as well as the interactions among them, so Moravcsik advocates generalizable 
“mid-range” theories rather than the so-called “grand” or “classical” theories of 
integration (Moravcsik 1998, 19). 
In addition, Moravcsik disconfirms HI’s path dependence argument that “shifting 
national preferences are an unintended consequence of prior integration”, which he 
regards as a revived successor to neo-functionalism and still lacking a theory of 
individual decisions (Moravcsik 1998, 489). European integration consequences are 
neither unforeseen nor unintended, but rather, they are “the deliberate triumphs” (“not 
the unintended side-effects”) of governmental cooperation (Moravcsik 1998, 491, his 
emphasis). The phenomenon of “the transfer of sovereignty and autonomy to 
supranational institutions is “not an unintended consequence of major EC decisions” 
but is “their primary purpose” to construct institutions to enhance member states’ 
credibility of commitments (Moravcsik 1998, 492, his emphasis). Opposed to the 
historical institutionalist argument that national interests and preferences are unstable 
and unpredictable which may cause the divergence of short- and long- term national 
interests, Moravcsik argues for “the stability and continuity of preferences” because in 
forty years, though economic integration in some areas got deepened, “the relative 
position of major governments on core issues such as CAP reform [...] have hardly 
changed” (1998, 493, his emphasis). Moravcsik holds that the weakness of HI is 
similar to that of neo-functionalism: lacking appropriate account of actual state 
behavior; nevertheless, he accepts the merits of HI: future decisions are made in the 
context of shifted preferences and institutional environments (Moravcsik 1998, 494). 
As for the status of supranational institutions, Moravcsik sees EC institutions as 
a means for national governments to strengthen their control over domestic affairs and 
also as a way to attain goals otherwise unachievable (Moravcsik 1993a, 507). Because 
of the “two-level games” structure, EC decision-making efficiency has been increased 
and national political leaders’ autonomy got strengthened; EC institutional structures 
are “the result of conscious calculations by member states to strike a balance between 
greater efficiency and domestic influence, on the one hand, and acceptable levels of 
political risk, on the other” (Moravcsik 1993a, 507). Nevertheless, Moravcsik 
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acknowledges the autonomy of EC institutions, as he writes that “the EC’s complex 
institutions include a semi-autonomous legal system, parliament, and bureaucracy as 
well as detailed norms, principles, rules, and practices governing direct relations 
among national governments” (1998, 1). Moravcsik also acknowledges the growing 
power of the ECJ:  
 
“The expansion of judicial power in the EC presents an anomaly for the 
functional explanation of delegation as a deliberate means by national 
governments of increasing the efficiency of collective decision-making. 
While supranational delegation undoubtedly creates benefits for 
governments, the decisions of the court clearly transcend what was initially 
foreseen and desired by most national governments. The 
‘constitutionalization’ of the treaty of Rome was unexpected.” (Moravcsik 
1993a, 513) 
 
Besides, as the EC progressed towards flexible concessions to national 
particularities, “unprecedentedly autonomous centralized institutions”, such as the ECB, 
have been constructed (Moravcsik 1998, 471). Despite the establishment of these 
autonomous institutions, European integration, Moravcsik would argue, “is grounded 
fundamentally in the preferences and power of member states” (Moravcsik 1993a, 514). 
Even though Moravcsik’s theory belongs to the intergovernmentalist camp, some 
neo-functionalists such as Leon Lindberg believe that a portion of Moravcsik’s ideas 
can be used to support certain neo-functionalist arguments. For example, Moravcsik’s 
analysis of the relative autonomy of nation states when participating at the EU level in 
relation to their domestic constituencies is valued by Lindberg, who writes: “exactly 
the same analysis can be applied to an understanding of the Commission in this process 
of national interest formation! This is [...] what neo-functionalists were trying to do or 
what I think I was certainly trying to do” (Lindberg 1994, 83; quote in Rosamond 2000, 
145). Lindberg would compare national governments’ ability to manoeuver and 
represent divided domestic interests with the Commission’s ability to do so among the 
diversified preferences of member states (Rosamond 2000, 145). As for the usefulness 
of LI, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig praise that LI actually has acquired the status of 
a “baseline theory”, carrying the quality and possibility for a dialogue and synthesis 
with other theories (2009, 67).  
In short, Moravcsik’s LI consists of three elements: a liberal theoriy of national 
preference formation, an intergovernmentalist theory of inter-state relations and 
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bargains, and a theory of institutional delegation. Those three factors formulate a 
tripartite explanation of European integration; in particular, his theory supplies a rich 
account of bargaining in the Council, highlighting national preference formation and 
underlining domestic economic interests as the powerful determiner of national 
interests (Cini 2010, 96-102). 
 
3.7.3 Critiques of LI  
Moravcsik once commented that “neo-functionalism remains a touchstone for 
scholarship on European integration” (1998, 13), while in turn, his theory is also 
revered as “a touchstone against which all integration theory is now judged” (Cini 2010, 
96). Moravcsik’s LI provides a competing model to explain the European integration 
process (Rosamond 2000, 145) and offers a theoretical approach of much more 
rigorousness than its antecedents (George and Bache 2001, 13). Still, it has been 
subject to the following criticisms.  
First, Moravcsik’s theory is criticized for its focus on the grand bargains of treaty 
negotiations while not accounting for day-to-day politics and daily work in the EU well 
(Cini 2010, 99-100). For Moravcsik, “[t]he most fundamental task facing a theoretical 
account of European integration is to explain these bargains” (1993a, 473). Critics 
point out that treaty negotiations are always history-making decisions, which must 
result from intergovernmental bargains, so member states are naturally the key players. 
Nevertheless, Moravcsik maintains that his theory can also help to explain day-to-day 
decision-making in EC institutions. For instance, member states can employ majority 
voting in the Council, but they always seek a consensus and unanimity, which, 
Moravcsik believes, demonstrates that each national interest is maximally protected 
(Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 39). Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) admit that 
LI is more appropriate to explain decision-making that is under a decentralized setting 
of unanimous voting rather than under an institutionalized environment of delegated or 
pooled sovereignty, but they defend LI in the way that “recent empirical research 
suggests that LI theory applies far more broadly than is commonly supposed, including 
much everyday EU decision-making”, and the reason for this, as it has been mentioned 
previously, is that “many decisions within the EU are taken by de facto consensus or 
unanimity, even when the formal rules seem to dictate otherwise” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 74). The fact that decisions in the Council of Ministers often 
turn to informal consensus even when QMV could be applied may lead to the 
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conclusion that “factors like precise institutional design, the composition of the 
Parliament, or the views of the Commission appear to have almost no impact on 
outcomes” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 74; cf. Achen, 2006)92. Nevertheless, 
due to an ever faster speed of globalization and the need to deal with new rising 
challenges, to improve decision-making efficiency in the EU, which now has 28 
member states already and still has the potential to enlarge, is necessary and 
unavoidable. As a matter of fact, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty aims to do so. 
Accordingly, this dissertation would boldly suggest that in order to improve collective 
decision-making efficiencies in front of severe crises, such as the on-going sovereign 
debt crisis in recent years, formal rules, especially QMV, will gradually replace the 
informal consensus practices in the Council, which could be stated in hypothesis form 
as follows:  
H6: Confronted with the severe sovereign debt crisis, the Council of Ministers 
tends to apply the formal rules of QMV rather than take decisions on the basis of 
informal consensus, so as to improve the collective decision-making efficiency to meet 
challenges of globalization.  
If this prediction is correct, in case studies one should observe the application of 
QMV in the Council of Ministers when it is prescribed as the formal rules instead of 
resorting to the informal unanimity to reach agreement. Furthermore, due to the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the new post of European Council President 
brings out changes to the consensus decision-making scenario of the European Council, 
and here raises the question: how can Van Rompuy’s activities be appropriately 
accounted for by LI? (in hypothesis form, see H7h) 
Second, Moravcsik’s conception of the state is believed to be quite narrow, and 
his LI pays little attention to the disaggregated components of the state and thus lacks a 
subtle analysis of domestic politics; besides, his LI is said to be simplistic, solely 
focusing on economic interests while ignoring other factors that also exert influence on 
government preferences, such as domestic structures (Cini 2010, 100). Despite 
                                                 
92 Achen also argues for states’ willingness to follow the decision-making mode of informal 
consensus rather than the formal decision-making rules: “[h]owever EU decision-making is carried 
out, it does not seem to be well described solely by the formal rules. Informal norms and procedures 
appear to play a more central role” (2006, 295), and “[t]he case study literature has repeatedly 
emphasized the role of compromise and the striving for unanimity in EU decision-making. States are 
disinclined to follow the letter of their legal rights if doing so makes an enemy. Bargaining matters 
more than the official decision-making rules” (Achen 2006, 297-98). 
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Moravcsik’s advocating for the analysis of domestic politics — as he argues that 
“[d]omestic analysis is a precondition for systemic analysis, not a supplement to it”, 
and to understand the formation of various national preferences and diplomatic 
strategies requires “further research into the domestic roots of European integration” 
(Moravcsik 1991, 55). LI “neither disaggregates the state satisfactorily, nor explains 
how the motivations of the executive cause a government to make certain choices and 
not others” (Forster 1998, 358). Moreover, the reality of EU politics today presents 
“multi-level” rather than “two-level” games (Rosamond 2010). 
Third, it is frequently argued that Moravcsik’s theory has played down the role of 
supranational institutions and non-state transnational actors (Cini 2010, 100-101). For 
example, when unwrapping reasons for the success of the SEA, Moravcsik clearly 
states that “[t]he historical record does not confirm the importance of international and 
transnational factors” (1991, 44), and the SEA got “launched independently of pressure 
from transnationally organized business interest groups” (1991, 45). Moravcsik rejects 
neo-functionalist propositions that supranational institutions and transnational interest 
groups play vital roles in pushing European integration forward, because “[n]one of the 
three supranational variables — European institutional momentum, transnational 
business interest group activity, and international political leadership — seems to 
account for the timing, content, and process of negotiating the SEA” (Moravcsik 1991, 
47). Instead, Moravcsik puts forward “intergovernmental institutionalism”, the 
precursor for his later LI, to explain the SEA negotiation, which consisted of three 
elements: intergovernmentalism, lowest-common-denominator bargaining, and 
protection of sovereignty (1991, 48-49). The EC’s reform of the internal market is the 
result of interstate bargains among three big leading states: the UK, France, and 
Germany, the success of which was preconditioned by the convergence of their national 
economic policy preferences (Moravcsik 1991, 20-21). National interests and states’ 
relative power are the primary sources of European regional integration, while EC 
supranational institutions are functioning in the sense of cementing existing interstate 
bargains (Moravcsik 1991, 56). In contrast to Moravcsik’s conclusion, researchers 
(especially neo-functionalists), however, have demonstrated the influence of the 
Commission on EU policy outcomes (e.g. Cram 1993), EC legal integration and the 
increasing power of the ECJ (e.g. Burley and Mattli 1993; Wincott 1994), the 
autonomy of supranational institutions (e.g. Pollack 1997; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1998) and the lobbying power of non-state actors such as European firms and European 
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interest groups for EU integration (e.g. Cowles 1995). All in all, Moravcsik “does not 
provide a full enough account of the supply side of his model when focusing solely on 
interstate negotiations” (Cini 2010, 100), and he looks at the formal aspects of the 
European integration process but looks over informal politics which also shape EU 
policy outcomes (Cini 2010, 101).
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Finally, LI has been disclaimed as a theory, for it lacks the specification of the 
conditions to assert or refute its premises and it fails to provide a final vision of 
European integration. Rather, it should be taken as a sort of approach, offering a 
“pre-theory” or “analytical framework” composed of three existing theories: national 
preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining, and institutional delegation (Cini 
2010, 101-102; see also Forster 1998). Forster (1998) tests LI’s analytical and 
predictive power in three dossiers of the UK’s role in the negotiations for the 
Maastricht Treaty: social policy, foreign and security policy, and enhancing the powers 
of the EP. Forster’s case studies of the UK cast doubt on LI’s proposition of national 
preference formation, governments as being purposeful and instrumental actors, and 
intergovernmental bargaining (Forster 1998, 347). 
Forster (1998, 350) first draws out six core assumptions from Moravcsik’s LI: (1) 
nation states are assumed to be rational actors with rational behavior; (2) producers 
express their preferences and governments aggregate them; economic interests shape 
national preferences; (3) government policy preferences, their ranges and government 
negotiation flexibility are shaped by three factors: (a) the magnitude of benefits that 
would be realized from cooperation, (b) the certainty of benefits and costs, and (c) 
producer groups’ relative influence (differential mobilization) on policy formation; (4) 
                                                 
93  William Wallace (1990) makes a distinction between “formal” and “informal” integration. 
Informal integration refers to intense patterns of interaction and interdependence flowing from “the 
dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks, and social change” without the impetus 
or sanctions of deliberate political decisions, while in the opposite, formal integration means “changes 
in the framework of rules and regulations which encourage — or inhibit, or redirect — informal 
flows”, that is, political leaders’ deliberate actions of institutional building (William Wallace 1990, 
9). Informal integration is a continuous process originating from transactions of individuals pursing 
private interests, while formal integration is about discontinuity, from treaty to treaty and bargain to 
bargain (William Wallace 1990, 9). Two different kinds of formal integration are further 
distinguished: the responsive and the proactive (William Wallace 1990, 11), which could be viewed 
as a reaction to informal integration — might promote, constrain or prohibit it (Rosamond 2000, 130). 
State primacy stands out in two types of routes: first, compared with informal integration, formal 
integration involves interstate bargaining, so it determines the width and depth of the European level 
governance; second, without national government political decisions, informal integration’s 
promotion into formal integration is not possible (Rosamond 2000, 130). 
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it is difficult for self-interested nation states to make concessions beyond their own 
objective interests, and EC negotiated results tend to embody the lowest common 
denominator. So the outcome of governmental bargaining is decided by the relative 
intensity of preferences and at the same time, reflects the interests of recalcitrant states. 
Government concessions happen not because of the action of supranational leaders, but 
because of government autonomy from their domestic interest groups; (5) policy areas 
are discrete and unconnected. Linkage occurs as a last resort to reach agreements and 
tends to relate to financial issues or symbolic side-payments rather than to substantive 
issues; (6) different issues and policy areas prescribe different constraints on 
government options and hence generate predictable patterns of interstate bargaining. 
Based on those assumptions, Forster (1998, 350-351) outlines the predictions for 
UK government behavior in each of the three dossiers: 
(1) As for the social policy dossier, the cost for the UK will be predictably high. 
Domestic interest groups backed up by coalitions of interested parties will articulate 
their concerns and thus the UK government will be under a tight constraint on the issue 
of social policy. Therefore, the UK government will be resistant to make any 
concession on this issue and even be impervious to issue linkage and side-payments. 
The UK’s decision to opt-out from the Social Protocol was based on its calculation of 
the benefits and costs to be involved. The UK government believed that firms would 
benefit more by its opt-out, so there was no reason to compromise. 
(2) The foreign and security policy area seems far away from exerting direct 
economic impact on domestic interest groups, and private producers have little interest 
in foreign and defense cooperation. So cost-and-benefit calculations of private groups 
are generally week, uncertain and diffuse. Such untraceable distributional 
consequences will leave a wide maneuver space to ideologically motivated state 
leaders. Government compromises and issue linkages are quite possible, which are 
justified on the basis of symbolism and ideology. 
(3) The EP dossier shares many features of foreign and security bargaining: a 
weak cost-and-benefit calculation; uncertain and diffuse consequences; more 
negotiation room for political elites. Because the implication of strengthening the EP is 
obscure and less predictable, there will be more space for concessions and the 
negotiated result may be greater than the lowest common denominator. 
Then Forster examines the empirical record of these three dossiers, from which 
he gets the following research results:  
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(1) As for social policy, the UK government’s resistance to comprise does 
suggest high costs for the UK to accept the Social Protocol, but these costs are not 
reduced to economic nature only: they are also political due to the struggle for the 
control over the ideological direction of the Conservative Party after the downfall of 
Ms Thatcher (Forster 1998, 352). The LI model is not absolutely correct in the sense 
that the opt-out decision is principally political rather than economic; besides, domestic 
producer groups do not impose a tight constraint on UK negotiations; on the contrary, 
despite their reluctance, domestic producer groups are generally supportive of a 
comprised social policy. Thus the LI model has missed the political and symbolic 
nature of the social policy debate in the UK (Forster 1998, 353-354). 
(2) In the area of foreign and security policy, as the LI model predicts, the 
domestic influence from private groups and producers on the UK government’s 
negotiation is weak, but the space for government to freely negotiate is not as great as 
the LI model suggests, nor is it solely determined by the UK Prime Minister’s (i.e. John 
Major’s) ideological motivations (Forster 1998, 354). The historical context of France’s 
pressures for a common foreign and security policy and the weight of the UK’s 
previous policy decisions, such as its affirmation to American-led North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), have curtailed the government’s freedom to compromise 
(Forster 1998, 354-356). 
(3) On the issue of the EP, the LI model is right in its way to predict the loose 
public constraints on increasing the powers of the EP; however, the UK government’s 
scope for compromise is far more restricted by its domestic Eurosceptic considerations 
than the LI model expects (Forster 1998, 356-357).  
Therefore, the LI model appears incomplete and inadequate to explain and 
predict the UK’s positions on these three dossiers. The six core LI assumptions could 
be grouped into three dimensions where the shortcomings of LI may lie: preference 
formation, governments as purposeful actors, and intergovernmental bargaining 
(Forster 1998, 357), and accordingly, based on the UK cases, the LI model’s weak 
points can be classified into three categories:  
(1) Few domestic producer interest groups placed their specific demands on 
government negotiations in 1991. The UK position was much more shaped by 
preferences stemming from within the government itself, and the government was 
likely to impose its views on interest groups rather than vice versa. National 
preferences were not formulated fixedly before strategies were put forward. Rather, 
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they were subject to continuous redefinition as the negotiation went on, which was 
constrained by a mix of factors: “international pressures, departmental and organization 
interests, powerful political rivalries, and the need to maintain domestic support” 
(Forster 1998, 358). Government negotiation freedom, in addition, was further 
infringed by “party management considerations, ideological as well as policy based” 
(Forster 1998, 358). LI’s economic dimension failed to account for “a fundamentally 
contingent political process” where the language used in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
pillar image of the EU constructed by the Treaty, and the majority voting mode 
implying a concession of national sovereignty all appeared to have assumed greater 
importance (Forster 1998, 359, his emphasis). 
(2) In contrast to the LI model, to preserve sovereignty was not an overriding 
and the only goal of the UK government, and its preferences are not hierarchically 
ordered (Forster 1998, 359). Negotiations muddle through disjointed incrementalism 
and mutual adjustments, which challenge LI’s notion of rationality; though states are 
still the final arbiters, government executives, due to the domestic and international 
constraints, are not as powerful as LI suggests (Forster 1998, 360). 
(3) LI emphasizes interstate bargaining of coalitions, preferences of the large 
member states, the limited practices of linkage, and side-payments, but in the case of 
the social policy dossier, the UK position undermines LI’s assumption that “the threat 
of exclusion is sufficient to ensure agreement from recalcitrant member states” (Forster 
1998, 360), and the negotiation outcomes do not embody the logic of the lowest 
common denominator (Forster 1998, 361). Meanwhile, common positions within issue 
areas did get upgraded through long-rolling and forward linkage techniques related to 
neo-functionalist thoughts (Forster 1998, 362).  
To sum up, in the UK cases mentioned above, LI is correct in highlighting the 
influence of domestic interests and constituencies on government preference formation 
and on the motivations of member states (Forster 1998, 363). Nevertheless, 
government preference formation is not only based on economic welfare, but also on 
political concerns, implying certain unpredictable decision-making, because “[p]olitics 
is not always a rational process: ideology, belief and symbolism can play as important a 
role as substance” (Forster 1998, 364). Additionally, LI fails to recognize the 
significance of the political context and unique nature of each negotiation leading to 
the Maastricht Treaty (Forster 1998, 364). All in all, the parsimonious explanatory and 




“LI is thus perhaps best regarded less as a theory of intergovernmental 
bargaining, than as pre-theory or analytical framework. It provides some 
very useful insights but, as empirical testing proves, it must be supplemented 
by other models in order to explain fully how and why a government 
chooses among various outcomes. Similarly, other models are needed to 
explain the determinants of politicians’ choices among competing 
alternatives. The irony is that, like neo-functionalism, LI’s aspiration to 
generality ultimately renders it ‘oddly apolitical’.” (Forster 1998, 365) 
 
Forster’s research steps actually represent the congruence method to test the 
explanatory and predictive power of the theory of LI: first, Forster derives assumptions 
from Moravcsik’s LI; second, he makes predictions of the UK government’s behavior 
in three dossiers in line with those assumptions; third, he examines the empirical 
records of these three cases to see to what kind of degree the predictions made by LI 
are correct; finally, after comparing the outcomes in each case with the assumptions, he 
summarizes the shortcomings of LI and points out other factors neglected by LI. As a 
result, Forster’s (1998) research not only sets up an example to test Moravcsik’s LI 
model by the EU’s new developments, but also offers possible alternatives to 
complement the LI model, such as partisan ideological struggles and domestic and 
international constraints on government executives. It must be pointed out, however, 
that Forster’s test is based on Moravcsik’s (1991, 1993a, 1995) initial thoughts on LI, 
and actually the LI model presented in Moravcsik’s 1998 work has avoided some 
pitfalls mentioned by Forster; moreover, when Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) 
add the scope conditions for the application of LI to the theory, Forster’s research 
results become explainable: first, national preference formation is “issue-specific” — 
in economic areas, economic calculations prevail in national preference formation, but 
in non-economic areas, other factors such as geo-politics and ideology weigh more; 
second, LI works better to explain and predict policies where domestic societal 
interests are well organized and represented, so accordingly, the three cases selected by 
Forster, for one thing, represent national preference formation in non-economic areas 
where non-economic factors are prominent and influential; for another, they do not 
meet the ideal conditions for the application of LI — the societal interest representation 
in the three cases is diffuse and uncertain. All of those illustrate the theoretical 





3.7.4 Modifications and Development of LI by Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 
Alongside the EU’s development and the criticisms leveled at LI propositions, 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) restate the key points of LI proposed by 
Moravcsik in the 1990s, justify LI as a theory, specify the scope conditions for the LI 
model, and test the LI model against two cases: EU agricultural policy (the CAP) and 
EU enlargement, based on which they conclude that LI, in the study of European 
integration, has obtained the status of a “baseline theory”, ever being open and ready to 
dialogue and synthesis with other theories and approaches, indicating the theoretical 
usefulness and modesty of LI in explaining and predicting the EU.  
 
3.7.4.1 Three Stages of the LI Model 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) use “national preferences”, “substantial 
bargains” and “institutional choice” to re-account the three stages of the LI model. As 
for the national preferences, LI treats nation states as unitary actors, assuming a 
consistent preference is possible despite multiple representation and various domestic 
actors involved in preference formation, and the fundamental goals of a state (i.e. state 
preferences) are “neither fixed nor uniform: they vary among states and within the 
same state across time and issues according to issue-specific societal interdependence 
and domestic institutions” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 69). The key to 
understanding preference formation is “issue-specific”, which implies different interest 
formation models for substantively different policy areas: in economic issue areas, the 
economic component is prominent and important, and the model for national interest 
formation is based on a balance or equilibrium between producers on the one side and 
taxpayers and actors interested in regulation on the other side; in those economic areas, 
issue-specific preferences mainly concern how to manage globalization and to meet the 
challenges brought by globalization, and the latter part of the equilibrium has greater 
impact in policy areas such as environment, immigration and development aid where 
the regulatory element is more salient; by contrast, in non-economic issue areas, such 
as foreign and defense policy, the proper model of preference formation derives from 
non-economic concerns rather than economic calculation (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 70). This “issue-specific” elaboration helps to dismiss the 
common misinterpretation of LI’s basic claim as “producer interests prevail” or 
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“economics dominates policy” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 70). So as for 
the EU, most of the initial policies do deal with economic issues, and Moravcsik’s LI 
confirms that national preferences do “have mainly reflected concrete economic 
interests rather than other general concerns like security or European ideals” 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 70). Concrete national interests emerge “from a 
process of domestic conflict in which specific sectoral interests, adjustment costs and, 
sometimes, geopolitical concerns played an important role”, and governments’ 
participation in integration is “subject to regulatory and budgetary constraints and the 
macro-economic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions” with the purpose to 
“secure commercial advantages for producer groups” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009, 70; Moravcsik 1998, 3, 38). The re-account here conveys the idea that 
Moravcsik’s LI also takes other factors besides economic interests into account, as 15 
case studies in The Choice for Europe show that economic interests driven by 
globalization play an important role in all cases, while geo-politics and ideology also 
have a secondary but still important effect in half of the cases (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 70). The key point of this re-account is to tell researchers that 
Moravcsik does not say economic interests are the sole factor to explain government 
preferences, but rather, it is the primary factor and other factors also weight on the 
basis of an “issue-specific” consideration. This clarification also shows the affinity 
between traditional intergovernmentalism and LI today: Hoffmann (1995, 5) has 
suggested that nation states are not “black boxes” — they are communities of identities 
and belongings, so national interests cannot be simply reduced to power and calculated 
from a state’s place in a regime; rather, other factors, being historical, political, and 
cultural, also play a role. So the re-account here resonates with something that is in the 
blood of intergovernmentalism.  
As different states rarely have precisely converged preferences, nation states 
come into the bargaining stage where cooperation decisions and negotiated outcomes 
depend on the relative bargaining power of the actors involved in the negotiation. The 
bargaining power, in the EU context, is mainly decided by national asymmetrical 
interdependence, “that is, the uneven distribution of the benefits of a specific 
agreement (compared to those of unilateral or alternative possibilities known as 
‘outside option’)” and information acquiring on actors’ preferences and institutional 
mechanisms. All those imply that first, actors in the least need of a specific agreement 
compared to the status quo are “best able to threaten other actors with non-cooperation” 
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and thus capable of forcing others to make concessions (this represents a minimal 
common-denomination proposition); second, actors who have acquired more and better 
information about other actors’ negotiation stances or preferences and the working 
procedures of institutions are “able to manipulate the outcome to their advantage” 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 71). So LI assumes that due to asymmetrical 
interdependence, member states who economically benefit the most from EU 
integration tend to “compromise the most on the margin to realize gains”,
94
 while 
those who benefit the least tend to impose conditions and are not easily ready to make 
concessions, and hard bargains would witness governmental threats to “veto proposals”, 
“to withhold financial side-payments” or “to form alternative alliances excluding 
recalcitrant governments” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 71). To elaborate on 
this bargaining stage, Moravcsik adopts a bargaining theory that follows rationalist 
institutionalism but downplays the role of informational asymmetries (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 70-71). Compared to federalism or neo-functionalism which 
would argue that “ideational entrepreneurs” such as the federal idealists Jean Monnet 
or a Commission president are armed with better information and expertise and thereby 
exert influence on national governments, LI posits that “such third parties are usually 
not required to reach efficient interstate agreements, precisely because they rarely 
possess information or expertise unavailable to states” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 71); such a view challenges the traditional assumption of 
potential inefficiencies of bargaining due to asymmetrical information acquiring, 
contending that intergovernmental negotiations in the EU can reliably produce efficient 
outcomes and arguing against supranational entrepreneurs’ role in enhancing 
negotiation. Nevertheless, Moravcsik does admit that in some “exceptional” cases such 
as the negotiation for the Single Act, supranational entrepreneurs did exert influence 
and hence promote the integration process (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 71). 
These exceptional cases indeed show that LI also cannot serve as a grand theory to 
account for all aspects of the EU, and sometimes, intergovernmentalists must 
                                                 
94 This is termed “the simple logic of asymmetrical interdependence”—“those who benefit the most 
from a policy must sacrifice the most on the margin”, which always turns out to be “the most 
profound factor shaping the negotiations” (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002, 3). Expressing their 
indebtedness to Keohane and Nye (1977), Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003, 44) argue that 
“interstate bargaining outcomes reflect patterns of ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ — all other 
things equal, more ‘interdependent’ countries tend to benefit more from liberalizing markets and are, 




acknowledge the appropriateness of the certain parts of competing theories, such as 
neo-functionalism.  
As for institutional choice, LI follows neo-liberal institutionalism and values 
some claims by neo-functionalists and historical institutionalists: “states deliberately 
delegate authority to supranational organizations capable of acting against the 
subsequent preferences of governments; and institutions incorporate unintended, and 
unwanted consequences under conditions of uncertainty — an essential component of 
regime theory” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 72). Here again institutions’ 
functions get emphasized: first, institutions help governments to reduce the transactions 
costs of future interstate negotiations on the same issue and at the same time provide 
information for governments to speculate about other actors’ future preferences and 
behavior; second, governments set up rules to distribute gains, reduce coordination 
costs, monitor and sanction governmental non-compliance. Hence, “the severity of 
distributional conflict and enforcement problems”, “uncertainty about the preferences 
of other actors”, and “the future states of the world” lead to concrete cooperation on a 
specific issue as well as different institutional designs (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009, 72). LI proposes that different issue areas display and require different degrees of 
delegating and pooling sovereignty, which reflects national government concerns about 
each other’s future ability to commit to the reached agreement. Two possibilities or 
forms of delegation are distinguished. The first one is to only lay down norms and 
procedures to facilitate interstate bargaining and reduce negotiation costs as well as 
uncertainty, exhibiting the purpose of “pure coordination” where “governments may 
delegate decisions to common decision-making, or delegate them to the EU — as in the 
case of some ‘standard-setting’ decisions — in order to reduce the transaction costs of 
determining a common solution”. Cases for this purpose of outright delegation are rare, 
as governments can handle such situations. The second one is to delegate sovereignty 
more extensively, such as making use of QMV, the Commission’s right to put forward 
proposals and to negotiate with third parties, the independent operation of the ECB and 
the judicial power of the ECJ, the EU’s modest centralized fiscal capacity, quite often 
aiming at “resolving problems of control, sanctioning, and incomplete contracting 
through credible pre-commitment”. The purpose of such a transferring of sovereignty 
to EU institutions is to help “governments effectively remove issues from the varying 
influence of domestic politics and decentralized intergovernmental control, which 
might build up pressure for non-compliance if costs for powerful domestic actors are 
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high” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 72). The intention to establish EC/EU 
institutions, therefore, is to guarantee “credible domestic commitment by strengthening 
the national executive or the national judicial branch or the very domestic groups that 
support the policy in the first place vis-à-vis other domestic forces favoring 
non-compliance” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 73). In short, from LI’s point 
of view, European integration is of nation states, by nation states, and for nation states, 
and such integration and the process of Europeanization is not to replace the nation 
states, but to “rescue” (in the sense suggested by Milward (1992, 2000) and help them 
to cope with globalization (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 73).  
 
3.7.4.2 The Specification of Scope Conditions of the LI Model 
Taking the common criticisms leveled at LI into account, especially rational choice 
institutionalism’s charges on LI’s failure to explain EU everyday decision-making and 
thus attributing “a disproportionately small role” to EU institutions and HI’s criticisms 
of LI’s neglect of the unintended or underside consequences caused by treaty revisions, 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) justify the value of the LI model via answering 
“[t]o what extent can LI accurately account for European integration as a whole? And 
where does it reach its limits?” (73). For rational choice institutionalists’ criticism, 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009, 74) argue that LI’s emphasis on institutional 
choices does suggest that a deliberate delegation and pooling of sovereignty is 
happening, and some EU institutions do presume semi-autonomous legal power, so 
institutions matter; meanwhile, LI can also apply to everyday EU decision-making 
besides “treaty-amending decisions”. As for the critiques from HI, Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig (2009, 75) insist that not only is LI able to explain undesired 
consequences, but it also assumes their existence, as unintended consequences are 
starting points “for international institutions to elaborate ‘incomplete contacts’” so as to 
specify agreements and “credibly lock in compliance against defection by future 
unsatisfied governments.” The interstitial changes between intergovernmental grand 
bargains as well as the changes of unanticipated consequences can also be explained by 
the changes in state preferences, power, and information, and thus LI helps to 
understand and resolve “the uncertainty and indeterminacy inherent in the initial 
bargain — or any political process” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 75); since 
nation states’ preferences for integration “tend to be rather stable over time” and 
“European governments were quite aware of the consequences of their actions”, the 
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commonly-believed unintended outcomes, such as the CAP and the EU Social Protocol 
(both of which have been elaborated on by Pierson (1996, 1998) as unanticipated 
consequences), actually have been foreseen by governments at the beginning 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 76). 
Though disagreeing with rational choice institutionalists’ and HI’s criticisms, 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig acknowledge that “LI is not a universal theory” and it 
“explains integration under most conditions, but not under those that violate its 
assumptions about preferences, bargaining, and credible commitments” (2009, 76). 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig specify two limitations to the application of LI: 
“First, LI best explains policy-making in issue areas where social preferences are 
relatively certain and well defined”, that is, the weaker and more diffuse/the more 
intense, certain and institutionally represented societal interests there are, the less 
predictable/more certain national preferences are; as a matter of fact, LI assumes a 
correlation between the variance of outcomes and the underlying uncertainty of interest 
representation of the domestic constituency, and the less “substantive implications of a 
choice” there are, “the more likely ideological preferences and beliefs, or other factors, 
may be influential” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 76). Consequently, among 
various EU policies, the most reliably predictable national preferences are in 
agricultural and trade areas “where economic preferences are stable” (i.e. countries 
hold consistent preferences for decades), and shifted national preferences result from 
governments’ incremental responses to changing market conditions and more sudden 
responses to “overt policy failures”; when nation states predict “downside risks”, the 
construction of institutions tends to maintain national prerogatives by privileging the 
status of national minister, restricting the role of the EP or employing unanimous 
voting to obtain tighter national control, as the case of agriculture suggests (Moravcsik 
and Schimmelfennig 2009, 76). Less predictable national preferences are “in economic 
areas such as monetary policy, where economic knowledge is more uncertain and the 
distribution of costs and benefits more diffuse” and the consideration of monetary 
policies’ efficacy may have assumed as much importance as the underlying political 
economy (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 76-77); however, “[e]ven less 
predictable are the politics of constitutional reform” (e.g. European Constitutional 
deliberations), “where substantive concerns are not invariably salient” and “weak 
ideological beliefs” matter (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 77). So LI works 
best to explain and predict policies where domestic societal interests are better and 
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institutionally represented and organized, and thus countries have more stable 
preferences based on those more-clearly defined domestic pressures, which shows a 
cause-effect relation between the diffusion of issue-specific societal interests and the 
uncertainty (unpredictability) of state preferences.  
“Second, intergovernmental bargaining based on asymmetrical interdependence 
dominates interstate bargaining except in rare conditions of high transaction costs and 
asymmetrical information, when supranational entrepreneurs may wield influence” 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 77) — to argue that the Commission can 
provide information services and reduce transaction costs actually is also a proposition 
of rational choice institutionalism (e.g. Pollack 1996, 438-439; see chapter four of this 
dissertation). Those “rare conditions”, Moravcsik (1999) argues, only have applied to 
the case of the SEA, where supranational entrepreneurs in the Commission and the EP 
took the advantage to initiate the SEA due to the failure of European multinational 
firms, interest groups, and domestic ministers to aggregate various disparate proposals 
into an integrated one and thus a lack of effective collective action among different 
interest groups. So Moravcsik believes that supranational entrepreneurship is effective 
“not so much in situations where international bargaining is complex, difficult or new, 
per se, but when domestic coordination problems are severe” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 77; Moravcsik 1999, 282-85). Accordingly, Moravcsik’s LI 
holds the basic tenets that as for international bargaining, “decentralized non-coercive 
negotiation will be more efficient where information is plentiful and distributed widely” 
and “[o]nly when governments lack critical information, expertise, bargaining skills, 
and legitimacy that third parties can provide are the latter likely to be influential” 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 77). The exceptional conditions and cases, 
however, from another perspective, confirm the validity of transaction-based theory 
and EU supranational institutions’ — especially the Commission’s — autonomy and 
their roles in promoting EU integration.  
  
3.7.4.3 Case Studies: Applying LI to Agriculture and Enlargement  
To illustrate their propositions on the scope conditions for LI as well as LI’s empirical 
power, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) select two cases: an easy case — 
agriculture (the CAP), and a more difficult one — enlargement, and their analyses for 
each case are largely based on Moravcsik (1998) and Moravcsik and Vachudova (2002, 
2003), respectively.  
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As for the case of agriculture, it has the ideal conditions for the application of LI 
proposed above: “certain and intense preferences, clear positive-sum benefits, and clear 
credible commitment problems”, as “[f]armers associations have intense preferences, 
are highly organized, and exercise a strong influence on governments”; and at the same 
time, agriculture remains one of the most important issues for any industrialized 
government and it is still a core issue for “European bargaining”, which consumes a 
large part of the EU budget. In short, the formation of the CAP (i.e. a policy outcome) 
is closely related to the relevant national domestic groups’ interests and demands 
(which contribute to and explain state preferences), hence providing an ideal condition 
for LI theory (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 77). Regarding the three stages of 
the LI model, the elements of the analysis of the CAP are as follows. 
First, the initial task is to ascertain and explain national preferences from “the 
structure of issue-specific domestic societal interests — in this case economic ones”, 
and in agriculture, “national preferences [...] were skewed toward producer interests” 
because of the big size of the farm sector and its better organization and interest 
representation in contrast to “the diffuse and unorganized groups of taxpayers and 
consumers who were forced to foot the bill” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 
78). Major governments’ preferences concerning the CAP in the 1960s varied largely 
and were closely related to domestic producers’ preferences. In France, 25 percent of 
the population worked in agriculture, in Germany 15 percent, and in the UK only 5 
percent; commensurately, France became the biggest surplus producer and exporter of 
agricultural goods, while Germany and the UK were large net importers with marginal 
exports — the latter two were uncompetitive in agriculture compared to France; 
consequently, France, as a large exporter, preferred intra-EC market liberalization and 
higher prices for agricultural products relative to the world market; in contrast, the UK, 
as a net importer, wanted to be offered with lower priced agriculture products by both 
the Community and the Commonwealth. As for Germany, due to “its still sizeable and 
politically influential agricultural sector”, it also pressed for high prices. As a result, 
each national preference reflected the size and competitiveness of its agriculture sector 
as well as the variance of the intensity of producers’ interests in the three big countries: 
France intensely favored the liberalization of the Community’s market with modest 
support prices, but strongly opposed to do so in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT); Germany objected to the liberalization of the intra-Community market 
“unless very high common support prices were paid” while it was willing to make 
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concessions in the GATT due to its domestic arrangements; finally, the UK was 
skeptical to any kinds of the CAP, and it “favored a liberalization of global agricultural 
trade” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 78).  
Second, carrying varied national preferences, these big three countries entered 
into the stage of interstate bargaining, where LI predicts that France’s strongest 
interests for the CAP would place it in an inferior bargaining position, implying that 
France should make more concessions or press other negotiators to reach agreement 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 78). The conventional explanation, or rather 
from a neo-functionalist perspective, is that France, via issue-linkage or package deals, 
made concessions on unrelated issues that were of less interests to France; 
consequently, the French government linked the issue of internal tariff removal to the 
creation of the CAP so as to threaten Germany to give up its favored bilateral 
agricultural trade agreements, and at the same time, France changed its previous tough 
stances on the negotiations of the GATT and supported the Kennedy round of GATT 
negotiations so as to force Germany into making concessions on the CAP. However, 
those explanations are problematic: how or to what extent can a state “impose losses on 
other interest groups in the name of cross-issue linkage”? The fact is that “there was [...] 
no real quid pro quo at the level of sectoral interests” since neither did the French 
industrialists really oppose GATT agreements, nor did German farmers reject the CAP 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 78). LI offers a different explanation: the 
bargaining process shows a “convergence of interest — collusion — between German 
and French farming interests at the expense of French and German consumers, 
taxpayers and technocrats, as well as third-country (e.g. US) producers and the 
European Commission” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 78-79). The negotiated 
results were as follows: French agricultural commodities obtained higher support 
prices and a preferential access to German markets; in return, the construction of the 
CAP followed the German government’s will, which includes “long transition periods 
for bilateral quotas, high subsidies, and price support”; meanwhile, German farmers’ 
slight disadvantage in wheat prices was “compensated” by “extremely high EU support 
prices for animal products, the mainstay of German agriculture”, which led to a huge 
increase of animal production and exportation in Germany (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 79). It was not the farmers but some officials who opposed such 
a deal, and to persuade those opponents, de Gaulle pretentiously made a credible threat 
that France would withdraw from the Community if the CAP were not established — 
212 
 
“pretentiously” because when he made good on such a threat, he lost domestic support 
and backed down (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 79). Moreover, geopolitical 
ideology did play a role as de Gaulle tried to “embarrass German politicians into 
accepting a deal by threatening to undermine the EEC”, but the Commission, which is 
always regarded as a “supranational entrepreneur” by neo-functionalists, exerted little 
influence on the final outcomes. The reason is that member states were well informed 
about each government’s preferences and the intricacies of agricultural policy, and in 
fact, the CAP turned out to be based on an opposite design to the Commission’s 
proposal (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 79).  
Finally, LI asserts that the institutional prescription for the CAP as well as for the 
common market reflected concerns about member states’ credible commitments. 
Despite the de Gaulle government’s “purportedly ideological aversion to supranational 
institutions”, France pressed for a centralized CAP to lock Germany’s compliance into 
a permanent mechanism of high price financing before it finally agreed to let the UK 
join the Community; meanwhile Germany insisted on the unanimous voting mode, 
because it was worried that the protection to its agricultural goods might be reduced to 
a lower level in the future if QMV were adopted. So from the very starting point, EU 
agricultural policy was decided by unanimity without the Commission’s right to 
propose — national agricultural ministers have acquired an incomparable privileged 
status (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 79). From the LI perspective, because 
domestic agricultural interests were very strong and all industrialized governments 
favored subsidization to the agricultural sector, to put agricultural issues on the agenda 
of EU-level negotiations was necessary, and this was another way to maximally protect 
national interests (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 79).  
In contrast to the agriculture case, the LI model encounters difficulties to explain 
EU enlargement, a case where intergovernmental negotiations with unanimous voting 
are applied. The reason is that despite that candidate states’ national interests tend to 
exhibit more concrete and intense propensities because of their economic orientation to 
qualify for membership, the exiting members’ interests turn out to be more diffuse 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 80). When new members are admitted into the 
EU club, they must adopt the acquis communautaire and the existing policies almost 
remain unchanged; at the same time, new members’ size and budgetary impact are 
small compared to the existing EU members, and the latter’s primary concerns are 
issues of Community budgetary flows, trade and investments. On the issue of 
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enlargement, the existing member states’ calculations of the costs and benefits become 
more diffuse and imprecise (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 80). But still, LI 
predicts that, first, “members will calculate the advantages of enlargement in terms of 
the costs and benefits of social-economic interdependence of various types”; second, 
new members will actively and strongly seek membership in the EU, while old 
members will promote new members’ accession process more slowly, among which 
those who have the closest and most positive interdependent relationship with potential 
new members will lead the process; finally, existing members will exploit their 
bargaining superiority to impose conditions and create exceptions to mitigate the 
impact and disadvantages brought by new members, such as the competition for 
subsidies and markets (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 80). 
Moravcsik (1998) offered an analysis of the UK’s accession to the Community in 
the 1960s. In light of LI, both the UK’s wishes to join the Community and France’s 
opposition were “economically motivated”: the UK’s wanted to become a member of 
the Customs Union (CU), reflecting a strong demand of UK commercial and trade 
interests, while France’s objection to the UK’s membership was due to the UK’s 
opposition to the CAP and a low-price commercial competition that would be brought 
by the UK; the CAP was France’s key concern, and only after the CAP was created, 
France finally agreed to the UK’s entry but with the demand for “a permanent 
financing arrangement for the CAP” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 80).
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95 With its objectives laid down first in the Rome Treaty of 1957 (Article 39) and later at the Stresa 
Conference in July 1958, the CAP was launched in 1962; later the grain price was agreed in 
December 1964, and the Commission’s proposed measures on financing the CAP triggered the 
“empty chair” crisis from mid-1965 to early 1966, which led to the application of unanimity rules as 
the normal practice within the Agricultural Council. At the very beginning, in order to implement the 
CAP, national governments established the European Agriculture Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
(EAGGF) which was agreed to be directly financed by national contributions only for the first three 
years, and after that a new funding arrangement should be adopted; however, the Commission’s 
proposal to replace member state’s direct contribution with the Community’s own resources after July 
1965 sparked the “empty chair” crisis, and it was only in 1970 that the EC finally financed the CAP 
from its own resources, that is, “revenue from agricultural import levies and a proportion of VAT 
(Value Added Tax) payments” (Dedman 2010, 104), rather than from members’ annual “membership 
fee” (see Dedman 2010, 82-108; Fouilleux 2010, 341-45; Dinan 2010, 329-35). As for the UK’s 
membership in the Community, De Gaulle vetoed against the UK’s two accession applications in 
1963 and 1967, and only after De Gaulle resigned as French President in 1969, did the UK finally 
conclude accession terms with the EEC in June 1971 and joined it in 1973 (Dedman 2010, 93; 106); 
the main reason for De Gaulle’s successor, Georges Pompidou (1969-74), to change French 
government stances toward the UK, according to Dedman (2010, 104-105), is that France was 
alarmed by German “Ostpolitik” (Eastern Policy) and thus hoped to counterweigh Germany’s 
growing influence in the Community by admitting the UK’s membership.  
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During the entry negotiations, the UK government bargaining power was weak, 
because “Britain was more commercially dependent on the Six than vice versa”, and 
France, expressing “little economic interest in British membership”, gave up its veto 
against the UK’s accession in exchange for extracting more concessions mainly on the 
CAP (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 80). LI’s explanation is different from the 
conventional stories told from ideological or geopolitical perspectives, such as French 
politicians’ anti-Americanism and the national hatred caused by the Second World War.  
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) supplement LI’s case studies with the 
EU’s recent eastern enlargement. To begin with, each member state’s preference “can 
be largely — but not entirely — explained by their patterns of interdependence, 
geographical position, and economic structure”, and national positions towards eastern 
countries’ accession to the union differ in terms of both the speed (i.e. to be the “drivers” 
or “brakemen”) and extent (i.e. pushing for a limited enlargement only focusing on the 
central European states, or for an inclusive enlargement for all 10 candidate countries) 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 80-81). All 15 old member states’ preferences 
could be illustrated by “the speed” x “the extent” matrix
96
, and LI can account for these 
preference distributions as it proposes that when governments lack intense economic 
interest, geo-political or ideological interests emerge to be the old member states’ main 
concerns (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 81). LI takes the existing members’ 
geographic position as “a proxy variable” for “‘the imperatives induced by 
interdependence, and, in particular, the [...] exogenous increase in opportunities for 
cross-border and capital movements’ that should determine national preferences”; 
therefore, countries bordering the Central and Eastern European (CEE) candidate 
countries, except for Greece and Italy, became “drivers” for enlargement, while 
countries far from the CEE candidates, except for the UK, turned out to be “brakemen” 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 81). Greece and Italy’s negative attitudes reflect 
that, in line with LI’s predictions, being “the poorer, less highly developed, and more 
agricultural among existing members”, these two countries feared potential losses in 
trade, agriculture and fund budget competition with the new members, as the latter 
were also less developed countries with “the same traditional and resource-intensive 
industries” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 81). Though the CEE countries are 
                                                 




“neither geographically close nor economically important to Britain”, the UK 
government strongly supported EU expansion, not only acting as a “driver” instead of a 
“brakeman” but also pressing for an “inclusive” rather than an “limited” enlargement, 
which follows LI’s expectations that when intense economic interests are absent, other 
factors, like geopolitical or ideological interests play decisive roles in accounting for 
national states’ preferences (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 81). Still, there are 
other kinds of explanations. Some scholars hold that the UK’s supportive stance comes 
from its conservative government’s Europhobia, and the UK hopes that the widening 
process could prevent or at least dilute the EU’s deepening process, while others 
contend that the UK is devoted to a stable Europe, and the inclusion of the CEE 
countries was essential to avoid war calamities like those in Yugoslavia; yet, LI is 
correct in predicting the general trends of state preferences for or against EU eastward 
enlargement (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 81-82). 
In terms of substantive bargains, LI’s logic of “asymmetrical interdependence” 
works well to account for the old members’ and candidates’ bargaining powers: the 
sum of all 10 candidate countries’ Gross National Product (GNP) was less than 5 
percent of that of the existing members, while their exports and imports to the EU took 
up a large share of their total foreign trade, increasing to between 50 and 70 percent 
during the 1990s, which, nevertheless, also only accounted for less than 5 percent of 
the sum of the old member states’ foreign trade at that time. Besides, inflows of capital 
from western Europe was critical to the CEE countries, whereas the CEE’s economic 
impact on old members was far smaller — all these illustrate candidate countries’ 
one-sided dependence on EU markets. Therefore, though the market expansion was 
profitable for both the old and the new members, new members appeared to benefit 
more. As a result, the existing members gained superior bargaining positions and 
“[a]pplicant countries consistently found themselves in a weak negotiating position 
vis-à-vis their EU partners, and accordingly have conceded much in exchange for 
membership” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 82). Moreover, the negotiated 
results meet LI’s expectations: the CEE states accepted conditions set up by the 
existing members, such as “temporary restrictions of the free movement of labor and 
the phasing in of agricultural subsidies over a 10-year period”, while by imposing 
transitional restrictions, old member states guaranteed their benefits and reduced the 
negative impact of enlargement on their economies as much as possible (Moravcsik 
and Schimmelfennig 2009, 82). In short, the high asymmetrical interdependence 
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between the applicants and the existing members determined a weak and strong 
bargaining position for each group, respectively.  
As far as institutional choice is concerned, LI turns out to be not as convincing as 
it explains national preferences and intergovernmental bargaining, and the puzzle is 
that since there was already an “association” regime for the current members to 
negotiate with the CEE countries, why not just stick to this association regime which, 
with the similar functions to the EU, could also facilitate current members to access 
CEE markets while protecting the CEE countries’ vulnerable sectors, trade and budget 
competition with the existing members? The reason, some argue (e.g. Skalnes, 2005), 
was the old member states’ concern for continental stability and security, which “could 
be achieved much better through the strong incentives and ties of membership rather 
than through association” and the wars in the former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo 
precipitated the EU’s preparation for the eastern enlargement and the extension of its 
prospective membership to the western Balkans (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 
82). Other scholars (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2001, 2003) contend that it is the EU’s 
identity as being a liberal democratic community that “obliged the EU to admit 
democratic European countries as full members if they so desire” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 83). All in all, LI explains most parts of the difficult case — EU 
enlargement.  
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig’s (2009) case studies on the CAP and EU 
enlargement provided examples of testing LI by the selected three cases in this 
dissertation, which suggest two essential dimensions. The first one is to ascertain the 
nature of each case: an easy case or a harder case for LI, applying the judgments of 
“limitations” to see whether the selected cases possess the features of ideal conditions; 
the second dimension is to dissect the LI model into three stages with various 
sub-hypotheses, and to ascertain the explanatory and predictive power of LI means to 
test the validity of each sub-hypothesis.  
 
3.7.5 The Revised LI Model and Hypotheses Derivation  
The literature above depicts the origins, formation and evolutionary track of LI: by 
synthesizing neo-liberalism and traditional intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik first put 
forward “intergovernmental institutionalism” (Moravcsik 1991), then adapted it to LI 
(liberal intergovernmentalism) (Moravcsik, 1993a, 1995), and later systematically 
elaborated LI propositions and tested them on the basis of EU empirical developments 
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(Moravcsik, 1998). Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) further clarify and 
supplement LI, exhibiting visible theoretical revisions on the basis of empirical tests 
and criticisms leveled at LI’s previous assumptions. So according to the updates 
offered by Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009), a revised LI model can be framed 
as follows:  
 
“EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These 
choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful 
domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence, and 
the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments.” (Moravcsik and 






(1) Preference formation is “issue-specific”, implying two different models: 
(1a) Model 1: In economic issue areas, the preference formation model is based 
on a balance between producers and taxpayers and actors interested in regulation, 
mainly concerning how to manage globalization and to meet the challenges 
brought by globalization; (1b) Model 2: In non-economic issue areas, the proper 
model of preference formation derives from non-economic concerns rather than 
economic calculations, such as geo-politics and ideology. 
(2) Concrete national interests emerge from (2a) specific domestic sectoral 
interests, (2b) considerations of adjustment costs, and/or (2c) geopolitical 
concerns or other factors.  
(3) A government integration position can be derived from (3a) regulatory and 
budgetary constraints (costs and benefits calculations), (3b) ruling governmental 
coalitions’ macro-economic preferences, and/or (3c) the purpose to secure 






(4) Bargaining power is decided by two factors: (4a) national asymmetrical 
interdependence, that is, the uneven distribution of the benefits of a specific 
agreement; and (4b) national information acquiring of other actors’ preferences 
and institutional mechanisms.  
(5) These two factors imply: (5a) member states who economically benefit the 
most from EU integration tend to compromise the most on the margin to realize 
gains, whereas those who benefit the least tend to impose conditions and are 
difficult to make concessions; (5b) the Commission or its President or other 
ideational entrepreneurs of supranational institutions will influence national 
governments and enhance negotiations only when the transaction costs involved 
are high and they are armed with better information and expertise than national 
governments, because these entrepreneurs rarely possess information or expertise 
unavailable to states. 
(6) Hard bargains might witness governmental threats: (6a) to veto proposals; 
(6b) to withhold financial side-payments; or (6c) to form alternative alliances 
excluding recalcitrant governments. 





governments to reduce the transactions costs of future interstate negotiations on 
the same issue; (7b) to provide information for governments to estimate other 
actors’ future preferences and behavior; and (7c) by setting up rules to distribute 
gains, reduce coordination costs, monitor and sanction governmental 
non-compliance.  
(8) Three factors contribute to different institutional designs: (8a) the severity of 
distributional conflict and enforcement problems; (8b) uncertainty about the 
preferences of other actors; and (8c) the future states of the world.  
(9) Two forms of sovereignty delegation: (9a) to only set up norms and 
procedures to facilitate interstate bargaining and reduce both negotiation costs and 
uncertainty, with the purpose of “pure coordination” and reducing the transaction 
costs of determining a common solution; (9b) to delegate sovereignty more 
extensively, such as by the application of QMV, the Commission’s right to put 
forward proposals and to negotiate with third parties, the independent operation of 
the ECB and the judicial power of the ECJ, the EU’s modest fiscal centralization, 
quite often aiming at resolving problems of control, sanctioning, and incomplete 
contracting through credible pre-commitment. 
(10)  The intention to establish EU institutions is to guarantee credible domestic 
commitments by strengthening (10a) the national executive; or (10b) the national 
judicial branch; or (10c) the very domestic groups that support the policy in the 
first place vis-à-vis other domestic forces favoring non-compliance so as to help 
nation states to cope with globalization.  
(11)  National non-compliance will happen when an agreement leads to high 






(12) LI best explains policy-making in issue areas where social preferences are 
relatively certain and well defined, which implies the following: (12a) the most 
reliably predictable national preferences are in agriculture and trade areas; (12b) 
less predictable national preferences are in economic areas such as monetary 
policy, where economic knowledge is more uncertain and the distribution of costs 
and benefits more diffuse; and (12c) even less predictable are the politics of 
constitutional reform where substantive concerns are not salient and ideological 
beliefs matter more. So LI works better to explain and predict policies where 
domestic societal interests are well organized and represented, exhibiting a 
cause-effect relation between the diffusion of issue-specific societal interests and 
the uncertainty (unpredictability) of national preferences. 
(13) It is rare for supranational entrepreneurs to wield influence, which could 
happen only when domestic coordination and interest representation get severe 
problems and/or only when governments lack critical information, expertise, 
bargaining skills, and legitimacy that third parties can provide. 
Figure 3.2 A Revised LI Model: National Preferences, Substantial Bargains and Institutional Choice 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009).  
 
As an integration theory, the revised LI model, for one thing, offers enlightening 
explanatory matrices to account for national interest formation, interstate bargaining 
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and institutional set-ups, and for another, it should be empirically tested by the ever 
developing EU, with the potential to be further revised and developed. This dissertation 
will test this revised LI model on the basis of the three selected cases representing the 
EU’s new developments so as to examine LI’s explanatory and predictive power. In the 
context of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the revised LI framework suggests the 
following:  
 
H7: The EU’s new developments during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis are a series of rational 
choices made by national leaders, which are forged by three factors consecutively: national 
preference formation based on the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, 
intergovernmental bargaining where asymmetrical interdependence decides the relative power of 
states, and institutional arrangements to guarantee the credibility of intergovernmental commitments.  
   This hypothesis can be disaggregated into the following sub-hypotheses:  
Stage 1: National preference formation 
Due to the economic nature of the EU’s measures to counter the crisis, “issue-specific” preference 
formation is based on (1a) Model 1 with salient economic concerns: 
H7a: The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the sovereign debt crisis reflect the economic 
interests of powerful domestic constituents.  
If this mechanism is valid, then one should observe in the selected cases that states formulate their 
preferences for these new EU measures and policies on the basis of the economic interests of 
powerful domestic constituents rather than on the basis of geopolitical interests or ideological 
concerns, exhibiting the interest formation pattern which involves producers on the one hand and 
taxpayers and actors interested in regulation on the other hand, displaying concerns about how to deal 
with globalization.  
In addition to the examination of the economic interests of specific domestic constituents, this 
dissertation will see whether other factors mentioned by LI are prominent in the selected cases: (2b), 
(3a), (3b) and (3c), so as to get a more rounded picture of concrete national interest formation and 
national government integration positions.  
 
Stage 2: Interstate bargains  
Because different states express different interests, states enter the intergovernmental bargaining stage 
where (4a) and (5a) suggest H7b, while (4b) and (5b), together with (13), can be stated in H7h 
H7b: National asymmetrical interdependence (i.e. the uneven distribution of the benefits of a specific 
agreement) determines the relative bargaining power of the nation states, so member states who 
economically benefit the most from the EU’s new measures and policies tend to compromise the most 
on the margin to realize gains, whereas those who benefit the least tend to impose conditions and 
make hard bargains.  
To test the validity of this hypothesis, this dissertation will compare the bargaining power of the 
traditional big three: Germany, France, and the UK.97 The UK is not a euro country while Germany 
                                                 
97 The three EU member states, Germany, France and the UK, are traditionally defined as “the big 




and France, two core euro members, have strong interests in seeking solutions at the EU level to fight 
against the sovereign debt crisis, so if LI’s prediction is correct, then in case studies one should 
observe that the UK has a superior bargaining position, and it may exploit its superior bargaining 
power to impose conditions or cause hard bargains, whereas Germany’s and France’s strong interests 
in regulation and solutions at the supranational level put them into inferior bargaining positions, and 
they tend to make concessions on the margin to realize gains. If hard bargains appear in the cases, this 
dissertation will check in what kind of way: (6a) and/or (6b) and/or (6c). Moreover, to compare the 
negotiation positions of Germany, France, and the UK is also a way to judge LI’s following 
predictions:  
H7c: The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the euro area sovereign debt crisis reflect big 
countries’ will rather than supranational entrepreneurship, because EU entrepreneurs rarely possess 
information or expertise unavailable to the member states. 
If H7c is not valid in case studies, then the selected cases in this dissertation suggest “exceptional” 
situations to the LI model: (4b) and (5b), which, combined with the second limitation to LI’s 
application (13), can be stated in hypothesis form of H7h. 
 
Stage 3: Institutional choice 
H7d: In order to solve the debt crisis, nation states make institutional choices to delegate and pool 
sovereignty to EU supranational institutions so as to guarantee the credibility of intergovernmental 
commitments.  
To test this hypothesis, this dissertation will examine the following factors: first, what are the nation 
states’ institutional choices and how do the institutional choices work, by adjusting existing 
institutions or establishing new institutions? Second, how do member states delegate sovereignty to 
EU supranational institutions, in the form of (9a) and/or (9b)? Third, are the new institutional 
arrangements designed to guarantee member states’ credible commitments to the reached agreements? 
If the new institutional arrangements are dedicated to ensure member states’ commitments, then the 
dissertation will further examine in which way, (10a), (10b) or (10c), domestic commitments get 
guaranteed, which suggests the following:  
H7e: Member states’ credible commitments can be guaranteed and realized via strengthening the 
national executive, the national judicial branch and/or the very domestic groups that support the 
policy in the first place vis-à-vis other domestic forces favoring non-compliance. 
For the situation of national defection from the agreed agreements, LI (see (11) in Figure 3.2) predicts 
that 
H7f: National non-compliance will happen when an agreement leads to high costs for powerful 
domestic actors.  
Moreover, LI offers three factors, (8a), (8b) (8c), to account for institutional designs, and other 
rationales (7a, 7b, and 7c) besides the commitment concerns to explain the setting up of institutions, 
so this dissertation will also see whether these factors suggested by LI are prominent in the selected 
cases.  
  
   
 Mutual reinforcement between LI’s three stage propositions and the limitations to LI’s application  
Two limitations to the application of LI 
The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the sovereign debt crisis belong to the general category 
of EU economic governance, and they are related to many EU policy areas, such as fiscal, financial, 
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and monetary policies. According to (12), LI’s predictive power is moderate as the EU’s new 
measures and policies almost fall into the category of (12b). So this dissertation will see whether 
domestic societal interests are well organized and represented in the selected cases and whether the 
assertion of a cause-effect relation between the diffusion of issue-specific societal interests and the 
uncertainty (unpredictability) of national preferences is confirmed in case studies. The first limitation 
suggests the following: 
H7g: The stronger and better-organized (the weaker and more diffuse) representation of domestic 
societal interests is, the more (the less) predictable and more certain (uncertain) national preferences 
are, and the better (worse) LI works.  
As for the role of supranational entrepreneurs, LI predicts that they will wield influence only in 
exceptional cases, as an alternative to H7c. During the sovereign debt crisis, the Commission and 
European Council President Van Rompuy were actively engaging in their activities and fulfilling their 
functions, so the second limitation implies the following: 
H7h: During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the Commission and European Council President 
Van Rompuy exert influence only because the transaction costs involved are high, domestic interests 
are poorly coordinated and represented, and/or national governments lack critical information, 
expertise, bargaining skills, or legitimacy that the Commission and Van Rompuy can provide.  
H7h also offers explanations for the exceptional cases to H7c, and the case studies in this dissertation 
will check whether the EU’s new developments in economic governance are “exceptional cases” for 
LI or not. If H7h is effective in the selected cases, it also confirms neo-functionalist propositions on 
the pro-integrative roles of EU institutions’ entrepreneurs.  
Finally, the assumption that “the EU’s new developments during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
are a series of rational choices made by national leaders” should be clarified in case studies. As the 
effectiveness of the new post of European Council President from 1 December 2009, the nature of 
Van Rompuy’s activities should be properly defined.  
Figure 3.3 The Framework to Test LI in the Context of the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Sources: Own hypothesis derivation and compilation based on “Figure 3.2 A Revised LI 
Model” in this chapter.  
 
3.7.6 LI and the EU Today 
LI theory, according to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009, 83), throws light on 
“the most striking” feature of the European integration project today: the EU’s 
substantive and institutional stability, which has forged a normative plateau where 
incremental EU policy-making changes rather than “substantive reforms” are occurring. 
This suggests the existence of a “European Constitutional Settlement” (Moravcsik 
2006; 2007) — from the Amsterdam, to the Nice, and then to the Lisbon Treaties, there 
is an “incremental movement along slow trends toward reforms within the existing 
constitutional structure” without “a grandeur change” like the SEA or the Maastricht 
Treaty, and the main reason, from the LI perspective, is that “the absence of national 
preferences for a functional grand project [...] sufficient to motivate cooperation”, as 
the creation of the SEA and the single currency once did (Moravcsik and 
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Schimmelfennig 2009, 83). Two propositions are derived. First, the EU has reached the 
point where its constitutional system is mature enough to sustain its stability, which, for 
one thing, rejects federalists’ “bicycle theory”, that is, “the EU must keep moving 
toward federal union or risk collapse” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 84), and 
for another, implies an incremental reform trend within the EU’s existing institutional 
framework, such as to strengthen the Council and the EP, and deepen or enlarge certain 
EU policies (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 83). This argument is similar to H4 
on Jensen’s institutional/legalistic spillover (see chapter two of this dissertation), which 
expects that QMV is the most advanced development of EU decision-making and the 
QMV mode has a tendency to spread (“spillover”) into other EU policy areas where 
political integration is less developed — another way to claim the stability and maturity 
of the EU’s constitutional structure. From LI’s point of view, the EU has become “the 
most ambitious and successful” multilateral organization of multilateral governance 
with epochal achievements (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 84). Second, LI 
predicts that “[a]bsent a major and unforeseen exogenous shock, the EU is likely to 
develop incrementally, improving and reforming policies within the current confederal 
constitutional framework, with member states ruling by quasi-consensus and fiscal, 
administrative, and coercive powers decentralized to the states” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 83), which, in the case of the sovereign debt crisis, implies the 
following: 
H8: Due to the global financial crisis, a major and unforeseen exogenous shock 
with the internal consequence of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the EU is likely to 
embrace substantive reforms, developing and improving policies outside the current 
EU institutional framework, which might change the scenario where member states 
rule the EU by quasi-consensus and/or fiscal, administrative, and coercive powers are 
decentralized to the level of the states.  
As the first chapter of this dissertation elaborated, the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis was triggered by the global financial crisis originating from the US in 2008, and 
the general trend of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is regarded as an aftermath as 
well as an extension of the financial crisis of 2008, but still, the most direct cause of the 
debt crisis are the excessively high government debt and deficit rates. The ongoing 
euro area sovereign debt crisis indeed is a “major” and “unforeseen” shock, but this 
shock was caused by both exogenous and endogenous factors. In order to solve the 
crisis, the EU does embrace reforms, as new mechanisms and institutions are set up 
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and new policies are carried out; accordingly, this dissertation in case studies will 
check: (1) whether there is any “substantive” policy-making beyond the current EU 
institutional framework, that is, whether there is any “drastic” reforms — if not, how 
the new measures adopted by the EU demonstrate an incremental change under the 
EU’s current institutional structure, by strengthening the existing institutional 
arrangements (e.g. the Council and the EP) or deepening or enlarging a certain EU 
policy; this is also the way to ascertain the maturity of the EU constitutional structure; 
and (2) whether the EU’s recent developments challenge the national control scenario 
assumed by LI. In light of LI, the EU is a choice made by nation states to rescue and 
strengthen themselves against the trend of globalization. As a result, “[p]olitical control 
over the major fiscal activities of the modern state — policies like taxation, social 
welfare, health care provision, pensions, infrastructure, education, criminal prosecution, 
defence spending and, therefore, immigration and citizenship — are likely to remain 
national” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 83), while there are “exceptional 
cases where EU policy-making is salient for some subset of the population — trade 
policy, CAP reform, GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms), services deregulation, 
immigration, constitutional reform, domestic defence reform, right down to a relatively 
minor issue like the recognition of Kosovo — European governments remain 
responsive to publics” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 84). So case studies in 
this dissertation will also see whether developments in EU economic governance 
pushed by the crisis make any changes to the current picture of decentralized fiscal, 
administrative, and coercive powers of member states; if so, how and to what extent 
does “centralization” happen?  
LI’s assumption on the “exceptional cases” leads to another prediction of LI: 
“[t]he lack of saliency of EU issues in the minds of Europeans is the main reason why 
they do not participate actively in European-level elections or debates” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 84; also see Moravcsik 2007, 40-42).
98
 Obviously, LI believes 
that a salient EU issue for common citizens will stimulate and increase citizens’ 
participation in EU affairs. As for the so-called “democratic deficit”, LI argues that it 
“stems from the general unpopularity of government, and from the unfortunate 
                                                 
98 Moravcsik (2007, 40) makes a much bolder and absolute assertion: “I consider only one such 
reason — arguably the most important among them — namely that the issues dealt with by the EU are 
far less salient to the public than issues dealt with by national governments,” and “as long as voters 
view the matters handled by the EU as relatively obscure, they have little incentive to debate or 
decide them” (2007, 42). 
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decision to force unnecessary public debates and referenda about a confusing 
constitutional reforms [sic]” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 84; see also 
Moravcsik 2006); checks and balances among EU institutions, especially the increasing 
powers of the EP, “ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, 
transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens” 
(Moravcsik 2002, 605; also quoted in Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 83). In 
recent years, how to stop the spreading of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis and to 
finally resolve it has been a top issue for EU economic governance, and national 
austerity measures such as welfare cuts do influence common citizens, so it appears 
that the sovereign debt crisis has become a salient EU issue to Europeans. In line with 
LI, the following hypothesis is derived: 
H9: The salience of the sovereign debt crisis to EU citizens will increase the 
turnout of EP elections.  
Ideally, the validity of this hypothesis could be confirmed or rejected by the 
comparison of citizens’ participation rates in EU elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014, but 
since 2014 statistics are not yet available, the test of this hypothesis will be carried out 
in the future. Moreover, because the sovereign debt crisis and the countering-back 
measures are also nationally specific, when we come to this hypothesis test, “the 
salience of the sovereign debt crisis to EU citizens” should be deliberated further (i.e. 
the claim that “the sovereign debt crisis has become a salient EU issue in the minds of 
Europeans” should be confirmed first).  
 
3.7.7 LI: A Baseline Theory Open to Dialogue and Synthesis 
LI is open to dialogue and synthesis with other integration theories and approaches, 
and LI theory itself is a combination of three theories: preference formation, bargaining, 
and institutions (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 84)—a sort of acceptance of 
Forster’s (1998) criticism, but with the specification of its application conditions, 
Moravcsik’s LI has acquired the status as being a “theory”—a visible evolution and 
development of LI. Indeed, Moravcsik’s LI has synthesized “multiple theories and 
factors into a single coherent approach appropriate to explaining the trajectory of 
integration over time”, and thus provides a framework of multicausal explanations 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 68).  
The necessity and potential to synthesize with other theories, for example, have 
been demonstrated by the enlargement case, which suggests the possibility to borrow 
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ideational explanations (e.g. ideological concerns and geopolitics) from social 
constructivism when LI faces cases in which “economic interests are weak and 
cause-effect relations are uncertain”; sometimes, identity and norm effects tend to have 
a substantive influence on the negotiated outcomes when “an issue has a strong 
constitutive or identity dimension” or “the norms involved have high legitimacy in the 
EU and resonate strongly with domestic ideas of the actors” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 85; Schimmelfennig 2003). Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
suggest some easiest synthesis avenues for LI: theories that “share LI’s rationalist 
foundations and its empirical (positivist) methodological commitments”; as a matter of 
fact, LI can coexist with rational choice institutionalism, and HI “is also better seen as 
extension of LI than as an alternative to it”, because individual decisions, such as those 
proposed by LI, are a precondition to analyze and model institutions’ impact on 
national governments’ strategies (2009, 84).  
Nevertheless, LI’s openness for dialogue and syntheses should not obscure or 
even be used to disconfirm LI’s explanatory and predictive power as an European 
integration theory — actually, it has been empirically tested out as being “the strongest 
starting point for explaining the basic processes, and outcomes of European 
integration”; the reason causing such obscurity, however, is due to “LI’s role as a 
baseline theory” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 85). It is true that LI cannot 
explain all aspects of European integration, but neither can other theories do so; 
sometimes, there are exceptional cases, but LI variables have been confirmed by “the 
most consequential EU policies”, which constitute the substantively important issues of 
the EU, such as CAP reform, external trade policy, and free movement of people 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 85). Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig emphasize 
that LI has its scope conditions and works better for cases where issue-specific societal 
interests are more certain and better defined and national preference formation is 
related to the equilibrium of producers and consumers, whereas applying LI to 
issue-specific areas where societal interests are diffuse and not well represented while 
non-economic concerns weigh more, like social policy and the constitutional 
innovation OMC, is not justifiable to reject the validity of the tripartite — as a matter 
of fact, “very little has been accomplished” in social policy and “the OMC process has 
achieved [...] almost no policy outputs to date” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 
85). The significance of LI is that as a baseline theory, it focuses on the detailed 
empirical components of the EU project: national preferences, intergovernmental 
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bargaining and institutionalization, while it is also open to other theories and 
approaches to make possible syntheses, transcending the old problem in theorizing the 
EU: “the tendency to frame debates in terms of disagreements among ‘grand’ theories” 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 86). All in all, the European integration project 
today, LI would argue, is “the result of deliberate state choice” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, 86). 
 
3.8 Summary  
Taking a close examination of the above literature, we find a prominent theoretical 
thread running through the evolution of intergovernmentalism: state-centrism that 
stands on the opposite and complementary side of traditional neo-functionalism, but 
with a gradual acknowledgement and even the absorption of some neo-functionalist 
propositions as the EU project progressed, that is, the development of 
intergovernmentalism was accompanied by the admission and acceptance of certain 
neo-functionalists ideas. Figure 3.3 summarizes and illustrates the trajectory of 
intergovernmentalism as an EU integration theory. 
  
Origin: 
Hoffmann (1966) argued for the “logic of diversity”, emphasizing the centrifugal forces of integration 
that are absent in original neo-functionalism: national interests, internal domestic politics and external 
factors. 
 
Theoretical revisions to and the evolution of intergovernmentalism:  
After Hoffmann, three theoretical trends are distinguishable, which roughly constitute four consecutive 
stages of intergovernmentalism. 
Stage I (during the 1970s and the 1980s): Gradually exploring the impact of national domestic politics 
on EC policy-making and the interactions between the two levels, admitting and absorbing 
neo-functionalist ideas of the dynamics of integration, represented by such as Taylor’s (1975; 1982) 
and Wallace’s (1982) confederalism, Taylor’s (1993) “consociationalism”, Bulmer’s (1983) domestic 
politics approach, and Putnam’s (1988) “two-level” games.  
 
Stage II (from the end of the 1980s to the 1990s): Gradually realizing the indispensable functions and 
necessities of supranational institutional arrangements for nation states in a globalization context, 
acknowledging that the autonomy of national states has been circumcised and national sovereignty has 
been eroded by the “locking-in” of states into the Community’s institutions, admitting and absorbing 
certain neo-functionalist propositions, such as legal integration, spillover effects, supranational 
governance, non-governmental actors’ influence on European integration, unintended consequences 
and the power of supranational institutions, and adding a historical element into intergovernmentalism, 
but still being state-centric: the purpose to establish supranational institutions is to serve nation states’ 
interests better, and due to the “locking-in” effect, national control over supranational institutions and 
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policy-making is believed to get 
(a) strengthened rather than being weakened (Scharpf 1988) 
(b) and heavily circumscribed (Pierson 1996, 1998, 2000); 
Consequently, a novel form of representative government and indirect democracy is evolving, and the 
responsibilities and accountability for specific policies are diffused and cannot be traced (Wessels 
1997). 
 
Stage III (from the 1990s to the new millennium): Moravcsik’s (1991, 1993, 1998) LI, proposing that 
European countries’ cooperation at the EU level comes from domestic political conflicts, and the 
dynamics of European integration are decided by factors such as national preferences, interstate 
bargaining, and institutional choice. These three factors frame up the LI model which exhibits a 
synthesis and adoption of the previous intergovernmentalist ideas developed at Stage I and II, showing 
LI’s convergence with neo-functionalism and HI at certain points: the transfer of national sovereignty 
to supranational institutions, the autonomy of institutions, and the context of intergovernmental 
negotiations conditioned by shifted preferences and institutional environments.  
 
Stage IV (in the new millennium) modifications to LI: Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) specify 
the scope conditions for LI and define LI’s status as a baseline theory for EU studies, being open to 
other approaches and theories, and thus with the potential to be tested, modified and developed. 
Figure 3.4 The Trajectory of Intergovernmentalism Theorizing the EU 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of the literature review of this chapter. 
 
The trajectory of intergovernmentalism also highlights its own theoretical 
critiques of the theory itself. Table 3.2 illustrates the changes and differences of revised 
LI, a later descendant of intergovernmentalism, made to the main assumptions of 
intergovernmentalist state-centrism:  
 
Table 3.2 Revisions to Intergovernmentalism by LI 
Main assumptions of 
intergovernmentalist 
state-centrism 
LI’s Propositions LI’s Convergence with 
Neo-functionalism and HI 
(1) The concept of sovereignty: 
national sovereignty is untouched 
or even strengthened through 
participation in the EU.  
Certain national sovereignty has 
been transferred to EU 
institutions to guarantee a 
credible intergovernmental 
commitment. 
(1) Nation states 
surrender some of their 
sovereign prerogatives, 
delegating and pooling 
sovereignty to EU 
supranational institutions. 
(2) EU dynamics: the EU is driven 
by intergovernmental bargains 
among its member states. 
√  
(3) The negotiated results 
represent the lowest common 
denominator of the wishes and 
preference of member states. 
√ 
When actors in the least need of a 
specific agreement compared to 




actors with non-cooperation and 
force others to make concessions 
— this represents a minimal 
common-denomination 
negotiation. 
(4) The function of supranational 
actors is to streamline and assist 
national negotiations. 
√  
(5) Policy outcomes reflect 
national executives’ interests and 
relative power. 
√ 
Policy outcomes mirror the 
relative power of states which 
stems from asymmetrical 
interdependence. 
 
(6) Supranational actors have little 
independence. 
EU institutions include a 
semi-autonomous legal system, 
parliament, and bureaucracy, and 
there are a power-growing ECJ 
and unprecedentedly autonomous 
centralized institutions, such as 
the ECB. 
(2) LI admits the 
autonomy of EC 
institutions, and also 
acknowledges the growing 
power of the ECJ and the 
independence of the ECB. 
(7) The preference to describe the 
EU project as a sort of European 
“cooperation” rather than 
“integration”: cooperation has 
nothing to do with ideology or 
idealism, but purely with national 
governments’ rational choices to 
seek collective solutions to 
common problems in modern 
times. 
In non-economic issue areas or 
when an intense economic 
interests are absent, geo-politics 
or ideology could play prominent 




(8) EU integration will not lead to 
a supranational state, but an 
international order, serves as a 
domestic order for a transnational 
economy. 
√  
The process of Europeanization 
is not to replace the nation states, 
but to “rescue” and help them 
cope with globalization. 
 
Notes: “√” stands for LI’s approval of the state-centric assumptions of traditional 
intergovernmentalism, exhibiting a theoretical continuity and heredity. 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of the literature review of this chapter.  
 
As the literature review reveals, LI is a later revision and development of 
intergovernmentalism applied to EU studies, so this dissertation takes the LI model to 
explain the selected cases so as to test the explanatory and predictive power of 
intergovernmentalism today. Intergovernmentalism as a theory to explain EU 
integration starts from the opposite side of neo-functionalism, so the validation or the 
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rejection of the neo-functionalist hypotheses in chapter two of this dissertation can 
serve as a way to refute or support the typical state-centric assumptions; moreover, as 
the literature shows, intergovernmentalism as an evolving theory also exhibits a 
self-critique quality (see Figure 3.4, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 of this dissertation): 
intergovernmentalist researchers have gradually admitted and adopted certain 
neo-functionalist ideas — there are even converged points between the two classical 
theoretical camps — and these modifications themselves show a self-rejection to some 
traditional intergovernmentalist state-centric propositions. As a result, along with the 
empirical development of the EU project, intergovernmentalism also got revised and 
developed by absorbing and synthesizing ideas from other theories and disciplines. 
 
Table 3.3 Comparing LI with Neo-functionalism and HI 
LI’s critiques of neo-functionalism and HI 
Neo-functionalism and HI are considered as macro theories lacking the micro-level explanation of 
integration, that is, lacking appropriate account of the purposive choice of states and social actors as 
well as the interactions among them. 
Compared with neo-functionalism Compared with HI 
 Difference: 
(1) Domestic coalitional struggles v.s. 
domestic technocratic consensus; 
(2) The role of relative power v.s. the 
opportunities to upgrade the common 
interest;  
(3) Passive institutions and the 
autonomy of national leaders v.s. the active 
role of supranational officials (“ideational 




(1) The unintended consequences regarded by HI are 
deliberate triumphs of intergovernmental cooperation, 
and sovereignty transferring is the result of nation states’ 
purposive choice to construct institutions so as to 
enhance the credibility of commitments;  
(2) National preferences exhibit stability and 
continuity, rather than being unstable and unpredictable 
as suggested by HI.  
 
 Convergence: 
In exceptional cases, such as the creation 
of the SEA, ideational entrepreneurs exert 
influence on national governments and 
they do enhance negotiations and promote 
integration.  
 Convergence: 
LI acknowledges the merits of HI: decision-making 
happens in a certain historical and institutional context. 
 
LI’s converged points with neo-functionalism and HI 
(1) Nation states surrender some of their sovereign prerogatives, delegating and pooling sovereignty 
to EU supranational institutions; 
(2) LI admits the autonomy of EC institutions, and also acknowledges the growing power of the ECJ 
and the independence of the ECB. 




As suggested by Forster (1998), some parts of the early LI might turn out to be 
inadequate and even a failure in accounting for specific cases, and the critiques on 
Moravcsik’s LI actually offer possible alternatives to complement the LI model as well 
as contribute to a more rounded picture of EU studies: in addition to the grand bargains 
on treaties, EU studies also include research on EU daily operation and informal 
politics; besides economic interests, various other factors (e.g. domestic structures, 
partisan political struggles, redefined national preference caused by international 
pressures, departmental and organization interests, powerful political rivalries, and the 
need to keep voters’ support) may also account for national choices; apart from the role 
of national governments and leaders, supranational institutions and other non-state 
actors also exert impact. To develop a grand theory to account for every aspect of the 
complex EU project is impossible; rather, different theories highlight certain parts of 
the EU, privileging certain constituents and offering different angles to understand and 
explain the EU. Intergovernmentalism, as an opposite and competing theory to 
neo-functionalism, focuses on the factors that have been neglected or devalued by 






4 Chapter Four: Historical Institutionalism (HI)  
HI is generally regarded as one of the three schools of modern new institutionalism (e.g. 
Hall and Taylor 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Pollack 2009, 2010; Rosamond 
2010, 2013; Lelieveldt and Princen 2011). Hence, this chapter will first introduce the 
theoretical background of HI (i.e. the origins of new institutionalism and its 
applications in EU research), then elaborate on the basic propositions of HI and review 
the most typical and representative HI analyses of the EU (i.e. Pierson’s path dependent 
theory), and finally, derive hypotheses. 
 
4.1 The Theoretical Background of New Institutionalism  
4.1.1 Limits of the Classical Debate between Neo-functionalism and 
Intergovernmentalism and New Thinking on the EU 
In the 1990s, the two grand theories of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, 
representing two classical debated models — supranationalism and nationalism — to 
account for EU integration, drew various critiques as they failed to provide accurate 
explanations for the ever growing EU project. Generally speaking, as was also 
discussed in the previous chapters, the traditional 
neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist debate has been subject to three kinds of 
criticisms: first, both theories fail to reflect and capture the unfolding reality of the 
integration project, as neo-functionalism was unable to explain the EC in the 1970s and 
intergovernmentalism only focused on one dimension of the project while neglecting 
the fact of EU governance; second, as the derivatives of IR studies, both theories have 
fallen into the entrapment of the IR perspectives, such as the simple zero-sum 
opposition between member states and a “superstate” and the characteristic academic 
practice of “state fixation”; and finally, both theories have their “scientific” limitations, 
being ambitious to provide a general theory for the whole integration project 
(Rosamond 2010, 106-109). Despite these critiques, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism are two cornerstones that EU studies cannot simply circumvent 
and these criticisms also stimulated both theories’ new developments during and after 




The explanative failure of both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism 
(represented by LI), according to Risse-Kappen (1996, 55-57), is rooted in their 
common weaknesses. First, both assume that the driving forces behind European 
integration are self-interested actors “whereby the utility functions are defined in 
economic terms”; as a result, neo-functionalism has no account for “the transition from 
utility maximizing self-interest to integration based on collective understandings about 
a common interest”, while LI fails to examine whether EU institutions and the 
integration process influence actors’ interests and preference formation (Risse-Kappen 
1996, 56). Second, both utilize “low” and “high” politics to make a distinction between 
the easier integrated economic policy areas and other difficult integrated areas such as 
foreign policies (Risse-Kappen 1996, 56): neo-functionalists hold that “‘low politics’ 
can be successfully depoliticized through Europeanization”, while 
intergovernmentalists claim that nation states get strengthened rather than weakened 
through integration because “transferring issues from the domestic to the foreign policy 
sphere moves them into the ‘domaine réservée’ of executive control” (Risse-Kappen 
1996, 57). Third, both adopt a conventional concept of the state, “implicitly adhere(ing) 
to a Weberian notion of the state as a hierarchical structure of authoritative 
decision-making enjoying external and internal sovereignty” (Risse-Kappen 1996, 57). 
Finally, both fail to make a distinction “between domestic structures, i.e. the nature of 
political institutions, of society, and of state-society relations” (Risse-Kappen 1996, 
57).  
The controversies between traditional neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism also suggest that to develop a grand theory to account for all 
aspects of the EU is impossible. Thus, along with the growth and increasing 
complexity of the European integration project, scholars in recent years have tended to 
focus their attention on certain elements or specific policy areas of the EU and rarely 
attempt to construct a one-size-fits-all theory to encapsulate the whole project 
(Rosamond 2010, 105). For example, Moravcsik’s LI is taken as “an account of one 
dimension of the EU, namely, state-to-state bargaining” rather than “a theory of 
European integration” (Sandholtz 1996, 45), while Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s (1998) 
supranational governance does not explain the origins of the EU (Rosamond 2010, 
107). Recognizing that “different kinds of theories are appropriate for different pieces 
of the EU puzzle” (Sandholtz 1996, 427), scholars forged a new academic trend in EU 
studies as they developed “middle-range theories” to focus and explain certain fabrics 
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of the EU rather than the whole project (Rosamond 2010, 108). Meanwhile, scholars 
started to take the “Euro-polity” as an independent variable instead of a dependent 
variable (Rosamond 2010, 108). As a result, the EU is treated as a political system and 
analyses began exploring the actual functioning of the EU rather than its origins. Quite 
often, new research starts from the controversies between neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, raising different questions while answering them from more 
diverse perspectives (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 41). For instance, rejecting both 
supranational and intergovernmental paradigms represented by neo-functionalism and 
LI, Risse-Kappen (1996) argues for the analysis of transnational/transgovernmental 
relations, that is, “cross-boundary relations of sub-units of national governments in the 
absence of centralized decisions by state executives” (58), which emphasize the role of 
transboundary non-governmental actors and challenge the traditional conception that 
the state is the only significant unitary actor in IR (57-58). Risse-Kappen (1996, 58-59) 
makes four propositions of transnational/transgovernmental relations on the EU: (1) the 
EU’s peculiar institutional structure has been formed by the interaction among 
interstate relations, supranational institutions and transnational relations; (2) the 
network of transnational coalitions and organizations affects not only EU policies, but 
also national preference formation processes via the domestic structure of nation states, 
and in turn, domestic structures also influence the very nature of transnational actors, 
such as their independence; (3) EU institutions provide an environment for the 
flourishing of transnational/transgovernmental relations; and (4) ideas, communicative 
processes and collective identities also have their impact on the formation of the EU 
project, so transnational coalitions, and consequently the construction of the EU, are 
not only the result of the convergence of self-interests, but also shaped by “collectively 
shared values and consensual knowledge” (59). Risse-Kappen (1996, 59-60) believes 
that four types of research resemble the notions of transnational relations: Wolfgang 
Wessels’ “fusion thesis”，Marks et al.’s multi-level structure of governance, the 
inter-organizational network analysis and HI, and all of these research, from 
Risse-Kappen’s point of view, can be classified under the rubric of Politikverflechtung 
(interlocking politics) (1996, 60-61), exhibiting a growing convergence among scholars 
to conceptualize the EU as “a multi-level structure of governance where private, 
governmental, transnational and supranational actors deal with each other in highly 
complex networks of varying density, as well as horizontal and vertical depth” 
(Risse-Kappen 1996, 62). Risse-Kappen contends that the domestic structures of the 
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member states together with the EU institutional structure determine the degree of EU 
governance (1996, 67), and beyond rational choice models, communicative actions 
should also be integrated in EU studies so as to understand the diffusion of ideas and 
internalization of norms (1996, 72). Risse-Kappen’s transnational/transgovernmental 
argument actually suggests other new approaches to analyze the EU: governance 
approaches, policy networks, new institutionalism and constructivism (cf. Table 1.1), 
which demonstrates that when traditional integration theories are not inadequate to 
capture European integration, scholars begin to look into the new thinking in IR theory 
and comparative policy analysis and creatively apply them to EU studies. Nevertheless, 
the two competing as well as complementary models — supranationalism and 
nationalism advocated by neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism — have never 
fallen out of favor with scholars, and they are still useful to account for certain EU 
policies (e.g. Lieberman and Gray 2006).  
To sum up, the neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist controversies in the 1990s, 
on the one hand, promoted new theories and approaches to the EU, which, by 
addressing the contextual factors neglected by the classical dichotomous debate 
(Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 41), formulated another distinctive phase as well as a 
new branch of EU studies: analyzing EU governance besides explaining EU integration 
(cf. Table 1.1); on the other hand, those controversies point out the inadequacy and 
shortcomings of the two classical integration theories, encouraging them to absorb new 
thoughts from other theories and disciplines and adapt themselves to the EU’s new 
situation; thus, the classical debate also promises the necessities and possibilities for 
the traditional theories to develop and update. Moreover, the classical debate’s 
convergence on HI exhibits the significance to understand and analyze the EU from an 
institutionalist perspective, and hence new institutionalism, specializing in offering 
institutionalist explanations and spotlighting EU institutional operation and 
decision-making procedures, assumes a peculiar status in EU studies.  
 
4.1.2 Old and New Institutionalism 
Institutionalism as a theory has a long history. It is argued that “[t]he roots of political 
science are in the study of institutions” (Peters 1999, 1; 2005, 1; 2012, 1), and great 
thinkers from Aristotle, Althusius (John of Salisbury), Thomas Hobbes to John Locke 
and Montesquieu all have recommended a systematic analysis of institutions and their 
impact on individuals and society (Peters 1999, 3; 2005, 3-4; 2012, 3-4). So 
235 
 
institutionalist research, stressing that individuals are constrained by formal or informal 
institutions (Peters 1999, 1; 2005, 1; 2012, 1), actually can date back into ancient times. 
After the Second World War, two theoretical approaches gained in popularity: 
behaviouralism and rational choice, both of which assume “individuals act 
autonomously as individuals, based on either socio-psychological characteristics or on 
rational calculation of their personal utility”, and consequently, “preferences are 
exogenous to the political process” (Peters 1999, 1; 2005, 1; 2012, 1).
99
 
Accompanying the new theories is the transforming of the methodological and 
theoretical construction in the discipline of political science, which, as a result, 
demands more systematical thinking about the collection of evidence and more 
rigorous empirical research methods, such as carrying out hypothesis tests derived 
from theories by the application of statistics and mathematics (Peters 1999, 11-13; 
2005, 12-13; 2012, 12-13). Traditional institutionalist studies primarily focusing on 
institutions, however, appear incompatible with this methodological revolution while 
the new rising theories lack institutional concerns; later, at the beginning of the 1980s, 
as a counter-reformation, a revival return to institutionalism led to what March and 
Olsen (1984) called “new institutionalism” (Peters 1999, 15; 2005, 16; 2012, 16). So 
for one thing, the new trend of institutionalist approaches from the 1980s onwards is a 
result of reintroduction of institutions into existing theories (e.g. Marxism, pluralism, 
neo-realism, and behaviorism) where “institutions had been either absent or 
epiphenomenal, i.e. reflections of deeper factors or processes such as capitalism or the 
distribution of political power in a given domestic society or international system” and 
the revival of institutionalism during the 1980s and early 1990s actually fulfills the 
                                                 
99 Both of these two approaches have four attributes in common: (1) an explicit concern with 
research methodology and theory construction in political science; (2) anti-normative bias; (3) 
methodological individualism; and (4) “inputism”, that is, emphasizing the inputs from society into 
political structures (Peters 1999, 11-15; 2005, 12-15; 2012, 12-16). According to Peters, the 
prominent differences between traditional institutionalism and the two revolutionary approaches are 
as follows: behaviorism focuses on individual performances and views causation in one direction — 
economy and society influence politics and political structures; by contrast, old institutionalism goes 
to the other extreme to emphasize government behavior, but it views causation in a mutual direction 
as institutions also shape social and economic orders; as for rational choice, it explains both 
individual behavior and collective decision-making, but sees institutions as “little more than means to 
aggregate the preferences of the individuals who comprise them” and thus tends to deny the shaping 
power of institutions on participants’ preferences (1999,14-15; 2005, 14-15; 2012, 15-16). In a broad 
sense, the theoretical styles of political science from the 1950s to the beginning of the 1980s are 
characterized by contextualism, reductionalism, utilitarianism, functionalism and instrumentalism 
(March and Olsen 1984, 735-738). 
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theoretical vacuum left by these institution-free accounts of politics throughout the 
1950s and 1970s (Pollack 2009, 125; 2010, 21); for another, though various new 
institutionalist approaches may paint the political world in different pictures, they are 
reactions to the popular theory of behaviouralism during the 1960s and 1970s, sharing 
the commonality in “elucidate(ing) the role that institutions play in the determination 
of social and political outcomes” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936).  
According to Peters (1999, 2005, 2012), the old institutionalism, represented by 
such authors as Carl Friedrich, James Bryce, Herman Finer and Samuel Finer, has 
provided intelligent and insightful descriptions of the political world in non-abstract 
terms (1999, 2-3; 2005, 3; 2012, 3) and “constituted the basis of political science for 
much of the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries” (1999, 6; 2005, 6; 
2012, 6), while “new institutionalism”, utilizing many old institutionalist assumptions, 
pays more attention to research tools and theoretical construction (1999, 1; 2005, 1; 
2012, 1). Peters lists five defining assumptions for old institutionalism: (1) legalism: 
“[l]aw constitutes both the framework of the public sector itself and a major way in 
which government can affect the behavior of its citizens” (1999, 6; 2005, 7; 2012, 7); 
(2) structuralism: structure matters and determines behavior, leaving little or no space 
for individual’s impact, and old institutionalism tends to concentrate on the formal 
aspect of political systems (1999, 7-8; 2005, 8-9; 2012, 8-9); (3) holism: old 
institutionalists tend to make comparative studies on the whole political systems rather 
than compare components of institutions within systems (1999, 8-9; 2005, 9-10; 2012, 
9-10); (4) historicism (revised into “historical” in 2005 and 2012 edition): old 
institutionalism sees a long term pattern of mutual influence between society and 
politics, and it is “concerned with how [...] contemporary political systems were 
embedded in their historical development as well as in their socio-economic and 
cultural present” (1999, 9-10; 2005, 10-11; 2012, 10-11); (5) normative analysis: old 
institutionalism has a strong normative element, stressing norms and values that consist 
of a “good government” (1999, 10-11; 2005, 11; 2012, 11). 
Old institutionalism has always been criticized for its formal-legal approaches 
and normative descriptions which make it lack the base for a scientific theory 
construction, whereas new institutionalism, growing out of the old theory, takes these 
critiques into account and reasserts the virtues of the old institutionalist propositions 
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(Peters 1999, 6-11; 2005, 6-11; 2012, 6-11).
100
 According to March and Olsen (1984, 
738), new institutionalist ideas, compared with “contemporary theoretical thinking in 
political science”, stress (1) “an interdependence between relatively autonomous social 
and political institutions” rather than “the dependence of the polity on society”, (2) 
“relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency” rather than “the simple 
primacy of micro processes and efficient histories”, and (3) “logics of action and the 
centrality of meaning and symbolic action” rather than “metaphors of choice and 
allocative outcomes”. Some of those new ideas, however, may turn out to be mutually 
inconsistent. For instance, the assumption that large institutional structures are 
rationally coherent autonomous actors contradicts the proposition that political actions 
and choices may not be adequately rational — as (1) and (3) may suggest (March and 
Olsen 1984, 738). Furthermore, institutionalism emphasizes institutional structures and 
thus imposes certain orders on the world, and new institutionalism proposes six 
conceptions of order: historical, temporal, endogenous, normative, demographic, and 
symbolic order (March and Olsen 1984, 743-744).  
As there are various approaches to institutional phenomena, to specify the 
common core of new institutionalism is necessary, and Peters (1999, 18-19; 2005, 
18-19; 2012, 19-20) defines four common features of new institutionalist views as the 
criteria that can disqualify any approach claiming to be new institutionalism under 
false pretenses: (1) an institution is a structure, being formal (i.e. “a legislature, an 
agency in the public bureaucracy, or a legal framework”) or informal (“a network of 
interacting organizations or a set of shared norms” ), where given specified 
relationships among the actors, “some sort of individual patterned interactions [...] are 
predictable”; (2) an institution is of some stability over time; (3) an institution must 
affect individual behavior with its formal or informal constraints; and (4) it is of 
“shared values and meaning among the members of the institution”. With these criteria, 
Peters contends that new institutionalism includes six variants (1999, 19-20; 2005, 
19-21; 2012, 20-21): (1) normative institutionalism: how the norms of institutions 
affect and shape the behavior of members of institutions; (2) rational choice 
institutionalism: the purpose of institutions is to meet social and economic necessities, 
and individual “behaviors are a function of rules and incentives” to maximize their own 
                                                 
100 For a more elaborate comparison between old and new institutionalisms see, for example, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991, 13), “Table 1.1 The Old and the New Institutionalisms”. 
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utilities (1999, 19); (3) HI: initial policy choices and the institutionalized commitments 
after them determine subsequent decisions, exhibiting “path dependence”; (4) empirical 
institutionalism: the structure of government decides the way of policy-making and 
governmental choices, as different decision procedures in presidential and 
parliamentary government suggest;
101
 (5) international institutionalism: the existence 
of structure delineates and explains the behavior and interactions of states and 
individuals, as international regime theory illustrates; (6) societal institutionalism: this 
category refers to “the structuring of relationships between state and society” (1999, 
20). As a matter of fact, Peters’ classification of six types of new institutionalisms in a 
broad sense echoes March and Olsen’s (1984) six conceptions of institutionalist order.  
The birth of new institutionalism was marked by March and Olsen’s article in 
1984, and roughly in the same time period, EU studies started to examine institutions, 
such as Scharpf’s joint-decision trap (e.g. Pollack 2009, 129). As a matter of fact, there 
was a mutual reinforcement between EU studies and the development of new 
institutionalism in political science: on the one hand, EU studies are heavily indebted 
to the theoretical developments in other disciplines, while on the other hand, new 
institutionalism takes EU institutions as cases for research and brings theoretical 
innovations and new insights to the theory itself as well as enriches EU studies 
(Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 6-7). As a result, new institutionalism became a 
distinctive and important integration theory. Obviously, new institutionalism 
emphasizes a mutual interaction between institutional structures and individual 
behavior and the rubric “new institutionalism” actually includes various institutionalist 
approaches; besides, the trajectory of institutionalism suggests that HI, rooted in the 
old institutionalist assumption — historicism — has always been a distinctive and 
important variant of institutionalism.  
 
4.1.3 Three Schools of New Institutionalism in the Context of the EU 
Although originally formulated in IR research, new institutionalist approaches have 
been applied to EU studies. Adopting Hall and Taylor’s (1996) categorization of the 
three institutionalisms — rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism
102
 
                                                 
101 In 2012 edition, Peters changes the fourth category “empirical institutionalists” (1999,19; 2005, 
20) into “old institutionalists” (2012, 21), and this shows the empirical feature of old institutionalism. 
102 Cf. Campbell (2004) argues for three paradigms of institutional analysis in IR studies: rational 
choice, organizational, and historical institutionalism. For the classification and comparison of these 
239 
 
— Aspinwall and Schneider (2001) map out a spectrum of three institutionalist variants 
where the economistic-rationalist approach and the sociological approach sit at 
polarized ends while HI lies in the middle, and they apply the spectrum to understand 
and classify institutionalist approaches to the EU (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 2; 
see also Rosamond 2010, 110). Rational choice institutionalism sees institutions as the 
most external factors while sociological institutionalism views them as the most 
internalized ones; by comparison, HI eclectically synthesizes the two extremes with a 
research objective on the long-term effects of institutions (Aspinwall and Schneider 
2001, 5; Rosamond 2010, 110).
103
 As a matter of fact, Hall and Taylor, after 
comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the three schools of new institutionalism, 
conclude that “HI stands in an especially pivotal position”, as HI contains both rational 
choice and sociological institutionalist elements: in one respect, HI analyses can be 
translated into rational choice terms in the instrumental selection of new institutions, 
and in another respect, they are open to the sociological approach in interpreting 
historically available alternative choices (1996, 957; see also Lelieveldt and Princen 
2011, 42).  
Drawing inspirations from signaling games, voting power studies, and the spatial 
theory of voting
104
, rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors involved in EU 
decision-making behave rationally and make use of strategies to realize their preferred 
                                                                                                                            
three new institutionalisms, see “Table 1.1. Similarities and Differences in the New Rational Choice, 
Organizational, and Historical Institutionalism” in Campbell (2004, 11). The term “organizational 
institutionalism” is often treated as a synonym for sociological institutionalism (e.g. Sitek 2010, 570). 
Scholars may adopt different categorizations of new institutionalism, but no matter what types of 
classification are made, as Campbell (2004, 10) argues, “there are always exceptions to these 
generalizations and considerable variation within each paradigm.” 
103 Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 411) define analytic eclecticism as an appreciable “intellectual stance 
that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in 
contending research traditions to build complex arguments that bear on substantive problems of 
interest to both scholars and practitioners” and it has three valuable merits in the research of social 
sciences. 
104 The spatial theory of voting involves two classes of actors: voters and candidates. Based on the 
premises that both actors are self-interested, the spatial theory of voting concerns “how the interaction 
between voters and candidates affects the choices that candidates offer the voters” (Enelow and 
Hinich 1984, 6). Accordingly, this theory can be divided into two kinds: the spatial theory of 
committees and the spatial theory of elections. The former treats the voters as the key actors who are 
“voting over different policy alternatives, each of which is usually represented as a point in a 
Euclidean space”, and the latter takes the candidates as the key actors while the voters are playing a 
fixed role (Enelow and Hinich 1990, 1). As voting always takes place in an institutional setting, 
institutions matter — they can serve as agenda setters. This suggests the links between the spatial 
theory of voting and new institutionalism: when an institution affects actors’ calculations, “the 
institution must be included in the spatial voting model” (Enelow and Hinich 1984, 161-162).  
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outcomes; consequently, the EU is generally analyzed under principal-agent models, 
illustrating how principals (i.e. member states) delegate their power to agents (i.e. the 
supranational institutions or the member states who implement supranational decisions) 
and how such delegation affects interactions at both the national and supranational 
levels (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 7). In light of rational choice institutionalism, 
EU institutional agents, typically represented by the Commission which possesses most 
information, are always depicted as opportunity-takers to exploit the delegated power 
so as to expand their authorities and realize their own agenda, and rational choice 
analysts began to examine “how agents exploit the uncertainty which results from the 
imperfect division of power between competing European actors” (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2001, 7). This shows the affinity between rational choice institutionalist and 
neo-functionalist (and even the revised LI’s) proposition on the Commission’s 
autonomy, as Pollack (1997) clearly states his principal-agent analyses of the 
relationship between member government principals and EU supranational agents (e.g. 
the Commission, the ECJ, and the EP) are “based largely on the new institutionalism in 
rational choice theory” (100). According to Aspinwall and Schneider (2001, 6-14) and 
Pollack (2009, 129-136), three distinctive thematic sub-groups stand out in the rational 
choice institutionalist research on the EU: rationalist approaches to legislative 
procedures (i.e. EU decision-making involving the Commission, the Council and the 
EP) (e.g. Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994, 1997; Garrett 1995a; Moser 1996, 1997, 
1999; Moser et al. 2000; Crombez 1996, 1997; Kreppel 1999, 2002; Crombez et al. 
2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000, 2001; Hix 2001; Garrett et al. 2001; Albert 2003; 
Mattila 2004; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Thomson et al. 2006; Hix et al. 2007; 
McElroy 2007; Häge 2008; Naurin and Wallace 2008; Thomson 2011; Héritier and 
Reh 2012; Jensen and Nedergaard 2012); rationalist approaches to the implementation 
of rules, measures and policies (i.e. power delegation to the Commission and the 
exercise of those powers — the so-called comitology procedures) (e.g. Steunenberg et 
al. 1996, 2000; Pollack 1997, 2003a; Schmitter 1997; Moravcsik, 1998; Tallberg, 1999, 
2007; Franchino 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007; Majone 2001; Hix 2007; Moury and Héritier 
2012); and rationalist approaches to the ECJ (i.e. the role of ECJ vis-à-vis national 
governments and courts) (e.g. Garrett 1992, 1995b; Garrett and Weingast 1993; Burley 
and Mattli 1993; Weiler 1994; Mattli and Slaughter 1995, 1998; Alter 1998, 2001; 
Garrett et al. 1998; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; 
Kilroy 1999; Conant 2002, 2007). So rational choice institutionalism actually has 
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studied “all three of the major functions of government at the Union level”: legislative 
politics, executive politics and judicial politics (Pollack 2009, 129). Certainly, besides 
these three areas, rational choice institutionalism covers broad topics. For example, 
Schneider and Cederman (1994) adopt a rational choice approach to the effects of 
information asymmetry so as to explore how uncertainty may influence the bargaining 
strategies of member states and outcomes, particularly in the negotiations in the 
summits of the European Council; Hug (2000) utilizes spatial models to discuss the 
possible effects of referendums on the European integration progress; Schneider (1997) 
uses a portfolio allocation model to explore constraints imposed by informal rules (e.g. 
the seniority in the selection of the Commissioners) of Commission politics on the 
discretion of the Commission; Dijkstra (2010, 2012) applies the rational choice 
institutionalist principal-agent approach to explain the Council Secretariat’s political 
influence in the CFSP (2010) and EU officials’ influence in the CFSP (2012); 
Fägersten (2010) investigates the bureaucratic resistance to international intelligence 
cooperation of Europol from a rational choice institutionalist perspective; drawing on 
rational choice institutionalism, Stacey (2010) explores the informal modes of 
rule-making outside the EU’s regular legislative procedures and the intergovernmental 
treaty-making meetings, while Tallberg (2010) probes the chairmanship of EU formal 
leaders’ influence in international cooperation.  
In comparison, sociological institutionalist research on the EU comes along with 
the IR theoretical trend of identifying normative and cultural mechanisms constructing 
or constraining national behavior and identity and of how identity itself influences state 
interests and behavior as well as international normative structures; so EU studies of 
this tradition partly concern how state behavior is shaped or constrained and partly how 
identity is constructed and exerting its influence (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 12). 
Various topics are discussed from the sociological institutionalist perspective, such as 
domestic-European relations (e.g. Holm 1997; Larsen 1997; Laursen, 1997; Berglund 
et al. 2006; Adler-Nissen 2009; Crespy 2010; Zahariadis 2010), regionalism and 
European integration (e.g. Christiansen 1997; Bicchi 2006; Carter and Pasquier 2010; 
Gourgues 2010), member states’ policy-making (Hope and Raudla 2012), European 
citizenship (e.g. Wiener 1998; Fligstein 2008), EU security and military operation 
(Hardt 2009; Petersohn 2010), EU institutions and policy-making (e.g. Joerges and 
Neyer 1997a, b; From 2002, Argomaniz 2009a; Lewis 2010; Lauber and Elisa 2011), 
European integration and IR (e.g. De Ville 2012; Schmidt 2012; Delreux and Van den 
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Brande 2013), EU enlargement (e.g. Fierke and Wiener, 1999; Sedelmeier 2005; 
Piedrafita 2007, 2012; Schukkink 2012) and candidate countries (e.g. Atikcan 2010). 
Jenson and Mérand (2010) highlight the necessity and significance of applying 
sociological institutionalism — via merging the two traditional isolated theories 
institutionalism and sociology — to EU studies so as to explore “the informal practices, 
symbolic representations and power relations of social actors involved in European 
society as well as the broad polity” (Jenson and Mérand 2010, 74).  
According to Aspinwall and Schneider (2001, 12-14), two prominent features 
emerge from sociological institutionalist research on the EU. First, sociological 
institutionalists would problematize the concepts that rationalists have taken for 
granted and they particularly focus on norm and identity construction and norm 
communication through discursive practices (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 13), such 
as Diez (1999), Wiener (1998), Fierke and Wiener (1999), Lynggaard (2007), Crespy 
(2010), Lauber and Elisa (2011), Schmidt (2012), De Ville (2012) and Hope and 
Raudla (2012) — actually, the rising popularity to explore the dynamics of institutional 
changes from “the substantive content of ideas and the interactive process of discourse” 
(Schmidt 2010, 1) leads Schmidt (2010) to support a fourth “new institutionalism” 
besides the traditionally recognized three new institutionalisms: discursive 
institutionalism (DI) (see also Hope and Raudla 2012, 400-402). Second, sociological 
institutionalists tend to expound cultural traditions that make a distinction among the 
European states, along professional or organizational lines, or at the subnational level 
so as to examine “the impact of values, beliefs and identities on actors’ responses to 
integrative challenges”, that is, the shaping powers of culture (Aspinwall and Schneider 
2001, 14); this kind of research is represented, for example, by Crouch (1993), 
Zetterholm (1994), Finnemore (1996), Crouch and Streek (1997) and Kitschelt et al. 
(1999), Bicchi (2006), Mounier (2009), Tatar (2011), and Faleg (2012). 
As there is a polarization of rationalist-constructivist arguments, HI cuts into the 
antithesis of economic and sociological ontologies and links the two, highlighting how 
prior institutional arrangements and commitments condition further actions, set limits 
on possible options, and lead actors to redefine their interests (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2001, 10; see also Bulmer 1994, Pierson, 1996; 1998), and assuming that 
“institutions reflect the complex and unique structures that influence both the interests 
of actors and action arenas” (Sitek 2010, 570). The changes of institutions and policies 
are “path dependent” — current decisions are endogenously constrained by what are 
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made in the past, that is, “[h]istory creates context, which shapes choice” (Aspinwall 
and Schneider 2001, 10). (HI argument 1)
105
 Taking the two extremes of “power” and 
“culture” into consideration, HI studies on the EU can be close to the rational choice 
school when they view institutions as being power-neutral and take culture into 
discount, and can also be close to the sociological school when they stress cultural 
factors and institutional power implications to social groups; in addition, similar to the 
EU-level research, HI approaches have also been applied to the member-state level, 
highlighting the influence of national unique economic and political traditions on states’ 




Exploring and extending the basic premise — institutions affect political 
decisions — in different directions, the three types of institutionalist approaches 
advocate different logics of explanations, yet all of them are valid (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2001, 1) as March and Olsen once commented: “[i]t is not obvious that any 
one approach is superior to the others in capturing the complexities of change. There 
are several stories to be told and a necessary humility associated with the telling of any 
one of them” (1998, 958; also quoted in Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 16). Lelieveldt 
and Princen (2011, 42-43) illustrate the differences and validity of the three 
institutionalist interpretations of the EU’s fisheries quotas, that is, how to explain the 
phenomenon that the finalized-decided level of fisheries quotas is always much higher 
than that proposed by the scientists and the Commission. From a rational choice 
institutionalist perspective, this can be explained by the institutional rules of decision 
making on the fisheries quotas where the Council of Ministers has the ultimate say. 
Because each member state is the maximizer of its own interests and a decision in the 
Council could be blocked by the states who have large fisheries sectors, the Council’s 
decisions on quotas tend to elevate the level proposed by the Commission. In such a 
rational choice institutionalist framework, rational strategic bargaining of member 
states is the analytical focus. In light of sociological institutionalist analyses, the 
                                                 
105 In order to facilitate hypotheses derivation at the end of this chapter, this dissertation, when 
narrating HI’s arguments, italicizes the core ideas of HI and numbers them in the way of “HI 
arguments 1, 2, 3, …”, which thus serve as the basis of and sources for the HI hypotheses formation. 
106 Aspinwall and Schneider (2001, 12) argue that here rises one of the shortcomings of HI: it lacks 
the integration of the effects of institutions over time at both the national and EU levels, so more 
efforts should be endeavored to examine institutional interactions between the two levels, and the 
challenge is that how to break the cycle of feedback mechanism — where institutions influence 
decision making but are also subject to change — to determine and test causality.  
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fisheries case could be interpreted as follows: people who are responsible for fisheries 
policy-making have been socialized into a paradigm which combines three 
fundamental objectives of EU fisheries policies — “protecting fish stocks, protecting 
the economic viability of the fisheries sector, and protecting vulnerable communities 
dependent on fisheries” (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 42); under the instruction of 
those fundamental objectives, people for fisheries policy-making always try to balance 
these three without giving precedence to any one of them; the level proposed by 
scientists tends to be low due to their exclusively ecological concern, so the inflated 
quotas can be explained as policy-makers’ intentions and efforts to balance the three 
fundamental objectives. By comparison, HI takes a “path dependence” view on how 
earlier fisheries decisions have effectively “locked in” EU policies and integration. The 
practice of the fixed formula for the division of fisheries quotas among member states 
originates from the 1980s, and it is guided by the principle of “relative stability”, which 
makes the pre-set formula nearly impossible to change. Lelieveldt and Princen’s 
illustration of applying the three different institutionalist approaches to the same case 
echoes Checkel’s arguments that “each school explains important elements of the 
integration process; working together, or at least side-by-side, they will more fully 
capture the range of institutional dynamics at work in contemporary Europe” (Checkel 
2001, 20). It is also important to keep in mind that there might be several different 
theoretical explanations for the same puzzle, and one approach is not necessarily 
superior to the others (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 16). Nevertheless, scholars may 
compare the three different institutionalist approaches — or any two of them, such as 
Karlas 2012 and Pollack 2003b — and argue for the better one among (between) the 
three (two) for specific cases, as De Ville (2012) contends that HI and DI are better 
than rational choice institutionalism in explaining how the WTO rules influence EU 
regulatory politics. Or they may combine the three institutionalist approaches together 
(e.g. Jabłecka and Lepori 2009; Ziemann 2009; Borońska-Hryniewiecka 2011; Gross 
and Juncos 2011) — or any two of them, such as Font (2006) and Duina and Buxbaum 
(2008)
107
— to explain a certain phenomenon, as Delreux and Van den Brande (2013) 
argue that the three new institutionalisms make up a complementary framework to 
explain the EU’s informal division of labour with regard to the EU’s external 
                                                 
107 Literature below referring to scholars’ efforts to synthesize and bridge the rational-sociological 
divide also belongs to this category. 
245 
 
environmental policy-making during the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD) and international climate negotiations where member states and 
the Commission, instead of the rotating Presidency (who should formally and officially 
represent the EU externally), “take the lead”, and four factors account for such an 
informality: burden sharing, expertise pooling, involving member states, and 
guaranteeing continuity, which demonstrates that “not only rational choice but also 
historical and sociological institutionalism need to be taken into account if one wants to 
fully understand (the continuation of) informal practices in the EU” (Delreux and Van 
den Brande 2013, 127); in such a way, “these three institutionalist approaches are 
complementary rather than competing” (Ziemann 2009, 314). Focusing on the same 
case, researchers may compare the strengths and weaknesses of each institutionalist 
approach (e.g. Sitek 2010). The polarization of the rationalist and sociological 
approaches does not prevent scholars’ efforts to synthesize and build bridges between 
the complementary dichotomous rationalist-sociological/constructive divide
108
 (e.g. 
Bursens and Deforche 2008; Lynggaard and Nedergaard 2009; Niemann and Mak 2010; 
Brosig 2010; Dunlop and Russel, 2012). Moreover, as new institutionalist theories 
came after the two orthodox integration theories — neo-functionalism and LI — 
scholars may compare them with the traditional approaches and thus cast new 
insightful light on theoretical explanations for the integration project as well as 
supplement our understanding of the EU. For instance, Verhoeff and Niemann (2011) 
argue that LI provides an adequate framework to explain the formation and 
development of Germany’s energy policy concerning EU–Russian relations before its 
EU Presidency term — as LI predicts, German policy preferences for this issue reflect 
German domestic producers’ interests, but LI fails to account for German governmental 
action during the Presidency as domestic preferences were largely downplayed after it 
took on the Presidency role. Instead, it is rational choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism that offer satisfactory explanations: the former “highlights 
                                                 
108 Checkel (2007, 58) defines constructivism as the study of the concepts such as “deliberation, 
discourses, norms, persuasion, identity, socialization, (and) arguing”, and he distinguishes three 
variants of constructivism: conventional, interpretative and critical/radical constructivism, and hence 
constructivism is also referred to as “social constructivism” (Cini and Borragán 2010a, 440). 
Moreover, as Pollack (2007, 44) points out that the controversy between rational choice and 
constructivism has forged “a new ‘great debate’”, which, displacing the earlier 
neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist divide, characterizes IR and EU studies from the late 1990s 
into the early 2000s. So in new institutionalist studies, constructivism is sometimes taken as a 
synonym to refer to sociological institutionalism.  
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Germany’s restraint from defending its original domestic preferences due to rational 
calculation embedded in normative Presidency constraints”, while the latter “accounts 
for the reprioritization of objectives through the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of thoroughly 
internalized Presidency norms” (Verhoeff and Niemann 2011, 1271). Clearly, the three 
new institutionalist approaches can be taken freely to combine or contest with other 
theories and approaches to do EU research, such as Mackay et al. (2009) advocating 
the dialogue between sociological institutionalism and feminist political science so as 
to develop tools and paradigms beyond conventional political science for feminist 
analyses, Klüver (2010) combining resource mobilization theory with rational choice 
institutionalism to investigate national interest groups’ lobbying strategies at the EU 
level, and Loveca and Erjavec (2013) proposing a critical realist approach which is 
considered better than rational institutional and constructivist approaches to the CAP 
reform.  
All of those show the advantages and merits of new institutionalism, as “it does 
not prescribe a unique recipe for institutionalization; instead it recognizes the diversity 
of paths that can lead towards the internationalization of cooperation”, that is, the three 
variants of new institutionalism provide different institutionalist perspectives and each 
of them is “grounded in a different theoretical tradition and hence emphasizes the 
importance of different explanatory variables” (Wolff et al. 2009, 17). The proliferation 
of institutionalist studies on the EU suggests that new institutionalism as a whole 
indeed “offers an attractive venue” to understand and conceptualize the 
institutionalized EU (Wolff et al. 2009, 17).  
Among these three, HI is believed to possess an eclectic trait of both rational 
choice and sociological extremes (e.g. Hall and Taylor 1996, Aspinwall and Schneider 
2001, Sitek 2010), and this theoretical advantage as well as modesty probably is a 
reason for neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism to converge on HI rather than 
on other institutionalist theories. Naturally, as an IR theory and integration theory, HI is 
also subject to criticism, as Koelble (1995, 239) points out that “it is unclear whether 
the intentions of individuals or the constraints imposed by institutions shape outcomes”, 
and besides, it is difficult to ascertain and measure the “cultural roots” of institutions 
and there is no alternative control group in reality to study specific institutional 
outcomes in its absence (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 6). From the methodological 
point of view, historical (or sociological) institutionalist research on the EU has 
exhibited its strengths and merits in case studies with rich and precise descriptions and 
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explanations of unique events, but it may “obscure the relative importance of causal 
variables” and moreover, lack valid theoretical generalization and adequate quantitative 
data analyses (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 15). Despite all those weaknesses, HI 
has become an extensively applied EU integration theory and it offers a singular 
perspective to understand, explain and predict EU developments.  
  
4.2 HI in the Context of the EU 
Recent literature reveals abundant HI research on the EU. Adopting the historical 
institutionalist approach, for example, Argomaniz (2009b) conducts an empirical 
analysis of the post-9/11 institutionalization of EU counter-terrorism, Howell (2009) 
assesses the devolution and institutional culture in the Welsh Assembly, Kourtikakis 
(2010) accounts for the structural similarities between institutions in the member states 
and certain EU institutions — a process of institutional transfer from the national to the 
EU level, Icoz (2011) explicates the changes in Turkey’s National Security Council and 
in Turkey-EU relations, Lăşan (2012) explains the 1992 and 2003 CAP reforms, and 
Mendez (2012) even develops a ‘path-interdependent’ approach to account for the 
radical changes of EU cohesion policy. Meanwhile, combined with other institutionalist 
approaches — rational choice and/or sociological institutionalisms (and sometimes 
with the so-called fourth new institutionalism DI (e.g. Schmidt 2009) — HI has been 
applied to account for the reform of the public research funding system in Poland from 
1989 to 2007 (Jabłecka and Lepori 2009), the dynamics of changes that take place in 
health care systems of post-communist Central Europe (Sitek 2010), the similarities of 
the regional reform outcomes in Romania and Turkey during their EU candidacy 
(Ertugal and Dobre 2011), the endogenous institutional change by focusing on the 
attitudes of (Dutch) legislators to institutional reform in the Netherlands in 1990 and 
2006 (Ziemann 2009), and the creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits 
(Thatcher 2011). Though the literature review here only represents a portion of HI 
research on the EU — it is far from being exhaustive and the list can go on and on 
along with the EU’s development, those recent studies have displayed two prominent 
features of the HI approach to the EU: (1) the cases explored by HI all are related to 
institutional or policy evolution, changes or reforms, and (2) those research emphasizes 
the core ideas of HI: path dependence. Those two characteristics of HI approaches to 
the EU cast light on the case studies of this dissertation: first, the three selected cases 
are potentially suitable for HI research as they represent the EU’s recent developments 
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and changes, and therefore, they are the most-likely cases for HI analyses; second, as 
Pierson’s path dependent theory is generally regarded as a typical HI application to EU 
studies (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Pollack 2009), this dissertation will probe 
into the concept of this theory and derive hypotheses related to the EU’s new 
developments during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The following section will 
first review Hall and Taylor’s propositions of HI as an IR theory, then elaborate on 
Pierson’s path dependence theory, present HI’s three-stage analytical framework, and 
finally, summarize HI’s propositions by formulating HI hypotheses about the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis.  
 
4.2.1 Hall and Taylor’s Account of HI as a Variant of New 
Institutionalism in IR Studies  
Developing from the prominent group theories of politics and structural-functionalism 
during the 1960s and 1970s, HI defines institutions as “the formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure 
of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). Compared with two 
other schools of institutionalism — rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, there are four distinctive features of HI. First, it tends to have a broad 
conception of the relationship between institutions and individual actions. Second, it 
lays stress on power relations and the asymmetrical power distributions during the 
operation and development of institutions. A given institution provides different interest 
groups with “disproportionate access to the decision-making process”; consequently, 
some groups win and others lose (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). Third, it views 
institutional development through the lens of “path dependence” and “unintended 
consequences”. Finally, it takes institutions as one factor in a causal chain leading to 
political outcomes. (HI argument 2) Compared with rational choice institutionalism, 
HI is concerned with other factors, such as socioeconomic development and the 
propagation of ideas and beliefs, paying particular attention to the relationship 
between institutions and ideas (Hall and Taylor 1996, 942). (HI argument 3) Hall and 
Taylor (1996) offer a detailed elaboration of the first and third features of HI. 
 
4.2.1.1 HI’s View on the Relationship between Institutions and Actors  
North (1990, 5) once argued that institutional creation and changes, on the one hand, 
depend upon individual decisions, while on the other hand, institutions impose 
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constraints on individual choices, and therefore institutionalist research should 
combine both individual choices and institutional constraints. So the central issue to 
any institutional analysis is to explore the mutual effects between institutions and 
individual behavior, which, according to Hall and Taylor (1996, 939), can be answered 
by three sub-questions: “how do actors behave, what do institutions do, and why do 
institutions persist over time?”; and there are two contrasting approaches to these 
questions — the “calculus approach” and the “cultural approach” (Hall and Taylor 
1996, 939).  
Hall and Taylor (1996, 939) explain that the calculus approach views individuals 
as rational and purposive utility-maximizers who always calculate strategically to 
select the options that could bring maximum benefit from all possible choices; 
individuals’ preferences or goals, therefore, are exogenous to institutional analysis. 
What institutions mean to individuals is, for example, to provide actors the information 
of the certainty of other actors’ behavior as the reached agreements introduce 
enforcement and penalty mechanisms for the actors involved; from such a perspective, 
institutions can alter the expectations of an actor on others and strategic calculations 
assume key roles in institutional analysis (Hall and Taylor 1996, 939). In contrast, the 
cultural approach, while not denying the rationality of actors and the strategic 
interactions among them, views individuals, bounded by the individual world view, as 
“satisficers” rather than “utility-maximizers”, emphasizing “the extent to which 
individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their 
purposes”; as a result, individual choices depend upon “the interpretation of a situation 
rather than on purely instrumental calculation” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 939). From this 
point of view, institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, serve as the 
filters for individuals to interpret the situations and themselves, and thus construct their 
courses of actions; institutions do not only offer strategic interaction information, but 
also affect an individual’s preferences, identities, and self-images, providing “moral or 
cognitive templates for interpretation and action” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 939). As for 
the question of the persistence of institutions over time, the calculus approach contends 
that it is because the deviation from current institutional arrangements will cause more 
losses than gains to individuals, and the more gains an institution brings to involved 
actors and the more it contributes to solving collective problems, the less possibility for 
it to decease; the cultural approach, on the other hand, claims that it is because 
individual choices tend to treat institutions as conventions and thus neglect a direct 
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scrutiny on them, and the taken-for-granted collective constructions, which cannot be 
changed easily by any single individual’s actions, structure all possible options for 
individuals to make reform (Hall and Taylor 1996, 940). Being eclectic of both calculus 
and cultural approaches, HI explains the mutual relationship between institutions and 
individual behavior as follows: under a given institutional arrangement, an 
individual’s calculated strategies over time could be transformed into world views, 
which, having being advocated by institutional organizations, may ultimately shape an 
individual’s preferences and self-images (Hall and Taylor 1996, 940). (HI argument 4)  
 
4.2.1.2 Historical Development and Social Causation: Path Dependence 
History matters, and “[w]e cannot understand today’s choices [...] without tracing the 
incremental evolution of institutions” (North 1990, 100). The sequences of decisions 
matter and past choices exert an influence over today’s decisions by making certain 
alternatives appear more attractive — this is called “path dependence”, which 
suggests that once a course of action is taken, it will be difficult to break away from it 
radically because the status quo is regarded as the right way to do things, and a drastic 
change requires large investment (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011, 42). (HI argument 5) 
Institutions are one of the central factors driving historical development along a set of 
“paths” inherited from the past, and actually history can be interpreted as landscapes of 
different path dependence (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). Seeking to explain how 
institutions produce different paths in various ways, historical institutionalists look at 
“state capacities” and “policy legacies” on subsequent policy formation, or focus on 
“policy conditions” which encourage societal groups to line up with existing policies 
or to develop interests in certain policies (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). (HI argument 6) 
As a result, there might be unintended consequences and inefficiencies generated by 
existing institutional settings; nevertheless, path dependence of continuity might be 
punctuated by “critical junctures”, that is, a “branching point” where historical 
movement takes a new path due to a substantial institutional change; so at issue is to 
explain what causes such junctures, but besides the factors of economic crisis and 
military conflict, historical institutionalists seem to lack a complete elaboration of this 






4.2.2 A Path Dependence Framework 
Pierson’s path dependent theory (1996, 1998) highlights the importance of past 
decisions on current intergovernmental negotiations and raises our awareness of the 
evolution of cooperation among European nation states over time (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2001, 10; see also chapter three of this dissertation), and later Pierson (2004) 
— “[t]he best and most comprehensive statement of historical institutionalism” 
(Pollack 2009, 143) — highly recommends to place politics in time so as to examine 
political processes and causal chains unfolding over time. According to Aspinwall and 
Schneider (2001, 11), HI may stress the normative aspect of institutions as certain 
values and ideas are embedded into them, which might influence the choice of actors: 
non-market preferences, for instance, have been marginalized by the Community’s 
market orientation policy and the configuration of producer and consumer directorates; 
nevertheless, on the issue of the power and the role of culture in institutional influence, 
HI researchers may have different opinions: Pierson’s (1996, 1998) analyses do not 
address EU supranational institutions’ structural bias which could privilege certain 
actors and types of policies over others, an important feature of HI defined by Hall and 
Taylor (1996, 940-941); in comparison, Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) emphasize the 
influence of different cultural factors within European institutions, such as the 
Commission. However, Pierson (2004, 11) does claim that his path dependent 
arguments of self-reinforcing processes “reinvigorate the analysis of power in social 
relations by showing how inequalities of power, perhaps modest initially, can be 
reinforced over time and often come to be deeply embedded in organizations and 
dominant modes of political action and understanding, as well as in institutional 
arrangements.” (HI argument 8) Such a theoretical supplement or revision exhibits the 
trajectory of Pierson’s path dependence theory. In order to explain his path dependent 
theory, Pierson’s (1996, 1998) initially utilizes “sunk costs” (see chapter three of this 
dissertation), then “increasing returns processes” (Pierson 2000), and “self-reinforcing 
or positive feedback processes” (Pierson 2004) to underline his core arguments. 
Accordingly, the concept of path dependence is defined as “a social process grounded 
in a dynamic of ‘increasing returns’” (2000, 251) or “the dynamics of self-reinforcing 
or positive feedback processes in a political system” (2004, 10). In essence, Pierson 





Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country 
or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There 
will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the 
better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are 
many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn 
around or to clamber from one to the other — and essential if the chosen 
branch dies — the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to 
follow. (Levi 1997: 28, quoted in Pierson 2000, 252; see also Pollack 2009, 
127) 
 
The idea of increasing returns suggests “self-reinforcing or positive feedback 
processes” (Pierson 2000, 251), which, Pierson believes, captures the essence of path 
dependence: as “the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other 
possible options increase over time” while “the costs of exit — of switching to some 
previously plausible alternative — rise”, “the probability of further steps along the 
same path increases with each move down that path”; therefore, “preceding steps in a 
particular direction induce further movement in the same direction” (Pierson 2000, 
252), and those previous steps “make reversals very difficult” (Pierson 2004, 10). 
“Increasing returns” are self-reinforcing as “[l]ong movement down a particular path 
will increase the costs of switching to some previously forgone alternative” (Pierson 
2000, 261); they are of “positive feedbacks” as “institutions and policies generate 
incentives for actors to stick with and not abandon existing institutions, adapting them 
only incrementally to changing political environments” (Pollack 2009, 127). (HI 
argument 9) When an institution is established and a policy is adopted, three factors 
may contribute to the self-reinforcing dynamics: patterns of political mobilization, the 
institutional rules, and “citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world” 
(Pierson 2004, 10), and the result is that “[p]olitical alternatives that were once quite 
plausible may become irretrievably lost” (Pierson 2004, 11) or “forsaken alternatives 
becomes increasingly unreachable with the passage of time” (Pierson 2004, 13). In EU 
institutional decision-making procedures such as the co-decision procedures, path 
dependence means “steps in a sequence are irreversible because losing alternatives 
are dropped from the range of possible options” (Pierson 2004, 13), that is, the 
sequence entailed in EU decision-making procedures involving different institutions 
which may possess discrepant opinions matters as the alternatives are dropped out 
along with the process of policy-making procedures. (HI argument 10)  
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Previously, “path dependence” has been used to illustrate human being’s 
technology history, as North once explained: “incremental changes in technology, once 
begun on a particular track, may lead one technological solution to win out over 
another, even when, ultimately, this technological path may be less efficient than the 
abandoned alternative would have been” (North 1990, 93). Similarly, the incremental 
evolution of an institution gets its own path dependence once a solution prevails (North 
1990, 94). Agreeing with North, Pierson (2000) holds that due to increasing returns, 
actors are strongly motivated to stick to a single alternative to continue and thus a 
specific path is taken after the first choices in that direction are made. In other words, 
“[o]nce an initial advantage is gained, positive feedback effects may lock in this 
technology, and competitors are excluded” (Pierson 2000, 254). (HI argument 11) 
Increasing returns in technology are conditioned, and so is it for the world of politics.  
Borrowing from Arthur’s (1994) arguments on the conditions that give rise to 
increasing returns, Pierson lists four factors that contribute to the self-fulfilling 
movement of a particular path: large set-up or fixed costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations (Pierson 2000, 254; see also 1998, 46). 
(HI argument 12)  
 
“1. Large set-up or fixed costs. These create a high pay-off for further 
investments in a given technology. With large production runs, fixed costs 
can be spread over more output, which will lead to lower unit costs. When 
set-up or fixed costs are high, individuals and organizations have a strong 
incentive to identify and stick with a single option.  
2. Learning effects. Knowledge gained in the operation of complex systems 
also leads to higher returns from continuing use. With repetition, individuals 
learn how to use products more effectively, and their experiences are likely 
to spur further innovations in the product or in related activities. 
3. Coordination effects. These occur when the benefits an individual receives 
from a particular activity increase as others adopt the same option. If 
technologies embody positive network externalities, then a given technology 
will become more attractive as more people use it. Coordination effects are 
especially significant when a technology has to be compatible with a linked 
infrastructure (e.g., software with hardware; automobiles with an 
infrastructure of roads, repair facilities, and fueling stations). Increased use 
of a technology encourages investments in the linked infrastructure, which in 
turn attracts still more users to the technology.  
4. Adaptive expectations. If options that fail to win broad acceptance will 
have drawbacks later on, then individuals may feel a need to ‘pick the right 
horse’. Although the dynamic here is related to coordination effects, it 
derives from the self-fulfilling character of expectations. Projections about 
future aggregate use patterns lead individuals to adapt their actions in ways 




As these four features are applied to institutions
109
, they refer to (1) the creation 
of institutions entails considerable start-up costs; (2) individuals and institutions learn 
by doing; (3) the benefits of individual activities or those of an institution are enhanced 
if they are coordinated or “fit” with the activities of other actors or institutions; and (4) 
in order to bet on the “right horse”, actors adapt actions in light of their expectations 
about the actions of others (Pierson 2000, 254). (HI argument 13)  
As a matter of fact, factor (3) is similar to the idea of “spillover” in the sense that 
gaining benefits in one option will promote and encourage cooperation in the linked 
areas, while factor (4) implies the acceptance of different methods, ideas, values, or 
world views could become a part of an individual’s strategic calculation, which then 
over time might be translated into an taken-for-granted preference. Moreover, 
according to Pierson (2000, 255), increasing returns processes, at the micro-level, tend 
to reinforce the stability and further development of the newly established individual 
institutions, while at the macro-level, promote complementary configurations of 
institutions. (HI argument 14)  
Under those conditions conducive to path dependence, Pierson makes four 
presumptions of the path dependent mechanisms (multiple equilibria, contingency, a 
critical role for timing and sequencing and inertia): (HI argument 15)  
 
“1. Multiple equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to 
increasing returns, a number of outcomes — perhaps a wide range — are 
generally possible. 
2. Contingency. Relatively small events, if they occur at the right moment, 
can have large and enduring consequences.  
3. A critical role for timing and sequencing. In increasing returns processes, 
when an event occurs may be crucial. Because earlier parts of a sequence 
matter much more than later parts, an event that happens “too late” may have 
no effect, although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had 
been different.  
4. Inertia. Once an increasing returns process is established, positive 
feedback may lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be 
resistant to change.” (Pierson 2000, 263, his emphasis) 
 
                                                 
109 The applicability of “increasing returns” from economics to politics, Pierson explains, is due to 
four prominent characteristics of the political arena: “(1) the central role of collective action; (2) the 
high density of institutions; (3) the possibilities for using political authority to enhance asymmetries 
of power; and (4) its intrinsic complexity and opacity” (Pierson 2000, 257). In addition, another two 
factors, the short time horizons of political actors and the strong status quo bias associated with the 
decision rules of political institutions, contribute to the intensity of path dependent effects in politics 
(Pierson 2000, 261-62). 
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Those four propositions are four “likely” features of political life if “path 
dependent processes are at work”, and a path dependent fashion will get changed at 
“critical junctures” — Pierson emphasizes that it is important to keep the two, i.e. 
“path dependence” and “critical junctures”, distinct, and it is the former that lays the 
foundations to the latter, not vice versa, and besides, the former can explain why the 
latter has “lasting consequences” (Pierson 2000, 263) (HI argument 16); accordingly, 
the hypotheses in this dissertation are drawn within two categories: (H ) is about 
critical junctures; (H) concerns path dependence. Path dependence, as North points out, 
“is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future” (1990, 
98-99), but rather “a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision 
making through time” (1990, 98), which means “previously viable options may be 
foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and cumulative 
commitments on the existing path will often make change difficult and will condition 
the form in which new branchings will occur” (Pierson 2000, 265). (HI argument 17) 
The above arguments are reinforced in Pierson (2004), where four major themes 
stand out: positive feedback and path dependence, time and sequence, slow-moving 
dimension of social life (e.g. the stickiness and incremental changes of political 
institutions), and institutional origins and changes (e.g. critical junctures) (Pierson 
2004, 9); it is the first theme of path dependence that lays the foundation for the other 
three thematic propositions and the whole argument of Pierson’s “politics in time” 
(2004, 11). As institutional arrangements are deeply embedded over stretches of time, 
scholars should explore “institutional development rather than institutional choice” 
(Pierson 2004, 15, his emphasis). (HI argument 18) This displays HI’s distinctive 
characteristic compared to Moravcsik’s LI model which takes “institutional choice” as 
a key research theme.  
 
4.2.3 HI’s Three-Phase Analytical Model  
Pierson’s HI analysis of the EU derives from the HI school in political science (e.g. Hix 
1999, 2005; Pollack 2009). Pierson himself claims that his theory of path dependence 
actually supports HI’s key propositions as follows: “specific patterns of timing and 
sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences 
may result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, 
once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, the political 
development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic 
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contours of social life” (2000, 251; see also 2004, 8-9) (HI argument 19), which in fact 
is a re-statement of the four likely characteristics to judge a path dependent process at 
work and the idea of critical junctures. In order to explain the historical perspective 
better, Hix (1999, 2005) summarizes HI as a three-step model:  
 
“At time T0, a set of institutional rules is chosen or a policy decision is made 
(by the member state governments), on the basis of the structure of existing 
preferences. At time T1, a new structure of preferences emerges under the 
conditions of the new strategic environment: the changed preferences of the 
member states, the new powers and preference of the supranational 
institutions, and the new decision-making rules and policy competences at 
the European level. And, at time T2, a new policy decision is adopted or a set 
of institutional rules is chosen.” (Hix 1999, 16) 
 
In this model, though national governments have had their control at the first 
stage T0, decisions made at time T0 “lock” the integration process into a particular 
“path”, that is, “the decision taken by the member states at T2 is very different from 
that which they would have taken if they had faced the same decision at T0” (Hix 2005, 
17). As actors do not have perfect information to predict preferences at T1 or policy 
outcomes at T2, unintended consequences can take place (Hix 1999, 16) with 
governmental policy competences and powers further delegated to EU institutions (Hix 
2005, 17). (HI argument 20) Such path dependence does not mean an inevitable 
process of integration, but rather, the only way to escape from further integration is to 
break with past practice at “critical junctures”(Cini 2010, 95), where “path dependent 
institutional stability and reproduction [...] are punctuated occasionally by brief phases 
of institutional flux [...] during which more dramatic change is possible” (Cini and 
Borragán 2010a, 441), that is, moments of “branching points” brought by substantial 
institutional changes where the historical movement takes a new path (Hall and Taylor 
1996, 942; Pierson 2000, 263). (HI argument 21) Promoting HI to the study of 
international political economy (IPE), Drezner (2010) argues that though HI’s path 
dependence may not be a perfect causal mechanism, it does explain why institutions, 
rules and policies evolves into current looking (Drezner 2010, 795). When discussing 
international market regulation, Drezner (2010) explains, 
 
“At time t, a set of rules R is codified. These rules help to shape and 
reinforce the preferences of the salient actors. At time t+1, the cost of 
switching away from R is somewhat higher. With each iteration, the 
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reinforcement between actor preferences and the rules that bind them make it 
increasingly unlikely that R will be changed endogenously.” (Drezner 2010, 
794) (HI argument 22) 
 
Drezner’s description highlights theoretically unlimited “iteration” and 
“reinforcement” of rules R via time stages of t+1, t+2, t+3, … t+n, and the analysis of 
rules R can be divided into a sequence of T0-T1-T2 analysis. The difference here is that 
Hix’s T0-T1-T2 model stresses the evolving relationship between nation states and 
supranational institutions on institutional rules and policy-making throughout certain 
periods of time, that is, it focuses on decision-makers and the potentially changing 
context of decision-making over time, while Drezner’s proposition pays attention to the 
rules themselves and the underlying factors that drive the reinforcement and stickiness 
of the established rules and policies throughout certain periods of time. So Hix’s 
T0-T1-T2 model and Drezner’s t+1, t+2, t+3, … t+n proposal actually can be viewed as 
different approaches to path dependent mechanisms from different angles: if the former 
emphasizes the historical and institutionalist context to explain how a path dependent 
mechanism works and evolves, then the latter values the dynamics of path dependence 
— increasing returns. Moreover, Drezner’s argument that “it (is) increasingly unlikely 
that R will be changed endogenously” implies that to break up the current chain of 
reinforcement and thus to embrace a new path may require exogenous pushes, that is, 
rules will be changed due to exogenous factors, such as the global economic crisis (cf. 
Niemann’s (2006) “exogenous spillover” propositions in chapter two of this 
dissertation). Corresponding to HI’s three-stage T0-T1-T2 analytical framework, 
Pierson (1996, 149; 1998, 49) maps out “the path to European integration” in the 
pattern of three time stages, visually offering the factors that account for EU 
institutional and policy evolution between intergovernmental “grand bargains” from a 
path dependent perspective (see chapter three of this dissertation). Pierson argues that 
decisions made by “the short-term preoccupations of institutional designers”, as the 
evolution of European social policy suggests, could “undermine [...] the long-term 
control of member state governments” and lead to widespread unanticipated 
consequences (1998, 56), because the institutional arrangements and increasing sunk 
costs (i.e. “the cost of exit”) make a reversal difficult and unattractive (Pierson 1998, 
45-46; see section 3.6.3). The logic here is not only about the institutional constraints 
from the macro-level (e.g. high institutional thresholds to later reforms, reward and 
penalty mechanisms prescribed by new rules), but also about societal actors at the 
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micro-level incrementally building up their vested interest in the maintenance of EU 
policies over time (see chapter three of this dissertation). (HI argument 23) Pierson’s 
T0-T1-T2 path to European integration actually exhibits a synthesis of Hix’s new 
structures of preferences and Drezner’s switching costs in the context of EU “grand 
bargains” for Treaty revisions and the term “sunk costs” defined by Pierson (1996, 
1998) was later developed into “increasing returns” (Pierson 2000) and “positive 
feedback” (Pierson 2004). The analyses here lay a foundation for the derivation of H16 
in light of HI’s T0-T1-T2 path dependent model on the basis of the arguments of 
Pierson, Hix and Drezner. 
Situating analyses at different periods of time, the T0-T1-T2 path dependence 
analytical framework can be used to explain institutional and policy outcomes (if 
starting from T2 and thus looking backwards into T0-T1) or predict future 
policy-making (if starting from T0 and looking forward to T1-T2) at the supranational 
level. Combing through the literature above, two key propositions underpin HI 
analyses: path dependence and critical junctures — the former delves into history to 
explain institutional and policy formation and evolution, while the latter can be treated 
as a starting point to predict institutional and policy in the future following the path 
dependent logic.  
 
4.2.4 Summary and Hypotheses Derivation 
As argued previously, all three new institutionalist approaches to the EU are valid, 
providing us with various theoretical lenses to examine and understand the EU, but 
“post hoc explanations are too easy to invent and usually [...] totally useless” (Scharpf 
1997, 29), so the significance of hypotheses formulation is to put forward “strong prior 
expectations” on the basis of theories to check the explanatory and predictive power of 
the relevant theories, where “the disconfirmation of such expectations” serves “as a 
welcome pointer to the development of more valid explanations” (Scharpf 1997, 29, 
his emphasis). According to the literature review above, “path dependence” and 
“critical junctures” lie at the core of HI, and in hypothesis form, HI arguments against 
the background of the crisis after 2008 can be stated as follows, which could be viewed 
as an HI framework to explain as well as to predict the EU’s developments during the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis and in the future. To begin with, HI’s propositions on 
“critical junctures” imply that 
H10: The 2008 global financial crisis serves as a “critical juncture” where EU 
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policies of economic governance in the post-2008 crisis era take new paths as 
national-national and/or national-supranational competence and powers get changed 
and redefined. 
This hypothesis will be tested by the three selected cases: the ESM, the ESRB, 
and the European Semester to see whether they mark EU “critical junctures”, signaling 
the moments of the “branching points” where EU financial and/or fiscal supervision 
and policy-making take new paths. However, “new paths” are subject to definition; 
they are not absolute yes-or-no questions, but rather questions of degree and relativity 
compared with the “old paths”, because to ascertain the effects and property of the 
“critical junctures” evolves over a certain period of time and depends on the thematic 
subjects, that is, “new paths” may mean different things to different scholars for 
different research purposes. In a broad sense, judging from Cini and Borragán’s (2010a, 
441) definitions of “critical junctures” (HI argument 21), all new institutional creations 
during the post-2008 crisis era could be viewed as sort of “branching points” on the 
trunk of the EU as the EU’s path dependent institutional stability and reproduction are 
punctuated by phases of institutional flux; thus from such a broad perspective, the 
crisis in 2008 does serve as a “critical juncture”. This dissertation, however, selects 
national-national and national-supranational power relations as the litmus to test the 
new paths, which is based on the following consideration. First, in recent years, the 
sovereign debt crisis is a “contagious headache” for euro member states as well as for 
the whole EU, and the EU’s new measures are collective attempts of national 
governments to find solutions at the supranational level. Without a doubt, national 
states are the elementary bricks for the grand building of the EU and the tensions 
between nationalism and supranationalism lie at the heart of the EU, both in practice 
and in theory (cf. chapter two and chapter three). For example, the essence of EU 
decision-making procedures, the core of the EU machine, is about the function, power 
and competence division between national states and EU supranational institutions, and 
the changes in national-supranational relations normally will influence the EU’s future 
policy-making and developments which may contribute to “a substantial institutional 
change” (HI argument 7). Second, as HI arguments 2, 8 and 20 suggest, to analyze 
power relations and asymmetrical power distributions, as well as to examine how those 
asymmetries and inequalities get reinforced and evolve over time, is a distinctive tool 
and feature of HI and an intrinsic element that underscores the self-reinforced path 
dependent processes. Therefore, this dissertation will take national-national and 
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national-supranational power relations as the gauge to judge the “critical junctures” and 
“new paths”. Accordingly, this dissertation will look at national governments’ and the 
EU supranational institutions’ functions, powers and status defined in the new 
measures, and if there is any change of national-national and/or national-supranational 
power relations caused by the new measures compared with previous financial and 
fiscal policies and practices, H10 will be shown to be valid; if the power distributions, 
however, do not assume any changes in case studies, H10 will be rejected. If H10 is 
valid, then firstly, HI’s argument 7 on the causes of critical junctures (i.e. an economic 
crisis) are justified, and to be more accurate, the factors contributing to the branching 
points of the EU and EMU development this time are the world-wide financial crisis 
originating from the US, the consequent global economic recession and the unsound 
fiscal conditions of nation states (i.e. the high budget deficit and debt rates). This 
dissertation will delineate the timing and sequence of those factors, and the adoption 
and implementation of the new measures so as to see whether there is any visible 
patterns underling those factors and any contingencies of relatively small events which 
exert large and enduring consequences as occurring at the “right” moment (HI 
arguments 15, 19). Secondly, if national government powers are further constrained, 
unintended consequences posited both by HI and neo-functionalism are also confirmed. 
Besides, this dissertation will examine whether previous institutions and these new 
measures have forged an asymmetrical access to the decision-making process for 
different interest groups, and if so, this dissertation will check who are the winners and 
the losers and how the disproportionate access and asymmetrical powers evolve over 
time, getting reinforced or changed (HI arguments 2, 8). However, even if H10 is 
vindicated, the new measures’ actual magnitude of impacts on the EU and EMU 
(whose developments also depend on various other factors) in the future requires 
further clarification and specification. Because “critical junctures” and “new paths” 
connote time-involvement (i.e. the appearance and effects of them require certain 
period of time to expose, to be visible and then to be evaluated), the evaluation of the 
new measures at different time points (e.g. at present, 10 years later or even 100 years 
later), together with other factors such as scholars’ research questions and objectives, 
may lead to different judgments and conclusions on the same “critical junctures” and 
“new paths”, and thus H10 is still, and should be, open to empirical tests in the future 
along with EU developments. The case studies in this dissertation just make a small 
contribution to the ever-developing HI research project on the EU, and these new 
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institutional and policy creations, being efforts of the EU and the member states to 
solve the crisis, may be or may not be vindicate as far-reaching “branching points” for 
the EU and EMU in the future.  
As Pierson (2000, 263) argues, critical junctures rest on the arguments of path 
dependence, or else how can a juncture be judged as being “critical” (HI arguments 16, 
18)? The EU’s new measures to cope with the crisis since 2008, on the one hand, may 
exhibit differences and deviations from the EU’s previous policies and practices as 
challenges this time are unexpected and really serious, while on the other hand, being 
developed under the existing EU institutional structures, the new measures may also 
display policy coherence and consistence, inheriting certain policy features from the 
previous decisions and choices. Like a coin which has two sides, institutional and 
policy creations, in one respect, are novelly designed to deal with the new rising 
challenges, and in another respect, their formation is conditioned by a specific 
historical context. If “critical junctures” suggest institutional and policy inventions, 
deviations and “new paths”, then path dependence, stressing looking back into the 
historical and institutionalist context where those new policies are produced, has 
offered an explanation for why and how these inventions, deviations and “new paths” 
happen and thus explores policy roots, continuity and evolution. All in all, path 
dependence theory offers an explanation for institutional and policy outcomes — 
whether they are shown as branching points and new paths or not; meanwhile, the logic 
of path dependence also makes predictions on future institutional and policy 
developments. In the context of countering the negative impact of the crisis, the path 
dependent arguments in hypothesis form can be stated as follows: 
H11: The EU's new measures adopted during the post-2008 crisis era, on the 
one hand, are conditioned by prior institutional arrangements and commitments which 
set limits on the possible available options, make certain alternatives appear more 
attractive, and lead actors to redefine their interests, while on the other hand, the new 
measures reflect a complex context that shapes actors’ strategies, world views and 
action arenas, which, having been advocated by EU institutions with each iteration of 
the new measures, will shape actors’ preferences and/or self-images as the status quo 
of the new measures is regarded as the right way to solve the crisis. (HI arguments 1, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 22, 23).  
H11 emphasizes the structural effects exerted by path dependence. Apart from 
this, path dependence as well as HI also stresses the influence of past choices on 
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current decisions and the importance of the timing and sequences of events, which, 
according to HI arguments 5, 6, 10, 15, 17, 23, suggest the following:  
H12: The choices of the specific new measures to cope with the post-2008 crisis 
era are made on the basis of the past choices where certain elements in today’s choices 
have appeared more attractive and the sequences of institutional decisions entailed in 
EU decision-making procedures to adopt the new measures matter as certain 
alternatives are irreversibly dropped from the range of possible options along with the 
proceeding of the decision-making procedure; thus, path dependence indicates a way 
to link decision-making through time and to narrow conceptually the choice set, and 
consequently, the new measures have become the only available options for actors to 
resort to, along which societal groups make adaptations to the new measures and 
incrementally build up their vested interest in maintaining and even developing the 
new measures. 
In case studies, this dissertation will examine whether the mechanisms of H12 
are present in the selected cases. Following HI argument 22, this dissertation will focus 
on the “salient” actors’ preferences and the rules that bind them; as far as the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis is concerned, this dissertation will take national governments and 
EU supranational institutions as the “salient” actors. At issue is how nation states can 
solve the sovereign debt crisis, so this dissertation will particularly focus on nation 
states’ preferences; if member states become to take the new measures for granted and 
resort to the new measures as their first responses to solve the sovereign debt crisis, 
then we can say that the new measures have shaped member states’ preferences and 
they have been internalized as part of nation states’ strategies and world views. 
Moreover, because the sovereign debt crisis exerts a great negative impact on national 
economies and as suggested by HI arguments 6 and 23, this dissertation will also 
examine the positions of societal interest groups to see whether the new measures have 
encouraged societal groups to line up with the new policies and to incrementally build 
up their vested interest in maintaining and even developing the new measures. The 
mechanisms argued in H12 tend to be the “possibly materializing” phenomena or 
observable facts; the underlying reasons leading to these possible phenomena or facts 
are, however, due to “increasing returns”: 
H13: Once the new measures are established to deal with the crisis, actors tend 
to stick to them due to the increasing returns, that is, the relative benefits brought by 
current measures compared with other possible options increase over time, and the 
costs of exit (i.e. sunk costs) or the costs of switching to the previously plausible 
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alternatives rise (i.e. self-reinforcing processes), which generate incentives for actors 
to stick with and not abandon the new measures, only adapting the new measures 
incrementally to the changing environment (i.e. positive feedbacks). As a result, with 
each iteration of the new measures, (a) actors’ preferences and the rules that bind 
them are increasingly reinforced and the status quo of the new measures is regarded as 
the right way to solve the crisis, (b) the once competitive options are excluded, (c) the 
equilibriums formulated by the new measures to solve the crisis are resistant to change, 
(d) specific paths are taken as the new measures induce further institutional and policy 
movement in the same direction, (e) the iteration of rules codified in the new measures 
and the repetition of the cumulative commitments on the existing paths make changes 
difficult and condition the form where new branching points will occur in the future, 
and (f) it is increasingly unlikely that the new measures will be changed endogenously. 
(HI arguments 4, 5, 9, 11, 15, 17, 22, 23) 
While H12 hypothesizes the relationship among possible phenomena and facts, 
H13 explains the dynamics and deep reasons that cause H12. The first half of H13 
hypothesizes the causal mechanisms entailed in increasing returns, whereas the second 
half of H13 argues for the possible results of increasing returns, and the absence or 
presence of H13(a)-(f) should be judged after a certain period of time after the adoption 
and implementation of the new measures. As the research period is delimited to the 
phase of 2010-2012, the effectiveness of H13(a)-(f) will be checked by the three 
selected cases during this time period. However, some of the causing mechanisms, 
such as (e) and (f), may suggest a much longer period of time to be involved, so 
judging from a different angle, H13(a)-(f) can also be taken as predictions made by HI 
on the EU’s and EMU’s future development after the adoption and implementations of 
the new measures, which are open to future empirical tests. The causing chains have 
been stated clearly in H13(a)-(f), but still H13(d) needs further clarification if HI 
argument 14 is taken into account. H13(d) argues that the new measures induce 
specific paths that will lead to further institutional and policy movement in the same 
direction, while HI argument 14 expects that both the reinforcement as well as the 
development of the new measures complementary to the new measures are the results 
of increasing returns processes. Therefore, “movement in the same direction”, spurred 
by increasing returns, not only suggests the reinforcement of the stability and the 
further development of the new measures, but also should include the development of 
complementary measures; accordingly, the “same” direction also means to take new 
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initiatives that are facilitating the implementation of the new measures or are generally 
considered helpful to solve the crisis. The development of complementary institutions 
and policies to the new measures in the future, from an HI perspective, can be regarded 
as a result of increasing returns, while from a neo-functionalist point of view, they 
indicate the dynamics of spillover. So EU integration theories actually offer different 
angles and interpretations to the same snapshot of the EU empirical development. In 
addition, H13(e) will probe into both macro-constraints and micro-adaptations as 
suggested by HI argument 23. 
Certain factors are conducive to the effectiveness of path dependent mechanisms, 
and in accordance with the four factors posited by Pierson (1998, 2000), this 
dissertation hypothesizes that there is a beneficiary environment for path dependence to 
take place, that is,  
H14: There are conditions conducive to foster the self-fulfilling movement of the 
particular paths introduced by the EU’s new measures to deal with the crisis, as large 
set-up costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations are 
effectively present. (HI arguments 12, 13, 14) 
This hypothesis actually is composed of four sub-hypotheses according to the 
four analytical factors:  
H14a: The EU’s new measures to address the crisis entail considerable 
institutional start-up costs, which serve as a strong incentive for actors to stick to them. 
H14b: National actors actively engage in learning and adapting to the new 
measures as the new measures are considered helpful to keep economic and financial 
stability; as actors gain more experience and expertise with these new measures, they 
are likely to introduce further innovations and changes into these measures and/or into 
other related policy areas. 
H14c: The new measures are compatible with the activities of other actors and 
institutions, and moreover, the new measures promote new developments in the linked 
areas and policies, which in turn increase the viability of the new measures. 
H14d: Actors whose options have failed will adapt their actions and expectations 
in accordance with the new measures. 
The case studies in this dissertation will see whether those four beneficiary 
factors are present and thus to judge whether there is a fertilizing field for the new 
measures to introduce specific paths for the EU’s future economic governance. Besides 
the assumptions on the conditions conducive to path dependence, Pierson (2000) (HI 
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argument 15) argues for four likely features that mark the political life when path 
dependent processes are at work, which indicate the following:  
H15: The political process accompanying the effectiveness of path dependence 
of the new measures are likely marked by (a) multiple equilibria, (b) contingency, (c) a 
critical role for timing and sequencing, and (d) inertia. 
The purpose of this hypothesis is to check whether the political life before and 
after the adoption of the new measures to tackle the post-2008 crisis situation is 
marked by the four features (also see HI argument 19) where the timing and sequences 
of (small or contingent) events have great impact on the formation of the new measures. 
H15 actually is partly entailed in H13(b), (c), (e) and (f), and H15 could also be viewed 
as a sort of re-statement of the propositions in H12 from a different angle; additionally, 
the planned analyses for the “critical juncture” of H12 also cast light on H15. In short, 
H15 posits a completed and full political process of path dependence, and the four 
possible features are the symptoms to “diagnose” the effectiveness of path dependence. 
In accordance with HI’s three-step analytical model T0-T1-T2, this dissertation 
puts forward the path of the new measures to deal with the post-2008 crisis situation 
via T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty to test the assumptions 
entailed in HI arguments 20, 22 and 23 and Pierson’s T0-T1-T2: “the path to European 
integration” (see Figure 3.1).
110
The path dependent mechanisms of the 
T0-T1(T1a-T1b)-T2 posited by this dissertation assume the following: 
H16: Member state initial decisions on EMU, the single currency, and EU 
economic governance enshrined in the TEU (T0) lock the relevant development of 
institutions and policies into a particular “path”, which, via the time stages of T0the 
TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty, is characterized by three 
                                                 
110 The road to the Lisbon Treaty illustrates the history of the EU: the Treaty establishing the ECSC 
(1951) — Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and the Euratom (1957) — the SEA (1986) — the 
Treaty of Maastricht (the TEU) (1992) — the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) — the Treaty of Nice 
(2001) — the Constitutional Treaty (2004) — the Lisbon Treaty (2007). The Constitutional Treaty 
was signed in October 2004, but France and the Netherlands rejected it during May to June 2005 by 
referendum, so it never became effective. As a revision to the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon 
Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 by 27 member states and approved by 26 out of 27 member 
state parliaments from 2007 to May 2009. On 12 June 2008, the referendum in Ireland failed to ratify 
the Treaty; after negotiations and revisions to the Treaty, on 2 October 2009, the second referendum 
of Ireland adopted the Treaty, and on 1 December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force (see, for 
example, Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty (2010, 11)). This dissertation selects the period from the 
TEU to the Lisbon Treaty, and as the Constitutional Treaty has never been ratified, the road to Lisbon, 
in accordance with the HI T0-T1-T2 path dependence model, is illustrated as T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam 
Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty -T2the Lisbon Treaty. 
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prominent features: (a) the TEU shapes and reinforces the preferences of the salient 
actors, which get further reinforced with the iteration of Treaty rules, and from T0 to 
T2, the initial rules set down at T0 get changed due to exogenous challenges rather 
than endogenous needs; (b) the institutional arrangements and increasing sunk costs 
make actors stick to the existing course; (c) the EU’s new measures to cope with the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty (T2) are 
unintended consequences of the initial decisions of the TEU (T0) as (i) more national 
government competences and powers are delegated to EU institutions and national 
governments’ control over the EU policies (i.e. the new measures) is further reduced, 
and (ii) member states would have taken very different measures if they had faced the 
sovereign debt crisis after the enforcement of the TEU.  
The purpose of this hypothesis test is to see whether there is an HI T0-T1-T2 path 
dependent mode for the policies relevant to the single currency and EU economic 
governance from the TEU to the current EU’s new measures to address the post-2008 
crisis challenges, particularly the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and the hypothesized 
path is shown as follows: T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon 
Treaty-The EU’s New Measures to solve the crisis. This path model derives from the 
time-stage mechanisms argued by Pierson (HI argument 23 and Pierson’s “the path to 
European integration”), Hix (HI argument 20) and Drezner (HI argument 22), and the 
designation for T0, T1 and T2 is based on the following consideration.  
First, as Pierson’s “path to the European integration” via T0-T1-T2 is formulated 
through the study of institutional and policy evolution between EU intergovernmental 
“grand bargains” for Treaty revisions (which require member state unanimous 
approval), accordingly, the selection of the TEU (IGC 1990-1991), the Amsterdam 
Treaty (IGC 1996), the Nice Treaty (IGC 2000) and the Lisbon Treaty (IGC 2007) 
meets the requirement of Pierson’s case selection of intergovernmental grand bargains 
to test his HI model. Besides, the EU has been developing through a series of Treaties 
which lay down the legal basis for this regional organization, and moreover, each 
Treaty conclusion constitutes the milestones of the EU, so carrying out research on the 
progress of EU Treaties is meaningful. 
Second, the selected new measures addressing the post-2008 crisis era are the 
institutional and policy outcomes after the grand bargains for the Lisbon Treaty, so 
naturally the Lisbon Treaty is assigned as T2, whereas assigning the TEU as T0 is 
because the TEU satisfies the requirement of the T0-T1-T2 model, which assumes that 
at the initial time T0, national governments had control over institutional structures and 
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supranational policy-making. The first IGC negotiation for EMU was “opened in Rome 
in October 1990 and closed in Maastricht in 1991” (Verdun 2010, 329), and the 
negotiated results are reflected in the TEU, which, on the basis of the 1989 Delors 
Report, not only stipulated three stages to realize EMU, but also set down the 
convergence criteria for member states to join EMU at the final stage implemented on 
1 January 1999, thus “constitut(ing) the legal basis for EMU and its new single 
currency” (Hosli 2005, 37). Therefore, choosing the TEU as time T0 meets the 
conditions set out by the HI model T0-T1-T2, as it is in the TEU that national 
governments made their first IGC negotiations and decisions related to EMU and the 
common currency and thus, national governments at that time are assumed to have had 
their control over EMU and the single currency policies. Additionally, it should also 
not be forgotten that the name of the “European Union” was officially introduced by 
the TEU, signaling a new era for European regional cooperation.
111
 Moreover, the 
solution to the post-2008 crisis era is related to EU financial, fiscal and economic 
policies (see Table 1.2 and 1.3), which are interwoven with each other and collectively 
belong to EU economic governance in a broad sense, so the research of this dissertation 
also reflects EU economic governance tendency against which the decisions and 
policies related to the single currency are made. The HI T0-T1-T2 model emphasizes 
that decisions made at time T0 will cause unintended consequences at time T2 over 
time; accordingly, this dissertation is going to examine whether the new measures are 
unexpected consequences for the decisions made in the TEU. 
Finally, the HI T0-T1-T2 model represents a conceptual framework which 
stresses the evolution of institutions and policies over time, offering a historical rather 
than a snapshot perspective to understand EU policies today. In Pierson’s T0-T1-T2 
model, T1 indicates the time period between two grand bargains, from which 
considerable gaps in national government control, contributing to the altered context 
for T2, emerge, and to be more exact, T1 suggests (1) shifts in domestic conditions, (2) 
micro-level adaptations (“sunk costs”), (3) accumulated policy constraints, and (4) 
heavily discounted or unintended effects, whereas T2 indicates a changed context for 
the IGC negotiations forged by (5) member state preferences (influenced by (1), (2) 
                                                 
111 The TEU (i.e. The Maastricht Treaty) is regarded as “a new stage” for the European integration 
project, as it introduced a three-pillar-structured “European Union”: the European Communities, 
CFSP and JHA. Meanwhile, the concept of European citizenship, a reinforced EP and the launch of 
EMU are also introduced. Besides, the EC superseded the EEC. See “Treaty of Maastricht on 
European Union” (European Union).  
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and (4) at time T1), (6) member state bargaining powers (decided by (3) and (4) at time 
T1), and (7) the power of other actors (as the consequences of (4) at time T1), which as 
a whole causes the institutional and policy outcomes after the grand bargains. By 
comparison, in Hix’s T0-T1-T2 model, T1 means a new structure of national 
preferences in a new environment conditioned by (8) the changed preferences of the 
member states, (9) the new powers and preferences of the supranational institutions and 
(10) the new decision-making rules and policy competences at the European level, 
while T2 is the decision making after the new structure of national preferences. In 
contrast, in Drezner’s t, t+1, t+2, …, t+n model, t+1 suggests (11) higher switching 
costs from the rules codified at t, (12) the reinforcement between actors’ preferences 
and the rules that bind them, and (13) an increasing unlikeliness to change the rules 
codified at t endogenously. In the model T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice 
Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty put forward by this dissertation, T0the TEU represents the beginning 
of decisions and policies about the single common currency and the related economic 
governance trend at that time, while the new measures dealing with the crisis are the 
decisions and policies related to the euro and EU economic governance after the grand 
bargains of T2the Lisbon Treaty; between T0the TEU and T2the Lisbon Treaty, T1 is a large time gap 
which actually consists of two chronological intergovernmental grand bargains of 
T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty, which for one thing, being the time gaps between 
T0the TEU and T2the Lisbon Treaty and following Pierson’s T0-T1-T2 model, should suggest 
(1)(2)(3)(4), and for another, representing new structures of national preferences and 
altered contexts, and in light of Pierson’s and Hix’s arguments, should exhibit the 
features of (5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10); besides, following the logic of Drezner’s model, T1 
after T0 should also exhibit (11)(12)(13). So synthesizing all of them together,
112
 this 
dissertation formulates H16, and from another perspective, the selection of T1 as T1athe 
Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty satisfies various interpretations to T1 in an HI three-phase 
model. In addition, treating T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty as a whole as T1 is also 
justified by the nature of the Lisbon Treaty, which, “amend(ing) the Treaty on 
European Union, the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty 
                                                 
112 It is also possible to illustrate such a synthesis visually based on Figure 3.1 (i.e. Pierson’s diagram 
“the path to European integration”). Pan and Hosli (2014) represent H16 in a Figure form by 
integrating Hix’s (1999, 2005) and Drezner’s (2010) analytical factors into Pierson’s path to 
European integration. As a result, all the thirteen factors mentioned in this part are visually displayed 




establishing the European Atomic Energy Community”, was designed “to complete the 
process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to 
enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the 
coherence of its action” (Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon C 306/3). Altogether, 
(1)-(13) discussed here are the analytical elements for the proposed path dependent 
model, which shall be examined in the case(s) where the path model is supposed to be 
effective. 
The merits of the proposed path dependent model — T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam 
Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty-The EU’s New Measures to address the post-2008 
crisis situation — are that from T0 to T2, each time point represents IGC bargains and 
EU Treaty revisions, which on the one hand, meet the conditions for Pierson’s model, 
while on the other hand, also represent changed structures of preferences and new 
contexts for policy-making, as argued by both Pierson and Hix. Besides, each 
concluded EU Treaty is based on previously adopted Treaties, and in the end, based on 
the Treaties of Rome that gave birth to the Community on 1 January 1958 (among 
which the TEU for the first time laid down specifications and regulations for EMU and 
the single currency). Each EU Treaty revision and expansion connotes the potential of 
the iteration and reinforcement of initial rules as suggested by Drezner. The nature and 
property of the selected time points for analyses make the proposed path dependent 
model possible and reasonable. As a matter of fact, each two consecutive grand 
bargains and the institutional and policy outcomes after the second grand bargain (i.e. 
TTEU-Tthe Amsterdam Treaty; Tthe Amsterdam Treaty-Tthe Nice Treaty; Tthe Nice Treaty-Tthe Lisbon Treaty) can be 
analyzed from the different perspectives offered by Pierson, Hix and Drezner, 
respectively, and the contribution of this dissertation is to make an original synthesis of 
the various causal mechanisms of path dependence posited from diverse points of view. 
According to the assumptions of H16, this dissertation will delineate the contour 
of the rules about the single currency and EU economic governance related to the three 
new measures from the TEU, via the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice, to the 
Lisbon Treaty, after which the mechanisms posited in H16(a), (b) and (c) will be tested 
as follows: 
First, as for H16(a), empirical analyses will investigate whether the preferences 
of the salient actors who are bounded by the TEU rules (e.g. national governments, EU 
supranational institutions and the societal interest groups) get strengthened and 
reinforced over time (12), and whether the changes of relevant rules are caused by EU 
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internal needs (endogenous causes) and/or external challenges (exogenous causes) (13), 
both of which imply the possibility of newly emerging interests and preferences 
(8)(9)(10); moreover, the changed preferences of national governments (5)(8) subsume 
three analytical factors: (1), (2) and (3).  
Second, the assumption of H16 (b) that “the institutional arrangements and 
increasing sunk costs make actors stick to the existing course” will be tested by the 
presence or absence of mechanisms suggested by (2)(4)(7) (9)(10)(11), among which 
(7) and (9) are the embodiment of (4), (11) is another expression of (2), both suggesting 
a micro-level analysis on societal actors’ incrementally building-up of their vested 
interests in the maintenance of EU policies, and (10), which always associates with (9), 
concerns the rules and institutional arrangements themselves such as the punish 
mechanisms, decision-making procedures, voting rights and thresholds for institutional 
reforms.  
Finally, the assumption of H16(c) will be accepted or rejected by examing (i) and 
(ii). While (ii) is a frank evaluation of the possible unintended consequences by 
situating the current sovereign debt crisis in the context of the effectiveness of the TEU 
rather than the Lisbon Treaty and the new measures are not predicted by national 
governments when they make decisions at the time of the TEU, (i) suggests the causal 
chains presumed by (3)(4)(6)(7)(9)(10), among which (3) and (4) are the contributing 
factors to (6); as (4) (i.e. heavily discounted or unintended effects) connotes (7) (i.e. the 
increasing “power of other actors” besides national governments), (7) is also a factor 
that will influence (6) (i.e. member state bargaining powers), which implies a possible 
power and competence trade-off between nation states and EU supranational 
institutions, and accordingly this dissertation will check: (a) whether fromT0the TEU to 
T2the Lisbon Treaty and then to the new measures, step by step, the power and competence 
of national governments get reduced and delegated to EU institutions while those of 
EU institutions increase; and (b) the evolution of the power and competence of various 
actors bounded by the Treaties.  
Obviously, this proposed model places the new measures into the evolving 
historical and institutionalist context of EU Treaties, an perspective that is valued and 
stressed not only by HI, but also shared by neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. As Pierson’s path dependence theory (1996, 1998) is utilized by 
both neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists to support their own arguments, the 
hypothesis tests results of HI will serve as confirmative or disconfirmative proof to 
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some of the neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist propositions (see Tables 3.2 and 
3.3). In addition, viewing all HI hypotheses formulated in this chapter, this dissertation 
observes that there are overlapping elements among some HI hypotheses, so 
consequently, there is mutual support or disconfirmation among these hypotheses. 
Last but not least, as HI argument 2 has pointed out that institutions are just one 
of the factors in the causal chains that lead to political outcomes, but after a close 
examination of the HI arguments, this dissertation finds that external factors tend to be 
excluded from explaining policy formation. For example, Pierson’s map on “the path to 
European integration” stresses domestic changes, but offers no places for international 
vicissitudes. Based on HI arguments 1 and 22, the hypothesized mechanisms H13(g) 
and the second half of H16(a) introduce the factor of the exogenous challenges (the 
external environment) into HI perspectives. Although Europe’s sovereign debt crisis 
happened in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the broad international 
economic and financial situation should be included in accounting for the adoption and 
implementation of the new measures. So in case studies, this dissertation will also look 
into the global context in which the EU treaties were concluded and the new measures 
were formulated, so as to explore the interactions between the EU policy outcomes and 








5 Chapter Five: Overviews of the Hypotheses and 
the Three Selected Cases 
5.1 An Overview of the Hypotheses 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of all the hypotheses to be tested by this dissertation, as 
elaborated and developed in chapters two, three and four of this dissertation.  
 
Table 5.1 An Overview of the Hypotheses 
Neo-functionalism (chapter two) 
H1: European economic integration, via spillover effects, leads to European political integration; with 
more intense economic cooperation and social interaction among member states, the degree of 
political integration increases. 
H1a: Solving the debt crisis (i.e. a fiscal issue) requires support and cooperation in other related 
areas and thus pushes further integration in both the original and these related areas via positive 
integration rather than negative integration.  
H1b: Confronted with the collective sovereign debt problem, national interest actors, both 
governmental and non-governmental, support further integration and promote European-level 
solutions over national-level means because to do so brings more benefits.  
H1c: By making proposals for the solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, the Commission, under the 
framework laid down by the European Council, takes pro-integrative approaches to address the crisis; 
as a consequence, the Commission, while building coalitions with the key member states and/or 
interest groups, expands its power and autonomy, and meanwhile, the EP also takes pro-integration 
positions and tends to support the Commission’s proposals. 
H1d: As the inherently expansive task (i.e. to solve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis) is assigned to 
EU supranational institutions, the autonomy and power of EU institutions — typically represented by 
the Commission — expand; meanwhile, European citizens’ support for the EU project also tends to 
increase. 
H2: The presence of four factors (i.e. increasing economic interdependence between member states, 
crises of sufficient magnitude as unintended consequences, regional bureaucrats’ competence and 
autonomy to intervene, interest associations’ capability to deal with problems independently from 
national constraints) contributes to the occurrence of spillover; however, the integration process tends 
to slow down due to the increase of “engrenage” and “politicization”. 
H3: Rising cross-border transactions increase transactors’ demand for more regulation at the EU 
level (i.e. European standards, rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms), and this leads to the 
process of EU institutionalization where the degree of EU supranational governance increases while 
member-states’ capacity to control policy outcomes decreases, as the presence and the degree of 
clarity and formalization of EU rules, the Commission’s autonomy, and the presence and influence of 
transnational actors on policy-making increase and get mutually reinforced. 
H3a: Increasing cross-border transactions among euro states demand more regulation at the EU level 
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(i.e. European standards, rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms), leading to a process of EU 
institutionalization where rules are introduced or reinforced on the basis of the mutual enforcement 
among EU institutions, EU rules, and transnational society. 
H3b: Along with the process of institutionalization during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, EU 
supranational governance increases while national capacity to control economic and monetary policy 
outcomes is reduced.  
H3c: During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the EU’s new developments, which result from 
increasing cross-border transactions and transactors’ demand for more regulation at the EU level, 
lead to a higher degree of EU supranational governance, which is hard to reverse as current 
supranational rules both define transactors’ means to pursue their interests and dispute resolution 
mechanisms that shape the context for subsequent interactions and delineate the normative and 
institutional contours of future policy. 
H4: When institutional and legal rules and procedures are applied in the policy areas where political 
integration has reached the most advanced stage of development (i.e. decisions by QMV in the 
Council), there is a spillover effect of these rules and procedures which tend to affect other related 
areas where political integration is least developed (i.e. unanimity in the Council) as the Commission 
tends to choose the use of QMV as its proposals’ legal bases for member states to reach agreement 
and thus arouses member states’ attention to the limits of current decision-making of unanimity. 
H5: Because problems are beyond individual states’ potential ability (which is also decreased by 
national interdependencies) to address and a regional integrated block can serve as a buffer against 
the harsh external environment, exogenous threats and crises push the EU integration process forward 
rather than impede it, as member states cooperate closely at the EU level to seek common solutions 
with the result that participating member states, who might rely on the new central institutions, forge a 
collective common position against non-participant third parties so as to increase the EU’s collective 
bargaining power and/or its ability to meet the outside world demand, and/or with the result that EU 
decision-makers’ preferences are shaped by a wider internationally prevailing policy paradigms and 
discourses. 
H5a: The exogenous threats and crises imposed by the global financial crisis of 2008 as well as the 
world-wide economic recession afterwards push the EU integration process forward rather than 
impede it, as member states seek closer cooperation at the EU level to forge common solutions to the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis triggered by the global financial crisis.  
H5b: The reasons for EU countries to seek common solutions at the supranational level are due to two 
facts: (1) the nature and magnitude of the global financial crisis, economic recession and the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis go beyond each state’s individual capacity to cope with and the EU acts as an 
effective buffer to the external financial turmoil and economic crisis; (2) against the trend of 
globalization, increasing economic interdependence among EU member states decreases the power of 
individual national governments to solve the sovereign debt crisis, as national economies and the 
financial market become more sensitive and susceptible to each other’s economic and financial 
disturbance. 
H5c: Along with the adoption and implementation of the common measures, participating states forge 
collective external positions, which may contradict their original intentions, against non-participant 
third parties so as to increase the EU’s collective bargaining power and/or its ability to meet the 
outside world demand, and as the expression and realization of the common external positions 
increasingly rely on EU supranational institutions, national government reliance on EU (new) 
institutions also increases.  
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H5d: The external environment exerts structural pressures on EU decision-makers’ choices for the 
solutions to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, that is, EU decision-makers’ preferences are shaped by 
wider internationally prevailing policy paradigms and discourses. 
Intergovernmentalism (chapter three)  
H6: Confronted with the severe sovereign debt crisis, the Council of Ministers tends to apply the 
formal rules of QMV rather than take decisions on the basis of informal consensus, so as to improve 
the collective decision-making efficiency to meet challenges of globalization.  
H7: The EU’s new developments during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis are a series of rational 
choices made by national leaders, which are forged by three factors consecutively: national preference 
formation based on the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, intergovernmental 
bargaining where asymmetrical interdependence decides the relative power of states, and institutional 
arrangements to guarantee the credibility of intergovernmental commitments. 
H7a: The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the sovereign debt crisis reflect the economic 
interests of powerful domestic constituents.  
H7b: National asymmetrical interdependence (i.e. the uneven distribution of the benefits of a specific 
agreement) determines the relative bargaining power of the nation states, so member states who 
economically benefit the most from the EU’s new measures and policies tend to compromise the most 
on the margin to realize gains, whereas those who benefit the least tend to impose conditions and make 
hard bargains.  
H7c: The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the euro area sovereign debt crisis reflect big 
countries’ will rather than supranational entrepreneurship, because EU entrepreneurs rarely possess 
information or expertise unavailable to the member states.  
H7d: In order to solve the debt crisis, nation states make institutional choices to delegate and pool 
sovereignty to EU supranational institutions so as to guarantee the credibility of intergovernmental 
commitments.  
H7e: Member states’ credible commitments can be guaranteed and realized via strengthening the 
national executive, the national judicial branch and/or the very domestic groups that support the 
policy in the first place vis-à-vis other domestic forces favoring non-compliance. 
H7f: National non-compliance will happen when an agreement leads to high costs for powerful 
domestic actors.  
H7g: The stronger and better-organized (the weaker and more diffuse) representation of domestic 
societal interests is, the more (the less) predictable and more certain (uncertain) national preferences 
are, and the better (worse) LI works.  
H7h: During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the Commission and European Council President Van 
Rompuy exert influence only because the transaction costs involved are high, domestic interests are 
poorly coordinated and represented, and/or national governments lack critical information, expertise, 
bargaining skills, or legitimacy that the Commission and Van Rompuy can provide. 
H8: Due to the global financial crisis, a major and unforeseen exogenous shock with the internal 
consequence of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the EU is likely to embrace substantive reforms, 
developing and improving policies outside the current EU institutional framework, which might 
change the scenario where member states rule the EU by quasi-consensus and/or fiscal, 
administrative, and coercive powers are decentralized to the level of the states. 
H9: The salience of the sovereign debt crisis to EU citizens will increase the turnout of EP elections.  
Historical Institutionalism (HI) (chapter four)  
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H10: The 2008 global financial crisis serves as a “critical juncture” where EU policies of economic 
governance in the post-2008 crisis era take new paths as national-national and/or 
national-supranational competence and powers get changed and redefined.  
H11: The EU's new measures adopted during the post-2008 crisis era, on the one hand, are 
conditioned by prior institutional arrangements and commitments which set limits on the possible 
available options, make certain alternatives appear more attractive, and lead actors to redefine their 
interests, while on the other hand, the new measures reflect a complex context that shapes actors’ 
strategies, world views and action arenas, which, having been advocated by EU institutions with each 
iteration of the new measures, will shape actors’ preferences and/or self-images as the status quo of 
the new measures is regarded as the right way to solve the crisis. 
H12: The choices of the specific new measures to cope with the post-2008 crisis era are made on the 
basis of the past choices where certain elements in today’s choices have appeared more attractive and 
the sequences of institutional decisions entailed in EU decision-making procedures to adopt the new 
measures matter as certain alternatives are irreversibly dropped from the range of possible options 
along with the proceeding of the decision-making procedure; thus, path dependence indicates a way to 
link decision-making through time and to narrow conceptually the choice set, and consequently, the 
new measures have become the only available options for actors to resort to, along which societal 
groups make adaptions to the new measures and incrementally build up their vested interest in 
maintaining and even developing the new measures. 
H13: Once the new measures are established to deal with the crisis, actors tend to stick to them due to 
the increasing returns, that is, the relative benefits brought by current measures compared with other 
possible options increase over time, and the costs of exit (i.e. sunk costs) or the costs of switching to 
the previously plausible alternatives rise (i.e. self-reinforcing processes), which generate incentives for 
actors to stick with and not abandon the new measures, only adapting the new measures incrementally 
to the changing environment (i.e. positive feedbacks). As a result, with each iteration of the new 
measures, (a) actors’ preferences and the rules that bind them are increasingly reinforced and the 
status quo of the new measures is regarded as the right way to solve the crisis, (b) the once competitive 
options are excluded, (c) the equilibriums formulated by the new measures to solve the crisis are 
resistant to change, (d) specific paths are taken as the new measures induce further institutional and 
policy movement in the same direction, (e) the iteration of rules codified in the new measures and the 
repetition of the cumulative commitments on the existing paths make changes difficult and condition 
the form where new branching points will occur in the future, and (f) it is increasingly unlikely that the 
new measures will be changed endogenously. 
H14: There are conditions conducive to foster the self-fulfilling movement of the particular paths 
introduced by the EU’s new measures to deal with the crisis, as large set-up costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations are effectively present. 
H14a: The EU’s new measures to address the crisis entail considerable institutional start-up costs, 
which serve as a strong incentive for actors to stick to them. 
H14b: National actors actively engage in learning and adapting to the new measures as the new 
measures are considered helpful to keep economic and financial stability; as actors gain more 
experience and expertise with these new measures, they are likely to introduce further innovations and 
changes into these measures and/or into other related policy areas. 
H14c: The new measures are compatible with the activities of other actors and institutions, and 
moreover, the new measures promote new developments in the linked areas and policies, which in turn 
increase the viability of the new measures. 
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H14d: Actors whose options have failed will adapt their actions and expectations in accordance with 
the new measures. 
H15: The political process accompanying the effectiveness of path dependence of the new measures 
are likely marked by (a) multiple equilibria, (b) contingency, (c) a critical role for timing and 
sequencing, and (d) inertia. 
H16: Member state initial decisions on EMU, the single currency, and EU economic governance 
enshrined in the TEU (T0) lock the relevant development of institutions and policies into a particular 
“path”, which, via the time stages of T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty, is 
characterized by three prominent features: (a) the TEU shapes and reinforces the preferences of the 
salient actors, which get further reinforced with the iteration of Treaty rules, and from T0 to T2, the 
initial rules set down at T0 get changed due to exogenous challenges rather than endogenous needs; 
(b) the institutional arrangements and increasing sunk costs make actors stick to the existing course; 
(c) the EU’s new measures to cope with the euro area sovereign debt crisis after the enforcement of the 
Lisbon Treaty (T2) are unintended consequences of the initial decisions of the TEU (T0) as (i) more 
national government competences and powers are delegated to EU institutions and national 
governments’ control over the EU policies (i.e. the new measures) is further reduced, and (ii) member 
states would have taken very different measures if they had faced the sovereign debt crisis after the 
enforcement of the TEU.  
 
While Table 5.1 puts all the hypotheses together to give a general overview, 
Table 5.2 offers a simplified outline of the hypotheses, illustrating relations and logics 
among them.  
 
Table 5.2 Simplified Summary of the Hypotheses 
Theories and Hypotheses  Core Arguments and Propositions of the Hypotheses 
Neo-functionalism (chapter two): 






The vindication of H3 and H5 is 
composed of each proving 
evidence for their sub-hypotheses, 
and any failure in these 
sub-hypothesized mechanisms will 
lead to the partial failure of H3’s 
and H5’s explanatory and 
predictive power, while indicating 
possible hypothesis revisions and 
theoretical developments. 
H1: Economic integration leads to political integration via 
spillover; 
Three sub-hypotheses further specifying three types of 
spillover (H1a, H1b, and H1c) 
H1a: Functional spillover; 
H1b: Political spillover; 
H1c: Cultivated spillover; 
H1d: to test whether functional spillover will trigger a 
proportionate increase in both (i) the powers of supranational 
institutions (i.e. the result of cultivated spillover) and (ii) elites’ 
and interest groups’ (i.e. political spillover) and national 
citizens’ support for the EU project; 
H2: Conditions for spillover and the hypothesized slowed-down 
pace of EU integration; 
H3: The internal dynamic of institutionalization and 
supranational governance, an extension of H1;  
   H3 is dissected into three sub-hypotheses (H3a, H3b and 
H3c), explaining three causal mechanisms entailed in H3: 
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H3a: The internal dynamic of institutionalization;  
H3b: The trade-off between increasing supranational 
governance and member state decreasing control over EU 
policy-making; 
H3c: The irreversible trend of EU supranational governance, 
a path-dependence property of supranational governance, which 
can be tested under the rubric of HI; 
H4: Institutional/legalistic spillover, supplementing traditional 
neo-functionalist three types of spillover; 
H5: Exogenous spillover, another development of 
neo-functionalist concepts of spillover; 
H5 is dissected into four sub-hypotheses (H5a, H5b, H5c 
and H5d), elaborating four causal mechanisms entailed in 
H5: 
H5a: The general nature and the expression of the 
effectiveness of exogenous spillover; 
H5b: Factors contributing to exogenous spillover; 
H5c: Possible results of the exogenous spillover effect: 
common external positions against third parties and growing 
national governmental reliance on supranational institutions; 
H5d: Structural impact of the external environment on EU 
decision-makers’ preferences and choices; 
Intergovernmentalism (chapter 
three): 
H6 (a refutation to LI’s prediction);  
H7 (an LI model of three stages)= 
stage 1 (H7a) + stage 2 (H7b 
+H7c)+ stage 3 (H7d+H7e+H7f )+ 




The vindication of H7 is dissected 
into three categories of 
sub-hypotheses tests, and as being 
an LI model, H7 is supplemented 
by two hypotheses on LI’s 
H6: Whether globalization, decision-making efficiency and 
severe crises change the traditional scenario of informal 
consensus in the Council into the use of formal QMV — a 
criticism of LI’s predictions about the impervious practice of 
the informal consensus in the Council; 
H7: A revised LI framework (a later development and evolution 
of intergovernmentalism) — the EU’s developments are the 
results of national leaders’ rational choices forged by three 
consecutive stages: national preference formation (stage 1), 
intergovernmental bargaining (stage 2), and institutional 
arrangements (stage 3);  
Accordingly, the vindication of H7 as an LI model 
consists of the test of the sub-hypotheses in the three 
stages (H7a-H7f) and the check of the LI model’s 





 Stage 1 national preference formation: H7a 
 Stage 2 interstate bargains: H7b and H7c 
H7b: National asymmetrical interdependence determines 
the relative bargaining power of the nation states; 
H7c: Negotiated results and policy adoption reflect big 
countries’ will rather than supranational entrepreneurship; 
 Stage 3 institutional choice: H7d, H7e and H7f 
H7d: Institutional arrangements are to guarantee the 
credibility of intergovernmental commitments; 
H7e: the way to guarantee member states’ credible 
commitments; 
H7f: LI’s predictions on national defections from agreed 
commitments; 
Two limitations to the application of LI: H7g and H7h 
H7g: the better representation of domestic interest groups is 
organized, the better LI works; 
H7h: LI’s predictions on the role of supranational 
entrepreneurs (the Commission and European Council President 
Van Rompuy) in exceptional cases;  
H8: LI’s predictions on the impact of exogenous shocks to 
change the scenario of EU incremental development; 
H9: LI’s predictions on the salience of an EU issue to stimulate 
the common citizens to participate in EU affairs, such as the 
turn-out for the EP election; 









The vindication of H14 is based on 
the confirmation of the four 
sub-hypotheses H14a, H14b, H14c, 
and H14d.  
H10: “A critical juncture”; 
H11, H12, and H13: path dependence from different angles 
H11: Structural effects exerted by path dependence; 
H12: Influence of past choices on current decisions and the 
importance of the timing and sequences of events in narrowing 
down the choice set;  
H13: “Increasing returns”, the engine of path dependence; 
H14: Conditions conducive to foster path dependence; 
    H14 is divided into four sub-hypotheses: 
H14a: large set-up costs; 
H14b: learning effects; 
H14c: coordination effects; 
H14d: adaptive expectations; 
H15: Four likely features symptomizing the political process of 
path dependence; 
H16: Hypothesized path dependence model T0the TEU-T1athe 
Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty-The EU’s New 
Measures to solve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis to account 





Table 5.2 offers a short summary of all the hypotheses formulated in the 
previous three chapters of this dissertation, presenting the relations and logics for each 
hypothesis. Five main hypotheses are derived from neo-functionalism, four from 
intergovernmentalism, and seven from HI; meanwhile, there are several 
sub-hypotheses for three main hypotheses: first, H1a, H1b and H1c are the further 
examination of specification of concrete spillover effects posited by H1, while H1d 
speculates a concurrence relationship among the three traditionally defined spillover 
mechanisms suggested by H1a, H1b and H1; second, arguing for three consecutive 
stages, H7 is accordingly divided into three categories of sub-hypotheses, each 
including H7a, H7b+H7, H7d+H7e+H7f, respectively, and additionally, two 
sub-hypotheses about the limitations of LI, H7g and H7h, supplement H7 as an LI 
model to explain and predict; finally, H14 is dissected into four sub-hypotheses, H14a, 
H14b, H14c and H14d, and the vindication of the main hypothesis H14 requires the 
confirmation of each of the four sub-hypotheses. Moreover, as illustrated by Table 5.2, 
the two grand EU integration theories — neo-functionalism and LI — have their 
common concerns over EU institutional aspects (see H3, H4 and stage 3 of the LI 
model about institutional choice), which exhibit their convergence at HI, reflecting 
some features of path dependence (see particularly H3c, H7f, H11 and H13).  
Following the explanations and analyses (and even some preliminary tests) after 
each hypothesis formulation, all the hypothesized causal mechanisms in this 
dissertation as listed in Table 5.1 are going to be tested consistently with the three 
selected cases: (1) the European Semester, (2) the ESRB, and (3) the ESM via the 
congruence method and process-tracing. Any deviation from the posited causal chains 
could serve as the potential developing points of theories concerned. Before moving 
into case studies, the following section first presents general overviews on the three 
cases. 
 
5.2 An Overview of the Three Selected Cases 
5.2.1 The European Semester113 
As the EU has been evolving into an entity of highly integrated economies, the 
discrepancies and out-of-pace steps of national economic policies would hamper 
                                                 
113 The information for the European Semester in section 5.2.1, otherwise indicated, is based on “The 
European Semester” (European Commission) and “Special Reports, the European Semester” (Council 
of the European Union).  
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further economic prosperity and even endanger the whole economic stability of the EU, 
so to synchronize and coordinate national budgetary, growth and employment policies 
in line with the objectives of the whole EU is essentially substantive to foster EU 
economic stability and prosperity. The global economic recession and the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis in the wake of the global financial crisis have exposed 
disadvantages of economic and fiscal planning and coordination of the EU, demanding 
more strengthened and pragmatic EU economic governance. With the targets to 
achieve sound public finances, realize economic growth and prevent excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, the European Semester was designed and adopted as a 
yearly-cycle mechanism to strengthen economic policy coordination within the EU 
from three approaches: fiscal policies (entailed in Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs) in line with the SGP), structural reforms (presented in National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs) in line with the Europe 2020 strategy), and the prevention 
of excessive macroeconomic imbalances (starting from the Alert Mechanism Report 
(AMR) as an early warning system which consists of the preventive action of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)), all of which display the inclusive and 
integrative nature of this new mechanism to bring various existing coordination and 
surveillance procedures jointly together under the same unified framework. The annual 
Semester can be divided into the “European semester” for the first half of the year and 
the “national semester” for the second half, setting up a common timetable for policy 
guidance and monitoring at the EU level and policy concretization and implementation 
at the national level. Five kinds of documents lead through this new mechanism, 
exhibiting a materialized operational way and the concrete steps to realize policy 
coordination and surveillance at the EU level (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2): (1) the Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS); (2) the AMR and possible In-Depth Reviews (IDRs); (3) SCPs 
(i.e. Convergence programmes by non-euro member states and Stability 
programmes by the euro countries), outlining member state medium-term budgetary 
strategies; (4) NRPs, outlining member state structural reform plans, focused on 
promoting growth and employment; and (5) Country-Specific Recommendations 








Figure 5.1 The Timeline of the European Semester 
Sources: Adapted from The European Union Explained: Economic and Monetary Union and 
the Euro (2012, 10).  
 
Though the yearly Semester is kicked off at the beginning of each year, the 
preparatory work starts from the end of the previous year. Chronologically, a full 
Semester includes (see Figure 5.2): (1) the preparatory phase: in November and 
December, the Commission, based on the analysis of the situation and the follow-up to 
the previous year, publishes the AGS and the AMR, with the former stating EU policy 
priorities for member states to take into account when they draw up their own 
economic policies for the coming year while the latter reviewing individual member 
state macroeconomic developments; based on the AMR, the Commission may decide 
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to conduct IDRs to identify potential high macroeconomic imbalances and accordingly 
make relevant policy recommendations to the member states concerned; (2) the first 
phase of policy guidance at the EU level: in January and February, the Council of 
Ministers debates the AGS, formulates orientations and adopts conclusions, and the EP 
discusses the AGS and may publish its own initiative report and issue its opinions on 
employment guidelines; in March, on the basis of the AGS and the Council’s analysis 
and conclusions, the European Council gives policy orientations which member states 
must take into account when preparing their SCPs of budgetary policies and NRPs of 
policies promoting growth, employment and competitiveness, and meanwhile the 
Commission may issue IDRs of macroeconomic imbalances and draft country-specific 
recommendations (i.e. CSRs) to those imbalances; (3) the second phase of 
country-specific objectives, policies and plans: in April, member states submit their 
policy plans of the SCPs and NRPs; in May, the Commission makes evaluations on the 
submitted plans and issue draft CSRs; in June, the Council discusses the draft and 
reaches agreement (with possible amendments) on the final CSRs, which require the 
endorsement of the European Council in June; in July, the Council adopts the CSRs, 
and the member states shall implement them; (4) the third phase of implementation: in 
July, member states take the CSRs into account in their national decision-making 
processes for the following year’s national budget and planned policies. As a result, 
“governments, when submitting the draft budget to the national parliament, are 
expected to include policy recommendations by the Council and/or the Commission 
accompanied by an explanation of how these have been incorporated” (The Task Force 
Report 21 October 2010, 10).  
The policy coordination cycle starts again at end of the year, when the 
Commission, taking the progress made by individual countries in implementing the 
CSRs into account, publishes its AGS overviewing the economic situation for the 
coming year. When a member state receives financial assistance, it is not required to 
submit stability programmes, neither is it subject to possible IDRs on macroeconomic 
imbalances, because the conditions for financial assistance programmes have already 
covered those policy areas (and at the end of 2013, Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal are in such a case). For the euro member states, during the national semester 
(i.e. the second half of the year), there is an additional European discussion of the 
Commission’s opinions on euro countries’ draft budgetary plans and their fiscal 
situation against the whole euro area.  
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Two prominent changes were introduced by the European Semester: (1) it times 
and streamlines EU policy coordination procedures via (a) synchronizing the time of 
economic and fiscal policy reports and evaluation as well as the assessment of 
macroeconomic imbalances at the EU level so as to align individual member state 
reform and budgetary plans and to pursuit EU common goals more effectively, and 
(b) changing the coordination of national economic policies (particularly each member 
state’s budgetary and reform plan) from ex-post to ex-ante — in the past, member 
states coordinated their economic policies after the adoption of national budgets, but 
from the year 2011 onwards, member states should take EU recommendations into 
account before they adopt their next year’s budgets and economic plans; (2) it adds a 
new dimension into EU policy coordination: carrying out surveillance on 
macroeconomic imbalances via the MIP, which is introduced by the so-called 
“six-pack” (six EU legislative acts) of strengthening economic governance in the EU 
and came into force on 13 December 2011; the MIP includes a preventive arm and a 
corrective arm — the former is brought under the umbrella of the European Semester 
while the latter becomes effective through the so-called Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure (EIP). As a whole, the European Semester is an integrated and inclusive 
policy coordination and surveillance mechanism, bringing Europe 2020, the Euro Plus 
Pact, the preventive arms of the SGP and the MIP, and the country-specific minimum 
benchmark figure demanded by the “balanced budget rule” of the TSCG, all together 
under the same evaluation and supervision framework. The Commission states the 
differences of EU economic policy coordination before and after the implementation of 
the European Semester as follows: “[t]he different strands of economic policy 
coordination, including surveillance of structural reforms, are to be integrated in a new 
surveillance cycle, the European Semester, which will bring together existing processes 
under the SGP and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), including 
simultaneous submission of stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) and national 
reform programmes (NRPs)” (COM(2010) 526 Final, 29 September 2010, 2). 
According to Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011, the European Semester includes: the 
BEPGs, Employment Guidelines (EGs), SCPs, NRPs, and the surveillance to prevent 
and correct macroeconomic imbalances.
114
  
                                                 
114 The SGP was underpinned by Council Regulation 1466/97, Council Regulation 1467/97 and a 
European Council resolution, among which Council Regulation 1466/97 prescribes that SCPs (i.e. 
stability programmes for euro members and convergence programmes for non-euro members) shall be 
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Figure 5.2 Who Does What in the European Semester? 
Sources: Adapted from “Special Reports, the European Semester” (Council of the European 
Union, 2013). 
 
All the above provides a general description of the European Semester, and 
another four questions addressed by the Commission in Table 5.3 could lead to a better 
understanding of this new measure.  
 
Table 5.3 Four Questions Addressing the Nature of the European Semester 
Q1: Why should the member states follow the recommendations (i.e. CSRs)? 
Three key reasons:  
(1) Peer pressure: The recommendations, approved by member states at the highest political level, 
are expected to be embedded in national decision-making processes (such as the formulation and 
adoption of national annual budgets). With input from the Commission, member states (via 
ministerial meetings on specific policy issues) will track each other’s progress through a process of 
peer monitoring and review throughout the year. 
(2) Market pressure: Due to the high budget deficit and debt rates, the yield rates of national 
government bonds are driven up, which may reach an unsustainable point and thus lead to the 
bankruptcy of the nation state — hence the risk of the sovereign debt crisis, which on the whole has 
dramatically increased financial markets’ scrutiny to EU member states. The CSRs address the typical 
issue and prominent problems of the sovereign debt crisis, and national governments shall have strong 
incentives to implement the recommendations which push them to decrease debts and deficits while 
promoting economic growth and job creation. 
(3) Possible sanctions under other separate mechanisms: As the new rules for economic governance 
(the “Six Pack”) entered into force on 13 December 2011, there is another incentive for euro member 
states to adopt the CSRs — the prospect of sanctions under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), 
the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), or the interest-bearing deposit sanction for the preventive 
part of the SGP.  
Q2: How will the Commission monitor national implementation of the recommendations?  
The Commission services will closely monitor the implementation of the recommendations, who will 
also keep the Council informed. For instance, in May and June 2013, when the Commission presents 
the next year’s country-specific recommendations, an assessment of each member state’s performance 
is also given, but there are no such formal review missions. 
Q3: Can it be fined or taken to the Court if a member state fails to implement the recommendations? 
The answer is “NO”. The incentives for member states to implement CSRs, as the answer to Q1 
suggest, are primarily by peer pressure, market pressure and possible sanctions under other separate 
proceedings, but still policy warnings can be issued when countries concerned have failed to 
implement recommendations within the given time-frame.  
Q4: What are the roles of the EP and national parliaments under the European Semester? 
The legal bases for the CSRs are based on Articles 121 and 148 of the Lisbon Treaty (for economic 
policy and employment), on Council Regulation 1466/97 (referring to the SGP) and on Council 
Regulation 1176/2011 (referring to the MIP), and there is no specific prescription for the role of the 
EP, but the EP in reality fully involves in the policy discussion related to EU economic governance, 
such as the design of the new mechanism and EU priorities; besides, as Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show, the 
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EP may give its opinions on the AGS and CSRs. 
As for the role of national parliaments, they enjoy prerogatives in debating and voting on member 
states’ budgets and other economic policy legislation which shall enable the CSRs on paper to be 
taken up and implemented in practice. Collectively, national parliaments are also expected to help 
define EU policy priorities in member state next year programmes (i.e. the SCPs and NRPs). 
Summary: What is the nature of the European Semester? 
It is a policy coordination and surveillance mechanism at the EU level without legally binding power 
and sanctions of its own, but it shall lead to sanctions under other proceedings, and it actually brings 
the preventive arms of the SGP and the MIP and part of “the balanced budget rule” of the TSCG 
together under one unified framework. Thus, the European Semester can be defined as integrated 
policy coordination and surveillance device for EU economic governance, offering country-specific 
recommendations and functioning as a preventive rather than corrective instrument – serving as a 
“valve” that shall open to separate proceedings of corrective and punishment actions.  
In order to translate EU-level recommendations into concrete and specific national actions and to 
ensure a wide ownership of implemented policies, the European Semester shall maintain close 
cooperation with other actors, such as the EP and other EU advisory bodies (e.g. the Committee of 
the Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)), and keep a full 
involvement of national parliaments, social partners, regions and other stakeholders as much as 
possible. 
Sources: Own compilation and summary on the basis of European 
Commission-MEMO/12/386 (30 May 2012) and “Making It Happen: The European Semester” 
(European Commission).  
 
5.2.2 The European Systemic Risk Board (the ESRB) 
Apart from the background introduction of the ESRB in section 1.3.4, Table 5.4 gives 
an overview of the functions, structures and working mechanisms of the ESRB. 
 
Table 5.4 An Overview of the ESRB 
 The nature of the ESRB: an independent EU body seated in Frankfurt am Main; its Secretariat 
ensured by the ECB, and meetings convened at the ECB’s premises; having no legal personality.  
 Functions: “Financial stability is a precondition for the real economy to provide jobs, credit 
and growth”; being part of the ESFS dedicated to supervising the whole EU financial system, 
the ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the Union’s financial system; 
taking macroeconomic developments into account, it aims at preventing or mitigating financial 
systemic risks “so as to avoiding periods of widespread financial distress”, thus contributing to 
the smooth functioning of the internal market and thereby ensure a sustainable contribution of 
the financial sector to economic growth”; its main tasks include collecting, analyzing and 
exchanging information, identifying and prioritizing systemic risks, issuing warnings and 
recommendations and, where appropriate, making them public, monitoring the follow-up to 
warnings and recommendations, and cooperating closely with the other parties to the ESFS (e.g. 
elaborating a color-coded system to classify and indicate different risk levels; in particular, in 
collaboration with the ESAs, developing a common set of quantitative and qualitative indicators 
(a risk dashboard) to identify and measure systemic risks) and with international financial 
organizations on issues of macro-prudential oversight. (see ESRB Regulation, Article 3 
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Mission, Objectives and Tasks) 
 Structure:  
 a General Board, taking decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to 
the ESRB and establishing the rules of procedures for the ESRB; 
 a Steering Committee, assisting the ESRB decision-making process by preparing the meetings 
of the General Board, reviewing the documents to be discussed, and monitoring the progress of the 
ESRB’s ongoing work; (for the composition of the Steering Committee, see ESRB Regulation Article 
11) 
 a Secretariat, responsible for the day-to-day business of the ESRB, providing analytical, 
statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, and collecting information on behalf of 
the ESRB; ensured by the ECB which provides sufficient human and financial resources as well as 
analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support to the ESRB, the staff of the Secretariat are 
subject to the Conditions of Employment for Staff of the ECB; the head of the Secretariat is appointed 
by the ECB after consulting with the General Board of the ESRB; (see ESRB Regulation Article 4(4), 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010, and ESRB Decision 2011/C 58/04 Chapter VI (Articles 14, 
15)) 
 an Advisory Scientific Committee (see ESRB Regulation Article 12) and an Advisory Technical 
Committee (see ESRB Regulation Article 13), both providing advice and assistance on issues relevant 
to the work of the ESRB; 
 A Chair and two Vice-Chairs of the ESRB who represent the ESRB externally (e.g. presenting 
to the EP or public hearings): the ESRB chaired by the President of the ECB for a term of 5 years 
who presides at the meetings of the General Board and the Steering Committee; the first Vice-Chair 
shall be elected by and from the members of the General Council of the ECB for a term of 5 years; 
the second Vice-Chair shall be the Chair of the ESAs Joint Committee; the Vice-Chairs preside at the 
General Board and/or the Steering Committee when the Chair is unable to participate in a meeting. 
 Meetings of the General Board and the voting modality: a simple majority or two thirds of 
the votes cast (see ESRB Regulation Articles 9 and 10) 
(1) Members with voting rights: one vote for each member 
Members  Votes counting  
(a) the President and the Vice-President of the ECB; 2 
(b) the Governors of the national central banks;115 28  
(c) a Member of the Commission; 1 
(d) the Chairperson of the EBA; 1 
(e) the Chairperson of the EIOPA; 1 
(f) the Chairperson of the ESMA; 1 
(g) the Chair and the two Vice-Chairs of the 
Advisory Scientific Committee; 
3 
(h) the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee; 1 
Total 38 
                                                 
115 Croatia’s joining the EU on 1 July 2013 brought EU membership to 28, and accordingly, from 1 
July 2013, Croatia’s national central bank, Hrvatska narodna banka, became a member of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and its Governor a member of the General Council of the 
European Central Bank, see, for example, ECB Press Release (1 July 2013); for the concrete 
information on the personnel composition of the General Board, see “Permanent Members of the 
ESRB General Board (Voting Members and Non-Voting Members)” (ESRB).  
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(2) Voting modalities of the General Board: each member of the General Board shall be present in 
person and shall not be represented 
(a) the normal mode: by a simple majority of members present with voting rights; in the case of a tie, 
the Chair of the ESRB shall have the casting vote; 
(b) by derogation from the normal mode, when adopting a recommendation or to make a warning or 
recommendation public: a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast;  
(c) the quorum for any valid vote in the General Board: two thirds of the members with voting rights; 
if this quorum is not met, the Chair of the ESRB may convene an extraordinary meeting at which 
decisions may be taken with a quorum of one third; the extraordinary meetings can be initiated by the 
Chair of the ESRB or at the request of at least one third of the members of the General Board have 
voting rights. 
(3) Members without voting rights 
(a) one high-level representative for each member state of the competent national supervisory 
authorities (and there is a rotation of the respective high-level national representatives depending on 
the topics discussed, unless the national supervisory authorities of a particular member state have 
agreed on a common representative); 
(b) the President of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC). 
(4) Observers 
The proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential, but observers from the third countries and 
international financial organizations are still possible. 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of ESRB Regulation (i.e. Regulation (EU) No 
1092/2010), Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010, ESRB Decision 2011/C 58/04, and the 
ESRB official website <http://www.esrb.europa.eu/about/background/html/index.en.html>.  
 
5.2.3 The European Stability Mechanism (the ESM) 
In addition to the information of the evolving timeline of the ESM already presented in 
section 1.3.4, Table 5.5 offers a general description of the ESM, including a simple 
comparison with its predecessor: the EFSF. 
 
Table 5.5 An Overview of the ESM 
 Key Features and Facts of the ESM:  
 The ESM is the EU’s permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the euro states with a total 
subscribed capital of €700 billion (i.e. €80 billion paid-in capital + €620 billion committed 
callable capital); via issuing debt instruments, it finances loans and other forms of financial 
assistance to euro countries which are undergoing or are threatened by severe financing 
problems with the maximum lending capacity of €500 billion. The aim and purpose of the ESM 
is to ensure the financial stability of the whole euro area and of its member states and it 
cooperates closely with the IMF in providing stability support, which is subject to strict 
conditionality; the ESM has full legal personality; 
 The lending instruments that the ESM can make use of include the following which are subject 
to appropriate conditionality: (a) providing loans in the framework of a macroeconomic 
adjustment programme; (b) purchasing debt in the primary and secondary debt markets; (c) 
providing precautionary financial assistance in the form of credit lines; (d) financing 
recapitalizations of financial institutions through loans to the ESM governments. In addition, it 
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will be enabled to directly recapitalize banks in the euro area as soon as the SSM for eurozone 
banks is established; 
 The ESM is an intergovernmental organization, and to be exact, an international financial 
institution based in Luxembourg under public international law; the contracting parties and 
shareholders are the 17 eurozone member states; under the charge of Klaus Regling, the 
Managing Director, the ESM has approximately 90 staff members. 
 Structure: a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors, a Managing Director, and the staff  
 The Board of Governors:  
(1) A Governor and an alternate Governor appointed by each ESM member: the alternate Governor 
shall have full power to act on behalf of the Governor when the latter is not present; revocable at any 
time;  
(2) To Decide the Board of Governors to be chaired by the President of the Eurogroup, or to elect a 
Chairperson to convene and preside over the meetings of the Board of Governors and a 
Vice-Chairperson from among its members (two-year term, re-eligible) (when the Chairperson is 
unable to participate, the Vice-Chairperson shall preside over the meetings); 
(3) Observers who may participate in the meetings of the Board of Governors:  
(a) the Commissioner in charge of economic and monetary affairs, the President of the ECB, 
and the President of the Eurogroup (if he or she is not the Chairperson or a Governor);  
(b) on an ad hoc basis, representatives of non-euro member states participating alongside the 
ESM stability support shall also be invited; 
(c) on an ad hoc basis, other persons, including representatives of institutions or 
organizations, such as the IMF, may be invited; 
(4) The Board of Governors shall adopt the by-laws of the ESM and the rules of procedure of the 
Board of Governors and Directors, and also lay down what activities are incompatible with the duties 
of a Director or an alternate Director. 
 The Board of Directors: 
(1) Each Governor appoints one Director and one alternate Director (revocable at any time, and 
vacancy shall be immediately filled); the alternate Directors act on behalf of the Director with full 
power when the latter is not present; 
(2) Observers who may participate in the meetings of the Board of Directors:  
(a) the European Commissioner in charge of economic and monetary affairs and the President 
of the ECB appoint one observer each; 
(b) on an ad hoc basis, representatives of non-euro member states participating alongside the 
ESM in a financial assistance operation shall also be invited when this financial assistance 
and its monitoring will be discussed; 
(c) on an ad hoc basis, other persons, such as representatives of institutions or organizations, 
may also be invited by the Board of Governors to attend meetings; 
(3) The Board of Directors shall ensure that the ESM runs in accordance with the ESM Treaty and 
the by-laws adopted by the Board of Governors, taking decisions accordingly as provided for in the 
ESM Treaty or which are delegated to it by the Board of Governors.  
 Tasks of the Managing Director: 
(1) Having nationality of an ESM member and appointed by the Board of Governors; may not be a 
Governor or Director or an alternate of either; a five-year term and renewable once; cease to hold 
office when the Board of Governors decides so; 




(3) Being the chief of the staff of the ESM, responsible for organizing, appointing and dismissing 
staff in accordance with staff rules to be adopted by the Board of Directors; 
(4) Being the legal representative of the ESM and conducting the current business of the ESM 
under the direction of the Board of Directors.  
 Other necessary staff: about 90 staff members 
 ESM Governance Structure 
Board of Governors (Eurozone finance ministers) 
 
Board of Directors (decisions delegated by Board of Governors; each Governor appoints one 
Director) 
 
Managing Director: Klaus Regling (5-year term) 
 Voting Rules: the decisions of the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors by 
mutual agreement of unanimity (a derogation: an emergency voting procedure), qualified 
majority or simple majority as specified in the ESM Treaty 
(1) Mutual agreement: (a) unanimity of the members participating in the vote, and abstentions do 
not prevent the adoption of a decision under mutual agreement; (b) a derogation from unanimous 
voting of mutual agreement when both the Commission and the ECB conclude that a failure to 
urgently adopt a decision to grant or implement financial assistance would threaten the economic and 
financial sustainability of the euro area — an emergency voting procedure: the adoption of a decision 
by mutual agreement by the Board of Governors referred to in points (f) and (g) of Article 5(6) and 
the Board of Directors under that emergency procedure requires a qualified majority of 85% of the 
votes cast; 
(2) Qualified majority: 80 % of the votes cast; 
(3) Simple majority: a majority of the votes cast; (e.g. Article 9 (2) and Article 23 (1) of simple 
majority in the Board of Directors) 
 All decisions require a quorum of 2/3 of the members with voting rights representing at least 2/3 
of the voting rights; 
 Each ESM member’s voting rights equal the number of shares allocated to it in the authorized 
capital stock of the ESM as set out in Annex II of the ESM Treaty; 
 If an ESM Member fails to pay any part of the amount due in respect of its obligations in 
relation to paid-in shares or calls of capital or in relation to the reimbursement of the financial 
assistance, the voting rights of the member concerned shall be suspended so long as such failure 
continues and the voting thresholds shall be recalculated accordingly. 
Operational issues: 
(1) Procedures to grant stability support (Article 13): (a) a euro state requests to the Chairperson of 
the Board of Governors who will entrust the Commission, in liaison with the ECB to assess the 
financial situation of the state concerned, based on which the Board of Governors will decide to 
grant stability support in the form of a financial assistance facility; (b) the Board of Governors 
shall entrust the Commission in liaison with the ECB (and, wherever possible, together with the 
IMF) to negotiate a memorandum of understanding (an MoU) laying down a detailed 
conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility with the euro state concerned; 
meanwhile, the Managing Director prepares a proposal for a FFA (e.g. the financial terms and 
conditions, and the choice of instruments); (c) the Commission, on behalf of the ESM, signs the 
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MoU approved by the Board of Governors, and the Board of Directors shall approve the detailed 
FFA and, where applicable, the disbursement of the first tranche of the assistance; (d) an 
appropriate warning system shall be established to ensure the ESM receives the due repayments 
timely from the supported euro state; (f) the Commission in liaison with the ECB (and, wherever 
possible, together with the IMF) will monitor the beneficiary state’s compliance with the 
conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility; 
(2) Other forms of assistance instruments: procedures for precautionary financial assistance (see 
Article 14); financial assistance for the re-capitalisation of financial institutions (Article 15); 
ESM loans (Article 16); primary market support facility (Article 17); secondary market support 
facility (Article 18); 
(3) Dispute resolution: submitted to the Board of Directors, the Board of Governors or even to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU (based on Article 273 TFEU); 
(4) Post-programme surveillance: by the Commission and the Council (based on Articles 121 and 
136 TFEU). 
 The Predecessor of the ESM — the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
 About the EFSF: 
Aiming at safeguarding the eurozone financial stability, the EFSF was created as a temporary 
financial assistance and rescue mechanism along with the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) to raise funds in capital markets to finance loans for euro member states by the 
euro area countries following the Ecofin Council decisions taken on 9 May 2010 during the height of 
the eurozone crisis starting from Greece. In December 2010, a permanent rescue mechanism, the 
ESM, was decided to be created to replace the temporary assistance mechanism, the EFSF. As ESM 
inaugurates on 8 October 2012, the EFSF works in parallel with the ESM, but from 1 July 2013 
onwards, the ESM becomes the sole financial mechanism that shall respond to the new requests of the 
euro countries. Accordingly, the financial assistance for Cyprus up to €10 billion is approved and 
carried out by the ESM on 8 May 2013 (i.e. €9 billion by the ESM+€1 billion by the IMF). The EFSF 
will only remain active for the ongoing programmes for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, and it will be 
dissolved and liquidated when all financial assistance provided to euro countries and all funding 
instruments issued by the EFSF have been repaid in full; if the three countries covered by the EFSF 
need further support, new programmes will be possibly granted by political decisions, but in principle 
shall not be undertaken by the EFSF. As for the financial assistance to Spain, it was decided by the 
Eurogroup meeting on 21 June 2012 and reaffirmed by the euro area summit of 29 June 2012 that the 
financial assistance (in the form of a Bank Recapitalisation Facility for Spain) shall be provided by 
the EFSF till the ESM becomes available, and accordingly, the programme for Spain under the EFSF 
has been transferred to the ESM after the ESM became operative.  
 A Comparison of the ESM and the EFSF116 
(both serve the same purposes with the current 17 euro member states as their shareholders, but they 
are different in some key aspects) 
 The EFSF The ESM 
Legal basis An intergovernmental agreement of 
euro area member states 
Amending the TFEU Treaty, adding a 
third clause to Article 136117 
                                                 
116 Altogether, there are four types of financial assistance facilities developed for euro area countries 
since the Greek sovereign debt crisis: Euro area intergovernmental loans to Greece, the EFSM, the 
EFSF and the ESM; for a comparison of these four, see ECB Monthly Bulletin (July 2011, 75). 
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Legal structure A private company under Luxembourg 
law 
 





Disputes only between the euro area 
member states shall be submitted to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU; 
disputes between one or more euro 
states and the EFSF shall be submitted 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Courts of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg.  
Submitted to the Board of Directors or 
the Board of Governors of the ESM or 
to the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
Duration Temporary (7 June 2010 –30 June 
2013*) 
* stop engaging in new financial 
assistance programmes 




Backed by guarantees of euro 
countries for up to €780 billion 
(increased from the initial guarantee 
commitments of €440 billion) 
Authorised capital stock of €700 
billion, composed of: (a) €80 billion in 
paid-in capital and 






Member states may “step out” of the 
guarantee scheme when they request 
financial assistance (e.g. on 29 April 
2013, the Eurogroup Working Group 
(EWG) approved the Cyprus’s 
step-out, but the liability of Cyprus as 
a guarantor for notes issued prior to 
this time is not affected). 
Obligation to contribute to paid-in 
capital stock will not be affected if a 




€440 billion €500 billion 
 
Claims to loans Pari passu (not a preferred creditor, 
which suggests that if there were many 
other preferred creditors, private 
investors would be reluctant to provide 
loans to the country concerned.) 
Preferred creditor status (only junior to 
the IMF) 
The main features of the ESM are built on the EFSF; the ESM and the EFSF are parallel in the market 
and will not be merged. The EFSF is based on national guarantees, while the ESM is guaranteed by 
paid-in capital, which is believed to make the ESM more effectively against market contagion. 
Following the establishment of the ESM, the EFSF staff also carries out tasks for the ESM (i.e. the 
                                                                                                                            
117 The European Council of 25 March 2011 decided that: “The following paragraph shall be added 
to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) : ‘3. The Member 
States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable 
to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance 
under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” (European Council 
Decision-2011/199/EU; see also ESM Treaty) 
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staff of the ESM are also responsible for the running of the EFSF); consequently, headquartered at the 
same place in Luxembourg, both are managed and coordinated by the same team but perform their 
work according to two separate balance sheets (e.g. Klaus Regling is the CEO of the EFSF since its 
creation in July 2010, and he was also appointed as the first Managing Director of the ESM). This 
will allow the ESM to benefit from the experience gained by the EFSF which has been dealing with 
the sovereign debt market for some time. The EFSF support commitments such as undisbursed and 
unfunded parts of loan facilities can be transferred to the ESM, but till now there is no possibility for 
the ESM to take over EFSF bonds. 
 The structure and decision rules of the EFSF: meetings of the Board of Directors and the 
general meeting of shareholders  
(I) Meetings of the Board of Directors 
(1) The EFSF company is managed by a Board of Directors: each EFSF shareholder proposes for 
nomination to the Board of Directors and its representative in the EWG (or such person’s alternate as 
representative on such group); each director for each shareholder, appointed by the general meeting of 
shareholders (not exceeding 6 years, re-eligible, removed at any time); each share is entitled to one 
vote, and the number of votes of each Director corresponds to the number of shares held by the 
member state shareholder;  
(2) A Chairman: elected by the Board of Directors; the Chairman does not have a casting vote; 
(3) Meetings of the Board of Directors: convened by the Chairman or by any two Directors; a 
Director can appoint another Director as his proxy; 
(4) Valid meeting and decisions of the Board of Directors: at least half of the Directors are present 
or represented by proxies and the present Directors are those who have been proposed for nomination 
by shareholders holding in aggregate at least 80% of the shares of the Company; 
(5) Decision rules of the Board of Directors:  
(a) all decisions of the Board of Directors, except for those under unanimity, are taken by 
qualified majority (“EFSF Articles of Incorporation”, 11.5 ): (i) at least 2/3 of the directors 
present or represented which represent at least 80% (on a weighted basis) of the vote; 
abstentions shall not be considered to establish such majority; each Director has a number 
of votes corresponding to the number of shares in the Company held by the member state 
shareholder (“EFSF Articles of Incorporation”, 11.5.1); (ii) if a decision is reached via 
meeting the 2/3 requirement but not obtaining the majority of 80% on a weighted basis, the 
matter shall be referred to the shareholders’ meeting, decided by a majority of 80% of the 
shares of the Company; abstentions shall not be considered to establish such majority, and 
then the Board of Directors shall take relevant measures to implement decisions of the 
shareholder meeting (“EFSF Articles of Incorporation”, 11.5.2); 
(b) unanimous consent (“EFSF Articles of Incorporation”, 11.6) — three kinds of decisions 
require the unanimous consent of the Directors present or presented (i.e. abstentions are 
not taken into account): decisions (i) related to the grant of a loan facility and the 
corresponding funding strategy to a member state; (ii) on the disbursement of loans; and 
(iii) call of any existing capital commitments and issuance of the authorized share capital; 
(6) Possible observers without voting power: appointed by the Commission, the ECB and any other 
European bodies;  
(7) Auditors: one or more statutory auditors appointed by the shareholders’ meeting, maximum of 
6-year duration, re-eligible;  
(8) The Board of Directors has general powers and all powers not expressly prescribed to the 
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general meeting of shareholders by the 1915 Law fall within the competence of the Board of 
Directors, and it may confer all powers and special mandates to any persons who need not to be 
Directors, such as entrusting the person to conduct the Company’s daily management; 
(9) The Board of Directors may establish various committees of particular technical skills.  
(II) The general meeting of shareholders 
(1) Normally convened by means of convening notice by registered letters as provided by 
Luxembourg law; being entitled to vote by correspondence; 
(2) Except other mandatory requirements by Luxembourg law, the annual or ordinary general 
meeting of the shareholders makes decisions by a majority of at least 80% of the shares of the 
Company present or represented (and abstentions shall not be considered to establish such majority); 
an extraordinary general meeting convened to amend the provisions of the Articles requires the 
presentation or representation of all shareholders, and if the first such meeting does not satisfy this 
condition, the second meeting of such will go ahead regardless of the mentioned condition, and the 
resolutions of the extraordinary general meetings must be adopted by the unanimous consent of the 
shareholders present or represented (i.e. abstentions are not taken into account when determining 
unanimous consent).  
 Operational issues (see Sections C and D of the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the 
EFSF): 
(1) An EFSF lending within a macroeconomic adjustment programme (which would only occur 
when a euro state is unable to borrow from markets at acceptable rates) entails the following steps: (a) 
a euro member state requests; (b) the euro country concerned negotiates with the Commission and the 
IMF for the conditions of an assistance programme which shall be approved by the euro area finance 
ministers and then an MoU is signed between the troubled country and the Commission — it takes 
three to four weeks to formulate a support programme; (c) as soon as the support programme is 
approved by the euro area finance ministers, the EFSF will raise funds and disburse the loan within 
several working days; (d) the EFSF financial assistance is linked to strict policy conditions detailed in 
the MoU, and the maximum amount of a loan, its margin and maturity, and the number of 
installments to be disbursed are decided unanimously by the euro states’ finance ministers;  
(2) When the beneficiary country fails to meet the conditions of the MoU, the loan disbursements 
shall be interrupted until a new MoU is renegotiated and reached;  
(3) New instruments for the EFSF (as the Euro Area Summit on 21 July 2011 agreed to increase 
EFSF’s scope of activity): bank recapitalizations, precautionary programmes, primary market 
intervention, and secondary market intervention.  
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of the ESM Treaty, European 
Commission-MEMO/10/173 (10 May 2010), EFSF Framework Agreement, EFSF Articles of 
Incorporation, ESM Factsheet, ESM FAQs (1 July 2013; 22 October 2013) and EFSF FAQs 
(21 January 2013). 
 
To summarize, this chapter offered an overview of all the hypotheses which are 
going to be tested in the following sections and presented the logics and relations 
among these hypotheses. Meanwhile, this chapter also provided general descriptions of 
the three cases: the European Semester, the ESRB and the ESM — three new measures 
adopted and developed during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. From chapter six to 
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chapter eight, this dissertation will test all the hypotheses listed in Table 5.1 on the 
basis of the three selected cases, checking the validity of each hypothesis and probing 




6 Chapter Six: Hypotheses Tests of 
Neo-Functionalism and New Insights Based on Case 
Studies 
6.1 Evidence for H1: Economic Integration Leads to Political 
Integration 
Section 2.1.1.1 in chapter two of this dissertation has explained that collective 
decision-making is the indicator of political integration proposed by neo-functionalism, 
and in accordance with Table 2.1, the studies on the three selected cases show the 
following.  
 
Table 6.1 New EU Measures Indicating the Degree of Political Integration 
New 
measures 
Political integration indicator: collective 
decision-making 







Falling into the category of Mode 1, but 
also exhibiting some features of Mode 2:  
Evidence: 
(1) Mode 1: under the framework of the 
European Semester, a few important 
problem areas (i.e. fiscal planning, 
structural reform and the prevention of 
macroeconomic imbalance) are involved at 
the EU level, but decisions are only made 
into goals and CSRs; it is a policy 
coordination among member states in line 
with EU objectives and goals; no sanction 
mechanisms for member states’ failure to 
implement EU recommendations;  
(2) Mode 2: A few important areas are 
regarded as common and approached as 
such (i.e. fiscal planning, structural reform 
and the prevention of macroeconomic 
imbalance), but decisive issues are still 
subject to national processes (i.e. national 
parliaments as usual have the final say of 
Policy decisions on 
both the national 















debates and makes 
possible revisions 
to and finally 






member states’ budgets and economic 
policies; moreover, the implementation of 
CSRs also depends on national 
governments); besides, under the European 
Semester, problems dealt with at the EU 
collective level are as many as those at the 
national level, but only in the formation of 
goals and recommendations at the 




implement, and the 
Commission and 





An independent EU body responsible for 
the macro-prudential oversight of the 
financial systems within the EU by issuing 
warnings and recommendations, indicating 
Mode 4;  
Evidence (mainly presented by ESRB 
Regulation Articles 3, 15, 16, 17 and 18): 
the ESRB represents a collective 
macro-prudential oversight mechanism for 
EU financial systems, whose administration 
is at the EU level decided by a General 
Board; the relevant data for 
macro-prudential supervision are gathered 
and analyzed by the collective system; 
giving warnings and recommendations for 
remedial action (including for legislative 
initiatives) are decided collectively by the 
ESRB General Board. All in all, decisions 
are taken jointly under the ESRB for EU 
financial macro-prudential oversight, but 
responses to ESRB warnings and 
recommendations still are at the hand of the 
addressees (who may be the Union as a 
whole, or one or more member states, or to 
one or more of the ESAs, or to one or more 
of the national supervisory authorities), and 
national actors play substantial roles; 
moreover, to fulfill its missions and tasks, 
the ESRB needs a timely flow of 
harmonized micro-level data and 
information provided by national 
micro-prudential supervisory and statistics 
authorities as well as the ESAs, the ESCB, 
and the Commission. 
Both, the 
Community 















depend upon the 
addressees, among 
which the member 
states and their 
national 
supervisory 
authorities play a 
substantial role.  
   
Level 4 4 
The ESM Falling into the category of Mode 5:  
Evidence (mainly presented in the ESM 
Both, community 
dominates, with 
Level 5 5 
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Treaty and the ESM’s financial assistance to 
Cyprus):  
From 1 July 2013 onwards, the ESM is the 
sole and permanent mechanism responding 
to the new requests of financial assistance 
by the euro member states; established by 
the Treaty Establishing the European 
Stability Mechanism (i.e. ESM Treaty) 
concluded by 17 euro countries, it is an 
international financial institution with full 
legal personality and capacity headed by a 
Board of Governors and a Board of 
Directors to decide the form, amount, 
tranches, disbursement and conditionality to 
grant financial assistance to the euro states; 
the great bulk of recognition and problem 
solution (i.e. addressing national funding 
needs and providing timely financial 
support) takes place at the European level, 
where the rescue funds and programmes to 
the euro state plagued by the sovereign debt 
crisis are decided collectively and 
authoritatively by the ESM Board of 
Governors and Board of Directors; nation 
states put forward requests, and then the 
assistance granting is decided at the 
collective level rather than at the national 
level; the implementation of conditionality 
(entailed in MoUs about meeting the fiscal 
targets and carrying out national economic 
reform) attached to the FFA is subject to 
governmental discretion, but the financial 
assistance to be provided depends upon the 
beneficiary state’s compliance with the 
objectives and measures set out in the MoU 
(which may get amended or supplemented 
from time to time), implying 
narrowed-down national autonomy on the 




The decisions to 
grant rescue funds 
and other forms of 
financial assistance 
are made 
collectively at the 
ESM level, and the 
dispute resolution 
mechanisms are 
also at the 
European level; as 
the MoU specifies 
the conditions to 








actions to meet 
those requirements, 
and meanwhile, the 
Commission, in 
liaison with the 
ECB and IMF, will 
monitor and verify 





Sources: Own compilation; scores are attributed on the basis of Table 2.1 of this dissertation. 
 
The research results in Table 6.1 vindicate the first half of H1: European 
economic integration leads to European political integration, as all the three cases 
have illustrated EU political integration of different degrees. Among the three measures, 
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the European Semester, in the form of policy coordination, indicates the lowest level of 
political integration (level 1), but meanwhile, such policy coordination exhibits certain 
features of political integration at level 2, so the European Semester scores 1-2; by 
comparison, the ESM represents the highest degree of political integration among the 
three, registering at level 5 and scoring 5, while the ESRB embodies a middle degree of 
political integration, locating at level 4 and scoring 4. Two implications can be drawn 
from these findings: first, when economic cooperation develops into a certain stage, 
political integration of different degrees will happen, and political integration can be 
viewed as the extension of economic interests and it is the necessary step to foster 
further economic benefits; second, policy areas related to financial assistance 
(represented by the ESM) and macro-prudential supervision (represented by the ESRB) 
turn out to be more technically manageable via a unified approach at the EU level than 
those concerning national fiscal plans and economic reforms (represented by the 
European Semester). The high and low degrees of political integration of these three 
cases, however, can be explainable by the competence division between the EU and the 
member states prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty (see the TFEU Title I Categories and 
Areas of Union Competence), which are subject to three fundamental principles (TEU 
Article 5).  
 
Table 6.2 Competence Division within the EU 
Three main types of competences EU’s special competences in certain fields 
1. Exclusive competences (Article 3 TFEU): the EU 
alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts in these 
fields. The Member States’ role is therefore limited to 
applying these acts, unless the Union authorizes them to 
adopt certain acts themselves, including: (a) customs 
union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market; (c) 
monetary policy for the Member States whose currency 
is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological 
resources under the common fisheries policy; (e) 
common commercial policy. 
4.  The coordination of economic and 
employment policies (Article 5 TFEU): the 
EU is responsible for ensuring the 
coordination of these policies. It is required 
to define the broad direction and guidelines 
to be followed by Member States, and it is 
also responsible for taking initiatives to 
ensure coordination of social policies. 
2. Shared competences (Article 4 TFEU): the EU 
and Member States are authorized to adopt binding acts 
in these fields. However, Member States may exercise 
their competence only in so far as the EU has not 
exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own 
competence, including (a) internal market; (b) social 
policy, for the aspects defined in the TFEU; (c) 
5.  The CFSP (Article 24 TEU): the EU 
has competence in all fields connected with 
the CFSP. It defines and implements this 
policy via, among others, the President of 
the European Council and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, whose roles 
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economic, social and territorial cohesion; (d) agriculture 
and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine 
biological resources; (e) environment; (f) consumer 
protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-European 
networks;(i) energy; (j) area of freedom, security and 
justice; (k) common safety concerns in public health 
matters, for the aspects defined in the TFEU. 
and status have been recognized by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. However, the EU may 
not adopt legislative acts in this field. In 
addition, the Court of Justice of the EU 
does not have competence to give judgment 
in this area. 
3. Supporting competences (Article 6 TFEU): the 
EU can only intervene to support, coordinate or 
complement the action of Member States. 
Consequently, it has no legislative power in these fields 
and may not interfere in the exercise of these 
competences reserved for Member States, including (a) 
protection and improvement of human health; (b) 
industry; (c) culture; (d) tourism; (e) education, 
vocational training, youth and sport; (f) civil protection; 
(g) administrative cooperation. 
6.  The “flexibility clause” (Article 352 
TFEU): this clause enables the EU to act 
beyond the power of action conferred upon 
it by the Treaties if the objective pursued so 
requires. However, this clause is framed by 
a strict procedure and by certain restrictions 
in terms of its application (e.g. not 
applicable for attaining objectives 
pertaining to the CFSP). 
 
Three fundamental principles and changes to current competence division 
 The principle of conferral: the Union has only the 
competences conferred upon it by the Treaties or 
else remaining with the member states; 
 Transfer of competences: the 
reduction or extension of EU 
competences requires the consent of 
all Member States and necessitates 
Treaty revisions. 
 The principle of proportionality: the exercise of 
EU competences may not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties; 
 The principle of subsidiarity: for shared 
competences, the EU may intervene only if it is 
capable of acting more effectively than the 
member states. 
Sources: Adapted from the TFEU and “Division of Competences within the European Union” 
(European Union).  
 
In light of Table 6.2, the European Semester exhibits the EU’s supporting 
competences and its special competence in coordinating economic and employment 
policies within the EU, as under the European Semester, the EU gives guidance and 
recommendations to be followed by the member states and there is no legislative 
binding power on member states (also see Table 5.3); in comparison, the establishment 
of the ESRB, based on Article 114 of the TFEU in particular, is to facilitate the proper 
functioning of the internal market and it falls into the category of shared competences; 
finally, the creation of the permanent ESM became possible only after making Treaty 
revisions, because previously the Lisbon Treaty did not provide any legal bases for the 
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EU to establish a permanent stability mechanism — this actually reveals the vacuum of 
the EU project to deal with the collective eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and this is 
also the main reason to explain that the EFSF was created as a temporary assistance 
mechanism; by adding a third paragraph to Article 136 of the TFEU and after national 
ratification of such a Treaty revision, the EU was conferred by the Treaties the 
competence and legality to build up a permanent financial assistance mechanism for 
the euro states, and as the ESM is specialized only for the euro member states and it is 
related to the common currency issue, the ESM falls into the exclusive competences of 
the EU.  
To sum up, the three selected cases show a positively proportionate connection 
between the political integration degree entailed in the EU measures and the 
competence division and the legal basis prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty: the three types 
of EU competences — competences of coordinating economic and employment 
policies, shared competences, and exclusive competences indicate a low-to-high scale 
of political integration — policies related to EU exclusive competences are of a higher 
degree of political integration (as illustrated by the case of the ESM), whereas issues 
belonging to economic coordination competences express a lower degree of political 
integration (as supported by the case of the European Semester); as for those falling 
into shared competences, they symptomize a middle level of political integration (as 
vindicated by the case of the ESRB). Therefore, EU political integration is essentially 
defined and limited by EU Treaties, which theoretically have decided the utmost mode 
and degree of current EU political integration. As for the highest political degree (level 
6) suggested by Table 2.1, the EU seems impossible to achieve this in all of its policy 
areas, because that “distinction between internal policy and collective policy disappears” 
means the tearing-down of all national barriers and even the disappearance of national 
policy-making, that is, all activities shall be located at the collective EU level; still, in 
certain policy areas, the EU has achieved the highest degree of political integration. For 
instance, all euro countries use the same currency issued by the central bank ECB, 
which is responsible for the monetary policy of the whole euro area, and consequently, 
euro member states cannot rely on devaluing their national currencies to stimulate 
economies as they did before; the fact is that all the activities of monetary policy are 
conferred upon the collective agency — the ECB, and national governments of the 
eurozone do not have authorities on their monetary policy. From such an angle, the 
303 
 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis also exposes an inborn disadvantage of the euro system: 
EMU has a common monetary policy, but lacks a unified fiscal approach.  
As brand new inventions, these three measures, compared with the EU’s 
previous practices, indicate rising-level political integration in the sense that they fill 
out certain vacuums of the European integration project. First, the European Semester 
has integrated previous independent and scattered policy coordination together, which 
can also be glimpsed through Treaty provisions, such as Article 9 TFEU (about social 
inclusiveness and social progress), Article 121 (about the coordination of economic 
policies), Article 126 TFEU (about avoiding excessive government deficits and the 
Protocol on the EDP) and Article 148 TFEU (about employment) — those actually 
serve as the ultimate legal basis for the operation of the European Semester
118
. More 
importantly, it coordinates national budgetary and economic plans before, instead of 
after, their finalization, acting as a surveillance valve which can lead to punishments 
and sanctions under other separate mechanisms. Judging by the scale of political 
integration (Table 2.1), previous EU economic governance on national policy 
coordination registers at level 1 and scores 1, carrying all the features of the Mode 1 of 
collective decision-making and representing a typical coordination practice; in 
comparison, the European Semester, though still subject to policy coordination, has 
already exhibited the features of Mode 2, indicating a strengthened economic 
governance framework which locates at level 1-level 2. Second, before the creation of 
the ESRB, “responsibility for macro-prudential analysis remains fragmented, and is 
conducted by various authorities at different levels with no mechanism to ensure that 
macro-prudential risks are adequately identified and that warnings and 
recommendations are issued clearly, followed up and translated into action” (ESRB 
Regulation, (11)), so the establishment of the ESRB fills out the vacuum of an 
integrated EU-wide macro-prudential supervision, clearly demonstrating a rising level 
of political integration which reaches level 4. Finally, as for the ESM, its creation takes 
Treaty revisions as a prerequisite, also illustrating a development that fulfills the 
vacuum of the EU project. From the absence of an available financial mechanism to the 
                                                 
118 The scattered Article bases also imply possible ambiguities in the legal architecture of the 
European Semester, which may cause institutional conflicts. According to Hallerberg et al. (2011, 
10-11), the Treaty base for the European Semester can be traced back to “the Integrated Guidelines 
for Growth and Jobs (IGs) adopted in March 2005, which combined the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPGs) and the Employment Guidelines (EGs) into a single document for the first time, 
each one in fact regulated by Articles 121 and 148 TFEU respectively”. 
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establishment of a permanent one, a rising-level of political integration is indicated; 
nevertheless, the EFSF is the predecessor of the ESM and the latter is molded from the 
former, so the justification for the rising political integration degree indicated by the 
ESM should also be born from its comparison with the political integration degree 
embodied in the EFSF. As Table 5.5 shows, the EFSF and the ESM are different in 
their basic nature: there is no legal basis provided by the Lisbon Treaty for the 
functioning of the EFSF, so the eurozone countries, via concluding intergovernmental 
agreement, launched the EFSF as a company located at Luxembourg and thus it is 
subject to Luxembourg Law, and meanwhile, the EFSF was created as a temporary 
facility and will cease to exist in the future (see ESM FAQs 22 October 2013); by 
contrast, the ESM, via Treaty revisions, acquired its legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty, 
and it was created as a permanent intergovernmental institution subject to international 
law. The practical operation of the ESM is built upon the EFSF and both of them have 
the same purposes and serve the same functions; judging by the scale of political 
integration, the EFSF also indicates level 5 of political integration, but the different 
legal bases and the legal structures of the ESM and the EFSF signal different dispute 
resolution mechanisms for each — and thus suggest different degrees of political 
integration: regarding “locus of activity”, dispute resolution of the EFSF shall happen 
at the national level (by the Courts of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) or the 
European level (by the CJEU), while for the ESM, all disputes shall be resolved 
collectively (by the Board of Directors or the Board of Governors of the ESM or the 
CJEU), so in terms of “locus of activity”, the ESM carries more collectively 
supranational activities than the EFSF does, and thus the ESM represents a higher 
degree of political integration than the EFSF. All in all, the three selected cases display 
a rising level of the degree of political integration compared with the EU’s previous 
practices.  
Neo-functionalism also argues that a rising level of political integration is 
accompanied with a rising level of economic and social interactions as a result of 
economic cooperation. The amount of euro area trade with other countries and regions 
as well as with other EU member states (as shown in Table 6.3 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2) 
did increase in last decade spanning from 2002 to 2012: the total amount of exports 
increased from €1,083.9 billion to €1,870.7 billion, while that of imports nearly 
doubled, rising from €984.8 billion in 2002 to €1,791.0 billion in 2012. Though there 
were sharp drops in exports and imports all-round in 2009 due to the impact of the 
305 
 
global financial crisis, the figures of both exports and imports trade in 2009 were 
higher than those before 2005 (including 2005). Moreover, the euro countries’ trade in 
2010 began to recover and as a whole it continuously climbed up in 2011 and 2012, 
though in 2012 the pace of growth turned out to be slower and the volume of imports 
from China, Japan and other Asian countries decreased slightly compared to those of 
2011 — a signal of trade surplus. So generally the increase in EU trade kept its 
momentum and a rising level of political integration did come along with a rising level 
of economic integration. 
 
Table 6.3 Euro Area Trade in Goods with Main Partners1), 2002-2012 

















 Exports (f.o.b.) 
2002 1,083.9     205.8 174.6 380.4 184.1 29.9 33.1 140.5 316.0 
2003 1,058.7     194.8 181.2 376 166.4 35.3 31.3 135.4 314.2 
2004 1,142.8      205.4 206.2 411.6 172.5 40.3 33.3 150.3 334.8 
2005 1,237.0     203.2 232.1 435.3 185.0 43.3 34.0 165.9 373.6 
2006 1,379.5     214.7 274.6 489.3 199.7 53.5 34.5 183.1 419.3 
2007 1,505.2 231.3 307.2 538.5 196.7 60.6 34.4 201.7 473.3 
2008 1,561.6 220.4 322.7 543.1 186.9 65.7 33.7 210.0 522.1 
2009 1,275.6 174.6 245.6 420.2 152.1 68.0 28.7 185.6 421.0 
2010 1,533.1    194.7 291.1 485.8 180.6 94.8 34.6 227.1 399.7 
2011 1,745.1      213.4 334.8 548.2 200.6 115.5 39.4 251.5 453.6 
2012 1,870.7  230.7 338.2 568.9 223.6 120.7 44.7 273.9 489.2 
 Imports (c.i.f.) 
2002 984.8       149.7 152.1 301.8 125.6 61.8 52.7 142.7 300.0 
2003 987.9       138.9 162.7 301.6 110.3 74.3 52.2 141.5 308.0 
2004 1,073.3     145.0 181.7 326.7 113.1 92.1 54.4 161.0 326.0 
2005 1,223.2      152.5 197.7 350.2 119.9 117.9 53.1 189.8 392.2 
2006 1,390.7      165.6 228.5 394.1 128.2 143.6 56.0 212.5 456.3 
2007 1,492.0 169.5 250.6 420.1 130.5 172.7 59.3 223.4 486.1 
2008 1,611.6 164.7 267.6 432.3 135.8 185.0 57.4 238.2 562.8 
2009 1,258.3 125.6 226.2 351.8 116.0 159.0 42.9 174.8 413.8 
2010 1,550.7     147.8 270.2 418 129.8 208.6 51.4 234.7 365.4 
2011 1,759.1        166.9 309.9 476.8 140.8 218.6 52.6 280.9 416.4 
2012 1,791.0       168.3 311.5 479.8 150.3 213.7 48.5 276.4 445.4 
Notes: 1) EUR billions; seasonally adjusted. 
2) Data for mainland China exclude Hong Kong. 
Sources: Statistics Pocket Book published by the ECB at different times: data on 2002-2003 
(Statistics Pocket Book June 2005, 13), on 2004-2006 (June 2007, 13), on 2007-2009 (June 
2010, 13), on 2010-2011 (February 2013, 12), and on 2012 (July 2013, 12); own calculation 




Figure 6.1 Total Amount of Euro Area Trade in Goods with Main Partners, 2002-2012 
Sources: Own charting on the basis of data in Table 6.3 of this dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Euro Area Trade in Goods with Main Partners, 2002-2012 































































As for the social interactions judged by personnel mobility, two types of 
statistics can be used as indicators to measure personnel movement across the EU: (1) 
the number of EU citizenship acquisitions; (2) tourist traveling within the EU.  
As suggested by Table 6.4 and Figure 6.3, there was an increasing number of 
people acquiring the citizenship of an EU-27 member state in the past decade, 
growing from around 663,300 in 2001 to around 782,200 in 2011 and reaching a 
record of 810,500 in 2010. Though the latest figures of 2011 are a little bit lower than 
those for 2010 (around 3.5% less),
119
 the general trend of citizenship acquisitions in 
the past ten years kept rising, which, for one thing, mirrors the increasing numbers of 
migration in general and for another, connotes a greater potential of the free 
movement of workers who can find jobs and reside in another EU country (i.e. an 
increased cross-border labor mobility), thus indicating a rising level of personnel 
mobility as well as social interactions within the EU. Three things deserve extra 
attention. First, national immigration policies have exerted a direct influence on 
citizenship acquisitions, particularly the “naturalization rate”, that is, “the ratio 
between the total number of citizenships granted and the stock of foreign residents in 
a country at the beginning of the year” (European Social Statistics 2013, 48), which 
deserve further analysis on their impact on the personnel mobility across the EU. 
Second, non-EU country persons make up the main part of citizenship acquisitions: 
according to Eurostat, in 2011, among those who acquired citizenship of an EU-27 
member state, about 678 000 were non-EU-27 nationals, accounting for 86.7 % of the 
total, meanwhile the figures for the nationals of the EU-27 who obtained the 
citizenship in another EU country amounted to 82, 000, taking up 10.5 % of the total 
(“Migration and Migrant Population Statistics”, Eurostat, March 2013a). Obviously, 
non-EU nationals make a strong contribution to the rise of citizenship acquisitions 
and thus can be viewed as a major “motor” for social interactions. Finally, the global 
financial crisis appears not to have affected the growing trend of citizenship 
acquisitions during the course of 2008-2010, while it could be that the decrease of 
citizenship acquisitions during 2010-2011 may be linked to the then on-going 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  
 
 
                                                 
119 See also European Social Statistics (2013, 48). 
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Table 6.4 Number of Persons Having Acquired the Citizenship of the Reporting Country, EU-27, 
2001-2012 (Thousands) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU-27* 663.3 662.5 651.9 719.1 723.6 735.9 697.3 698.7 776.1 810.5 782.2 807.6 
BE 62.2 46.4 33.7 34.8 31.5 31.9 36.1 37.7 32.8 34.6 29.8 38.6 
BG - 3.5 4.4 5.8 5.9 6.7 6.0 7.1 1.0 0.9 0.6 1.8 
CZ 6.3 3.3 2.2 5.0 2.6 2.3 2.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.8 
DK 11.9 17.3 6.6 15.0 10.2 8.0 3.6 6.0 6.9 4.0 4.2 3.6 
DE 180.3 154.5 140.7 127.2 117.2 124.6 113.0 94.5 96.1 104.6 109.6 114.6 
EE 3.1 4.1 3.7 6.5 7.1 4.8 4.2 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.3 
IE 2.8 - 4.0 3.8 4.1 5.8 4.6 3.2 4.5 6.4 10.7 25.0 
GR - - 1.9 1.4 1.7 2.0 3.9 16.9 17.0 9.4 17.5 16.2 
ES 16.7 21.8 26.5 38.2 42.9 63.4 71.9 84.2 79.6 123.7 114.6 94.1 
FR 127.5 128.1 144.6 168.8 154.8 147.9 132.0 137.5 135.8 143.3 114.6 96.1 
IT 10.4 10.7 13.4 19.1 28.7 35.3 45.5 53.7 59.4 65.9 56.2 65.4 
CY - 0.1 0.2 4.5 4.0 2.9 2.8 3.2 4.1 1.9 2.2 2.3 
LV 9.9 9.4 10.0 17.2 20.1 19.0 8.3 4.2 3.2 3.7 2.5 3.8 
LT 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
LU 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 4.0 4.3 3.4 4.7 
HU 8.6 3.4 5.3 5.4 9.9 6.1 8.4 8.1 5.8 6.1 20.6 18.4 
MT 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 
NL 46.7 45.3 28.8 26.2 28.5 29.1 30.7 28.2 29.8 26.3 28.6 31.0 
AT 31.7 36.0 44.7 41.6 34.9 25.7 14.0 10.3 8.0 6.1 6.7 7.0 
PL 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.9 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.8 
PT 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.0 4.4 - 22.4 24.2 21.8 23.2 21.8 
RO 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 5.6 9.4 - - - 
SI 1.3 2.8 3.3 3.3 2.7 3.2 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 
SK 2.9 3.5 3.5 4.0 1.4 1.1 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 
FI 2.7 3.0 4.5 6.9 5.7 4.4 4.8 6.7 3.4 4.3 4.6 9.1 
SE 36.4 37.8 33.2 28.9 39.6 51.2 33.6 30.5 29.5 32.5 36.6 50.2 
UK 89.8 120.1 130.5 148.3 161.8 154.0 164.5 129.3 203.6 194.8 177.6 193.9 
Notes:* estimated; 
- not available. 
Sources: Data for 2001-2011 come from “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics” 





Figure 6.3 Total Acquisitions of Citizenship (EU-27), 2001-2012 
Sources: Own charting on the basis of Table 6.4.   
 
Temporary travelling conducted by EU residents (rather than citizens) also 
points to the level of personnel mobility within the EU. One important indicator to 
measure tourist travelling is the number of overnight stays, which “reflects both the 
length of stay and the number of visitors” (“Tourism Statistics at Regional Level”, 
Eurostat). According to Figure 6.4, the general trend of tourist nights spent kept an 
ascending momentum in the past decade from 2001 to 2011, during which the 
financial crisis had a noticeable impact on tourist traveling — the number of 
overnight stays struck the lowest level in 2009 during 2006 to 2011; nevertheless, in 
2011, the number of travelling nights spent kept recovering and actually exceeded the 
pre-crisis peak in 2007 (for both EU residents and non-residents). It is also interesting 
to observe that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis has not reduced the level and 
intensity of internal travel within the EU. Rather, from 2009 to 2011, people’s 
mobility within the EU was taking an escalating momentum, surpassing all the 
previous records in 2011, among which non-residents’ travelling contributed a larger 
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personnel movement within the EU is more subject to the global financial crisis and 
world-wide economic recession (external factors) than the European sovereign debt 
crisis (internal factors). All in all, from the perspective of peoples’ temporary 
movement within the EU, personnel mobility has also been enhanced during the past 
decade, and therefore, the neo-functionalist proposition — a higher level of political 
integration is accompanied by a higher level of economic integration and social 
interactions — is vindicated. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Trends in Number of Nights Spent in Hotels or Similar Establishments (EU-27), 
2003-2012 
Sources: Eurostat (tour_occ_ninat, 18 March 2014). 
 
In sum, H1 is fully vindicated by the three cases. In addition, new findings can 
be drawn from the case studies, which can be formulated into the following 
propositions as a further elaboration and extension of H1.
120
  
                                                 
120 Along with the vindication and/or refutation of hypotheses, this dissertation will formulate some 
research results and findings into hypothesis form as a further elaboration, supplement, or revision to 
the relevant EU integration theories, so at the end of each hypothesis test, propositions 1, 2, 3, …, n , 
being distinctive to the hypotheses derived from the integration theories, are put forward after the 
conclusions to the relevant hypothesis tests. Those propositions, on the one hand, present the main 
findings of this dissertation during the case studies under the epistemic frameworks provided by the 
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Proposition 1: Political integration (of different degrees) will follow economic 
integration, because political integration is the extension of economic interests and it is 
a necessary step to foster further economic benefits.  
Proposition 2: The mode and degree of EU political integration are defined and 
limited by EU Treaties; the political integration degree entailed in an EU measure 
links to the competence division and the legal basis prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty, 
which suggests a low-to-high scale of political integration via the division of 
supporting competences/competences of coordinating economic and employment 
policies — shared competences — exclusive competences.  
Proposition 3: Non-EU nationals’ citizenship acquisitions and foreign tourist 
travelling, indicating personnel mobility across the EU, contribute to increasing social 
interactions which enhance EU political integration; the former tends to be subject to 
internal factors but impervious to external challenges, while the latter tends to be 
susceptible to external environments but impervious to internal crises. 
The establishment of the European Semester, the ESRB and the ESM indicates 
the effectiveness of spillover in a general sense; nevertheless, the exact causal 
mechanisms of spillover, which are proposed in H1a-d, need to be further examined on 
the basis of the three cases. The following section, from 6.1.1 to 6.1.4, will deal with 
the hypothesis tests of H1a-d. 
 
6.1.1 Evidence for H1a: Functional Spillover 
As the preliminary analyses after the formation of H1a have vindicated the 
effectiveness of functional spillover, the task here is to specify the exact functionalist 
causal chains and magnitude of functional spillover embodied in the three selected 
measures.  
First, there is the original goal A to solve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
Second, solutions to the crisis are entailed in a multi-approached framework (see Table 
1.2 and 1.3) which requires coordination between fiscal, financial and economic 
policies — to solve the crisis requires the reduction of national budget deficit and debt 
rates and growing economies (the function of the European Semester), a sound 
financial supervision (the ESRB) and an available and efficient financial assistance 
                                                                                                                            
form ever open to further empirical tests, can serve as the starting points for further research. In such 
a way, this dissertation makes its contribution to on-going EU studies with the three theoretical tools.  
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mechanism to provide immediate financial help to the troubled euro states (the ESM); 
so there is a functional interdependence between the original issue A and the multiple 
issues BM (rather than a single issue B) which include B1, B2, B3, …, Bx, and as far as 
the research topic of this dissertation is concerned, there is a functional 
interdependence between issue A to solve the sovereign debt crisis and issues of B1 
(the European Semester), B2 (the ESRB) and B3 (the ESM), and these three measures 
are necessary to achieve the original goal A and make constructive contributions to 
solve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Third, actions taken in the areas of BM may 
require and thus promote further integrative actions: the successful operation of all the 
three new measures depends upon the cooperation of national authorities who must 
accordingly take concrete and effective national actions, such as carrying out economic 
reforms and cutting budget deficits and debts; more prominently, among the three, the 
ESM became viable only after Treaty amendments by national ratification, that is, there 
was a prerequisite to the implementation of the ESM — in other words, being a 
requirement to the solution of the original problem A, the establishment of the ESM 
itself preconditioned another requirement. Finally, the salience of the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis (issue A) — typically expressed in the decrease of the external 
value of the euro, the increasingly high and unsustainable yield rates in some euro 
member states, and the contagious risks of the debt crisis and potential bankruptcy for 
the eurozone and the whole EU — defines a strong and urgent functional requirement 
on the issues of BM: as for B1, the European Semester, to coordinate and monitor 
national fiscal and economic policies as well as to strengthen EU economic governance, 
is an integrated policy coordination and surveillance framework, bringing other 
existing separate surveillance and preventive measures (e.g. the preventive arms of the 
SGP and MIP) and economic goals, priorities and strategies (e.g. Europe 2020) 
together under one umbrella; so in the aspect of coordinating and monitoring national 
budgets and economic reforms, besides the European Semester, other means are 
potentially available to reach the original objective A by exercising similar functions of 
the European Semester; in such a sense, the functional connection between A and B1 
tends to be weak. By comparison, the ESRB is a brand new mechanism and its creation 
fills the vacuum of EU financial supervision — EU-wide macro-prudential supervision, 
and more importantly, there is no other means functioning the same as the ESRB to 
contribute to the solution of the sovereign debt crisis; therefore, the functional 
connection between the objective A and B2 is quite strong. As regards the ESM, it 
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became the sole permanent mechanism of the EU to provide financial assistance to the 
euro member states from 1 July 2013 onwards, and thus it also embodied a strong 
functional connection between A and B3; nevertheless, other means, that is, IMF funds 
and financial assistance from other non-euro member states are also possibly available 
under the ESM assistance programmes, and consequently, the strong functional 
connection between the original objective A and B3 is mitigated by those 
complementary options — being “complementary” is because they come along with 
the ESM programmes and, in common situations, make up a comparatively smaller 
share of assistance responsibility; the ESM serves as the mainstay of the financial 
support for the euro states. All in all, put into a hierarchy, the ESRB displays the 
strongest functional connection between the original goal A (i.e. to solve the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis) and its related issue area BM, the European Semester the weakest, 
and the ESM lies between the two. Last but not least, the result of functional spillover 
is further integration in both A and BM, as A is approached from multiple policy areas 
BM, and further integration of BM also contributes to further integration of A: along 
with the implementation of the new measures of B1, B2 and B3, ..., Bx (which may 
require further integrative actions of C1, C2, C3, …, Cx), in one respect, the policy areas 
of B1, B2 and B3, ..., Bx are further developed, and in another respect, the original issue 
A of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis is approached and consolidated from multiple 
areas. As a matter of fact, current practices have formulated a formula to address the 
sovereign debt issue, combining various approaches from different policy areas of 
fiscal, economic and financial, and even including the establishment of a permanent 
financial injection; consequently, policy areas related to both A and BM became further 
integrated.  
Besides the magnitude of functional connection, another hierarchy is noticeable 
among the three selected cases: how fast can the new measures (B1, B2, B3, …, Bx) 
become effective to support the solution of the original issue A? As the European 
Semester is a yearly circle of policy coordination, its effectiveness is based on an 
annual judgment, while the ESRB shall issue warnings and recommendations 
whenever systemic financial risks are deemed to be significant, so the effectiveness of 
the ESRB is always in development. In comparison, the time period to be involved for 
the ESM to grant financial support is country-specifically varied, which is mainly 
determined by the time-length of negotiations between the ESM and the beneficiary 
country to reach an MoU: in light of the EFSF, the ESM’s predecessor, normally, it 
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takes three to four weeks to draw up an assistance programme following a euro state’s 
request, and then only several working days are needed to raise and disburse the first 
tranche of loans — just like the financial assistance to Cyprus showed, the ESM 
approved an FFA to Cyprus on 8 May 2013, and accordingly, the first and second 
disbursement of €2 billion and €1 billion each were transferred on 13 May 2013 and on 
26 June 2013, respectively; nevertheless, there were extensive negotiations for the 
MoU of Cyprus — the Cypriot government submitted its request as early as 25 June 
2012 to the President of the Eurogroup, but it was not until 25 March 2013 that a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme was agreed, which then paved the way to the 
final assistance package of up to €10 billion for Cyprus.
121
 So as far as the length of 
time involved to trigger the effectiveness of the new measures is concerned, the ESRB 
is the shortest (i.e. fastest triggered), the European Semester the longest (i.e. slowest 
triggered), and the ESM is in the middle among the three. However, the shortest time 
to trigger the effectiveness of the new measures and policy-making in the related areas 
BM may not always indicate a positive progress towards the solution of the original 
issue A: if there are frequent ESM assistance programmes, the sovereign debt situation 
of the eurozone is expected to become more dire and dangerous. This is because of the 
nature of the ESM: it is a “painkiller” for the serious sovereign debt crisis, or else the 
euro state concerned will go bankrupt, while for the European Semester and the ESRB, 
they are more like “preventive pills” to avoid the sovereign debt crisis, particularly as 
the European Semester addresses national fiscal plan to direct the high national budget 
deficits and government debts to meet the SGP criteria. 
Based on the literature review and analyses above, a functionalist spillover 
model could be constructed as follows:  
 
 Functional magnitude: the salience of issue A determines the strength of the functional 
requirement of B1, B2, B3, …, Bx ; if no other means can be adopted to function as B1, B2, B3,…, 
Bx, the functional connection between A and B1, A and B2, A and B3, …, Bx tends to be strong; 
 Functional effectiveness frequency: how fast can measures of B1, B2, B3, …, Bx be triggered to 
be effective to support the solution of the original issue A? The longer the time needed for the 
effectiveness of B1, B2, B3, …, Bx the lower effectiveness frequency of the measures concerned 
                                                 




there is; the high functional effectiveness frequency (i.e. the shortest time needed or the fastest 
to be triggered), however, does not necessarily indicate a positive progress to solve the original 
issue A; 
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Figure 6.5 A Functional Spillover Model 
 
This model vividly illustrates the rationales of functional spillover: how the 
original goal and the related issues mutually affect each other, and the result of 
functional spillover is further integration in both the original and the related policy 
areas. Still, to fully vindicate H1a, we need to examine the way leading to functional 
spillover: via negative or positive integration, that is, by deregulating national barriers 
at the national level or reregulating common rules at the EU level. As for the case of 
the European Semester, on the one hand, it issues the common goals and objectives to 
achieve at the EU level, such as the economic priorities set out in the AGS and the 
fiscal criteria laid down by the SGP, while on the other hand, the finalization of 
national budgets and economic plans as well as the implementation of CSRs are 
ultimately decided by national parliaments, so the European Semester has features of 
both negative and positive integration; actually, being a policy coordination and 
surveillance mechanism, the nature of the European Semester decides its dual 
characteristics: “coordination” of national policies suggests negative integration while 




ESRB, being a newly established independent EU body which fills the vacuum of 
EU-wide macro-prudential oversight, it represents a way of positive integration by 
setting up a common supervision mechanism at the EU level rather than a way of 
negative integration by harmonizing existing macro-prudential supervision measures at 
the national level. As for the ESM, it is a brand new intergovernmental institution 
concluded by the euro states, also representing a way of positive integration rather than 
negative integration. Therefore, the selected three cases do not all prove positive 
integration over negative integration, which, from one perspective, demonstrates the 
difficulties in setting up common standards for national economic policies, particularly 
connected to fiscal and employment issues, and from another perspective, suggests that 
negative integration of coordinating and harmonizing national economic policies is still 
the normal practice within the EU, but meanwhile, coordination and monitoring at the 
EU level gets enhanced and strengthened.  
To conclude, H1a is not fully vindicated because not all of the three cases 
display positive integration over negative integration. As a result, H1a, 
neo-functionalist functional spillover, only is confirmed to the degree that “solving the 
debt crisis (i.e. a fiscal issue) requires support and cooperation in other related areas 
and thus pushes further integration in both the original and these related areas”. 
 
6.1.2 Evidence for H1b: Political Spillover  
The adoption and implementation of the three new measures show national 
governments’ pro-integrative stances on the issues concerned, and governmental 
national interest actors, typically represented by the heads of state or government in the 
European Council and the ministers in the Council of the European Union (i.e. the 
Ecofin Council), expressed their support for the new measures. As mentioned in 
chapter one, the European Semester and the ESM were approved by both the leaders of 
government in the European Council and the ministers in the Ecofin Council, and 
moreover the launch of the ESM actually involved Treaty amendments which required 
national ratifications; the establishment and operation of the ESRB, in comparison, was 
realized through the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 and Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010. The fact is that without the endorsement by the 
Council of the Ministers, which stands for individual national interests, the 
establishment and the proper functioning of all the three new mechanisms were out of 
the question. So the successful introduction and operation of the three new devices 
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shows that faced with the serious sovereign debt crisis, governmental national interest 
actors did support further integration and promote European-level approaches over 
national-level solutions. 
As for the non-governmental actors’ positions, BusinessEurope’s and the 
ETUC’s opinions and attitudes towards the EU’s new measures, representing the 
broadest employers’ and employees’ interests across the EU, are shown in Table 6.5, 
which displays general support for the introduction and implementation of the 
European Semester, the ESRB, and the ESM. 
 
Table 6.5 BusinessEurope’s and the ETUC’s Positions on the European Semester, the ESRB and the 
ESM 
 BusinessEurope’s stances: 
1. On the European Semester:  
“We support the European Semester proposal”. (①, p.6)  
“We welcome efforts to strengthen this process, with the Commission providing ambitious 
Country Specific Recommendations and the Ecofin Council continuing to play a leading role in 
finalising them and ensuring their implementation.” ②  
2. On the ESRB: “The ESRB must have an important role to play”, and it “should provide 
complementary information on the emergence of excessive credit expansion and asset price 
misalignments. Early warning signals should lead to corrective actions, including through the 
alteration of the budget stance in the countries concerned.(①, p.7) 
3. On the ESM: “We believe the ESM should be further developed into a politically independent 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) open to all EU members.”②  
Summary of BusinessEurope’s positions: being supportive of the three new EU measures and being 
pro-integrative 
 ETUC’s stances: 
4. On the European Semester: 
A. “Employment must be at the heart of the European Semester”, and the European Council “must 
critically assess the European Semester to determine why the process is not meeting key 
objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, namely the creation of quality and sustainable jobs. 
Inadequate policies pursued by the member states and the European Union need to be corrected”. 
“We reject all policies that have the objective of shifting the burden onto workers through 
increased labor market flexibility, deregulation and competition on wages and working 
conditions”. “The gender dimension of the crisis continues to be neglected” and “[a]ll aspects of 
the semester process should therefore be gender mainstreamed to ensure a coherent and 
comprehensive approach. When developing and implementing the NRPs member states should 
apply a gender equality perspective as recommended by the European Pact for Gender Equality 
2011-2020.” ③ 
B. The NRPs and the CSRs “were adopted without the proper involvement of the social partners. 
An overwhelming majority of affiliates was not involved in the process or the topic was dealt 
with as collateral or incidental to the general discussion of the implementation of Europe 2020. 
The ETUC shares the EP’s critical analysis” that “in many Member States, national parliaments, 
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social partners and civil society were not involved in the European Semester process”, so the 
ETUC as well as the EP “urges the Commission to ensure that more democratic legitimacy be 
given to the process through the involvement of national parliaments, social partners and civil 
society”.④ 
C. “We call for the Parliament’s full involvement in the European Semester.”⑤  
D. As for the implementing of the EU/IMF rescue packages, the ETUC “denounces the diktat 
pressures from Commission officials to cut minimum wages and pensions, to reduce wage 
‘rigidities’ and to make labor markets more flexible in Greece and Ireland” and John Monks, 
ETUC General Secretary “warns that ETUC will find it impossible to support action by the EU 
along these lines.” The Commission officials are criticized for “ignoring social dialogue and 
collective bargaining processes and directly intervening in the labor markets of these countries. 
Diktats are being issued which are designed to lower living standards.” So from the onset of the 
implementation of the European Semester, the ETUC “is worried about the proposals on 
economic governance, and any new treaty which contains them, and which could reduce member 
states to quasi colonial status”. ⑥  
E. “The ETUC has always been supportive of the European project for many reasons, but primarily 
because its regional integration model aimed not only at economic integration but was also 
meant to foster social progress and full employment.” And “the number one priority is to fight 
unemployment by way of a moratorium on austerity policies and an investment programme for 
sustainable growth and jobs”. “We welcomed the European Council’s decision of December 
2012 to put the question of social Europe on the table for we see that as an echo – albeit faint – 
of our claims.” ⑦ 
5. On the ESRB: 
“The ETUC demands a seat in the European Systemic Risk Board.” “While the ESRB will not 
have any legally binding powers, the Commission expects it to exert influence through the quality 
of its analysis and by the virtue of its high-powered membership. The ETUC would prefer clear 
enforcement power to the ESRB over the failed model of self-regulation of finance”. “As the new 
European financial supervisory framework is currently conceived, both ESRB and, more 
importantly, ESFS may at best function as early warning systems. Until the establishment of a 
single EU supervisor, the European Supervisory authorities must be given binding 
decision-making powers over national supervisors if they fail to meet their obligations deriving 
from European law.” ⑧  
6. On the ESM: 
The ETUC supports the ESM and its possibility to rescue troubled banks directly, so it urges EU 
institutions to establish the SSM which is considered as “a prerequisite to enable a direct 
recapitalization of banks by the ESM”. “The ETUC firmly rejects the view of certain 
governments who have insisted that the ESM may only deal with troubled banks in the future and 
should abstain from ‘legacy debt’ of banks that have existed prior to the enactment of the ESM. 
Creating a level playing field requires that all banks that are still fundamentally solvent should 
have access to the ESM. Insolvent ‘zombie’ banks however should no longer be let alive 
artificially. Their recapitalization through European funds should be excluded.” The ETUC 
supports ESM programmes of purchasing government bonds in the primary markets of those 
assisted governments, but it “demands that any recapitalization of private banks through public 
money must in turn lead to a transfer of proportional entitlements to ownership” ⑨.  
Summary of the ETUC’s positions: being supportive of the three new EU measures and being 
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pro-integrative, while displaying its critical opinions to unemployment, austerity measures, gender 
inequality, inadequate involvement and participation of national parliaments, social partners and civil 
society, and the Commission officials’ diktat intervention in national labour markets, all of which have 
been integrated under the European Semester framework 
Sources: ①BusinessEurope (14 June 2010); ②BusinessEurope (25 April 2013); ③ETUC 
(14 June 2013); ④ ETUC (15 March 2013); ⑤ETUC (15 March 2012); ⑥ETUC (11 
January 2011); ⑦ETUC (29 May 2013); ⑧ETUC (27 October 2009); ⑨ETUC(18 
December 2012). 
 
Table 6.5 vindicates that the non-governmental national actors representing the 
interests of employers and employees across the EU supported the three new measures, 
taking pro-integrative positions and promoting European-level solutions over 
national-level approaches; moreover, both BusinessEurope and the ETUC propose 
further integrative developments of current measures. For instance, BusinessEurope 
argued that the ESM should be developed into an independent EMF that could cover 
all EU member states (see Table 6.5, 3), and the ETUC advocated the establishment of 
a single EU supervisor with legally binding powers and asked for a seat in the ESRB 
(see 5). Nevertheless, the ETUC’s attitudes and positions on the European Semester 
turn out to be critical. The ETUC sends a clear message: the core interests of the ETUC 
are employment (i.e. the creation of quality and sustainable jobs) and workers’ welfare, 
and it disapproves any policies and measures that would harm the benefits of workers 
and lower their living standards. So while conveying its support for the three new 
measures, the ETUC clearly states their limits as well as reasons to support the 
European integration project so far as their core interests shall not be violated (see 4E). 
Besides, the ETUC also pays attention to gender equality and social progress and 
inclusiveness (see 4A, B). As the ETUC’s core interests and concerns are also the EU’s 
goals and policy intentions, theoretically, the ETUC should be a trustful ally of the 
Commission. However, when Commission officials issued diktats to cut minimum 
wages and pensions in Ireland and Greece, the ETUC was angry about the 
Commission’s behavior (see 4D). Obviously, the actions of Commission officials are 
seen as harming the core interests of employees. If austerity measures and welfare cuts 
are the “musts” to solve national sovereign debt crises, while national governments, 
mainly due to election pressures and labour union protests, hesitate over welfare 
system reforms, the diktat intervention into national labour markets by the EU is a 
useful “scapegoat” for national leaders to carry out painful economic reforms. Several 
other points deserve mentioning here: first, the ETUC shares similar opinions with the 
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EP as far as the case of the European Semester is concerned, and the ETUC called for a 
full participation of the EP in the European Semester process, and thus the ETUC 
became a supportive ally of the EP (see 4B,C); second, when Commission official 
diktats intrudes into the ETUC’s core interests, the ETUC, though supposedly being a 
natural ally with the Commission, expressed its worries about proposals or any further 
new treaties “which could reduce member states to quasi colonial status” (see 4D), so 
in such a sense, the ETUC was a defender of national economic interests and 
sovereignty, and it can also be viewed as an ally of national governments; finally, 
comparing the two rival interest groups, BusinessEurope gives more concise and 
shorter statements on their positions towards the EU’s new measures, while the ETUC 
tends to publish more detailed and longer elaborations imbued with more demanding 
and stronger emotions.  
The benefits of the three new measures can be evaluated on the basis of their 
purposes and functions (see section 1.3.4 and section 5.2), among which the following 
advantages are prominent: (1) under the European Semester, national fiscal policies are 
coordinated and monitored in line with structural reforms and macroeconomic balances, 
and EU guidance and recommendations are embedded into national policies before 
governmental budgetary plans are formulated — the European Semester is not only an 
EU level coordination and surveillance mechanism for national fiscal plans and 
economic policies, but also acts as a “meta policy coordinator” for EU economic 
governance, organizing, coordinating and synthesizing various separate EU economic 
governance measures (e.g. Europe 2020, the Euro Plus Pact, the preventive arms of the 
SGP and the MIP, and the country-specific minimum benchmark figure demanded by 
the “balanced budget rule” of the TSCG) into one composite, while still being open to 
any other new inventions of strengthening EU economic governance; the European 
Semester, though without legally binding powers on member states, functions as a 
“preventive valve” that shall lead to further corrective and punishment actions under 
other procedures; all the arrangements under the European Semester aim to rein the 
ballooning national fiscal situations back to meet the SGP criteria while fostering 
economic stability and prosperity and enhancing employment; (2) the ESRB and the 
ESM fill the vacuums of the EU project — the former carries out EU-wide 
macro-prudential supervision and gives timely precautionary warnings and 
recommendations, while the latter was created as a permanent institution to provide 
necessary and urgent financial support to the euro countries, contributive to EU 
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financial stability. The adoption and implementation of the three new measures 
suggests that EU’s further integration is on the way. 
Nevertheless, the issues addressed by the three new measures are those that 
cannot be approached and solved by a single national government: to strengthen EU 
economic governance and coordinate national budgetary plans and economic policies, 
to carry out macro-prudential supervision of financial systems within the EU, and to 
establish a permanent financial assistance institution for the euro states; all those 
collective issues require EU level actions, and the new measures are logic 
developments of the EU to solve the sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, national interest 
actors promote European-level solutions over national approaches not only because to 
do so brings more benefits, but also because issues concerned reflect collective 
problems and challenges. If “more benefits” stress actors’ calculations on the potential 
gains brought by more integrative steps, then “be(com)ing a collective issue or 
common concern among EU member states” points out the internal logical demand of 
the issue concerned and the EU project: when reaching the point where individual 
member states cannot solve the problem by themselves, collective issues must be 
tackled at the EU level, and besides this, there are no other choices. Furthermore, 
though national interest actors support further integration and promote European-level 
means over national-level solutions, the ultimate causes of the sovereign debt crisis are 
the unsound fiscal conditions of member states of high governmental deficits and debts, 
so national-level actions to meet the SGP requirement are fundamentally emphasized 
under the European Semester and by the ESM rescue conditions, which echo the EU’s 
approaches to strengthen economic governance within the EU via “address(ing) the 
high degree of economic inter-dependence, particularly in the euro area, while 
preserving national responsibilities on fiscal and economic policies” (The Task Force 
Report 21 October 2010, 1).  
In addition, in line with Niemann’s (2006, 66) suggestions to examine interest 
actors’ positions on integrative measures, this dissertation observes the following. First, 
there is a sort of proportionate connection between the degree of political integration 
indicated by a new measure and actors’ supportive positions towards that measure: for 
the policies of a higher degree of political integration (i.e. the ESRB registering at level 
4 and the ESM at level 5, see Table 6.1), interest groups take a stronger supportive 
position for further integration, while for the policies of a lower political integration 
degree (i.e. the European Semester exhibiting a political integration degree at level 1-2), 
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interest groups, while expressing general support, also voice critical opinions when 
their core interests are violated; second, as far as the three selected cases are concerned, 
member states’ positions agree with the organized non-governmental interests — both 
BusinessEurope and the ETUC support the new measures, but when the core interests 
of the national/transnational groups are invaded by national or EU policies, these 
groups shall be in line with the actors who support their core interests; so although the 
European Semester has obtained general support from the workers within the EU, 
specific policies relevant to employment and social equality and progress, which are 
now placed under the European Semester, may trigger critical voices and contradictory 
positions among interest groups, national governments and the EU; therefore, the 
coalition among the EU, the government and interest groups is not fixed, but rather it is 
Figure 6.5 to the adopted policies’ impact on the core interests of national/transnational 
interest groups; finally, as the ETUC’s positions suggest, the core interests of 
national/transnational organizations determine their positions towards EU or national 
government policies, and as a result, the effectiveness of the learning and socialization 
process argued by neo-functionalists, that is, the shifts and trajectory of consensus 
formation among national interest actors of different political levels towards the EU 
measures, is not obvious, which actually requires further detailed research.  
As for the explanatory and predictive power of H1b, it is confirmed so far as the 
attitudes and positions of the heads of state or government in the European Council and 
the ministers in the Ecofin Council (representing national interest actors at the 
governmental level) and of BusinessEurope and the ETUC (standing for the 
non-governmental national interest actors) are concerned. Based on the analyses above, 
neo-functionalist political spillover mechanism H1b could be extended and revised as 
follows:  
H1bextended: Confronted with collective problems and challenges (e.g. the 
sovereign debt crisis), national interest actors, both governmental and 
non-governmental, support further integration and promote European-level solutions 
over national-level means because (a) to do so brings more benefits and (b) it is an 
internal logical demand by the nature of collective issues which, on the one hand, 
cannot be addressed by individual member states, while on the other hand, the solution 
to the collective issues ultimately relies on the substantial cooperation and efforts of 
the member states.  
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In addition, another three propositions can be drawn from the case studies, which 
can be regarded as a complement and development of neo-functionalist arguments of 
political spillover:  
Proposition 4: Confronted with crises, actors of different levels within the EU (i.e. 
interest groups, national governments, and EU institutions) tend to forge common 
positions and support EU integrative actions, so crises also mean opportunities and 
tend to push further integration; during the crises, the EU is a useful scapegoat for 
national governments to carry out economic and social reforms when national interest 
groups oppose to do so.  
Proposition 5: The core interests of interest groups decide their positions 
towards the EU project as well as their alliance with the Commission and/or the 
national government; interest groups tend to ever support EU integration so long as 
their core interests are not intruded upon by EU policies.  
Proposition 6: The strength of interest groups’ support for an EU policy 
proportionately links to the degree of political integration indicated by that policy: the 
higher the degree of political integration entailed in an EU policy, the stronger support 
by interest groups for that policy will be.  
 
6.1.3 Evidence for H1c: Cultivated Spillover 
Evidence provided by the three cases for the first half of H1c is presented in Table 6.6:  
 
Table 6.6 The Commission’s Proposals for the Three New Measures 
 The Commission’s 
proposals 
Features of the proposals 
and the strategies of the 
Commission 
Are the proposals put 
forward under the 





 The Commission 
proposed in May 
(IP/10/561) and June 2010 
(IP/10/859) to create a 
European Semester (i.e. by 
two Communications③,
④),① which was 
approved by the Member 
States at the Ecofin 
Council on 7 September 
2010; ② 
 “The Commission 
Displaying strategy 2 in 
Table 2.2: exploring 
non-binding soft law via a 
sort of an OMC approach, 
as no legally binding 
decisions shall be made 
under the European 
Semester process (cf. Table 
5.3 of this dissertation), and 
at the same time also 
exploring binding process 
law (via the OLP) to finally 
Yes; 
 The European 
Semester is one of the 
earliest initiatives put 
forward by the Task Force 
chaired by Van Rompuy 
established by the European 
Council meeting on 25-26 
March 2010 (cf. section 
1.3.4); 
 The Commission’s 
Communications of 12 May 
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will make the necessary 
formal proposals contained 
in this Communication by 
end-September [...]. In the 
meantime, the 
Commission invites the 
Ecofin Council of 13 July 
to confirm the launch of 
the surveillance cycle 
under the European 
Semester as of January 
2011 and to endorse the 
revised Code of Conduct 
for the Stability and 
Growth Pact SCPs as 
annexed to the 
Communication” (④, 
p.13); 
 The Ecofin Council 
on 7 September 2010 
“approve(s) the 
amendments to the Code 
of Conduct on 
implementing of the 
Stability and Growth Pact 
and establish(es) the 
launching of the ‘European 
Semester’ as of January 
2011”; ((22), p.2) 
 Based on the two 
Communications, the 
Commission tables the 
proposal: COM(2010) 526 
Final 2010/0280 (COD) 
⑱; 
In September 2010, “the 
Commission presented the 
EU economic governance 
enshrine the European 
Semester in Regulation 
(EU) No 1175/2011;  
Features of the proposals: 
 Taking the severe 
global and European 
financial and economic 
crisis as well as the 
eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis as an opportunity to 
improve the governance and 
coordination of economic 
policies within the EU; 
 Being one organic 
element of the 
Commission’s proposals to 
reinforce EU economic 
governance;①,③,④122 
 Integrating as well as 
making full use of the 
already existing and 
available tools, “cover(ing) 
all elements of economic 
surveillance, including 
policies to ensure fiscal 
discipline, macroeconomic 
stability, and to foster 
growth, in line with the 
Europe 2020 strategy”; (④, 
p.11)  
 “The Commission 
proposes to implement the 
European Semester as of 
2011”, which requires the 
revision of the Code of 
Conduct for SCPs (④,⑤), 
but “[i]mmediate legislative 
changes do not appear to be 
2010 and of 30 June 2010 
“respond to the invitation of 
the European Council to the 
Task Force and the 
Commission to develop its 
orientations further and to 
make them operational” (④, 
p.3); 
 “A constructive 
relationship developed 
between the Commission 
and the Task Force. The 
Commission contributed to 
the work of the Task Force 
through the 
Communications referred to 
above and through ad hoc 
contributions”. (⑱, p.3) 
                                                 
122 For instance, according to COM(2010) 367/2 (30 June 2010) (see source ④ of Table 6.6), the 
Commission’s proposal addresses five aspects, and the European Semester is only one of them: (1) 
broader macroeconomic surveillance (including surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances and 
thematic surveillance of structural reforms), (2) national fiscal frameworks, (3) increased focus on 
public debt and fiscal sustainability in the SGP, (4) effective enforcement of economic surveillance 




‘six-pack’ consisting of 
five Regulations and one 
Directive”, which were 
adopted via “a 
compromise reached 
between Parliament and 
the Council” in September 
2011 ⑲, and via the 
modification of Regulation 
1466/97, the necessary 
national procedures 
required by the European 
Semester are in place and 
become legally binding to 
the member states ②.  
 
necessary”; (④, p.12)  
 “The tools of the 
European semester are 
firmly rooted in the jointly 
agreed Europe 2020 
Strategy and in the Stability 
and Growth Pact”, and the 
effectiveness of the 
European Semester comes 
along with the evolving 
history of the SGP; ⑲ 
 Among the co-decided 
“six pack”, the European 
Semester mechanism was 
finally laid down in 
Regulation (EU) No 




COM(2009) 499 Final, 
2009/0140 (COD); ⑥ 
Displaying strategy 2 in 
Table 2.2: exploring binding 
process law (via the OLP) to 
set up an entirely new 
European body with no 
precedent; nevertheless, the 
ESRB has no legal 
personality and does “not 
have any binding powers to 
impose measures on 
No; 
Against the shocks and 
impacts of the global 
financial crisis, the ESRB 
was initiated by the 
Commission itself, and to be 
exact, by Commission 
President Barroso, who 
requested a group of high 
level experts (the de 
                                                 
123 The “six-pack”, reinforcing both the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP, was introduced 
as EU secondary law and came into force on 13 December 2011, which bound all 27 member states 
with some specific rules for euro members, especially regarding financial sanctions. The “six-pack” 
refers to (1) Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011, (2) Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, (3) 
Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011, (4) Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011, (5) Regulation (EU) No 
1173/2011, and (6) Council Directive 2011/85/EU; the “six-pack” got further complemented and 
developed by another two regulations of 21 May 2013 addressing the euro states (i.e. (7) Regulation 
(EU) No 473/2013 and (8) Regulation (EU) No 472/2013); see “EU Economic Governance” 
(European Commission). The rationales behind the “six-pack” and the relations between the 
European Semester and other measures of EU economic governance were stated clearly in each of the 
five Regulations: “The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked 
and coherent policies for sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and 
jobs, with particular focus on developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international 
trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and 
budgetary policies, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government 
deficits (the SGP), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, 
minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation 
and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.” All 
the Regulations mentioned here were implemented in the context of the European Semester.  
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Member States or national 
authorities” (⑥, p.5); it is “a 
body drawing its legitimacy 
from its reputation for 
independent judgments, 
high quality analysis and 
sharpness in its conclusions” 
(⑥, p.4); though “ESRB 
recommendations will not 
be legally binding”, they 
“cannot be simply 
ignored”(⑥, p.5); “ESRB 
recommendations are soft 
tools” and the addressees 
follow the principle of “act 
or explain” (21). 
Larosière group) to make 
recommendations on the 
EU’s supervisory 
framework; the ESRB is one 
of the de Larosière group’s 
two key recommendations; 
the European Council 
endorsed the relevant 
suggestions on the ESRB 
and requested the 
Commission to prepare 
relevant proposals swiftly so 
as to put the ESRB in place 
in the course of 2010. (⑥, 
p.2; also cf. section 1.3.4) 
The 
ESM 
This permanent rescue mechanism was initiated by the 
decisions of the European Council, and the Treaty 
revisions laying down the legal basis for such a 
mechanism also took place within the European Council 
under the simplified revision procedure prescribed by 
Article 48(6) TEU (which “shall not increase the 
competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties”). The 
Commission accordingly prepared relevant proposals 
about the general features of this new mechanism, 
displaying strategy 2 in Table 2.2 — exploring binding 
process law (via Treaty revisions) to create a new 
intergovernmental organization among the euro states at 
the EU level.  
Evidence:  
A. “On 9 May, based on a proposal of the Commission, 
the Ecofin decided on the establishment of a temporary 
European stabilisation mechanism [...]. This mechanism 
largely respects the basic principles for a permanent robust 
crisis resolution mechanism. [...] Based on this experience, 
the Commission intends in the medium-to-long term to 
make a proposal for a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism.” (③, p.10) 
B. “As it may imply a need for Treaty changes, 
depending on its specific features, it is an issue for the 
European Council”. (⑦, p.12) 
C. “The European Council welcomes the intention of 
the Commission to undertake, in close consultation with 
the President of the European Council, preparatory work 
on the general features of a future new mechanism, i.a. the 
Yes; 
 First, The Final 
Report of the Task Force 
Chaired by Van Rompuy on 
21 October 2010, among 
other things, recommends “a 
robust framework for crisis 
management”, suggesting 
after the temporary 
assistance mechanism (i.e. 
the EFSF and the EFSM), 
the EU “need(s) to establish 
a credible crisis resolution 
framework for the euro area 
capable of addressing 
financial distress and 
avoiding contagion”, which 
“will require further work”; 
(⑦, p.2)  
 Second, the European 
Council of 28-29 October 
2010 endorses the report of 
the Task Force and “agree(s) 
on the need [...] to establish 
a permanent crisis 
mechanism [...] and invite(s) 
the President of the 
European Council to 
undertake consultations with 
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role of the private sector, the role of the IMF and the very 
strong conditionality under which such programmes 
should operate.” (⑧, p.2) 
D. “On 28-29 October [2010] the European Council 
agreed on the need to set up a permanent crisis mechanism 
[...]. Eurogroup Ministers agreed that this European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) will be based on the European 
Financial Stability Facility capable of providing financial 
assistance packages to Euro area Member States under 
strict conditionality functioning according to the rules of 
the current EFSF”. (⑪, p. 13) 
E. “On Sunday (28 November 2010), the Eurogroup 
agreed on the principles and features of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), based on a proposal made by 
the Commission in close cooperation with President 
Herman Van Rompuy”(⑭), which specify the 
participation of private sector creditors and the inclusion 
of standardized and identical Collective Action Clauses 
(“CACs”)124⑭,⑮, ⑰.  
F. “On 16 December 2010, the Belgian Government 
submitted, in accordance with Article 48(6), first 
subparagraph, of the TEU, a proposal for revising Article 
136 of the TFEU by adding a paragraph under which the 
Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism [...]”. (⑨, p.5)  
G. “In its statement of 28 November 2010, the 
Eurogroup stated that standardised and identical Collective 
Action Clauses will be included, in such a way as to 
preserve market liquidity, in terms and conditions of all 
new euro area government bonds. As requested by the 
European Council on 25 March 2011, the detailed legal 
arrangements for including CACs in euro area government 
securities were finalized by the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC)” (ESM Treaty, (11)); consequently, 
“[t]he model CAC was approved by the Economic and 
Finance Committee (EFC) on 18 November 2011”, which 
should be read together with the EFC’s Explanatory Note 
of 26 July 2011 and Supplemental Explanatory Note of 26 
March 2012. ⑯ 
H. Term Sheet on the ESM of 21 March 2011 states “the 
Commission intends to propose a Regulation clarifying the 
the members of the 
European Council on a 
limited treaty change 
required to that effect, not 
modifying Article 125 
TFEU (“no bail-out” 
clause)”; (⑧, p.2) 
 Third, the European 
Council of 16-17 December 
2010 agreed to amend the 
Lisbon Treaty to establish 
the permanent ESM to 
replace the EFSF and the 
EFSM; it reached agreement 
on the draft text of treaty 
revision about adding a third 
paragraph to Article 136 of 
the TFEU;⑨  
 Fourth, after 
consulting the Commission, 
the EP and the ECB, the 
European Council of 24/25 
March 2011 adopted the 
Treaty revisions of the 
TFEU to establish the 
permanent ESM, calling for 
rapid national approval 
procedures to make the 
Treaty amendments 
effective on 1 January 2013; 
meanwhile, it “welcomes 
the decisions taken by the 
euro area Heads of State or 
government on 11 March 
and endorses the features of 
the ESM” and outlines next 
steps of preparing the ESM 
Treaty and the amendments 
to the EFSF agreement and 
of signing both before the 
end of June 2011; (⑩, p.6)  
                                                 
124 CACs “would enable the creditors to pass a qualified majority decision agreeing a legally binding 
change to the terms of payment (standstill, extension of the maturity, interest-rate cut and/or haircut) 




necessary procedural steps under Article 136 of the Treaty 
in order to enshrine the policy conditionality in Council 
decisions and ensure consistency with the EU multilateral 
surveillance framework. The Council and the Commission 
will inform the European Parliament on a regular basis 
about the establishment and the operations of the ESM.” 
(see also ⑩, p.28) 
I. “On 20 June 2011, the representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States of the European Union 
authorized the Contracting Parties of this Treaty to request 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank 
(“ECB”) to perform the tasks provided for in this Treaty” 
(ESM Treaty, (10)) — under the ESM Treaty, the 
Commission, in liaison with the ECB and/or the IMF, is 
entrusted with new tasks, such as carrying out 
post-programme surveillance and negotiating the MoUs of 
financial assistance with the beneficiary countries; as a 
result, “[t]he role of the Commission in the running of 
operations of the ESM is central, and the link of the ESM 
with EU institutions clearly established”⑬.  
 Fifth, the European 
Council of 23/24 June 2011 
states that “[a]greement has 
been reached on the 
European Stability 
Mechanism Treaty and on 
the amendment to the EFSF. 
Member States should take 
all steps required to ensure 
the ratification of the ESM 
Treaty by the end of 2012 
and for the rapid entry into 
force of the amended 
EFSF”, and “Euro area 
Heads of State or 
Government reiterate their 
commitment to do whatever 
is necessary to ensure the 
financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole”. (⑫, 
p.5) 
Sources: ① European Commission-IP/10/561 (12 May 2010); European 
Commission-IP/10/859 (30 June 2010); ② Council of the European Union-13190/10 
PRESSE 230 (7 September 2010); ③COM(2010) 250 Final (12 May 2010); ④COM(2010) 
367/2 (30 June 2010); ⑤Specifications on the Implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and Guidelines on the Format and Content of Stability and Convergence Programmes 
(3 September 2012); ⑥COM(2009) 499 Final (23 September 2009); ⑦The Task Force 
Report (21 October 2010); ⑧European Council 28-29 October 2010 Conclusions; ⑨
European Council 16-17 December 2010 Conclusions; ⑩European Council, 24/25 March 
2011, Conclusions; ⑪ Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of 
11 March 2011; ⑫European Council 23/24 June 2011 Conclusions; ⑬Juncker and Rehn 
(22 March 2011); ⑭Rehn (30 November 2010); ⑮European Commission-MEMO/10/636 
(1 December 2010); ⑯CAC Supplemental Explanatory Note (26 March 2010); ⑰“Annex II 
General Features of the Future Mechanism, Eurogroup Statement of 28 November 2010,” in 
European Council 16-17 December 2010 Conclusions; ⑱COM(2010) 526 Final (29 
September 2010); ⑲European Parliament-2012/0002(NTT); ⑳Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011; (21) Draghi (23 September 2013); (22)European Parliament-PE460.752v01-00 (8 
March 2011).  
 
As illustrated by Table 6.6, the Commission was actively involved in preparing 
proposals for the three new measures and it indeed took a pro-integrative position in 
promoting solutions to the crisis. Nevertheless, the strategies and concrete processes 
for the Commission to put forward proposals display variations. Regarding the 
Commission’s strategies, all three cases confirm strategy 2 listed in Table 2.2: all the 
329 
 
three new measures show the Commission’s resort to binding process law, and 
meanwhile, the European Semester also exhibits the Commission’s strategy of 
exploring non-binding soft law in the form of an OMC. The Commission’s 
employment of strategy 2, instead of other means such as strategy 1 (i.e. formulating 
“package deals” of heterogeneous issues via splitting the difference of national 
positions so as to make the swaps and concessions of different national interests 
possible and thus upgrade the common interests), demonstrates the compelling 
situation of the sovereign debt crisis and a general consensus among member states 
about EU approaches to address the crisis and the necessity of strengthening EU 
economic governance. Nevertheless, according to Table 6.7, the process leading to the 
creation of the ESM does show a package deal concluded by Franco-Germany 
compromises, where the two euro key member states make concessions and swap their 
different interests in reforming the SGP and in making Treaty revisions to establish a 
permanent rescue mechanism, but such a package deal was not hammered out by the 
Commission. Rather, it was reached under the auspices of national government leaders. 
As regards the relations between the Commission’s proposals and the European 
Council’s decisions, among the three cases, the establishment of the European 
Semester and the ESM was under the guidance and initiations of the European Council, 
and as a result, in these two cases, the Commission was like “dancing with chains” in 
tabling the relevant proposals, that is, it was the European Council rather than the 
Commission that firstly initiated and set up the agenda for the new mechanisms, while 
the Commission, in accordance with the directions and decisions of the European 
Council, responded with concrete proposals. The establishment of the ESM represents 
the most cogent case of the Commission’s “dancing with chains”: as Table 6.7 shows, 
the Commission’s proposals follow, that is, are coming after rather than being put 
forward before, the package deal reached by the two key euro countries, Germany and 
France. In comparison, the creation of the ESRB started from the original initiative of 
the Commission and its President Barroso, exemplifying the Commission’s 
independent autonomy and power in EU agenda-setting and policy-making. As 
indicated in Table 6.6, the European Council’s “framing-up” influence on the 
Commission’s proposals is prominent in the case of the ESM, and three kinds of 
proposals (not necessarily tabled by the Commission) leading to the final operation of 
the ESM are discernible: the first type is about the features and the basic principles of 
the financial rescue mechanism, both the temporary and permanent ESM — these 
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proposals were prepared by the Commission (see evidence A, C and E in Table 6.6); 
nevertheless, the detailed legal arrangements for the inclusion of CACs in government 
bonds issued by the euro states, a feature of the permanent ESM proposed by the 
Commission, were under the charge of the EFC, not under the Commission (evidence 
G in Table 6.6); the second category of proposals is relevant to Treaty amendments to 
lay down the legal basis for the permanent ESM — this time the Treaty revision draft 
was proposed by the Belgium government rather than by the Commission (evidence F 
in Table 6.6), and meanwhile, Treaty changes are historical-making decisions and thus 
subject to the decisions of the member states’ heads of government (evidence B and 
evidence from “Second” to “Fifth” in Table 6.6); finally, in order to realize the smooth 
functioning of the ESM as well as coordinating it with other EU institutions and 
surveillance frameworks, the Commission proposed relevant regulations, further 
clarifying necessary procedural steps under Article 136 of the Treaty (evidence H in 
Table 6.6), and moreover, the Commission was entrusted with the negotiation and 
formation of MoUs with the ESM beneficiary state — a sort of proposals based on 
which the ESM shall make its decisions on granting financial rescue packages 
(evidence I in Table 6.6). All the proposals related to the functioning of the ESM 
appear as “jobs” allocated by the European Council to different “agents”: first, the 
Commission was responsible to work out the principles and features of the ESM, 
including the inclusion of CACs; however, the task of specifying the actual operational 
details of the CAC model was assigned to the EFC — a committee set up by the EU to 
promote policy coordination among the member states as well as to provide opinions 
on economic and financial issues (Cf. Article 134 of the TFEU); second, the draft 
proposal for Treaty changes to lay down the legal foundation to create the permanent 
rescue mechanism for the euro states was presented by the government of a member 
state — Belgium, who held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from 
July to December 2010; finally, the Commission actively tabled proposals that 
facilitated the operations of the ESM within the whole EU institutional framework. All 
in all, the cases of the European Semester and the ESM highlight the European 
Council’s functions in providing necessary impetus and defining the general political 
directions for the EU (cf. Article 15(1) the TEU), as well as its president Van 
Rompuy’s pro-integration activities in promoting the solutions to the EU’s ever 
greatest challenge.  
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To sum up, the first half of H1c is vindicated to the degree that “by making 
proposals for the solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, the Commission, not 
necessarily under the framework laid down by the European Council, takes 
pro-integrative approaches to address the crisis”, which, from another perspective, 
confirms the Commission’s initiatives and autonomy in setting up its own agenda in 
promoting the general interest of the EU. 
As for the test of the second half of H1c, previous section 6.1.2 has shown that 
though the ETUC tends to be critical on some issues related to, for example, 
unemployment and austerity measures that could harm the benefits of workers, both 
interest groups of employers (BusinessEurope) and employees (the ETUC) not only 
supported the three new measures but also demanded further integrative steps, so the 
Commission actually formed a coalition with the two prominent interest groups and 
gained their strong support so far as the three new measures are concerned. As for the 
key member states’ positions, generally speaking, they also approved and supported the 
three new measures, or else those new measures would not have come true. Looking 
into the traditionally defined “big three” — Germany, France, and the UK — this 
dissertation finds the following, presented in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7 German, French and UK Governments’ Positions towards the Three New Measures 




A: “A ‘European Semester’ should be 
organized to enhance EU coordination, 
yet without encroaching on the 
budgetary prerogatives of national 
parliaments, which will continue to play 
the leading role in designing and 
controlling national budgets. The 
timetable should be flexible enough to 
take account of national budgetary 
procedures”. ① 
 
B: “We believe that Member States will 
benefit greatly from the introduction of a 
European Semester which will lead to more 
coherence in the way the Commission offers 
advice on how Member States could 
coordinate economic policies across the EU. 
Rather than downgrading the role of national 
parliaments we believe that a European 
perspective can only strengthen national 
parliaments’ scrutiny of their national 
executives by providing more information”. 









was ‘a new 
D: “Early on in the 
crisis, France made the 
reform of financial 
supervision its priority. 
This explains why 
France negotiated the 
seat of commissioner 
E: “The European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) is a key new body in the European 
financial supervisory framework, and will 
serve as the interface between 
macro-economic surveillance and 
macro-prudential supervision. We recommend 












‘a major step 
forward’”. ③ 
 
in charge of the 
internal market and 
financial services, 
which is now held by 
Michel Barnier. The 
French government has 
pushed for the creation 
of a supranational 
framework using 
European authorities, 
as proposed by 
Commissioner Barnier. 
As a result, the 
European Systemic 
Risk Board and three 
other European 
agencies have been 
created”. (④, 
pp.19-20) 
way the ESRB interacts with the Commission 
and Ecofin in the excessive imbalance 
procedure and the SGP. We encourage the 
Government to ensure that the analyses of the 
ESRB are considered, and acted upon, when 
the Commission and Council consider the 
results of the proposed macroeconomic 
surveillance framework. The European 
Central Bank has played a central role in 
managing the crisis and will continue to be a 
cornerstone of EU economic governance. The 
ESRB is the route through which the central 
banks, and the ECB in particular, should be 
able to contribute actively to discussions of 
the fiscal and macroeconomic positions of 
Member States.” (②, para. 276-77) 
F: “The EU’s leaders agreed today on reforms to financial supervision, following a deal 
between the UK, France and Germany on two of the main elements”, one of which is “the 
creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)”; the Commission’s proposal that 
“the president of the European Central Bank (ECB) should chair the ESRC [...] received a 
less than enthusiastic response prior to the summit from some countries outside the 
eurozone, including the UK”, and finally, “agreement struck between the UK, France and 
Germany is that the chair will be elected by the EU’s 27 national bank governors”.③ 
The 
ESM 
G: “Germany has yielded to France’s 
desire for more leniency on this issue 
(plans for reforming the Stability Pact) 
in exchange for Paris backing its plans 
for a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism”; ⑤ 
H: “The French government and most 
French economists have supported the 
creation of a crisis resolution 
mechanism. [...] the French government 
was opposed from the beginning to the 
creation of a European Monetary Fund 
[...]. Nevertheless, France has supported 
the creation of a European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which renders the 
EFSF permanent”; (④, p. 19) 
I: On 19 October 2010, the Deauville 
agreement was reached by the French 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the 
L: “We welcome the Council’s proposals for 
a European Stability Mechanism. The 
existence of a formal way of restructuring 
sovereign debt will encourage the market to 
price better the risks posed by individual 
Member States within the euro area, and 
encourage more responsible fiscal behaviour 
by Member States which will no longer be 
insulated from market forces by their 
membership of the euro. Conditionality is a 
vital element and we support its application. 
The ECB should be consulted on the terms 
and conditions of loans under the ESM. We 
welcome the principle, enshrined in the ESM 
agreement, that the private sector should share 
the burden of any restructuring of sovereign 
debt under the new ESM mechanism. It is 
only right that as they share in the rewards, 
they should share the risks. The ESM will be 
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German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, in 
which relaxing the penalties of the 
Stability Pact and making Treaty 
amendments “so as to compel countries 
which are in economic crisis to declare 
themselves bankrupt and lose the right to 
vote in EU Councils” are agreed; ⑥ 
J: “France and Germany called on 
European Union member states [...] to 
draw up proposals by next March (of 
2011) for a permanent system to handle 
crises in the euro zone by suspending 
voting rights, admitting that it would 
mean changing the EU treaty”; ⑦ 
K: Eurozone chief Jean-Claude Juncker 
criticized the Franco-German deal that: 
“The withdrawal of voting rights for 
budget-sinning countries isn’t a possible 
way forward and I reject any changes to 
the EU treaty in this case”; ⑧ 
L: “Although Juncker rejects some of 
the proposals from Berlin and Paris, he 
agrees with Merkel’s suggestion that the 
Lisbon Treaty needs to be altered to 
include a permanent crisis mechanism”. 
⑤ 
compulsory only for members of the euro 
area. However, we recognize that it might be 
in the UK’s interests to contribute to rescue 
packages for Member States in difficulties, as 
happened with Ireland. In this light, we 
welcome the recent European Council 
proposals which will allow Member States 
outside the euro area to contribute on a 
bilateral basis when they consider it is in their 
national interests. We recognize the expertise 
of the IMF in this area. The IMF has been 
involved in the rescue packages provided to 
Greece and Ireland; we recommend that it 
should be involved in any future rescue 
package provided by the European Stability 
Mechanism”. (②, para.286-89) 
Sources: ①Schaeuble and Lagarde (22 July 2010); ②“Chapter 6: Final Conclusions and 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations,” in The Future of Economic Governance in 
the EU Volume I: Report, House of Lords, UK Parliament; ③Brunsden (19 June 2009, 
European Voice) ④Jamet et al. (2011); ⑤“Brussels Showdown: Merkel and Sarkozy Risk 
Embarrassing Defeat” (Spiegel Online, 28 October 2010); ⑥“Franco-German Coup: the 
Deauville Agreement” (Parliamentary Questions, 20 December 2010); ⑦“Merkel, Sarkozy 
Agree on EU Treaty Change to Handle Crises” (EurActiv, 19 October 2010); ⑧Phillips (28 
October 2010).  
 
Table 6.7 presents the generally favorable opinions of three key EU member 
states (i.e. the “big three”) towards the three new measures. First, as for the 
implementation of the European Semester, there was a common supportive position 
reached by Germany and France, which is represented by the common letter issued by 
the Finance Minister in each country (evidence A in Table 6.7), and the UK also 
supported the operation of the European Semester (evidence B in Table 6.7); apart 
from expressing their consensus of approving this new policy coordination and 
surveillance mechanism, the three countries also gave their suggestions on the 
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European Semester, and they all stressed the prerogative role of national parliaments 
(evidence A and B in Table 6.7). Second, with regard to the ESRB, all the three 
member states supported and pushed the final formulation of the ESRB (evidence C, D, 
E and F in Table 6.7); moreover, evidence F in Table 6.7 once again demonstrates the 
“core status” of the three big countries in EU affairs; nevertheless, the Commission’s 
proposal that the president of the ECB should chair the ESRB received less enthusiasm 
in the non-euro states, typically represented by the UK (evidence F in Table 6.7), but 
still, the UK agreed that the ECB should play a central role in the management of the 
ESRB (evidence E in Table 6.7). Third, concerning the establishment of the ESM, 
Germany and France obviously acted as the promoters and engines in forging the 
permanent rescue mechanism, as backed by evidence G, H, I, J and K in Table 6.7 that 
the finalization of the ESM was the result of negotiations and concessions between the 
two countries. Though the French government opposed the establishment of an EMF, it 
did support the ESM (evidence H in Table 6.7); Germany turned out to be a staunch 
advocate of the ESM, and in order to establish the permanent ESM, it made 
concessions with France in terms of a more lenient SGP reformed plan (evidence G 
and I in Table 6.7) — a package deal, in which Germany and France swaped 
concessions for their different interests. Despite that other EU leaders may not fully 
agree with Franco-German proposals on reforming the SGP, the need to amend EU 
Treaties so as to create a permanent crisis mechanism seems to have gained a 
consensus among EU politicians (evidence J in Table 6.7). As far as the UK is 
concerned, though as a non-euro member, it supported the creation of the ESM among 
the euro state members; furthermore, the UK government defended the conditionality 
accompanying the ESM rescue fund and the involvement of the private sector in the 
ESM. The UK government also expressed its willingness to participate in the ESM in 
light of its own national interests; it stressed the role of the ECB and recommended the 
ever involvement of the IMF in financing troubled countries (evidence L in Table 6.7).  
Table 6.7 reveals several things. First, Germany and France, being the two key 
euro members, played a central role in directing and driving EMU as well as the EU 
through the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Second, the newly adopted measures, to a 
large extent, embody common positions as well as controversies among member states, 
particularly the German-Franco cooperation and compromise, which is regarded as a 





. Finally, it is possible to draw a rough line between euro and non-euro 
states within the EU as for the enthusiasm and activeness to push forward solutions to 
the euro area sovereign debt crisis — another example giving a further confirmation to 
this is that the UK and the Czech Republic decided not to be contracting parties of the 
TSCG
126
. The UK, as an outsider of the euro area, actively joined bilateral loans along 
with the ESM rescue packages for the beneficiary member states in accordance with its 
national interests, and on the affairs involving the general interest of the EU, such as 
the establishment of the ESRB, the UK (together with Germany and France) still 
remains as one of the influential countries. As there is general support for the three new 
measures by these three key nation states, the Commission did ally with those big three. 
Besides, the Commission’s proposals on the ESM followed the instructions of the 
European Council, and the ESM framework was largely defined by Franco-German 
positions. The three cases do not show the Commission’s purposive coalition-making 
with the key member states and interest groups. Rather, in front of the severe financial 
and economic challenges, there was an urgent need to solve the crisis as well as to 
strengthen EMU and EU economic governance. As a result, the Commission, national 
governments, and transnational interest groups shared common positions in addressing 
the crisis.  
Why do the three countries — Germany, France and the UK — appear to have 
the visible influence on the affairs related to the whole EU, while Germany and France 
assume leading roles in affairs specific to the eurozone states? The reason can be found 
in each country’s contributions to the EU and EMU.  
During the past decade, as can be seen from Table 6.8, Germany was the number 
one net contributor to the EU budget, and France followed Germany as the number two; 
after Germany and France were the UK and Italy. During the global financial crisis and 
the eurozone crisis, Germany’s net contributions in 2010 reached the ever highest 
figure of -9.223,6 EUR millions, while France also struck its record of -6.405,8 EUR 
millions in 2011. With regard to the ESM and its predecessor EFSF, as Table 6.9 
shows, Germany and France were the two biggest contributors in both the temporary 
and permanent rescue mechanisms — Germany itself assumed more than a quarter of 
                                                 
125 See Uterwedde (4 June 2013). The Franco-German proposals and deals could lead to another 
topic: Sarkozy’s view of “the creation of a small, inter-governmental ‘core’ of Eurozone States 
without the UK, Scandinavia and Eastern European States”, see Miller (16 April 2012, 4). 
126 This opt-out could lead to another relevant discussion about a “two-speed” Europe and UK 
isolation in the EU, see Miller (27 March 2012). 
336 
 
the whole responsibilities, while the two countries together made up nearly half of the 
whole contributions, so no wonder that Franco-German positions dominated the 
discussions and the formation of the ESM. 
 
Table 6.8 Member States’ Net Contributions to the EU’s Annual Budget, EU-27 (in EUR Millions) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
BE -323,2 -745,2 -517,7 -779,7 -536,1 -607,5 -709,9 -868,2 -720,6 -1.663,9 -1.466,4 -1.369,6 
DK 239,6 -223,1 -169,1 -220,0 -224,6 -265,3 -505,2 -604,4 -543,2 -969,5 -615,3 -836,6 
DE -8.232,4 -6.971,5 -4.954,0 -7.605,4 -7.140,4 -6.064,3 -6.325,2 -7.4215,2 -8.774,3 -6.357,5 -9.223,6 -9.002,5 
GR 4.380,6 4.503,6 3.375,7 3.358,3 4.163,3 3.900,5 5.102,3 5.437,2 6.279,7 3.121,0 3.597,4 4.622,6 
ES 5.263,6 7.661,2 8.859,4 8.704,9 8.502,3 6.017,8 3.811,7 3.615,8 2.813,2 1.1817,7 4.100,9 2.995,0 
FR -676,6 -2.043,4 -2.218,4 -1.976,1 -3.050,7 -2.883,5 -3.012,5 -2.997,3 -3.842,7 -5.872,7 -5.534,8 -6.405,8 
IE 1.719,5 1.198,3 1.574,1 1.559,0 1.593,8 1.136,6 1.080,5 662,1 566,1 -47,5 803,9 383,8 
IT 1.231,2 -2.030,9 -2.917,1 -849,8 -2.946,9 -2.199,0 -1.731,8 -2.013,5 -4.101,4 -5.058,5 -4.534,0 -5.933,0 
LU -54,6 -140,0 -48,1 -57,2 -93,6 -86,8 -60,2 -139,8 -22,1 -100,2 -41,9 -75,0 
NL -1.543,9 -2.259,9 -2.171,3 -1.942,2 -2.034,9 -2.636,6 -2.587,6 -2.864,3 -2.678,2 117,7 -1.833,1 -2.214,0 
AT -435,5 -542,4 -212,6 -330,9 -365,1 -277,9 -301,5 -563,2 -356,4 -402,1 -677,0 -805,1 
PT 2.128,2 1.773,8 2.682,7 3.476,3 3.124,0 2.378,0 2.291,7 2.474,4 2.695,1 2.150,7 2.622,6 2.983,7 
FI 275,9 -153,0 -4,9 -26,7 -69,6 -84,8 -241,0 -171,6 -318,5 -544,2 -300,2 -652,1 
SE -1.058,7 -982,9 -750,4 -945,6 -1.059,8 -866,9 -856,6 -994,8 -1.463,1 -85,6 -1.211,4 -1.325,4 
UK -2.913,7 955,4 -2.528,4 -2.364,9 -2.864,9 -1.529,0 -2.140,2 -4.155,3  -844,3 -1.903,3 -5.625,9 -5.565,6 
CZ - - - - 272,2 178,0 386,2 656,7 1.178,0 1.702,5 2.079,3 1.455,2 
EE - - - - 145,0 154,3 176,4 226,2 227,4 573,0 672,7 350,4 
CY - - - - 63,5 90,3 102,4 -10,5 -17,7 -2,3 10,6 6,9 
LV - - - - 197,7 263,9 255,5 488,8 407,0 501,5 674,2 731,3 
LT - - - - 369,3 476,4 585,3 793,2 842,6 1.493,3 1.358,4 1.368,0 
HU - - - - 193,4 590,1 1.115,0 1.605,9 1.111,7 2.719,4 2.748,4 4.418,3 
MT - - - - 45,0 90,0 101,0 28,1 30,0 8,6 52,9 67,0 
PL - - - - 1.438,3 1.853,2 2.997,6 5.136,4 4.441,7 6.337,1 8.427,5 10.975,1 
SI - - - - 109,7 101,5 142,8 88,6 113,8 241,9 424,1 490,1 
SK - - - - 169,2 270,9 323,2 617,8 725,6 542,1 1.349,6 1.160,6 
BG - - - - - - - 335,1 669,6 624,2 895,5 725,4 
RO - - - - - - - 595,8 1.581,0 1.692,5 1.245,2 1.451,5 
Notes: Negative amounts indicate that the member state concerned has paid more to the EU’s 
budget than it should if there were to be a balance between payments and receipts between 
the EU and the Member State. 










Table 6.9 EFSF Guarantee Commitments, ESM Capital Subscription, and EFSF and ESM 
Contribution Key 












Belgium  27,031.99 3.4666 3,4771 24 339 700 000 
Germany 211,045.90 27.0647 27,1464 190 024 800 000 
Ireland  12,378.15 * 1.5874 1,5922 11 145 400 000 
Spain 92,543.56 11.8679 11,9037 83 325 900 000 
France 158,487.53 20.3246 20,3859 142 701 300 000 
Italy  139,267.81 17.8598 17,9137 125 395 900 000 
Cyprus 1,525.68 0.1957 0,1962 1 373 400 000 
Luxembourg 1,946.94 0.2497 0,2504 1 752 800 000 
Malta  704.33 0.0903 0,0731 511 700 000 
The 
Netherlands 
44,446.32 5.6998 5,7170 40 019 000 000 
Austria 21,639.19 2.7750 2,7834 19 483 800 000 
Portugal 19,507.26 * 2.5016 2,5092 17 564 400 000 
Slovenia 3,664.30 0.4699 0,4276 2 993 200 000 
Slovakia  7,727.57 0.9910 0,8240 5 768 000 000 
Finland  13,974.03 1.7920 1,7974 12 581 800 000 
Greece 21,897.74 * 2.8082 2,8167 19 716 900 000 
Estonia  1,994.86 0.2558 0,1860 1 302 000 000 
Total  779,783.14 100.0000 100.0000 700 000 000 000 
Notes: * Greece, Ireland and Portugal have become stepping-out guarantors as they receive 
EFSF assistance, which means the active Guarantee Commitment under the EFSF is EUR 
726,000.00 million. 
Sources: Figures for the EFSF come from “Annex 1” and “Annex 2” of EFSF Framework 
Agreement; figures for ESM come from the “Annex I” and “Annex II” of the ESM Treaty. 
 
The EU budget is financed by various resources. It is chiefly (99%) funded by its 
own resources, which mainly come from customs duties on imports from outside the 
EU, value added tax (VAT) and gross national income (GNI), and is supplemented by 
other sources of revenue, such as taxes on EU staff salaries and fines paid by 
companies for their breaching of competition laws.
127
 All in all, it appears that a 
member state’s net contributions to the EU budget is proportionate to the size of its 
economy, as data in Table 6.10 exhibit, in 2010 and 2011 Germany, France, the UK in 
terms of GDP were the biggest three among EU-27 member states. As for Germany 
and France’s almost 50% shares in the ESM, obviously, it is due the two euro states’ 
economic power compared with other euro member states. Therefore, as far as the case 
studies of this dissertation are concerned, the leading role of Germany, France and the 
                                                 
127 See “Where Does the Money Come From?” (European Commission).  
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UK is related to their financial contributions to the EU or the relevant projects, and 
their contributions are proportionate to their economic size as indicated by GDP. In 
other words, a member state’s political influence within the regional integration system 
tends to be decided by its contributions to the integration project, which is 
proportionate to the member state’s economic power.
128
 Naturally, the three new 
measures represent big member states’ interests rather than those of small member 
states.  
 
Table 6.10 GDP at Current Market Prices (2001, 2010 and 2011) 
 GDP 
(Euro Billion) (PPS Billion) 
2001 2010 2011 2001 2010 2011 
BE 260 356 370 252 317 327 
DE 2102 2496 2593 1888 2371 2480 
EE 7 14 16 13 21 23 
IE 118 156 156 102 139 143 
GR 146 227 215 187 248 234 
ES 680 1051 1073 789 1128 1150 
FR 1496 1937 1997 1398 1708 1757 
IT 1256 1553 1580 1334 1486 1535 
CY 11 17 18 13 19 20 
LU 23 40 43 20 34 36 
MT 4 6 6 6 8 9 
NL 448 589 602 424 539 549 
AT 214 286 301 200 259 272 
PT 134 173 171 164 208 207 
SI 23 35 36 32 42 43 
SK 24 66 69 56 97 100 
FI 139 179 189 118 150 156 
Euro area 7085 9181 9435 6996 8774 9041 
BG 16 36 38 47 81 84 
CZ 72 149 155 148 204 211 
DK 179 236 239 135 172 175 
LV 9 18 20 18 28 30 
LT 14 28 31 29 46 50 
HU 59 97 101 117 158 165 
PL 212 355 370 360 584 625 
RO 45 124 136 123 244 263 
SE 254 349 387 216 284 300 
UK 1640 1710 1747 1397 1708 1716 
EU-27 9585 12283 12659 9586 12283 12660 
Notes: PPS (purchasing power standard).  
Sources: “National Accounts and GDP” (Eurostat, September and October 2012); own 
calculation for the euro area and EU-27.  
 
                                                 
128 This assumption targets the regional integration projects, which may not always be true for other 
international organizations, such as the relationship between the United Nations (UN) Security 




Table 6.11 The Power and Autonomy of the Commission 
Does the Commission expand its power and autonomy? 
The European Semester The ESRB The ESM 
Yes; 
The Commission publishes the 
AGS, AMR and IDRs, evaluates 
the SCPs and NRPs, gives CSRs, 
and monitors national 
implementation of the CSRs; it 
also gives opinions on euro 
countries’ draft budgetary plans 
and their fiscal situation during 
the national semester; 
furthermore, compared with the 
previous practice, a new 
dimension is added to EU policy 
coordination and economic 
governance under the charge of 
the Commission: carrying out 
surveillance on macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
No; 
The ESRB is an 
independent EU body, and 
it carries out its 
macro-economic prudential 
oversight mission in 
accordance with its own 
procedures; the 
Commission has one vote 
(1/38) in the ESRB 
General Board Meetings. 
Yes; 
The Commission is entrusted with 
new tasks provided by the ESM 
Treaty, such as carrying out 
post-programme surveillance, 
being responsible (in liaison with 
the ECB) to negotiate the terms of 
conditionality attached to each 
financial assistance (i.e. an 
“MoU”); besides, an emergency 
voting procedure in the ESM 
Board of Governors is possible, 
depending upon the assessment 
and conclusions made by both the 
Commission and the ECB. 
Sources: See section 5.2 of this dissertation. 
 
Following the implementation of the new measures, as illustrated by Table 6.11, 
the Commission expanded it power and autonomy under the European Semester and 
the ESM due to the fact that new work was added to the Commission’s domains and 
more responsibilities were assigned to the Commission, while the establishment of the 
ESRB did not see a growing power of the Commission. Therefore, H1c’s assumption 
that the Commission shall expand its power and autonomy along with the 
implementation of new EU measures is not fully justified by the cases.  
Then what is the position of the EP? Examining the EP’s positions on the three 
new measures, Table 6.12 confirms that the EP, like the Commission, also taking 
pro-integrative stances in addressing the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, supported the 








Table 6.12 The EP’s Positions on the Three New Measures 
 On the European Semester 
1. The implementation of the European Semester in the beginning did not require the approval of the 
EP, but the EP involved in this new device mainly in two ways: 
A: The EP and the Council, via the OLP, adopt packages of regulations detailing rules of 
strengthening the surveillance of national economic and fiscal policies and of enhancing EU (and 
particularly the eurozone) economic governance — mainly concerning the reinforcement of the 
preventive and corrective arms of both the SGP and the MIP, which entered into force from 13 
December 2011 onwards (the “six-pack”) ①; among those co-decided rules, the European 
Semester framework was finally codified in Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of 16 November 
2011③, and in line with those rules, the preventive procedures of the SGP and the MIP were 
carried out under the integrated framework of the European Semester, embodied in the 
Commission’s AMR, IDRs and CSRs, so the EP took a pro-integrative stance and actually 
played a substantive role in strengthening the fiscal discipline and economic policy coordination 
within the eurozone and the whole EU; in addition, according to Article 153 TFEU, the EP may 
co-decide with the Council via the OLP or may be consulted to make policies relevant to the 
issues which now are integrated under the European Semester framework. Later, the EP also 
involves in the co-legislation of the “two-pack”, which entered in to force on 30 May 2013 in all 
euro states.  
Two-pack proposed by the European Commission in November 2011. 
B: In accordance with Article 121 TFEU, the EP should be kept informed with the broad 
guidelines and recommendations to the economic policies as well as the results of multilateral 
surveillance; indeed, the EP adopted its resolutions on the performance of the annual European 
Semester. For example, the EP’s resolutions on the first year of the Semester (②) addressed the 
following aspects: it (a) outlined the challenges of the EU, (b) made suggestions for the role of 
the Commission, the EP, the Council and other actors, and (c) recommended sectoral 
contributions to the new mechanism, among which the EP was “concerned about the democratic 
legitimacy of the introduction of the European Semester” (②, item 42), “against the 
establishment of any practice that lacks parliamentary approval at the European or national 
level” (②, item 48) and the EP “should be recognized as the appropriate European democratic 
forum to provide an overall evaluation at the end of the European Semester” (②, item 55). 
Though the implementation of the European Semester was not subject to the EP’s approval and 
the EP expressed its critical opinions and suggestions, the EP initially regards the European 
Semester as a “valid framework” (②, item 3) and then as a “proper framework” (④, item 2).  
No wonder it is assessed that during the course of the first Semester in 2011, the EP played an 
important role in shaping EU economic governance via two ways: “i) own initiative report (INI) 
procedure and initiatives on Interparliamentary Cooperation, ii) co-legislation, which allowed the 
European Parliament to contribute substantially to the reform of EU economic governance and to 
the incorporation of the Economic Dialogue”. (⑨, p.23) 
2. As regards the issues concerned by the ETUC (see Table 6.5), the EP was in line with the position 
of the workers:  
A. The EP “[u]nderlines that the guidelines for the employment policies of Member States and 
the broad economic policy guidelines both form integral parts of the European Semester” (②, 
item 8); “[c]alls on the Commission to ensure that the national policies and targets announced in 
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the National Reform Programmes together add up to a level that is sufficiently ambitious to 
reach the EU 2020 headline targets; expresses its concern about the fact that under the first 
European Semester this was not the case” (②, item 15); “[n]otes that the Member States have 
failed to adhere to commonly agreed rules, in particular the Stability and Growth Pact [...]; calls 
on the Member States to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact and other commonly agreed 
rules” (②, item 65); “[n]otes that measures taken within the framework of National Reform 
Plans, ‘economic governance’ and the European Semester should not contribute to the worsening 
social crisis in a number of countries with more fragile economies, making life more and more 
difficult for families and in particular for women and children, who are the main victims of 
growing poverty, unemployment and precarious and poorly paid work” (②, item 80); “[c]alls on 
the Member States to integrate a gender equality perspective into the European Semester process 
by taking into account women’s needs and situation when implementing the policy guidance 
given in the Annual Growth Survey” (②, item 106); in its resolution of 26 October 2012, the EP 
in consecutive sub-sections expressed its opinions on the issues of “Employment and Social 
Policies”, “Budgetary Policies”, “Internal market”, “Constitutional affairs” and “Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality” ④;  
B. The EP strongly recommends the inclusion and participation of the social partners during the 
European Semester process. For instance, it “[e]emphasizes the need to reinforce and 
institutionalize the Macroeconomic Social Dialogue and considers that social partners must be 
involved in the development of actions the Commission wishes to undertake in the context of the 
European Semester and the implementation of the new economic governance and that social 
partners should address an opinion or, if appropriate, a recommendation to the Commission 
about these actions” (②, item 81); it “stresses that the autonomy of social partners is a crucial 
element of any well-functioning labour market and should be taken into account” (④, item 14); 
(more evidence see ②, items 44, 46, 67, 70, 75 and 112)  
C. The EP suggests its participation (as well as the national parliaments’ involvement) in the 
European Semester process adds a legitimate and democratic dimension to the mechanism — 
evidence for such includes: it “warns [...] against the current form of the Annual Growth Survey 
as a technical document which does not take into account the contribution of the European 
Parliament” (②, item,18) and “against the establishment of any practice that lacks parliamentary 
approval at the European or national level” (②, item,48) (other evidence see ②, items 39, 42 
and 43); it “[n]otes with concern that the European Parliament has been constantly marginalized 
in the main economic decisions resulting from the crisis, and considers that it must be involved 
in order to increase the legitimacy of decisions which affect all citizens” (④, item 27). 
3. The EP supports the Commission’s work: 
The EP takes a supportive stance for the Commission’s work under the European Semester 
mechanism, and it “acknowledges”, “recalls”, “welcomes”, “calls on”, “urges”, and “strongly 
supports” the Commission’s (further) efforts, among which it “[r]eiterates that the Commission 
is in a unique position to develop a truly detailed European macroeconomic plan that can boost 
growth and jobs” (④, item 15).  
4. The EP’s critical voices mainly concern the democratic credibility of the European Semester (also 
see 1 and 2C above in this Table): 
It “[r]egrets that parliamentary scrutiny plays only a minor role in the process, and stresses that 
the European Semester must in no way jeopardize the prerogatives of the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments” (④, item 29); it “[r]eiterates the need to involve Parliament — the 
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only supranational European institution with electoral legitimacy — in economic policy 
coordination” (④, item 34). 
 On the ESRB 
5. The EP and the Council via the OLP (the Position of the European Parliament of 22 September 
2010 (first reading)⑥ and the Decision of the Council of 17 November 2010⑦) have adopted the 
ESRB regulation, which led to the establishment of the ESRB of 24 November 2010, and the 
ESRB became operational from 1 January 2011. ⑤  
6. The EP supports the Commission’s proposal on the establishment of the ESRB, and it “called 
repeatedly for the reinforcement of a true level playing field for all actors at the level of the Union 
while pointing out significant failures in the Union’s supervision of ever more integrated financial 
markets”; furthermore, it also believed that “there is a need for a strong commitment on the part of 
the Union at the global level” so far as macro-prudential oversight is concerned. ⑤  
7. The ESRB is held accountable to the EP and the Council, and “[b]y 17 December 2013, the 
European Parliament and the Council shall examine this Regulation on the basis of a report from 
the Commission and, after having received an opinion from the ECB and the ESAs, shall 
determine whether the mission and organization of the ESRB need to be reviewed” (⑤, Article 
20).  
 On the ESM 
8. The EP supports the establishment of the ESM and takes a pro-integrative stance on building up 
EU economic governance, as the EP:  
A: “Endorses the draft European Council decision [...]; agrees with the view expressed in the 
opinion by the ECB supporting recourse to the Union method allowing for the European stability 
mechanism to become a Union mechanism at an appropriate point in time”; (⑧, item 14) 
B: “Considers that it is essential to go beyond the temporary measures aimed at stabilizing the 
euro area [...]; takes the view that the reinforcement of the SGP, the European semester, the EU 
2020 strategy and the amendment of Article136 TFEU concerning the European stability 
mechanism are only a first step in that direction;” (⑧, item 5) 
C: “Notes that the Council has not used all the possibilities provided for by the Treaties to fully 
enforce the SGP and to improve economic coordination at European Union level”; (⑧, item 4)  
D: “Regrets that the European Council has not explored all the possibilities contained in the 
Treaties for establishing a permanent stability mechanism”; (⑧, item 9)  
E: “[E]ncourag(s) the participation in the European stability mechanism of those Member States 
whose currency is not yet the euro”; (⑧, item 11) 
9. The EP supports the Commission: 
A: The EP “considers that the Commission must be a member of the board of this mechanism, 
and not simply an observer; considers, moreover, that in this context the Commission should be 
entitled to take the appropriate initiatives in order to achieve, with the consent of the Member 
States concerned, the objectives of the European stability mechanism”; (⑧, item 7) 
B: The EP suggests that “the Commission should play a strong central role in the monitoring of 
the implementation of the commitments, in particular so as to ensure that measures are 
compatible with, and supportive of, the EU rules and the involvement of Parliament”. (⑧, item 
12) 
10: The EP’s main critical voices on the ESM include:  
A: “Warns that the intention to establish the permanent stability mechanism outside the EU 
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institutional framework poses a risk to the integrity of the Treaty-based system” and “[s]tresses 
that the establishment and functioning of the permanent stability mechanism must fully respect 
the core principles of democratic decision-making such as transparency, parliamentary scrutiny 
and democratic accountability; emphasizes that the European stability mechanism should closely 
involve the Union institutions and bodies responsible for monetary issues — the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB)”; (⑧, 
item 7-8) 
B: “Insists that compliance by Member States [...] with the conditions imposed by the European 
stability mechanism needs to be scrutinized by Parliament, and stresses that each national 
parliament shall be fully involved, in accordance with their budgetary and control rights, at all 
stages, especially in the context of the European semester, in order to increase the transparency, 
ownership and accountability of any decision taken”. (⑧, item 17) 
Sources: ①Till the end of 2013, the package of the new set of rules includes six Regulations 
of the EP and the Council, one Council Regulation, and one Council Directive, among which 
four Regulations of the EP and the Council, the Council Regulation and Directive make up 
what it is called “six-pack” — EU secondary law covering both fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance and applying to all member states with some specific rules for the euro states, 
and the other two Regulations as a continuum to the six-pack reform specifically targeted at 
the eurozone countries and becoming effective as of 30 May 2013 are called “two-pack”; see 
footnote 123 of this dissertation; ②European Parliament-P7_TA(2011)0542 (1 December 
2011); ③Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011; ④European Parliament-P7_TA(2012)0408 (26 
October 2012); ⑤ESRB Regulation (i.e. Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010)); ⑥Council of the 
European Union-16452/10 PRESSE 303 (17 November 2010); ⑧ European 
Parliament-P7_TA(2011)0103 (23 March 2011); ⑨Hallerberg et al. (September 2012).  
 
Examining the EP’s positions on the three new measures, Table 6.12 confirms 
that the EP, like the Commission, also took pro-integrative stances in addressing the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis (particularly 1, 5, 6 and 8 in Table 6.12) and it indeed 
supported the Commission’s proposals (3, 5, 6 and 9 in Table 6.12) so far as the three 
selected cases are concerned. As regards the European Semester, the EP stressed the 
Commission’s “unique position” in developing macroeconomic plans which would 
promote economic growth and job creation across the EU (3 in Table 6.12). On the 
issue of establishing the ESRB, the EP in its first reading already approved the 
Commission’s proposal (5 in Table 6.12), and moreover, it encouraged the 
Commission to play a major (and even a leading) role in macro-prudential oversight 
affairs at the global level (6 in Table 6.12). As for the creation and operation of the 
ESM, the EP not only recommended the Commission to be a member of the ESM 
Board of Governors rather than being in the status quo of an observer, but also 
emphasized the Commission’s functions and powers in initiating new proposals and 
monitoring national commitments under the ESM (9 in Table 6.12).  
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Two features are exhibited in the EP’s positions towards the three new measures. 
First, the EP expressed its concerns and criticism on the new measures’ legitimacy and 
democratic credibility. Among the three new measures, the ESRB was prescribed to be 
held accountable to the EP and the Council (7 in Table 6.12), but for the other two, the 
EP voiced its critical opinions on the lack or inadequate involvement and participation 
of the EP (as well as national parliaments) (1B, 4 and 10 in Table 6.12). Nevertheless, 
the EP’s critical stances on the new measures’ legitimacy and the inclusion of the EP 
into the new measures mean to strengthen the prerogative status of the EP and of 
possibly increasing the power of the EP. In this regard, as for the ESRB, the EP, 
together with the Council, got empowered to make decisions before 17 December 2013 
on whether the current structure and operation of the ESRB needed to be reviewed and 
accordingly changed (7 in Table 6.12); regarding the European Semester and the ESM, 
the implementation of the European Semester will strengthen the prerogative status of 
the EP and the national parliaments (1B, 2C, 4 and 10B in Table 6.12) if EP resolutions 
are followed, while the operation of the ESM shall further increase the powers of the 
EP as the EP suggests that member states’ commitments to the ESM rescue 
conditionality should also be put under the scrutiny of the EP (10 B in Table 6.12). 
Therefore, from another perspective, the EP, while displaying cultivated spillover 
effects, also seeks to strengthen its prerogative status and to extend its power by 
making the new measures held accountable to the EP, which indicates mutual support 
among EU supranational institutions. Second, the EP’s pro-integrative stances are in 
line with those of the transnational interest groups represented by BusinessEurope and 
the ETUC — in particular, the EP’s views on the European Semester echo and support 
the concerns of the workers represented by the ETUC on the issues such as 
unemployment, gender inequality, the welfare of common citizens, the participation of 
social partners, and the involvement of national parliaments and the EP (4 in Table 6.5 
and 2 in Table 6.12), and the ETUC actually called for a full involvement of the EP in 
the European Semester (4C in Table 6.5). Therefore, this dissertation draws the 
conclusion that in front of the severe sovereign debt crisis, major actors within the EU 
tended to reach common agreements and willingly took further integrative steps. 
To summarize, H1c is confirmed in the way that “through proposal making on 
the solutions to the sovereign debt crisis, the Commission, not necessarily under the 
framework laid down by the European Council, takes pro-integrative approaches to 
address the crisis; as a consequence, the Commission, while due to the severe crisis not 
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purposively building coalitions with the key member states and interest groups, gets its 
power and autonomy expanded in two cases among the three (i.e. the European 
Semester and the ESM), and meanwhile, the EP, also taking pro-integration positions 
and supporting the Commission’s proposals, seeks the extension of its authorities and 
powers,” among which the findings of “not necessarily” suggest that: 
Proposition 7: In formulating solutions to the crisis, the Commission’s proposed 
initiatives tend to be framed up by the European Council and/or the Council of the 
Minister rather than by the Commission itself, which indicates that the fate of the EU 
still largely rests in the hands of the nation states. 
The conclusions to H1c illuminate another two features of cultivated spillover:  
Proposition 8: Confronted with crises, two main EU institutions, the Commission 
and the EP, not only tend to forge common supportive positions towards the EU 
project, but also tend to take further pro-integrative measures to push the EU forward.  
Proposition 9: EU supranational institutions tend to take crises as opportunities 
to expand their powers and autonomy. Meanwhile, EU institutions tend to mutually 
support each other’s positions.  
This dissertation would call proposition 9 “a synergy of the cultivated spillover 
effects of EU institutions” as in case studies the Commission and the EP have shown 
mutual support for each other’s policy stances. Furthermore, taking national 
governments’ and interest groups’ pro-integrative positions (i.e. the effect of political 
spillover) into account (see section 6.1.2), there is another type of synergy between 
political spillover and cultivated spillover: 
Proposition 10: Confronted with crises, actors within the EU, both institutional 
and non-institutional, not only tend to forge common pro-integrative positions toward 
the crises, but also willingly take new integrative steps, thus pushing EU political 
integration further. Meanwhile, these actors tend to support each other’s positions. 
It is interesting to observe that faced with severe crisis, “package deals” as a 
traditional means adopted by the Commission to upgrade common interests are 
concluded by EU member states before the Commission proposes, and member states’ 
political clout on EU/EMU affairs appears to be largely decided by their financial 
contributions to the EU budget and the relevant projects:  
Proposition 11: A member state’s contributions to the EU integration project, 
which are largely proportionate to its economic power, decide its political status and 
political clout within the EU system, that is, the stronger an economy is, the bigger 
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share it shall contribute, and then the greater influence it shall exert over EU policy 
making; consequently, the EU’s developments tend to reflect the biggest member states’ 
interests.  
Proposition 11 actually offers an explanation as to why the Commission tends to 
build a coalition with the key member states, and it appears that the economic power is 
the base of political status and influence. As section 2.5.1 of Jensen’s 
institutional/legalistic spillover explains, the voting weights and thresholds entailed in 
QMV embody the rationale of striking a balance between the larger and smaller 
member states, so from another angle, economic strengths and democratic equality are 
the two poles that define the contour of the EU. Besides, Proposition 7 suggests that at 
the crucial moment of the EU, nation states’ leading role is prominent, and this actually 
confirms certain intergovernmentalist propositions.  
 
6.1.4 Evidence for H1d: Relations between the Three Types of Spillover 
To solve the euro area sovereign debt crisis requires coordination of various policies 
(see Tables 1.2 and 1.3), and thus the inherently expansive nature of this issue is 
prominent; nevertheless, as Table 6.11 suggests, the autonomy and power of the 
Commission did not necessarily increase along with the adoption of the EU’s new 
measures — one case of the three (i.e. the establishment of the ESRB) does not show a 
power expansion of the Commission. As far as European citizens’ attitudes towards the 
EU are concerned, they should be topic-specific — people may have different opinions 
on different issues. European public support for EMU with the single currency is 





Figure 6.6 European Public Opinion about EMU with the Single Currency, EU-27*  
Notes: Results are based on the question: “What is your opinion on a European economic and 
monetary union with one single currency, the euro? Please tell me whether you are for it or 
against it.” 
* The figures of EU-27 do not include Croatia, which became the 28th member of the 
EU as of 1 July 2013. 
Sources:Adapted from Standard Eurobarometer 79 ( Spring 2013, 23).  
 
According to Figure 6.6, the assumption that “European citizens’ support for the 
EU project also tends to increase” is refuted, and the results show the opposite: since 
the beginning of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis from the autumn of 2008, citizen 
support rates of the EU-27 for EMU have exhibited a decreasing trend. Viewed in an 
even longer time span from the spring of 2006 to the spring of 2013, EU public support 
for the single currency keeps a positive rising trend till the spring of the 2007, and 
afterwards, it displays a declining trend in general, dropping from the highest record of 
63% in the spring of 2007 to the lowest point of 51% in the spring of 2013, with a 
two-percentage-point rebound from the spring (56%) to the autumn (58%) during 2010. 
Meanwhile, more and more Europeans take an opposing position towards EMU and the 
euro: the “against” rates have increased from 34% in spring 2006 to 37% in spring 
2010 and then to 42% in spring 2013 — the ever highest rate since the global financial 
crisis as well as in the past seven years. Naturally, there is a trade-off between the “for” 
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and the “against”. In comparison, the “do not know” rates stay stable, floating between 
6% and 8% during the past seven years. Figure 6.7 further specifies the supporting 
rates for the monetary project in each member state in 2013.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 National Results of Support for EMU with a Single Currency, 2013 
Notes: Results are based on the question: “What is your opinion on a European economic and 
monetary union with one single currency, the euro? Please tell me whether you are for it or 
against it.” 
Sources: Adapted from Standard Eurobarometer 79 (Spring 2013, 24).  
 
According to Figure 6.7, in 2013, the most supportive countries include Slovakia 
(77%), Slovenia (77%), Luxembourg (77%), Belgium (76%), Finland (75%), and 
Estonia (73%) — the support rates in those six member states exceed 70%. At the same 
time, the UK and Sweden only have 15% and 19% support rates while the opposing 
rates in both countries register the same records among all: 79% — the UK and 
Sweden turn out to be the least supportive members. The Czech Republic, Denmark 
and Poland follow the UK and Sweden closely, with 71%, 66%, and 63% disapproval 
rates respectively. Among the most supportive and the most opposing member states, a 
distinctive pattern of the euro v.s. non-euro member states emerges. All the six most 
supportive countries in 2013 are euro members, while another six members with the 
highest opposing rates (all above 50%) are all non-euro states; among those most 
supportive, the new members of the EU after the 2004 enlargement who adopted the 
single currency (i.e. Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia) have high support rates for the 
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in 2013, national support for EMU with the single currency reached 66% and 62%, 
respectively, being above the EU-27 average of 51% and thus displaying sound records. 
However, the opposing rates in the two states at the same time struke at 29% and 33% 
each, which are not commensurate with their leading roles in pushing and formulating 
the solutions addressing the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, thus suggesting a 
gap/disconnect between the governmental elites and the mass in the two countries.  
Though the average support rates for the monetary union reached the lowest 
point (51%) in spring 2013 since the spring of 2006, Figure 6.8 shows that the EU is 
constantly seen as the most effective actor to tackle the crisis since the spring of 2009. 
According to Figure 6.8, European citizens, though placing the EU as the best actor to 
deal with the ongoing crisis, also believe national governments assume similar 
importance as the EU. In spring 2013, the average support rate for the national 
government was 21%, only 1% less than for the EU (22%); actually in spring 2012, 
citizens feel that the best actor choice goes to both the national government and the EU 
equally with the same rates of 21%. During the time period from spring 2009 to spring 
2013, public support for the EU as being the most effective actor to tackle the crisis 
reached the highest rate of 26% in spring 2010, while 21% was the highest rate for the 
support for the national government. In general, the EU is always regarded as the most 
effective actor to deal with the crisis. Figure 6.8 reveals that citizens’ choice of the 
national government as the best actor to address the crisis has suddenly increased from 
12% to 19% during the course of the spring 2009 to the autumn of 2009, then keeping 
around 20% to the spring of 2013. Obviously, as the global financial crisis began to 
exert negative repercussions on the EU economy and triggered the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis in the fall of 2009, European citizens’ opinions on the most effective way to 
cope with the economic and financial crisis across the EU got changed. Figure 6.8 
suggests that after the financial crisis, not only do more choices go to the national 
government, but also the support for the Group of Twenty (G-20) and the US has fallen 
greatly, as the figures for the former dropped from 20% in spring 2009 to 14% in 
spring 2011, and then to 13% in spring of 2013 while the statistics for the latter 
decreased from 16% in spring 2009, to 7% in spring 2011, then to 5% in autumn 2011, 
but rose to 8% in autumn 2012 and spring 2013. The view to take the IMF as the best 
actor remains relatively stable with + 1% around 14% after the autumn of 2009. 
Besides, the “do-not-know” answers have increased slightly since the spring of 2009 
and in spring 2013, 14% respondents chose this category, suggesting the uncertainty 
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among European citizens on how and who can solve the ongoing eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. Finally, Figure 6.8 just presents the average of the EU-27 on the question 
concerned, and there are variations among member states. According to Standard 
Eurobarometer 75 (Spring 2011, 10), though “the belief that the EU is best able to take 
effective action against the effects of the financial and economic crisis is held by a 
majority of respondents in 16 Member States”, “the EU has lost its first place since 
autumn 2010 in three countries: France (EU, 18%, -4; national government, 21%, +4), 
Germany (EU, 20%, -2; IMF, 21%, +3) and Malta (EU, 25%, -6; national government, 
39%, +13)”, which reflect the gap between the elites and the common citizens in 
Germany and France, the two core euro members. Standard Eurobarometer 75 (Spring 
2011, 9) also reported that “respondents in the euro area first choose the EU (23%), 
whereas non-euro countries rank their national government first (24%), ahead of the 




Figure 6.8 Public Opinion on the Most Effective Level to Tackle the Crisis, EU-27 
Notes: Results are based on the question: “In your opinion, which of the following is best 
able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?” 
Sources: Data for EB 78 Aut.2012 and EB79 Sp.2013 come from Standard Eurobarometer 79 
(Spring 2013, 27); for EB 76 Aut. 2011and EB 77 Sp.2012 from Standard Eurobarometer 77 
(Spring 2012, 20); for EB 71. Sp. 2009-EB 75 Sp.2011 from Standard Eurobarometer 75 
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To conclude, H1d is confirmed to the degree that “as the inherently expansive 
task (i.e. to solve the eurozone sovereign debt crisis) is assigned to EU supranational 
institutions, the autonomy and power of EU institutions — typically represented by the 
Commission — do not necessarily expand (see sec.tion 6.1.3). Meanwhile, European 
citizens’ support for the EU project is topic- and country-specific: European citizens’ 
support for EMU with the single currency has notably decreased, while the average 
figures constantly place the EU as the most capable actor to address the crisis. 
Therefore, functional spillover effects do not always trigger the power expansion of EU 
institutions and the increase of public support for the EU project. Obviously, “actors” 
mentioned in political spillover (H1b) do not cover all EU citizens, but rather they refer 
to elites and interest group leaders, governmental or non-governmental. During the 
crisis, European public support for EMU and its single currency decreased, while the 
political spillover mechanisms (H1b) were effective, so there was a cleavage between 
the elites and the mass. Findings on the issue of national support for the EU and EMU 
along with the test of H1d (as well as national government positions towards the EU’s 
new measures in H1c) suggest the following:  
Proposition 12: There is a distinctive line between the euro and non-euro states 
within the EU: the euro countries tend to be more supportive of the EMU project and 
more enthusiastic about EMU affairs than the non-euro countries.  
Proposition 13: During the crisis, the support rates for EMU tend to decrease, 
and thus the gap between public and elite support for the EMU project tends to get 
enlarged rather than narrowed.  
Proposition 14: During the crisis, though the EU is still regarded as the most 
effective level at which to tackle the crisis, the public view seeing national governments 
as the most effective actors to cope with the crisis tends to increase.  
 
6.2 Evidence for H2: Conditions for Spillover and the Claim 
of a Slowed-Down EU Integration Pace 
In accordance with the preliminary analyses in section 2.1.1.5, this dissertation will 
now examine the extent of the four factors’ presence judged by the proposed 
measurements (indicators).  
First, the internal trade statistics in Table 6.3 illustrated an increasing economic 
interdependence among EU states (see Figure 6.9). According to Table 6.3 and Figure 
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6.9, euro area trade in goods with other EU members displayed an increasing trend in 
both exports and imports during the whole decade spanning from 2002 to 2012. 
Despite sharp drops for EU internal trade during the course of 2008 to 2009, in 2010 
the levels of internal exports and imports between the euro area and other EU members 
started to recover and in 2011, both EU-intra exports and imports exceed the 
ante-global-financial-crisis levels. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.9 suggest that the global 
financial crisis originating from the US, together with the very beginning of the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis, has caused serious damage to EU internal trade, but 
from 2010 onwards, the on-going eurozone sovereign debt crisis seems to have no 
negative impact on intra-EU trade, as the trade of the euro countries with other EU 
member states kept a rising momentum from 2010 to 2012.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 Euro Area Trade in Goods with Other EU Member States 
Sources: Own charting on the basis of data in Table 6.3 of this dissertation. 
 
Second, judging from the five indicators proposed in Table 2.3, the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis in the wake of the global financial crisis does suggest a serious 
crisis of sufficient magnitude to both EMU and the EU. In terms of GDP annual 
growth, as Table 6.13 illustrates, the euro area as well as the whole EU suffered a great 
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dropped sharply in 2008 and reached the lowest levels of -4.1% and -4.2% for the 
eurozone and the EU in 2009, respectively. The economic growth of 2010 showed a 
recovering momentum, but after 2010, 2011 and 2012 continuously witnessed 
economic recessions, and the GDP growth rates in 2012 turned out to be negative again 
with -0.6% for the euro area and -0.4% for the EU. Taking the EU-27 as a whole, the 
shock of the global financial crisis to the EU economy is considerable (Figure 6.10), 
and since 2009, the EU has been struggling through the mire of the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis, and till 2012, GDP annual growth has not recovered to the level before the 
crisis.  
Table 6.13 GDP Growth Rates (%) of the EU Member States, 2007-2012 1) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BE 2.8 0.8 -3.0 2.4   1.8 -0.3 
DE 2.5 1.3 -5.0 4.0  3.3 0.7 
EE … … … 3.3   8.3 3.2 
IE 6.0 -0.3 -7.1 -1.1   2.2 0.2 
GR 2) 4.5 2.0 -2.0 -4.9   -7.1 -6.4 
ES 3.6 0.9 -3.6 -0.2   0.1 -1.6 
FR 2.3 0.4 -2.3 1.7   2.0 0.0 
IT 1.4 -1.3 -5.1 1.7   0.4 -2.4 
CY 5.1 3.6 -1.7 1.3   0.5 -2.4 
LU 6.5 0.0 -3.4 2.9   1.7 0.3 
MT 3.8 2.1 -1.9 3.2   1.8 1.0 
NL 3.6 2.0 -4.0 1.5   0.9 -1.2 
AT 3.5 2.0 -3.6 1.8   2.8 0.9 
PT 1.9 0.0 -2.7 1.9  -1.6 -3.2 
SI 6.8 3.5 -7.8 1.3   0.7 -2.5 
SK 10.6 6.2 -4.7 4.4   3.2 2.0 
FI 4.9 1.2 -7.8 3.4   2.7 -0.8 
Euro area 2.8 0.6 -4.1 2.0   1.5 -0.6 
BG 6.2 6.0 -5.0 0.4   1.8 0.8 
CZ 6.1 2.5 -4.2 2.5  1.8 -1.2 
DK 1.7 -0.9 -4.9 1.6   1.1 -0.4 
EE 7.2 -3.6 -14.1 … … … 
HR … … … -2.3 0.0 -2.0 
LV 10.0 -4.6 -18.0 -0.9  5.5 5.6 
LT 9.8 2.8 -14.8 1.5   5.9 3.7 
HU 1.0 0.6 -6.3 1.3   1.6 -1.7 
PL 6.8 5.0 1.8 3.9  4.5 1.9 
RO 6.3 7.3 -7.1 -0.9   2.3 0.4 
SE 2.5 -0.2 -4.9 6.6   3.7 0.7 
UK 2.6 0.5 -4.9 1.7   1.1 0.2 
EU 2.9 0.7 -4.2 2.0   1.6 -0.4 
Notes: 1) Annual percentage changes in volume and quarterly data seasonally adjusted, 
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unless otherwise indicated. 
 2) Statistics for 2010, 2011, 2012, quarterly data unadjusted. 
Sources: Statistics for 2007-2009 come from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (June 2010, 39) and 






Figure 6.10 Annual GDP Growth Rates in the EU  
Sources: Own Charting on the basis of the following: statistics for 2000-2002 come from 
ECB Statistics Pocket Book (December 2003, 36); for 2003-2004 from ECB Statistics Pocket 
Book (June 2005, 37); for 2005-2006 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (June 2007, 37); for 






























Table 6.14 General Government Deficit (-)/Surplus (+) as a Percentage of GDP (%), 2006-2012 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BE 0.3 -0.2 -1.2 -5.6 -3.8  -3.7 -3.9 
DE -1.6 0.2 0.0 -3.1    -4.1 -0.8 0.2 
EE … … … -2.0   0.2 1.2 -0.3 
IE 3.0 0.1 -7.3 -13.9    -30.8 -13.4 -7.6 
GR -3.6 -5.1 -7.7 -15.6    -10.7 -9.5 -10.0 
ES 2.0 1.9 -4.1 -11.2   -9.7 -9.4 -10.6 
FR -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5   -7.1 -5.3 -4.8 
IT -3.3 -1.5 -2.7 -5.5    -4.5 -3.8 -3.0 
CY -1.2 3.4 0.9 -6.1    -5.3 -6.3 -6.3 
LU 1.4 3.6 2.9 -0.8    -0.9 -0.2 -0.8 
MT -2.6 -2.2 -4.5 -3.7    -3.6 -2.8 -3.3 
NL 0.5 0.2 0.7 -5.6    -5.1 -4.5 -4.1 
AT -1.5 -0.4 -0.4 -4.1    -4.5 -2.5 -2.5 
PT -3.9 -2.6 -2.8 -10.2    -9.8 -4.4 -6.4 
SI -1.3 0.0 -1.7 -6.2  -5.9 -6.4 -4.0 
SK -3.5 -1.9 -2.3 -8.0  -7.7 -5.1 -4.3 
FI 4.0 5.2 4.2 -2.5    -2.5 -0.8 -1.9 
Euro area -1.3 -0.6 -2.0 -6.4   -6.2 -4.1 -3.7 
BG 3.0 0.1 1.8 -4.3   -3.1 -2.0 -0.8 
CZ -2.6 -0.7 -2.7 -5.8    -4.8 -3.3 -4.4 
DK 5.2 4.8 3.4 -2.7    -2.5 -1.8 -4.0 
HR . . . . . . . 
EE 2.5 2.6 -2.7 … … … … 
LV -0.5 -0.3 -4.1 -9.8    -8.1 -3.6 -1.2 
LT -0.4 -1.0 -3.3 -9.4    -7.2 -5.5 -3.2 
HU -9.3 -5.0 -3.8 -4.6    -4.3 4.3 -1.9 
PL -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.4    -7.9 -5.0 -3.9 
RO -2.2 -2.5 -5.4 -9.0    -6.8 -5.6 -2.9 
SE 2.5 3.8 2.5 -0.7    0.3 0.2 -0.5 
UK -2.7 -2.8 -4.9 -11.5    -10.2 -7.8 -6.3 
EU -1.4 -0.8 -2.3 -6.9    -6.6 -4.5 -4.0 
Sources: Statistics for 2006-2008 come from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (June 2010, 45), 
and statistics for 2009-2012 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (September 2013, 45).  
 
Regarding national budget deficits, Table 6.14 shows that in 2009 the average 
government budget deficits in the euro area and the whole EU reached the highest 
levels of -6.4% and -6.9% of GDP, and from 2010 to 2012, the average budget deficits 
suggest a decreasing trend, at -3.7% and -4.0% for the euro area and the EU 
respectively, still above the SGP criterion of 3% of GDP. Meanwhile, the 
governmental debt rates exhibit an increasing trend from 2007 to 2012, during which 
they suddenly surge up with more than 10 percent points for both the eurozone and the 
EU from 2008 to 2009. The average figures of the government debts from 2009 to 
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2012 keep steadily rising, which also already exceed the SGP criterion of 60% of GDP.  
 
Table 6.15 General Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP, 2006-2012 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BE 88.1 84.2 89.8 95.7  95.5 97.8 99.6 
DE 67.6 65.0 66.0 74.5    82.4 80.4 81.9 
EE … … … 7.2 6.7 6.2 10.1 
IE 24.9 25.0 43.9 64.8    92.1 106.4 117.6 
GR 97.8 95.7 99.2 129.7    148.3 170.3 156.9 
ES 39.6 36.2 39.7 53.9    61.5 69.3 84.2 
FR 63.7 63.8 67.5 79.2    82.4 85.8 90.2 
IT 106.5 103.5 106.1 116.4    119.3 120.8 127.0 
CY 64.6 58.3 48.4 58.5    61.3 71.1 85.8 
LU 6.5 6.7 13.7 15.3  19.2 18.3 20.8 
MT 63.7 61.9 63.7 66.4    67.4 70.3 72.1 
NL 47.4 45.5 58.2 60.8   63.1 65.5 71.2 
AT 62.2 59.5 62.6 69.2   72.0 72.5 73.4 
PT 64.7 63.6 66.3 83.7  94.0 108.3 123.6 
SI 26.7 23.4 22.6 35.0  38.6 46.9 54.1 
SK 30.5 29.3 27.7 35.6  41.0 43.3 52.1 
FI 39.7 35.2 34.2 43.5    48.6 49.0 53.0 
Euro area 68.3 65.9 69.4 80.0  85.4 87.3 90.7 
BG 22.7 18.2 14.1 14.6   16.2 16.3 18.5 
CZ 29.4 29.0 30.0 34.2    37.8 40.8 45.8 
DK 32.1 27.4 34.2 40.7  42.7 46.4 45.8 
EE 4.5 3.8 4.6 … … … … 
HR . . . . . . . 
LV 10.7 9.0 19.5 36.9   44.4 41.9 40.7 
LT 18.0 16.9 15.6 29.3    37.9 38.5 40.7 
HU 65.6 65.9 72.9 79.8    81.8 81.4 79.2 
PL 47.7 45.0 47.2 50.9  54.8 56.2 55.6 
RO 12.4 12.6 13.3 23.6    30.5 34.7 37.8 
SE 45.7 40.8 38.3 42.6   39.4 38.4 38.2 
UK 43.5 44.7 52.0 67.8   79.4 85.5 90.0 
EU 61.4 58.8 61.6 74.0    79.9 82.3 85.4 
Sources: Statistics for 2006-2008 come from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (June 2010, 46), 
and statistics for 2009-2012 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book, September (2013, 46).  
 
As regards inflation rates, the quantitative target of the ECB pursing price 
stability for the euro area aims at below, but close to, 2% of the annual increase of the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) over the medium term, avoiding both 
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inflation above 2% and price level declining of deflation.
129
According to Table 6.16 
and Figure 6.11, the average HICP figure of 2.0% for the euro area in the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century shows that the ECB performs its main function well: keeping price 
stability for the eurozone and maintaining the euro’s purchasing power; nevertheless, 
the impact of both the global financial crisis and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis on 
the inflation rates is obvious. For the euro area, the inflation rates increased from 2.1% 
in 2007 to 3.3% in 2008, and then slumped to 0.3% in 2009; in 2010 rates recovered to 
1.6% and kept at a comparatively high level of 2.7% and 2.5% in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively. The inflation rates for the whole EU also display such a pattern of 
suddenly surging, then plummeting and then again rising to a higher level above 2%. 
The global financial crisis and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis caused a big swing of 
the inflation rates, illustrating the repercussions and negative influence of the crises on 
the economies of the euro countries and the whole EU (see Figure 6.11), but still 



















                                                 
129 See “ECB Monetary Policy: Introduction” (ECB).  
359 
 























BE 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.8 4.5 0.0 2.3  3.4 2.6 
DE 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.8 0.2 1.2   2.5 2.1 
EE … … 4.2 … … … … 2.7   5.1 4.2 
IE 2.6 3.4 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 -1.7 -1.6   1.2 1.9 
GR 4.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 4.2 1.3 4.7   3.1 1.0 
ES 2.6 3.2 2.8 3.6 2.8 4.1 -0.3 2.0   3.1 2.4 
FR 1.3 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.6 3.2 0.1 1.7   2.3 2.2 
IT 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.5 0.8 1.6   2.9 3.3 
CY 2.9* 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 4.4 0.2 2.6   3.5 3.1 
LU 1.7 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.7 4.1 0.0 2.8  3.7 2.9 
MT 3.2* 2.5 2.4 2.6 0.7 4.7 1.8 2.0   2.5 3.2 
NL 1.9 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.6 2.2 1.0 0.9  2.5 2.8 
AT 1.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 2.2 3.2 0.4 1.7   3.6 2.6 
PT 2.4 3.2 2.4 3.0 2.4 2.7 -0.9 1.4   3.6 2.8 
SI 8.2 5.5 4.2 2.5 3.8 5.5 0.9 2.1  2.1 2.8 
SK 8.2 5.8 4.1 4.3 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7   4.1 3.7 
FI 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.6 3.9 1.6 1.7   3.3 3.2 
Euro area 2) 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6   2.7 2.5 
BG 10.3** 5.5 6.0 7.4 7.6 12.0 2.5 3.0  3.4 2.4 
CZ 5.8* 2.0 2.3 2.1 3.0 6.3 0.6 1.2   2.1 3.5 
DK 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.7 3.6 1.1 2.2  2.7 2.4 
HR . . 2.9 . . . . 1.1   2.2 3.4 
EE 8.8 3.5 … 4.4 6.7 10.6 0.2 … … … 
LV 4.3* 4.1 5.4 6.6 10.1 15.3 3.3 -1.2   4.2 2.3 
LT 8.2 0.9 3.0 3.8 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2   4.1 3.2 
HU 15.1 5.8 5.6 4.0 7.9 6.0 4.0 4.7   3.9 5.7 
PL 11.0* 2.7 2.8 1.3 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.7   3.9 3.7 
RO 64.2 18.3 12.1 6.6 4.9 7.9 5.6 6.1   5.8 3.4 
SE 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.7 3.3 1.9 1.9   1.4 0.9 
UK 1.4* 1.4 2.1 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3   4.5 2.8 
EU 3) 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1   3.1 2.6 
Notes: *Data for 1997-2000. **Data for 1998-2000.  
1) Annual percentage changes of the HICP. 
2) Data refer to the changing composition of the euro area. Averages take actual euro 
area membership into account for the years of assessment. 
3) The HICP data for the EU take the actual composition of EU membership into 
account. 
Sources: Statistics for 2006-2009, average 1996-2000, and average 2001-2005 from ECB 
Statistics Pocket Book (June 2010, 38); statistics for 2006 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book 
(December 2009, 38), and statistics for 2010-2012 and average 2001-2010 from ECB 





Figure 6.11 Inflation (HICP) in the Euro Area, 2000-2012 
Sources: Own charting on the basis of the following: statistics 2000-2002 come from ECB 
Statistics Pocket Book (December 2003, 17); for 2003-2005 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book 
(June 2007, 18); for 2006-2012 from Table 6.16 of this dissertation. 
 
The effect and magnitude of an economic crisis can also be examined from the 
employment situation. Table 6.17 and Figure 6.12 show a general rising trend of 
unemployment for the euro area from 2007 to 2012, during which two “steep steps” are 
marked by the time period of 2008-2010 and 2011-2012. According to the data in 
Table 6.17, during the course of 2008 to 2009, the average unemployment rate for the 
whole EU increased almost two percentage points, jumping from 7.0% to 8.9%, 
meanwhile the figure for the eurozone rose from 7.6% to 9.4%. In the following three 
years from 2010 to 2012, the unemployment rates for both the euro area and the EU 
continuously climbed up, reaching the highest levels of 11.4% and 10.5% respectively 
in 2012 since 2007 — the situation in the euro area turned out to be much direr than 
that of the whole EU. The financial and sovereign debt crises, therefore, led to 
unprecedentedly high unemployment rates for the euro countries and the EU. From 
2010 to 2012, the figures for the euro area are noticeably above the average of 8.2% for 
the first ten years of this century as well as above the average rates of 10.0% from 1996 
to 2000. As a result, the current unemployment situation of the eurozone turns out to be 

























Table 6.17 Unemployment Rate as a Percentage of the Labor Force (%), 2007-2012 




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BE 8.7  7.8 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.2   7.2 7.6 
DE 8.9  8.9 8.4 7.3 7.5 7.1   6.0 5.5 
EE . 9.8 … … … 16.9  12.5 10.1 
IE 7.8  6.3 4.6 6.3 11.9 13.9   14.7 14.7 
GR -  9.8 8.3 7.7 9.5 12.5   17.7 24.3 
ES 15.5  12.0 8.3 11.4 18.0 20.1  21.7 25.1 
FR 10.4  8.9 8.3 7.8 9.5 9.7   9.6 10.3 
IT 11.0  7.8 6.2 6.8 7.7 8.4   8.4 10.7 
CY . 4.5 4.0 3.6 5.3 6.3  7.9 11.9 
LU 2.6  4.1 4.2 4.9 5.4 4.6   4.8 5.1 
MT . 7.1 6.4 6.0 6.9 7.0  6.5 6.4 
NL 4.5  3.9 3.2 2.8 3.4 4.5   4.4 5.3 
AT 4.2  4.4 4.4 3.8 4.8 4.4   4.1 4.4 
PT 5.8  8.2 8.1 7.7 9.6 12.0   12.9 15.9 
SI 7.1  6.0 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3   8.2 8.9 
SK .  15.2 11.2 9.5 12.0 14.5   13.7 14.0 
FI 11.8  6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4   7.8 7.7 
Euro area 10.0 8.2 7.5 7.6 9.4 10.1   10.2 11.4 
BG . 11.2 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3   11.3 12.3 
CZ . 7.0 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3   6.7 7.0 
DK 5.2  5.0 3.8 3.3 6.0 7.5   7.6 7.5 
EE … … 4.6 5.5 13.8 … … … 
HR . 12.2 . . . 11.9  13.5 15.9 
LV . 11.8 6.0 7.5 17.2 19.8   16.4 14.9 
LT . 10.9 4.3 5.8 13.7 18.0   15.3 13.3 
HU 8.1  7.4 7.4 7.8 10.0 11.2   11.0 10.9 
PL . 14.4 9.6 7.2 8.2 9.6   9.6 10.1 
RO . 7.0 6.4 5.8 6.9 7.3   7.4 7.0 
SE 8.0 7.0 6.1 6.2 8.3 8.6   7.8 8.0 
UK 6.4  5.6 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8   8.0 7.9 
EU . 8.6 7.1 7.0 8.9 9.7   9.7 10.5 
Sources: Statistics for 2006-2009 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (June 2010, 44), and 
statistics for 2010-2012, Average 1996-2000, and average 2001-2010 from ECB Statistics 





Figure 6.12 Unemployment Rates in the Euro Area and the EU 
Sources: Own charting on the basis of the following: statistics 2000-2002 come from ECB 
Statistics Pocket Book (December 2003, 40); for 2003-2004 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book 
(June 2005, 41); for 2005-2006 from ECB Statistics Pocket Book (June 2007, 42); for 
2007-2012 from Table 6.17 of this dissertation. 
 
Apart from the figures of worsening unemployment, the yield rates for 
government bonds are another indicator to measure the magnitude and effect of the 
financial and the eurozone sovereign debt crises. According to the Commission, since 
the introduction of the single currency until the outbreak of the global financial crisis, 
“the cost of borrowing for euro area governments was relatively low and fairly similar”; 
however, from 2009 onwards, imbalances among euro states began to enlarge and 
“these borrowing costs diverged rapidly as financial markets became doubtful about 
the fiscal sustainability and competitiveness of some EU countries” (The European 
Union Explained: Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro 2012, 13). As 
illustrated in Figure 13, the global financial crisis is the point where the euro countries 
start the divergence of their yield rates, which were further amplified during the euro 
area sovereign debt crisis. According to the Commission (The European Union 
Explained: Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro 2012, 13), at the beginning of 
2012, the yield rates for the Greek 10-year sovereign bonds once reached as high as 















sovereign bonds. As for two-year government bonds, according to ECB Annual Report 
2012 (15-16), during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 2012, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands paid the least — almost all time below 2% — while for 
Spain and Italy, the yields soared to around 7% and above 8%, respectively; for the 
ten-year government bonds, Spain and Italy also need to offer higher rates, registering 
above 7%, more than three times higher than those paid by the German government. 
General speaking, based on the information provided above, Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands perform as the most stable financial markets so far as the yield rates for 
government bonds are concerned; in addition, during the sovereign debt crisis, the 
yield rates for the three governments, compared with the increasingly unsustainable 
situation in other euro countries, have exhibited a convergence of decreasing yields. 
Among other things, the high borrowing costs for national governments to finance are 
related to national high budget deficits and debts. As Figure 6.14 suggests, the 
increasing borrowing costs for the euro member states as a whole go hand in hand with 
the ascending government deficit and debt rates, and two peaks of borrowing costs can 
be observed: the first one is at the beginning of 2009, and the second one is in the 
middle of 2010. In 2012, eurozone states’ borrowing costs on average still remained at 






Figure 6.13 European Government Bonds with Maturities of Close to 10 Years, January 2007–July 2012 
Notes: Percentages per annum, monthly averages.  
Sources: Adapted from Panico and Purificato (2013, 586). 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Deficits, Borrowing Requirement and Change in Debt (%), the Euro Area 
Notes: Four-quarter moving sum as a percentage of GDP. 
Sources: ECB calculations based on Eurostat and national data, adapted from ECB Monthly 




In short, the severe economic recession in terms of GDP, alarming high national 
budget deficit and debt rates, the ever highest rates of unemployment, and the 
unsustainable price for some euro governments to finance suggest a crisis of sufficient 
magnitude which is expected to foster spillover effects. While the five indicators 
presented above measure the crisis impact from non-institutional aspects, the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis was also criticized on the basis of the institutional disadvantage of 
EMU, which carries out a unified monetary policy entrusted to the ECB, while lacking 
a common fiscal policy. Meanwhile, the economic pillar of EMU is also limped (see 
Table 1.2). Therefore, the eurozone sovereign debt crisis was also an institutional crisis 
for EMU as well as for the whole EU economic governance; nevertheless, such 
unintended institutional crisis is triggered and exposed by the unexpected severe 
economic and financial (i.e. non-institutional) shocks. From this perspective, crises 
indeed mean opportunities for institutional reforms. 
As for the third factor — regional bureaucrats’ competence and autonomy to 
intervene, the three new measures have vividly illustrated new EU developments as the 
results of the efforts of the elites at both the EU level and national level to address the 
crisis. Table 6.6 “The Commission’s Proposals for the Three New Measures” provides 
evidence of EU bureaucrats’ and experts’ competence and autonomy to formulate, 
adopt and implement the new mechanisms to solve the crisis, among which the 
initiation and efforts of European Council President Van Rompuy (in the cases of the 
European Semester and the ESM, see Table 6.6) and Commission President Barroso 
(in the case of the ESRB, see Table 6.6) particularly stand out. Meanwhile, Table 6.7 
“German, French and UK Governments’ Positions Towards the Three New Measures” 
sheds light on the positions and interventions of the three core member states’ 
governmental leaders to the crisis.  
Finally, regarding interest associations’ capability to deal with problems 
independently from national constraints, Table 6.5 “BusinessEurope’s and the ETUC’s 
Positions on the European Semester, the ESRB and the ESM” has demonstrated two 
main European interest groups’ independent positions and views towards the crisis. In 
terms of interest groups’ independent capability from national constrains, this 
dissertation explored the nature, missions and working structure of BusinessEurope and 
the ETUC. As for BusinessEurope, it is a horizontal business organization at the EU 
level with a long history that can be traced back to the 1950s; it connects 41 member 
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federations and represents more than 20 million companies from 35 countries, and 
“[i]ts main task is to ensure that companies’ interests are represented and defended 
vis-à-vis the European institutions with the principal aim of preserving and 
strengthening corporate competitiveness” (“BusinessEurope”, European Commission) 
— to realize such, 60 Working Groups, composed of experts nominated by the member 
federations, are organized by seven policy committees to “debate proposed EU 
legislation and come to a consensus view of the impact on enterprises of these 
proposals”, which “are issued as official BUSINESSEUROPE position papers (about 
100 every year)” (“Policy Committees and Working Groups”, BusinessEurope). In 
comparison, the ETUC, founded in 1973 and being “on behalf of the common interests 
of workers, at European level”, “represents 85 trade union organizations in 36 
European countries, plus 10 industry-based federations” with the aim of promoting a 
European Social Model which “embodies a society combining sustainable economic 
growth with ever-improving living and working standards” (“Our Aims”, ETUC); 
expressing the common interests of European workers, “it is involved in economic and 
social policy-making at the highest level, working with all the EU institutions: 
Presidency, Council, Commission and Parliament” (“Our Aims”, ETUC). Normally, 
the ETUC can take actions via applying political pressure, conducting social dialogue 
or organizing large-scale demonstrations to influence EU legislation and policy making, 
and prominently, it took part in negotiations with employers at European level to reach 
autonomous agreements on topics affecting European workers, such as teleworking 
(2002), work-related stress (2004), harassment and violence at work (2007) and 
inclusive labour markets (2010); as a matter of fact, under the EC Treaty, it must be 
consulted by the Commission on all European employment and social policy proposals 
(“Actions”, ETUC). All those show that both BusinessEurope and the ETUC carry out 
their activities independently from national constraints.  
To summarize, evidence of the indicators proposed by Table 2.3 appears to 
confirm both the presence and magnitude of all the four factors listed by H2 — a 
generally favorable condition for the effectiveness of spillover. The presence of the 
four factors, as being the favorable conditions fostering a spillover effect, imply the 
following: (a) factor 1 indicates that more spillover shall occur along with the 
ever-increasing globalization, because economic interdependence among (EU) nation 
states gets strengthened and deepened due to globalization, and as “globalization 
processes are continuously evolving, driven by the economic aspirations of millions 
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around the globe — the more people involved, the faster the globalization is” 
(Rametsteiner et al. December 2007, iii), then the economic interests and activities of 
more involved people can be regarded as the bases for spillover; (b) factor 2 
demonstrates that crises (institutional or non-institutional, internal or external) also 
offer opportunities for reforms and new developments — if factor 1 explains the bases 
for spillover, then factor 2 acts as a catalyst for spillover, presenting the urgency and 
necessity to push for further integration; (c) factors 3 and 4 exhibit the necessity of an 
active intervention by regional supranational institutions and officials and interest 
groups, which can be routinized and augmented through institutionalization — if 
factors 1 and 2 argue for an objective environment, then factors 3 and 4 emphasize 
people’s subjective initiatives to promote spillover. All those implications can be 
diagramed as follows: 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Favorable Conditions Fostering Spillover 
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of this section.  
 
Obviously, in light of the propositions of neo-functionalism, national 
governments and their leaders’ roles are not emphasized in Table 2.3; nevertheless, as 
the case studies already show national governmental actors’ indispensable role in 
addressing the eurozone sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Tables 6.6 and 6.7), Figure 6.17 
The objective environment/context 
Factor 1: Increasing economic interdependence among (EU) 
nation states (the bases of spillover); 
Factor 2: Unexpected and unintended crises of sufficient 
magnitude — institutional or non-institutional (the catalyts 
for spillover and opportunities for reform); 
Human being’s subjective initiatives  
Factor 3: Regional supranational institutions and their 
leaders’ competence and autonomy to intervene; 
Factor 4 Interest associations’ capability to deal with 
problems independently from national constraints; 
Factor 5 Other actors' intervention and participation, such as 
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adds “Factor 5” into neo-functionalist arguments for the favorable conditions 
promoting spillover. Based on Figure 6.17, there are two ways to promote spillover 
effects: (1) from the institutional and non-institutional context, and (2) from actors’ 
initiatives. Since both the institutional and non-institutional environment tends to be 
objective, the possibility to add fuel to enhance spillover lies at human being’s 
initiatives, which can be routinized and augmented through institutionalization; thus 
institutionalization is an important means to boost spillover for further integration. 
Moreover, Factor 3 suggests the importance of developing regional integration 
organizations’ as well as its officials’ competence and autonomy to intervene, so the 
development and maturity of the supranational entity is also conducive to the 
occurrence of spillover. Finally, Factor 4 conveys that interest groups’ independent 
positions and decisions may turn out to be different from and even contrary to those of 
national governments, but still there are also times when the positions between national 
governments and interest associations resonate and reinforce with each other, which 
will enhance the happening of spillover — obviously, addressing the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis is such an occasion where both national governments and 
transnational interest groups share a common pro-integrative stance in seeking 
solutions at the supranational level so as to overcome the crisis and maintain the 
financial stability and economic prosperity of the region (see section 6.1.2) .  
The analyses above deal with the conditions for spillover in general, and the next 
part will check against Table 2.3 to see whether and to what extent the favorable 
conditions fostering the happening of each of the three specific spillover mechanisms 
are present.  
 
Table 6.18 Checking the Presence of the Favorable Conditions to the Effectiveness of 
Functional, Political, and Cultivated Spillover on the Basis of Table 2.3 with the Three New Measures 
 Favorable conditions for the functional spillover effect: all three factors suggested by Table 2.3 
are present 
Evidence for 5(1), (2) and(3) in Table 2.3: 
5(1): To achieve the original goal of solving the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, there are 
compelling and persuasive technical pressures and necessities to strengthen EU (and particularly 
eurozone) fiscal policy coordination and economic governance (via the European Semester) to realize 
sustainable fiscal conditions and economic growth, of carrying out integrated macro-prudential 
oversight of financial systems across the EU (via the ESRB) so as to keep regional financial stability, 
and of establishing a permanent rescue mechanism (via the ESM) which can provide urgent “financial 
blood” to the troubled members thus to avoid sovereign state bankruptcy;  
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5(2): Due to the urgent and compelling situation of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, 
decision-makers have a consensus on the ways to address the issue, anticipating that (b) the benefits 
of further integration as being embodied in the three new measures are salient and they outweigh the 
concerns about later spillover effects into other areas; meanwhile, decision-makers also anticipate that 
(a) the three new measures shall not cause problems in other areas which in turn shall trigger 
unintended integration in the future: the European Semester is a sort of OMC without any legally 
binding powers on member states and the authorities on fiscal and economic policies are still in the 
hands of national states as national parliaments are the ultimate decision-makers on national budgets 
and the Commission’s CSRs (see Table 5.3). At the same time, the ESRB and ESM just fill out the 
vacuums of the EU project as the former is the first EU integrated macro-prudential oversight system 
and the latter is the first permanent rescue mechanism to provide necessary financial assistance of the 
troubled euro states — the ESRB was created for the purpose of carrying out indispensable 
macro-prudential oversight and the ESM is an intergovernmental institution among the euro states. 
Both these new measures are the constructive parts of the EU in the logic of defending the financial 
and economic crisis and thus are considered as being natural and not to cause new demands of further 
integration in other areas;  
5(3): The issue for the EU and national governments to deal with — the sovereign debt crisis 
— is of high presence of the connections and interdependencies between various policy areas: fiscal, 
economic and financial (see Tables 1.2, 1.3 and section 6.1.1). 
 Favorable conditions for the political spillover effect: all the positive factors suggested by Table 
2.3 are present 
As for the political spillover of governmental elites and EU leaders, the successful adoption and 
the implementation of the three new measures confirm their preferences of addressing the crisis at the 
supranational level; as for the four factors (6 (1),(2),(3),(4)), the latter three (6(2),(3),(4)) indicate the 
hindrances to the effectiveness of political spillover and they appear to be diluted due to the 
seriousness of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis: from the proposed ideas to the final adoption of the 
new measures, a certain period of time (6(1)) is needed as discussions and negotiations are involved 
among member states before the agreements on the new measures are reached, and meanwhile, the 
constraining factors 6(2),(3),(4) are not prominent in the three selected cases: key members — 
Germany, France and the UK — share common positions on the three new measures, and despite 
some disputes among them, they all agree to address the problem from concerted supranational 
approaches instead of acting individually; such convergent positions and the severe challenges in 
front of them prompt the elites to solve their disagreement on the proposed designs of the three new 
measures quickly (see Table 6.6 and Table 6.7); 
Section 6.1.2 has confirmed non-governmental actors’ supporting stances of the three new 
measures, and with a hindsight perspective, the conditions 6 (5), (6), (7) in Table 2.3 showing interest 
groups’ political spillover are largely met:  
6 (5): Further integration with the implementation of the new measures can bring more benefits, 
and interest groups can ascertain those potential gains; taking BusinessEurope’s and the ETUC’s 
supportive stances on the three new measures as examples, this dissertation specifies 
BusinessEurope’s and the ETUC’s calculations of their potential benefits: 
The main considerations of BusinessEurope to support the three new measures: 
A. On the European Semester: “The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) remains the appropriate 
European instrument to coordinate budgetary policies, but needs to be reinforced, complemented and 
enforced with rigour. A more closely integrated budgetary process at national and European level 
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would provide an important added value. [...] In this regard, we support the Commission proposal for 
a ‘European Semester’” (①, p.6); “[m]ost governments have so far failed to develop comprehensive 
reform strategies. That is why the European Semester will be so important” (②,p.4);  
B. On the ESRB: BusinessEurope supports the ESRB without elaborating its reasons (see 
point 2 of Table 6.5), and its pro-integrative positions in this respect can be explained by the missions 
and functions of the ESRB: to keep financial stability of the EU and the eurozone, while it is common 
sense to support the measures that are helpful to keep financial stability; 
C. On the ESM: “The European business community believes that safeguarding and 
strengthening the euro is fundamental to the future economic prosperity and social cohesion of our 
continent”, and “[w]e need to use all means to support the Euro”, including the ESM where “[a]ll 
support must be strictly conditional on Member States simultaneously undertaking further structural 
reforms and fiscal consolidation”.③  
The main considerations of the ETUC to support the three new measures are: 
D. On the European Semester: Apart from ensuring sound public finances and preventing 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the EU, the European Semester underpins equal importance 
to economic growth and job creation as enshrined in Europe 2020; meanwhile, social policies are also 
included in CSRs, which are in line with the core interests of the ETUC: employment and social 
progress (see Table 6.5 4E); 
E. On the ESRB: “The ETUC firmly believes that Europe cannot limit itself to coordinate 
national financial markets’ regulatory authorities. The regulatory framework as well as scope and 
quality of regulation must be strengthened at European level”; ④ 
F. On the ESM: it is common sense that the ESM is helpful to stabilize the financial markets 
of the beneficiary countries as well as the EU, so the ETUC says little on the reasons to support the 
ESM; instead, the ETUC moves further to express its strong support for maximizing the functions and 
effectiveness of the ESM, such as urging the creation of the SSM to make the direct recapitalization 
of the ESM to the troubled banks possible, and the ETUC considers that “the introduction of SSM 
would directly address the core of the current crisis in two ways. By enabling the ESM to rescue 
troubled banks, governments of their home countries would no longer be coerced to take on ever 
more private banks’ debt and thus be in a position to avoid the most brutal forms of budget austerity. 
As an indirect effect, this could ease the borrowing of governments on financial markets by pushing 
interest rates down and this would be more effective than the ECB’s current interventions in the 
secondary markets. Secondly, the SSM could withdraw banking licenses and start to resolve financial 
institutions that are in fact zombie banks because technically insolvent, but still alive”.⑤ 
6 (6): The issues relevant to the three measures have already been under EU governance for a 
while: 
 For the European Semester, coordinating member state fiscal and economic policy can 
be traced back to 1997 when the European Council agreed on the SGP, which “was 
underpinned by Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
(preventive arm), Council Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (dissuasive arm), as well as a 
European Council resolution. Council Regulation 1466/97 provided both for stability 
programmes (for euro-zone members) and convergence programmes (for Member States 
outside the euro area) that the Member States were to submit annually to the 
Commission” ⑥; before the practice of the European Semester, existing procedures of 
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fiscal and economic policy coordination are under the SGP and the BEPGs, which also 
include the submission of SCPs and NRPs⑦; 
 The establishment of the ESRB falls into the category of the OLP; ⑧  
 Before the permanent rescue mechanism ESM, there was already a temporary rescue 
mechanism EFSF in functioning, and the ESM was modeled on the EFSF (see Table 
5.5); though the EFSF and the ESM are not EU institutions, the EU has gained 
experience from the establishment and operation of the EFSF.  
Therefore, all three suggest that interest groups have the time to become familiar with the 
existing policy-making processes and relevant rules, and as a matter of fact, relevant interest groups 
were consulted during the formation of the three new measures:  
 On the European Semester: By issuing the two Communications of 12 May 2010 and 30 
June 2010, the Commission consulted with interested parties about the European 
Semester: “the Commission wished to demonstrate its commitment to fostering dialogue 
with Member States, the European Parliament and all stakeholders, while at the same 
time delivering concrete proposals for action”; ⑦  
 On the ESRB: Two consultations were carried out by the Commission before it put 
forward the proposals on the ESRB on 23 Sepetember 2009 (COM(2009) 499 Final 
2009/0140 (COD)): the first one “was conducted following publication of the report of 
the de Larosière Group and extended from 10 March to 10 April 2009 as input to the 
Commission communication on Financial Supervision in Europe published on 27 May 
2009”, including 26 public authorities, 16 registered organizations and 74 individuals; 
the second one “was conducted over the period from 27 May to 15 July 2009, whereby 
all financial services sector operators and their representative bodies, regulators, 
supervisors, other interested parties were invited to comment on the more detailed 
reforms presented in the May 2009 Communication”, including 13 public authorities, 37 
registered organizations and 48 individuals; in both consultations, “none of the responses 
opposes the proposed ESRB but while some replies strongly support the proposal, others 
support it conditionally upon further details being provided” ⑨⑩⑪; moreover, while 
adopted by the co-decision procedures, the formation of ESEB regulation draws on the 
opinions from the EESC⑧, which, representing the broadest socio-occupational interests 
in Europe (composed of three groups: employers, workers, and various interests) is a 
consultative body of a key role in the EU’s decision-making process⑫;  
 On the ESM: The contracting parties for the ESM are euro member states, and the 
establishment of the ESM was pushed and realized by the European Council and the 
Eurogroup (see Table 6.6) rather than by interest groups, but parts of details of the 
functioning of the ESM involved the advice from relevant interest groups. For example, 
the European Council of 24/25 March 2011 “welcomes the decisions taken by the euro 
area Heads of State or government on 11 March and endorses the features of the ESM” 
⑬, according to which “[t]he detailed legal arrangements for including CACs in 
euro-area government securities will be decided on the basis of work to be undertaken 
by the EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, following appropriate 
consultation with market participants and other stakeholders, and be finalized by the end 
of 2011” ⑭.  
Therefore, all three show influence of interest groups at the EU level.  
6 (7): The functional spillover pressures are clearly presented (see Tables1.2 and 1.3, and 
372 
 
section 6.1.1), and moreover, the rationale of cooperation and partnership actually is a worldwide 
trend in recent years, as there is blooming regional and cross-continent cooperation in other 
geographic areas across the globe, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), and 
the G-20 (19 countries plus the EU).  
 Favorable conditions for the cultivated spillover effect of the Commission: the Commission 
largely meets the conditions suggested by table 2.3 
7(1): The Commission has demonstrated an internal cohesion as far as the proposals related to 
the three new measures are concerned: all the proposals leading to the finalization of the three new 
measures were quickly tabled with unambiguous purposes to meet the urgent demand of solving the 
crisis (see Table 6.6); 
7(2): Section 6.1.3 confirms the Commission’s pro-integrative stances and proposals, and the 
case of the ESRB spotlights the Commission’s capacity of setting up its own agenda, while the cases 
of the European Semester and the ESM show the Commission’s proposals were directed by the 
decisions of the European Council;  
7 (3): The Commission’s proposals do have gained the powerful member states’ and interest 
groups’ support (see Table 6.7 and Table 6.5), and this time, the Commission appears not purposely 
to form coalitions with certain actors so as to secure the adoption of the proposals. Rather, confronted 
with the most serious challenge ever to EMU and the EU, actors at different levels reached a 
consensus on the imperativeness to address the sovereign debt crisis. As a result, the EU, national 
governments, and interest groups all took pro-integrative stances and support the implementation of 
the three new mechanisms;  
7 (4): The fact in 7 (3), from one perspective, means the Commission was not troubled by the 
strategies (such as via package deals) to broker compromises among national governments of 
different interests since all the important actors involved agreed with the new measures — indeed the 
typical cultivated spillover feature of package deals by the Commission is absent in all three cases 
(see Table 6.6);  
7 (5): The fact in 7(3), from another perspective, suggests that the Commission took the 
opportunity of the crisis to promote future integration — the Commission stated unequivocally the 
objectives, necessities and functions of those measures in its proposals, and one thing was in 
common: to meet the challenges and counter the crisis; 
7 (6): The Commission was aware of its limited entrepreneurial leadership; among the three 
new measures, only the ESRB was fully under the charge of its initiatives, while the other two 
displayed its active responses to the decisions of the European Council, demonstrating that the 
Commission avoids to overplay its hand vis-à-vis the member states, while during the crisis, member 
states showed their initiatives and activeness to address the problems.  
 In sum, among the six favorable conditions for cultivated spillover listed in Table 2.3, all were 
present in the three cases except the third and fourth ones (i.e. 7(3), (4)), which suggests that the crisis 
pushes further EU integration, as the relevant actors, due to the imminent and serious challenges 
imposed by the crisis, tended to adopt further integrative steps to solve the crisis.  
Sources: ① BusinessEurope (14 June 2010); ② BusinessEurope (21 June 2011); ③
BusinessEurope (2 December 2011); ④ETUC (27 October 2009); ⑤ETUC (18 December 
2012); ⑥European Parliament-2012/0002(NTT); ⑦COM(2010) 526 Final (29 September 
2010); ⑧Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010; ⑨COM(2009) 499 Final (23September 2009); 
⑩Summary of Public Submissions Received on the Proposals of the de Larosière Report 
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Regarding Financial Supervision in Europe (European Commission); ⑪Summary of Replies 
Received to the Public Consultation on the Commission Communication of 27 May 2009 on 
European Financial Supervision (European Commission); ⑫See “About the Committee” 
(EESC); ⑬European Council 24/25 March 2011 Conclusions; ⑭ See “Annex II Term 
Sheet on the ESM” in European Council 24/25 March 2011 Conclusions.  
 
Table 6.18 presents the research results of the favorable conditions for the 
existence of the three spillover effects. All factors proposed in Table 2.3 are present in 
the cases, except the negative constraining factors (i.e. 6(2), (3), (4)) for the political 
spillover effects and another two factors (i.e. 7(3), (4)) for the materializing of the 
cultivated spillover effects. The absence of the three constraining factors for political 
spillover suggests that confronted with the crisis, actors became more active and 
cooperative to work out solutions, that is, human being’s initiatives were spurred and 
boosted by the threats imposed by the crisis. In comparison, the absence of 7(3), (4) 
shows that the Commission did not purposively build a coalition with the key member 
states and broker package deals among different national interests, thus suggesting that 
actors at the different levels within the EU, due to the pressures from the crisis, tended 
to forge common grounds.  
The analyses above confirm the first half of H2; there were favorable conditions 
stimulating the materializing of spillover. Among the four factors that contributed to 
the occurrence of spillover, factors 1, 3, and 4 are expected to get strengthened or 
maintain the status quo along with the developing EU, so only factor 2 — crises of 
sufficient magnitude as unintended consequences — tends to have variations and be 
time-specific. Therefore, this dissertation on the basis of the analyses above expects 
that: 
Proposition 15: Crises, in institutional and/or non-institutional aspects, 
contribute to the occurrence of spillover and thus promote EU integration; five 
non-institutional factors (i.e. GDP growth; government budget deficits and debts, 
inflation, unemployment and sovereign bond yields) can be used to measure the 
magnitude of the crises, and the more severe the five indicators are, the more likely 
spillover will happen.  
The studies on the environment for the effectiveness of spillover and of the three 
specific spillover mechanisms reveal the underlying factor that promotes spillover:  
Proposition 16: During a crisis, spillover effects tend to occur, because the 
threat imposed by the crisis tends to activate and promote actors’ motivations to work 
out solutions to the crisis. 
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As for the second half of H2, the initial analyses after the formation of H2 in 
chapter two refuted a slowed-down pace of EU integration. H2 posits two reasons that 
could cause a slowed-down development of the EU — engrenage and politicization — 
but the effects of the former are reduced as more new challenges appear along with 
globalization, which increases the topics and the policy areas for the EU and its 
member states to deal with and reach agreement, while the effects of the latter are 
largely constrained when facing serious collective problems, as actors of various 
interests, confronted with severe crisis, tend to be cooperative and take pro-integrative 
stances towards the EU project. Besides, the participation and involvement of national 
actors in EU decision making is regulated by EU rules and procedures, and the current 
institutional mode not only provides channels and platforms for national actors to 
pursue their political rights, but also regulates their behaviors and defines the limits for 
their power seeking within the EU policy-making systems. As evidence 6 (6) in Table 
6.18 shows, consultations with the relevant interest parties were carried out before the 
formulation or finalization of the three new measures, so these new mechanisms, to a 
lesser or greater extent, also represent the relevant interest groups’ positions and 
assertions. Meanwhile, the institutional structure defines the possibility and forms of 
interest actors’ political rights within EU decision-making systems. For instance, 
Article 148 (2) TFEU prescribes that on the issue of employment, the Council shall 
consult the EP, the EESC, the CoR and the Employment Committee (EMCO) to draw 
up policy guidelines for the member states. The EESC and the CoR are the two 
advisory bodies of the EU. According to Article 300 TFEU, the EESC “consist(s) of 
representatives of organizations of employers, of the employed, and of other parties 
representative of civil society, notably in socio-economic, civic, professional and 
cultural areas”, whereas the CoR is composed of “representatives of regional and local 
bodies who either hold a regional or local authority electoral mandate or are politically 
accountable to an elected assembly”, and members of both Committees “shall not be 
bound by any mandatory instructions [...] (and) shall be completely independent in the 
performance of their duties, in the Union’s general interest”. In comparison, EMCO 
was established by the Council “with advisory status to promote coordination between 
Member States on employment and labour market policies” (Article 150 TFEU), and 
each member state and the Commission nominate two members to EMCO; this 
advisory body in recent years mainly focuses on giving advice for Ministers on the 
main products under the European Semester mechanism, and its meetings sometimes 
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include representatives from trade unions and employers at the EU level.
130
 So interest 
groups’ political rights pursuing is limited by the current institutional framework laid 
down by EU rules and regulations. All those explanations can be expressed as follows:  
Proposition 17: The EU integration process will not slow down, because (a) as 
new unanticipated challenges emerge along with globalization, policy areas for 
member states to reach agreement are not going to be exhausted, and (b) though more 
national actors will pursue their political rights at the EU level, confronted with crises, 
different interests tend to forge common positions, and meanwhile, EU institutional 
arrangements frame up the channels and the possible representation for different 
interests.  
Proposition 17 implies that the pursuing of political rights by different interest 
groups is possible if current institutional arrangements get redesigned; since the crisis 
provides the opportunity for institutional reforms, it also offers chances for interest 
groups and actors to pursue their political rights within the EU arena. Moreover, both 
Figure 6.17 and Proposition 17 emphasize the external environment to the development 
of the EU. On the one hand, globalization causes unexpected challenges, while on the 
other hand, the global context is where the EU can draw energy for further integration, 
that is, crises also connote opportunities of changes as crises spur and promote human 
being’s initiatives to address the challenges. 
 
6.3 Evidence for H3: Internal Dynamics of 
Institutionalization and Supranational Governance 
After the formulation of H3 in chapter two, this dissertation has analyzed the eleven 
steps entailed in H3; checking those hypothesized causal chains against the three cases, 








                                                 











The three new measures/cases 
The European Semester The ESRB The ESM 




Transactors: EU member 
states  
Transactions and 





euro states;  




in one area while the 
absence of 
regulations in that 
area at the EU level is 
costly for transactors. 
Yes; 
EU internal cross-border 
trade as a whole expands 
which shows increasing 
economic 
interdependence among 
member states; the 
absence of a framework 
to coordinate the 
out-of-pace steps of 
national economic 
policies and to bridle 
ballooning government 
deficits and debts is 
costly for member states 
to achieve economic 
prosperity, that is, the 
ever integrated EU 
economy requires 
macro-level policy 
coordination and fiscal 
surveillance. 
Yes; 
 “EU financial 
markets are increasingly 
integrated, especially in 
the wholesale markets. 
The banking and 
insurance markets are 
dominated by 
pan-European groups 
[...]. There has been an 
increase in cross-border 
M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions) 
transactions in terms of 
value since 2003. This 
trend was particularly 
strong in 2005, when 
several large-value 
transactions were 
conducted, amounting to 
over 50% of the total 
M&A value in the euro 
area banking system. EU 
banks have become 
more international than 
ever, expanding into 
foreign markets both in 
Europe and beyond. 
Currently (in 2009) 
around 70% of EU 
banking assets is in the 
hands of 43 banking 
groups with substantial 
cross-border activities”; 
Yes;  
 See evidence for 
the European Semester 
and the ESRB; 
 “The recent events 
have demonstrated that 
financial distress in one 
Member State can 
rapidly threaten 
macro-financial stability 
of the EU as a whole 
through various 
contagion channels. This 
is particularly true for 
the euro area where the 
economies, and the 
financial sectors in 
particular, are closely 
intertwined”; ⑫ 
 “Heads of State or 
Government agree on 
the need for Member 
States to establish a 
permanent crisis 
mechanism to safeguard 
the financial stability of 
the euro area as a whole 
and invite the President 
of the European Council 
to undertake 
consultations with the 
members of the 
European Council on a 




 “Integration (of the 
EU financial markets) 
increases contagion 
risks, and thereby 
jeopardies financial 
stability” (③), while the 
EU lacks “adequate 
macro-prudential 
supervision” (see ④, 
item 153). 
required to that effect, 
not modifying Article 








and the Heads of State or 
Government press for 
strengthening policy 
coordination and 
surveillance at the EU 
level.  
Yes;  
The de Larosière Group 
held eleven full day 
meetings in the end of 




services associations and 
institutions, such as the 
CEA, AMICE, EBF, 
ESBG, EACB, FESE, 
ICMA, EFAMA, ISDA, 
FOA, AMAFI, LIBA, 
and representatives of 
large insurance 
companies (e.g. AXA, 
Munich Reinsurance 
Company, Aegon and 
AVIVA plc.) ⑤. 
Yes; 
There is no tool offered 
by EU Treaties for 
eurozone states to 
counter the collective 
sovereign debt crisis, 
and the euro countries 
agree they must have a 
permanent rather than 
temporary financial 
assistance mechanism. 
(3) The tasks or 
autonomy of EU 
institutions expand 
(such as the 
Commission 
exercising greater 
autonomy and/or the 
Court clarifying the 
rules). 






Not fully confirmed: 
 For the first half: 
No; national 
governments have 
converged interests in 
Yes; 
Various interest groups 
from financial sectors 
give their opinions and 
advice on EU financial 
Yes; 
Germany and France 
appear as the two core 
euro members 
dominating and directing 
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European Semester, so 
national and EU leaders 
all push and approve its 
creation rather than 
exploit it as an 
opportunity to influence 
the EU policy-making 
process; it is 
implemented before 
being codified into EU 
regulations via the OLP; 
 For the second 
half: Yes; the operation 
of the European 
Semester reflects both 
national and EU leaders’ 
will of strengthening EU 
economic governance. 
regulation and 
supervision for the de 
Larosière group 
meetings; as a result, 
though “they do not 
necessarily agree on all 
the detailed points made 
in the report”, “[t]he 
Members of the Group 
support all the 
recommendations” (④, 
p.5), which lead to the 
establishment of the 
ESRB.  
 
the formation of the 
ESM, and the finalized 
ESM reflects euro 
states’ choice under a 
Franco-German 
framework. (see Table 
6.7) 
(5) EU rules are 
introduced, 
reinforced, revised or 
further clarified. 
Yes; 
It is a new mechanism of 
policy coordination and 
surveillance, the contents 




The ESRB is a brand 
new independent body 
responsible for EU 
macro-prudential 
oversight introduced by 
Regulation (EU) No 
1092/2010 of 24 
November 2010. 
Yes; 
The Lisbon Treaty is 
amended so as to 
provide the legal basis 
for the introduction of 
the permanent ESM. 
(6) The application of 
new rules facilitates 
cross-border 
transactions, and the 






“This framework has 
started to deliver 
results”, such as building 
up fiscal consolidation 
and a closer partnership 
between the member 
states and EU institutions 
(①, p.4); along with the 
implementation of the 
European Semester, EU 
economies show “signs 
of a slow recovery”: 
“After five years of very 
limited or negative 
growth, the EU has 
experienced positive 
Not fully confirmed; 
 For the first half: 
Yes; amid challenging 
economic and financial 
turmoil and 
repercussions, the ESRB 
was launched quickly to 
address a range of 
systemic risks entailed in 
the EU financial system, 
among other things, 
monitoring and assessing 
systemic risks, giving 
recommendations and 
making a series of policy 
responses, which are 
helpful to pinpoint 
Not fully confirmed; 
 For the first half: 
Yes; the ESM’s financial 
assistance to the euro 
member states keeps 
financial stability and 
contains contagious risk 
in EMU and the EU; 
“Ireland, Portugal, 
Greece and Spain have 
[...] achieved 
considerable progress. 
As a result their 
competitiveness has 
improved, which in turn 
contributed to rising 
exports and a decrease 
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growth in the second 
quarter of 2013. The 
recovery is expected to 
continue and to become 
more robust in 2014. 
Inflation is expected to 
remain subdued. At the 
same time, [...] first signs 
of rebalancing of the EU 
economy are visible and 
a number of important 
macroeconomic 
imbalances are being 
corrected” (①, p.2). 
(potential) threats and 
keep financial stability;
⑥,⑦  
 For the second 
half: sector specific; due 
to the multiple aspects 





among financial sectors, 
there are adverse 
feedback loops and the 
financial system is still 
fragile (⑥,⑦), but in the 
second quarter of 2013, 
“[t]he macroeconomic 
indicators show some 
first signs of recovery” 
⑧; besides, during the 
course of 2011, the total 
value of cross-border 
M&As of the EU 
exhibits a recovery and 
increasing momentum, 
but from 2011 to 2012, 
interest in M&A activity 
of mainland Europe 
reduces, and such a 
subdued outlook is 
expected to be sustained 
for next three years (see 
⑯, p.5).  
of their current account 
deficits. These economic 
indicators have been 
pointing to an 
improvement for more 
than a year now” (⑭, p. 
6); 
 For the second 
half: sector- and 
country-specific; “in 
most beneficiary 
countries exports are 
starting to grow again”, 
but unemployment rates 
are “unacceptably high 
in all programme 
countries”, though the 
unemployment levels 
“have stabilized” and “in 
some countries they are 





decreasing”, and so are 
the deficit levels in the 
beneficiary countries; 
(⑭, pp. 6-7) 
 “The difficulty is 
that [...] wages and 
pensions are being cut 
and unemployment 
rises”; nevertheless, 
“[e]conomists know that 
after difficult reforms, 
growth and jobs always 
come back with a time 
lag”. (⑭, pp.7-8) 
(7) Transactors adjust 
their behavior to 
adhere to the new 
rules and the new 
rules are normalized 
as being “givens”. 
Not fully confirmed; 
Under the European 
Semester, no legally 
binding decisions shall 
be made; consequently, 
“member states have 
Not fully confirmed; 
The ESRB does not have 
binding powers on its 
addressees (see Table 
6.6), and the addressees 
follow the principle of 
Yes; 
 The ESM 
programmes are 
subjected to strict 
conditionality (see Table 
5.5) and there is hard 
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adapted differently to the 
European Semester” and 
“(o)wnership of and 
adherence to the new 
economic policy 
coordination cycle 
appears strongest in the 
new Member States 
(Estonia and Hungary); 
not relevant in countries 
under programmes 
(Ireland); strong but 
more freely interpreted 
in the larger old Member 
States (France and 
Germany) and weaker in 
small newish Member 
States that entertain 
intensive economic 
relations with countries 
outside the euro area or 
the EU (Finland)”. (②, 
p.17)  
“act-or- explain”, so 
there are variations 
among member states’ 
implementation of ESRB 
Recommendations (⑨, 
p.2). For instance, the 
assessment issued by the 
ESRB on 4 November 
2013 on member states’ 
implementation of the 
ESRB Recommendation 
on Lending in Foreign 
Currencies 
(ESRB/2011/1) shows 
that overall there is a 
high level of compliance 
by 27 EU member states, 
among which twelve are 
graded as fully 
compliant, fourteen as 
largely compliant and 
one as only partially 
compliant, while no 
country receives a 
non-compliant grade 
(⑨, p.4).  
economic data to 
confirm that “the 
strategy is right and that 
conditionality is 
working” (⑭, p.6); 
 The ESM 
operative rules are 
normalized as being 
“givens” in the sense 
that it is a financial 
depot that the troubled 
euro states will resort to, 
and the states who ask 
the help from the ESM 
know they need to 
negotiate for the 
conditionality which 
they must adhere to, as 
the disbursement of the 
tranches of the financial 
assistance depends on 
national compliance 
with the conditionality 
(e.g. the ESM Treaty 
Articles 14-17).  
(8) When the urgent 










salient and pressing, 
and as a consequence, 
transactors demand 
more regulation at the 
EU level to facilitate 
transactions further. 
Yes; 
The European Semester 
has yielded results, but 
“[m]ore needs to be done 
to improve the 
functioning and 
flexibility of product and 
services markets, e.g. by 
modernizing network 
industries and further 
opening services sectors 
to support growth and 
jobs” (①, p. 4); “in 
terms of deepening the 
European Semester as a 
process, there are a 
number of areas where 
further improvements are 
needed”, including 
Yes; 
 Responding to the 
exceptional challenges, 
the ESRB in 2011 after 
its inception carried out 
activities addressing the 
obvious vacuums and 
urgent issues, including 
(a) identifying and 
assessing systemic risks, 
based on which 
warnings and 
recommendations are 
issued, (b) contributing 
to the establishment of 
macro-prudential 
frameworks at the EU 
and national level, and 
(c) performing 
Yes; 
After the functioning of 
the ESM, another 
challenge becomes more 
salient and urgent: 
“creating a Banking 
Union for Europe. At the 
moment the financial 
markets are fragmented 
along national lines. 
Bank rates vary greatly 
across the euro area. In 
weaker states with 
doubts about the 
budgetary situation of 
the government, bank 
rates are high and credit 
is scarce. Obviously this 
puts a drag on growth”, 
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“[g]reater ownership at 
national level”, 
“[s]tronger co-ordination 
among the members of 
the Euro area”, and 
“[b]etter implementation 
of the country-specific 
recommendations”, 
which are already on the 
Commission’s agenda 
and hopefully get formed 
into principles agreed by 
the European Council in 
2014 (①, pp. 5-6). 
fundamental analysis for 
macro-prudential 
oversight and developing 
analytical tools; ⑥ 
 In 2012, the 
overarching threat was 
the adverse feedback 
loops which result from 
the linkages between 
reinforced negative 
macroeconomic factors 
and fragilities in the 
financial system, and the 
ESRB accordingly took 
relevant policy 
responses;⑦  
 During 2011, the 
ESRB in particular 
provided its views on 
“the draft directive and 
regulation on capital 
requirements for credit 
institutions (the 
CRD/CRR)* and the 
proposal for a regulation 
of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council on OTC* 
derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade 
repositories (EMIR)*” 
(⑥, p.5), while during 
2012, “it closely 
followed discussions on 
three key pieces of draft 
EU sectoral legislation”: 
“(i) the CRD IV/CRR; 
(ii) the proposal for the 
Omnibus II Directive; 
and (iii) EMIR, which 
was adopted in July and 
entered into force in 
August 2012” (⑦, pp. 
36-37); all those show 
that more regulation at 
the EU level is 
and “Europe has started 
to address this. The most 
important reform is the 
building up of an SSM 
at the ECB that will 
supervise the 130 most 
important banks in 
Europe. Once the 
European supervisor is 
up and running, the 
ESM could be allowed 
to recapitalize banks 
directly. This would 
contribute to breaking 
the vicious circle 
between the sovereign 
and the banks [...]. Other 
important steps are 
currently being worked 
on, such as the 
establishment of a 
Single Resolution 





(9) As transactors’ 
interests 
accumulatingly get 
entrenched in EU 
supranational rules, 
the EU moves along 
the scale towards a 
high degree of 
supranational 
governance. 
No, because the 
supranational level does 
not possess jurisdiction 
over policy domains 
under the European 
Semester, that is, the EU 
does not have the 
competence to make 
binding rules in the given 
policy domains covered 
by the European 
Semester. (See Table 
5.3) 
No, because it does not 
obtain legal personality 
and its recommendations 
are not legally binding to 
its addressees. (See 
Table 6.6) 
Yes, but the ESM is not 
an EU body — it an 
intergovernmental 
institution under 
international law (see 
Table 5.5); 
In the context of the EU, 
the ESM now is the sole 
crisis resolution 
mechanism for the euro 
states, and with more 
funding instruments 
utilized by the ESM, 
investors’ interests get 
entrenched in the ESM 
rules (⑮), and disputes 
related to the ESM 
affairs are subject to the 
ESM Board of Directors, 
the Board of Governors 
or the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU, indicating a 






realized through the 
process of 
institutionalization, 
exhibiting a path 
dependent fashion 
which is difficult to 
reverse as current 
supranational rules 
not only provide 
means for transactors 
to pursue their 
interests and the 
mechanisms to 
resolve their disputes, 
but also shape the 
context for their 
Not fully confirmed; 
 Though the 
European Semester does 
not suggest a higher 
degree of supranational 
governance, it does 
embody EU economic 




governance at the very 
beginning was not 
realized through the 
process of 
institutionalization, as it 
became operational on 1 
January 2011 before it 
was finally codified by 
Not fully confirmed; 
 Though not 
signaling a high degree 
of supranational 
governance, the ESRB is 
institutionalized as an 
independent EU body 
through ESRB 
regulation via the OLP 
(see Table 6.6); 
 It displays path 
dependence in the sense 
that (a) it fills the 
vacuum of 
macro-prudential 
supervision over the EU 
financial system and it is 
the only agency 
responsible for such a 
Yes; 
 The establishment 
of the ESM is realized 
through the process of 
institutionalization (see 
Table 6.6); 
 It exhibits a path 
dependent fashion as it 
is modeled from its 
predecessor — the 
EFSF; it is difficult to 
reverse as it is the sole 
crisis resolution 
mechanism for the euro 
states since 1 July 2013; 
it does not only provide 
the channels and 
instruments for the euro 








of EU future policy. 
Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011 of 16 
November 2011 (see 
Table 6.6); 
 It exhibits path 
dependence, as (a ) it 
becomes “the 




surveillance of Member 
States’ economic and 
budgetary policies” (①, 
p.4) and it is on the way 
of getting further 
deepened (①, pp. 4-6), 
so it is difficult to 
reverse; (b) it benefits 
national economies, but 
it has no binding powers 
on member states and 
thus offers no legally 
binding mechanisms to 
resolve the disputes; (c) 
it shapes the context for 
national economies’ 
interactions with EU 
institutions as well as 
among themselves and 
delineates EU future 
policies under the 
European Semester as 
being sort of the OMC. 
(see section 5.2.1) 
task; (b) “bring(ing) 
together all the central 
banks and financial 
supervisors of the EU, 
the European 
Commission and the 
Economic and Financial 
Committee, as well as 
the three European 
Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) involved in 
financial regulation and 
supervision”, it provides 
a “broader, systemic 
perspective and [...] a 
unique forum for 
discussing financial 
stability issues in a 
European context” (⑩, 
p.1); (c) among other 
things, due to its 
missions, the ESRB 
“asked the EU’s 
legislative bodies to take 
account of its concerns 
in the course of the 
legislative process” (⑩, 
p.8) and it responded to 
the consultations by 
other EU institutions 
(e.g. the Commission, 
the EBA, the ESMA) 
(⑦, pp. 36-40); (d) in 
general, “the 
establishment of the 
European System of 
Financial Supervision 
(ESFS) has enhanced the 
quality and consistency 
of financial supervision 
in the internal market” 
(⑪, p.6), and it is 
recommended that the 
ESRB, together with the 
ESAs, should be 
mandatorily involved in 
bankruptcy and maintain 
financial stability, but 
also offers dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
related to ESM affairs; 
meanwhile, it shapes the 
context for the euro 
states to deal with the 
sovereign debt crisis, 
and the current practice 
of the attached 
conditionality (the MoU) 
which entails reforms 
and the measures to 
meet the budgetary goals 
defines EU policies in 
handling with the 




concerning its fields of 
expertise and “propose 
additional measures for 
macroeconomic 
stability” (⑪, p. 10). So 
it is hard to reverse the 
developing trend of the 
ESRB as a supranational 
macro-prudential 
supervision body, which 
provides means for 
transactors to pursue 
their interests in 
achieving financial 
stability and avoiding 
systemic risk, shapes the 
context for their 
subsequent interactions 
and delineates the 
contours of EU future 
policy where the ESRB 
is consulted concerning 
its fields of expertise; 
nevertheless, the ESRB 
does not provide any 
dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 









decreasing control of 
member states on 
policy outcomes, a 
process by which 






have the ultimate say on 
their SCPs, NRPs, and 




authorities play a 
substantial role in 
providing accurate 
information and 
implementing the ESRB 
recommendations (see 
also Table 6.1); there is 
mutual support and close 
cooperation between 
macro- and micro- 
prudential oversight (e.g. 
ESRB Regulation, items 
(13) (24) (30)); the 
ESRB only issues 
warnings and 




Though the ESM’s 
shareholders are the euro 
area member states and 
national functions are 
not replaced by the ESM 
— but rather, the ESM 
becomes a supporting 
instrument and 
complement for nation 
states — there is 







reactive rather than 
proactive to changes 
in the supranational 
environment, and 
national executives 
gradually lose an 
ultimate say on 
policy formation. 
recommendations with 
no legal powers 
addressing to nation 
states; besides, the 
General Board is largely 
composed of the 
governors of the central 
banks of each member 
state (see Table 5.4). 
 
reduced their control 
over their economic and 
financial policies as they 
should carry out 
austerity measures and 
policies demanded by 
the ESM assistance 
programmes to meet the 
specific conditions; as 
conditionality means 
budgetary deficit cuts 
and structural reforms, 






reactive rather than 
proactive to the ESM 
conditionality and 
national executives have 
constraints on their 
policy formation under 
the ESM programme.  
Notes: *CRD: Capital Requirements Directive; CRR: Capital Requirements Regulation; 
CRD/CRR: Directive and Regulation on Capital Requirements for Credit Institutions (cf. 
CRR/CRD: Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive); EMIR: European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation; OTC derivatives: over-the-counter derivatives.  
Sources: ①COM(2013) 800 Final (13 November 2013); ②Hallerberg et al., (August 2011); 
③“Annex III: An Increasingly Integrated Single European Financial Market”, in the de 
Larosière Report (25 February 2009); ④The de Larosière Report (25 February 2009); ⑤
“Annex II: Meetings of the Group and Hearings in 2008 – 2009”, in the de Larosière Report 
(25 February 2009); ⑥ESRB Annual Report 2011 (31 May 2012); ⑦ESRB Annual Report 
2012 (8 July 2013); ⑧The ESRB Risk Dashboard: An Overview (Issue 5, 19 September 
2013); ⑨ ESRB Recommendation on Lending in Foreign Currencies (ESRB/2011/1) 
Follow-up Report – Overall Assessment (November 2013); ⑩Dierick et al. (February 2012); 
⑪European Parliament-PE521.510v01-00 (11 October 2013); ⑫“Annex II General 
Features of the Future Mechanism, Eurogroup Statement of 28 November 2010,” in 
European Council 16-17 December 2010 Conclusions; ⑬European Council 28-29 October 
2010 Conclusions; ⑭Regling (8 October 2013); ⑮ “Investor Relations” (ESM); ⑯The Rise 
of the Cross-Border Transaction (Grant Thornton International Business Report 2013). 
 
Based on the research results provided by Table 6.19, the confirmation of the 




Table 6.20 The Confirmation of Transaction-Based Theory and EU Supranational Governance by the 
Cases of the European Semester, the ESRB and the ESM 
Three 
cases 
Checking the presence of the eleven causal steps  
Summary
1)




Yes Yes Yes Not fully 
confirmed 
Yes Yes Not fully 
confirmed 
















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Not fully 
confirmed 






3/3 3/3 2/3 2/3 3/3 1/3 1/3 3/3 1/3 1/3 1/3  
Notes: 1) The ratio of the fully confirmed causal steps among the posited eleven;  
2) “3/3” means fully confirmed in all three cases, “2/3” fully confirmed in two cases 
among the three, and “1/3” fully confirmed in one case among the three. 
Sources: Based on Table 6.19. 
 
As the case study results displayed in Table 6.20 show, H3 is not fully vindicated 
by the three cases; among the three measures, the ESM appears to almost fully confirm 
the causal chains entailed in H3, while the European Semester and the ESRB fully 
support about half of the mechanisms posited by H3. As for H3’s three sub-hypotheses, 
none of them gets fully confirmed by the three cases. Examining those failed elements, 
this dissertation proposes explanations to account for the collapsed mechanisms: 
 
Table 6.21 Explaining the Failed Causal Mechanisms of H3 
Failed causal chains 
in the three cases 
 
Explanations and Implications  
1. (4) Not fully 
confirmed 
The severe crisis pushes national governments to address the challenges 
as soon as possible, and national governments appear to have converged 
positions on the issue of establishing the European Semester to monitor 
member states’ fiscal conditions and coordinate their economic policies, 
so national governments did not take the opportunity to influence the 
policy-making processes, and the European Semester as a policy outcome 
reflects their converged preferences. The operation of the European 
Semester before it finally got codified into EU regulation is decided by 
the nature of the issue: the multilateral surveillance of economic policies 
and performance, which is prescribed by Article 12 TFEU.  
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(7) Not fully 
confirmed 
Because decisions made under the European Semester are not legally 
binding, member states’ compliance to the CSRs roots at their own will 
and peer pressure; consequently, there are variations among member 
states’ commitments to the CSRs, and the normalization of the new rules 
as being given also varied across the EU countries.  
(9) No Since supranational governance means the competence of the EU to 
make binding rules, the European Semester without legally binding 
powers to the member states then does not show the EU is moving 
towards a higher degree of supranational governance in this policy 
domain. 
(10) Not fully 
confirmed 
The European Semester does not suggest a higher degree of EU 
supranational governance through the process of institutionalization due 
to its policy nature, but it does exhibit path dependence, which is hard to 
reverse.  
(11) No Because of the nature of the European Semester and the policies under 
this framework, there are no legally binding decisions under this 
mechanism; moreover, “EU’s special competences” in Table 6.2 also 
shed light on no trade-off between EU supranational governance and 
governmental control over policy outcomes under the European 
Semester.  
2. (3) No The Commission’s power and autonomy does not always get expanded 
along with the adoption of new EU measures and policies.  
(6) Not fully 
confirmed 
The value of transactions does not necessarily increase after the 
implementation of new rules — it is sectoral specific; the ESRB concerns 
a more generally macro financial environment which consists of multiple 
aspects and the complicated interconnectedness among those aspects. 
(7) Not fully 
confirmed 
The reason is the same as for 1 (7): the ESRB has no legally binding 
powers.  
(9) No The reason is the same as for 1 (9). 
(10) Not fully 
confirmed 
Similar to 1 (10), the ESRB does not suggest a higher degree of 
supranational governance, but it displays a path dependent property. 
(11) No Similar to 1(11), the ESRB recommendations have no binding powers to 
its addressees; besides, the tasks of the ESRB are a necessary and 
beneficial complement to, rather than a substitute for, nation state 
functions.  
3. (6) Not fully 
confirmed 
Similar to 2 (6), the ESM covers a range of transactors, and whether the 
value of transactors increases or not is sectoral- and country-specific; the 
effectiveness of the ESM is also related to many other factors. 
 
Accordingly, several conclusions can be drawn from Tables 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21. 
First, the crisis pushed rather than impeded EU integration as national governments 
tended to adopt converged positions towards more strengthened EU economic 
governance (1(4)) — an echo to the previous Proposition 4. Second, the core argument 
of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s supranational governance is that along with the rising 
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levels of transactions (as well as the development of interest networks and 
associations), the competence of the Union to make binding rules in a given policy 
domain will increase, but the European Semester and the ESRB do not have legal 
powers, so the causal steps of 1(7), 1(9), 1(10), 1(11), 2(7), 2(9), 2(10) and 2(11) 
collapse. In comparison, when there is supranational governance in the case of the 
ESM (3(9)), the ESM does show reduced national control over economic policies 3(11). 
Third, as the neo-functionalist belief in the power expansion of the EU supranational 
institutions, typically the Commission, is disproved by 2 (3), we need to look into the 
concrete cases and shall not take it for granted when coming to such an assertion — a 
caveat to the previous Proposition 9. Fourth, when Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argue 
for EU supranational governance with transaction-based theory, the term “transactions”, 
while referring to any form of cross-border exchange, emphasizes the mutual 
dependence of EU national economies in a specific area — more micro-level economic 
activities; the three cases in this dissertation, however, cope with more macro-level 
issues, which contain more than one aspect and thus the definition of “transactions” 
and “transactors” in these cases becomes sectoral- and country- specific. This causes 
the collapse of 2(6) and 3(6), as there are more than one type of transactors and 
transactions; in contrast, the confirmation of 1(6) is due to a more narrow definition of 
transactors and transactions under the European Semester: the economic developing 
trend in general. The almost full confirmation of all the eleven causal mechanisms in 
H3 by the case of the ESM shows the potential capacity of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’ 
theory in accounting for the macro developments of the EU, and the case study results 
suggest that the three sub-hypotheses of H3 can be modified to account for the 
developments in a more macro-level sense:  
H3amodified: Increasing cross-border transactions among EU member states 
demand more regulation at the EU level (i.e. European standards, rules, and/or 
dispute resolution mechanisms) and/or macro-frameworks to improve the environment 
of transactions, leading to a process of EU institutionalization where rules are 
introduced, revised or reinforced on the basis of the mutual enforcement among EU 
institutions, EU rules, and transnational society, which appears more salient in front of 
crises.  
H3bmodified: Along with the process of institutionalization, when EU 
supranational governance of making binding rules in a given policy area increases, 
national capacity to control policy outcomes in that policy area tends to decrease.  
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H3cmodified: During crises, the EU’s new developments, which result from 
increasing cross-border transactions and transactors’ demand for more regulation at 
the EU level and which may lead to a higher degree of EU supranational governance, 
exhibit a path dependence fashion, which is hard to reverse as current supranational 
rules define transactors’ means to pursue their interests and/or dispute resolution 
mechanisms that shape the context for subsequent interactions and delineate the 
normative and institutional contours of future policy. 
H3cmodified: During crises, the EU’s new developments, which result from 
increasing cross-border transactions and transactors’ demand for more regulation 
and/or macro coordination at the EU level, may lead to a higher degree of EU 
supranational governance; EU developments are difficult to reverse as current 
supranational rules, defining transactors’ means to pursue their interests and/or 
dispute resolution mechanisms, shaping the context for subsequent interactions and 
delineating the normative and institutional contours of future policy.  
A merit of transaction-based theory is that it privileges micro-level economic 
activities as its theoretical foundations, and this is the main reason why Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz’s supranational governance can also be adapted to account for more 
macro developments. Nevertheless, comparing the hypothesis test results of H1 and H3, 
this dissertation finds that political integration does not necessarily entail increasing 
supranational governance, because the two terms are defined differently: the former 
highlights EU collective decision-making, while the latter stresses the EU’s 
competence in making binding rules. The case of the ESRB is an example in point: it 
displays a middle degree (i.e. level 4) of political integration, but does not embody a 
movement towards a higher degree of supranational governance, because it has no 
legally binding powers on its addressees. Therefore, the degree of EU supranational 
governance does not increase in tandem with increasing EU political integration.  
 
6.4 Evidence for H4: Institutional/Legalistic Spillover 
As it was already mentioned in section 2.5.1, generally speaking, the enlargement of 
the application of QMV introduced by the Lisbon Treaty supports the first half of H4, 
which offers an account for the historical developments between EU Treaty revisions. 
Nevertheless, the second half of H4 requires proof, and moreover, H4 should be tested 
by the three concrete cases. Examining the three cases, this dissertation looks into the 
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legal bases of the three new measures to see whether they would have different legal 
bases before the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Table 6.22 Legal Bases for the Adoption of the Three New Measures 
 Legal bases for the 
three new measures 
prescribed in the 
Lisbon Treaty  
Would the legal bases be different 
under the Nice Treaty? 
(Are any changes due to the Lisbon 
Treaty?) 
A spillover of QMV 
from unanimity in the 
Council between the 







adopted via the OLP 




Article 121 TFEU (ex Article 99 TEC 
(the Treaty establishing the European 
Community))*: the ex Article 99 TEC 
gets amended, and the legal basis for 
current 121(6) TFEU switches from 
the co-operation procedure (Article 99 
(5) TEC, referring to the procedures 
in Article 252 TEC) to the OLP (i.e. 
co-decision) defined in Article 294 
TFEU.①  
No; 
Under both the 
co-operation procedure 
and the OLP, QMV 
rather than unanimity is 
applied in the Council, 
though there is a new 
method of calculation 
of QMV agreed on by 
the 2003-2004 IGC and 
the voting weights and 
QMV thresholds get 







adopted via the OLP 
on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU.  
No;  
Article 114 (ex Article 95 TEC): 
though there are changes introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty to ex Article 95 
TEC, basically the legal basis for the 
adoption of the ESRB has no 
difference: as for the establishment of 
the ESRB, under ex Article 95 TEC, 
“The Council shall, acting in 
accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the EESC, adopt the 
measures [...]”, while according to 
Article 114 TFEU, “The European 
Parliament and the Council shall, 
acting in accordance with the OLP 
and after consulting the EESC, adopt 
the measures [...].” As a matter of 
fact, ex Article 251 TEC defines the 
co-decision procedure and becomes 
Article 294 TFEU, which prescribes 
No; 
The decision mode of 
QMV rather than 
unanimous voting in 
the Council is already 
applicable to the 
adoption of the ESRB 
under the Nice Treaty. 
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the steps of the OLP (see Article 289 
TFEU). So in essence, there is no 
change for the ESRB legal basis 
before and after the Lisbon Treaty. 
②  
The ESM An 
intergovernmental 
institution of the euro 
member states, 
established via the 
Treaty revision of the 
TFEU, Article 136, 
adding the third 
clause to Article 136: 
“3. The Member 
States whose 
currency is the euro 
may establish a 
stability mechanism 
to be activated if 
indispensable to 
safeguard the 
stability of the euro 
area as a whole. The 
granting of any 
required financial 
assistance under the 
mechanism will be 
made subject to strict 
conditionality”. ⑤ 
Yes; 
Under “provisions specific to member 
states whose currency is the euro”, 
Article 136 TFEU is newly inserted, 
which concerns the adoption of 
measures “to strengthen the 
coordination and surveillance of their 
budgetary discipline” and “ to set out 
economic policy guidelines for them” 
via the procedures in Articles 121 and 
126 (except 126 (14)) TFEU by QMV 
of “euro-ins”;③ 
Moreover, Article 136 TFEU is 
amended in accordance with the 
simplified revision procedure (Article 
48 (6) TEU) rather than the normal 
procedure of EU treaty revisions — 
the ordinary revision procedure 
(Article 48 TEU); before the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the EU had only one way to make 
treaty revisions, that is, by the 
ordinary revision procedure which 
requires an IGC to be convened on a 
compulsory basis, and the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced anther two simple 
ways for treaty revision: 
passerelles**and a simplified revision 
procedure, where the latter is 
applicable to Part III of the TFEU (i.e. 
to the amendment of policies and 
internal actions of the EU) and does 
not require the convening of the IGC, 
but the competences of the EU shall 





The ESM was created 
as an international 
financial institution via 
the Treaty conclusion 
among the euro 
member states, which 
is “subject to 
ratification, approval or 
acceptance by the 
signatories” (ESM 
Treaty Article 47) and 
“shall enter into force 
on the date when 
instruments of 
ratification, approval or 




represent no less than 
90% of the total 
subscriptions set forth 
in Annex II” (ESM 
Treaty Article 48). As 
each contracting party 
of the ESM “shall 
receive shares in the 
ESM in exchange for 
its capital contribution, 
calculated in 
accordance with the 
contribution key 
provided for in Article 
11” (ESM Treaty 
Article 2(3), there is a 
unanimous approval for 
the establishment of the 
ESM. 
Notes: *Before the Lisbon Treaty, the abbreviation TEC was often used after a TEU Article 
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of the first pillar of the EU, distinguishing itself from the TEU-articles of the second pillar 
(the CFSP) and the third pillar (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) 
prescribed by the same treaty of the TEU. The Lisbon Treaty, among other things, abolishes 
the three-pillar structure of the EU, and the Treaty establishing the European Community (i.e. 
the TEC) becomes the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (i.e. the TFEU) 
while the Treaty on European Union (i.e. the TEU) sticking to the same name. See “TEC, 
TEU and TFEU” (EUABC) and “Pillars of the European Union” (European Commission). 
**This is a French word for “footbridge” and it has become the jargon referring to 
the “bridging clauses” established by the Lisbon Treaty (see Piris 2010, 104): Article 48 (7) 
TEU offers the possibility to adopt an act by QMV in the Council or via the OLP rather than 
by unanimity in the Council or via a special legislative procedure which has been laid down 
by the Lisbon Treaty. That is to say, passerelle can “upgrade” the means to adopt decisions 
from unanimity to QMV or from a special legislative procedure to the OLP without a formal 
amendment to the existing EU Treaties. For detailed information of the conditions, 
restrictions, and explanations of the application of passerelle, the simplified revision 
procedure and the ordinary revision procedure, see Article 48 TEU, or notes⑥ and⑦.  
Sources: ①See Piris (2010, 365-368); ②See the TFEU and the TEC; ③See the TFEU, the 
TEC and Piris (2010, 373-376). ④For further explanations, see Table 6.23; ⑤European 
Council Decision-2011/199/EU (25 March 2011); ⑥Piris (2010, 104-109); ⑦ “Revisions 
to the Treaties” (European Union).  
 
Before explaining the research results displayed in 6.22, this dissertation presents 
a short review of the development of the legislative procedures in the EU. Three 
institutions — the Commission, the Council and the EP — are involved in the EU 
legislative processes, and research of the Community’s legislative procedures concerns 
the power distributions among the three institutions and the EP’s independent 
legislative competence as an institutional player (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 8; 
Moser 1999, 16). The creation of the Single Market is an historical achievement and 
turning point of the European Community. Apart from replacing unanimity with 
majority voting in policy areas pertaining to the internal market in the Council, the 
SEA introduced two new procedures: the co-operation procedure (see Article 252 of 
the TEC)
131
 and the assent procedure. Later, the Maastricht Treaty established another 
new procedure: the co-decision procedure, which was further extended and adapted by 
the Amsterdam Treaty. When the Maastricht Treaty introduced the co-decision 
procedure, the co-operation procedure established by the SEA was replaced by the 
                                                 
131 See, for example, “Figure 1 Outline of the Cooperation Procedure” in Tsebelis (1994, 130); “The 
Cooperation Procedure Reconsidered” in Moser (1996, 836); “2. The Cooperation Procedure” in 
Moser (1997, 335-337); “Fig. 2. The Co-operation Procedure” in Crombez (1996, 206). 
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co-decision procedure in some areas while being extended in some other areas.
132
 The 
co-operation procedure was amended by the Amsterdam Treaty when there lacked 
agreement on its replacement by the co-decision procedure. Later the Nice Treaty 
limited the co-operation procedure only to EMU affairs, and finally it was repealed by 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The co-operation procedure was one of the principal 
legislative procedures of the EU before the Amsterdam Treaty came into force and it 
was gradually replaced by the co-decision procedure. Along with the Lisbon Treaty’s 
effectiveness from 1 December 2009 onwards, the co-decision procedure (defined in 
Article 294 TFEU, ex Article 251 TEC) became the OLP (“ordinary legislative 
procedure”), a normal decision making procedure for most of the EU’s policy areas.
133
 
The principle behind this co-decision practice is “parity”, that is, neither the Council 
nor the EP may adopt legislation without the other’s assent.
134
 
 Accompanying the evolution of those legislative procedures — the EU’s formal 
decision rules — the EP gradually gained more power. Before the SEA took effect in 
1987, the EC’s most important decisions were made under the consultation procedure 
where the Commission proposes and the Council makes a decision after receiving a 
non-binding opinion from the EP. Under the consultation procedure, the Council used 
the qualified majority rule — at least 62 out of 87 votes (71.26%) as member states’ 
votes were weighted in reference to each country’s population — to approve the 
                                                 
132 Moser (1997, 335) has summarized these areas: “this (co-operation) procedure was used until 
November 1993 for decision regarding the free movement of workers (Article 49), the freedom of 
establishment (Article 54.2), the treatment of foreign nationals (Article 56.2), the mutual recognition 
of diplomas (Article 57.1), the coordination of national provisions on the activities of self-employed 
persons (Article 57.2), and most important, for decisions about the harmonization or mutual 
recognition of national measures to achieve the internal market (Articles 100a and 100b)”. The 
co-decision procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty replaced those areas, “but the cooperation 
procedure remained in place for decisions regarding rules against discrimination (Article 6), the 
improvement in the health and safety of workers (Article 118.2), economic and social cohesion 
(Article 130e) and aspects of R&D-programs (Article 130o.2)”. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the 
co-operation procedure has been extended to the decision-making in transportation (Articles 75, 84, 
129d), aspects of fiscal and monetary policy (Articles 103.5, 104a, 104b, 105a), vocational training 
(Article 127), the European Social Fund (Article 125), measures to further the cooperation with 
developing countries, and of particular significance, to aspects of environmental policy (Article 
130s)”. 
133 Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the co-decision procedure covers eighty-five areas, and its scope 
almost doubled compared to forty-four areas of community action under the Treaty of Nice. For more 
details about the co-decision procedure, see Codecision and Conciliation: A Guide to How the 
Parliament Co-legislates under the Treaty of Lisbon (European Parliament, January 2012). 
134 See “The Co-Decision or Ordinary Legislative Procedure” (European Commission); Crombez 
(1997, 99) gave a summary of the co-decision procedure.  
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Commission’s proposals, while to amend proposals, the Council had to vote 
unanimously (e.g. Crombez 1997, 98). The co-operation and the assent procedures 
brought about by the SEA added additional stages to the former consultation procedure 
and granted more power to the EP. Under the co-operation procedure, the Council 
could, after consulting the EP (first reading), adopt a legislative proposal by a qualified 
majority, which was sent back to the EP for a second reading. The EP could accept, 
amend, or reject the Council’s decision, which was referred to as the common position. 
An amendment had to be examined by the Commission, and a rejection form the EP 
could be overruled only by the Council’s unanimous voting. In comparison, under the 
assent procedure a rejection from the EP could not be overturned. The Treaty of 
Maastricht introduced the fourth legislative procedure: the co-decision procedure, 
where the Council and the EP, if they approve different texts, need to work out a 
compromise on a joint text in a Conciliation Committee composed of an equal number 
of members or representatives from both the Council and the EP, and thereby the EP 
obtains more power as “a genuine co-legislator” and its role becomes as important as 
the Council’s (Crombez 1996, 200; 1997, 98).
135
 Consequently, the EP has acquired a 
veto right under both the co-operation and the co-decision procedures — conditional of 
not being overridden in the former while unconditional in the latter — and both 
procedures enable the EP to make amendments, which can only be rejected by a 
unanimous Council if the Commission has approved these amendments. Nevertheless, 
the Conciliation Committee makes the major difference between these two procedures 
(e.g. Moser 1999, 6). 
Alongside the development of the legislative procedures is the evolution of the 
voting system in the Council, where the coverage of QMV kept expanding from Treaty 
to Treaty, while the QMV thresholds and weights for member states got changed as the 
negotiated results responding to EU enlargement. Since 1957, QMV has ever been 
“based on weighted votes attributed to each member state”, which shall be replaced by 
a “double majority” with two thresholds introduced by the Lisbon Treaty: at least 55% 
of the number of member states while representing at least 65% of the EU’s population; 
however, this new QMV rule “will not produce its full effects before 1 April 2017” due 
                                                 
135 See also “Glossary, Codecision Procedure” (European Union), as it is explained that “the 
European Parliament (…) becomes co-legislator, on an equal footing with the Council, except in the 
cases provided for in the Treaties where the procedures regarding consultation and approval apply. 
The ordinary legislative procedure also includes qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council.” 
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to the transitional period from 1 November 2014 (the date when the “double majority” 
rule enters into force) to 31 March 2017 (Piris 2010, 213-14, see also section 2.5.1). So 
the adoption of the three new measures, if applicable, is subject to QMV defined by the 
Nice Treaty, which got amended along with the enlargement of the EU. 
 




QMV in the Council with the voting weight for each member state 
(votes +% of votes) 
EU-15* EU-25 EU-27** EU-28 
Belgium  5  5.7% 12   3.7% 12    3.5% 12    3.41% 
Denmark 3  3.4% 7    2.2% 7    2.0% 7    1.99% 
Germany 10 11.5% 29    9% 29    8.4% 29    8.24% 
Greece 5  5.7% 12    3.7% 12    3.5% 12    3.41% 
Spain 8  9.2% 27    8.4% 27    7.8% 27    7.67% 
France 10 11.5% 29    9% 29    8.4% 29    8.24% 
Ireland 3  3.4% 7    2.2% 7    2.0% 7    1.99% 
Italy 10 11.5% 29    9% 29    8.4% 29    8.24% 
Luxembourg 2  2.3% 4    1.2% 4    1.2% 4    1.14% 
Netherlands 5  5.7% 13    4% 13    3.8% 13    3.69% 
Austria 4  4.6% 10    3.1% 10    2.9% 10    2.84% 
Portugal  5  5.7% 12    3.7% 12    3.5% 12    3.41% 
Finland 3  3.4% 7    2.2% 7    2.0% 7    1.99% 
Sweden 4  4.6% 10    3.1% 10    2.9% 10    2.84% 
United Kingdom 10 11.5% 29    9% 29    8.4% 29    8.24% 
Poland   27    8.4% 27    7.8% 27    7.67% 
Czech   12    3.7% 12    3.5% 12    3.41% 
Hungary   12    3.7% 12    3.5% 12    3.41% 
Slovakia   7    2.2% 7    2.0% 7    1.99% 
Lithuania   7    2.2% 7    2.0% 7    1.99% 
Latvia   4    1.2% 4    1.2% 4    1.14% 
Slovenia   4    1.2% 4    1.2% 4    1.14% 
Estonia   4    1.2% 4    1.2% 4    1.14% 
Cyprus   4    1.2% 4    1.2% 4    1.14% 
Malta   3    0.9% 3    0.9% 3    0.85% 
Romania     14    4.1% 14    3.98% 
Bulgaria     10    2.9% 10    2.84% 
Croatia       7    1.99% 
Total  87  321  345  352  
QMV 
thresholds*** 
62 71.3% 232 72.3% 255 73.9% 260 73.86% 
Notes:* The weights for EU-15 are prescribed by the Nice Treaty (2001) Article 205, which 
“will be amended, on 1 January 2005, in accordance with the Protocol on the enlargement of 
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the European Union” — “Article 3 Provisions concerning the weighting of votes in the 
Council”. 
**The weights for EU-27 are laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, Protocol (No 36) on 
Transitional Provisions, Title II Provisions Concerning the Qualified Majority, Article 3 (3). 
*** QMV was “a triple majority” before the application of the “double majority”, see section 
2.5.1; besides the threshold (260 out of 352 votes after Croatia’s accession to the EU), 
another two thresholds refer to (1) a simple majority of member states (sometimes even two 
thirds) of the 28 EU countries, and (2) representing minimally 62% of the total population, 
checked upon a member state’s request.  
Sources: Data for EU-12, EU-25, and EU-27 are adapted from Piris (2010, 218-219); data for 
EU-28 from “Council of the European Union” (European Union) and own calculation of the 
percentages for EU-28.  
 
Subsequently, this dissertation turns to the case study results presented in Table 
6.22. Though H4 appears effective to account for the expansion of QMV between 
Treaty revisions from Nice to Lisbon, it fails to explain the concrete developments of 
the EU during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. As shown in Table 6.22, the case 
studies do not see changes from unanimous voting to QMV in the Council (i.e. the 
spillover of QMV into the policy areas originally covered by unanimity). Rather, the 
establishment of the European Semester and the ESRB was already covered by the 
QMV rule (though with different voting weights for each member state, see Table 6.23) 
instead of unanimity under the Nice Treaty — already indicating the most advanced 
stage of political integration where QMV is applied in the Council, while the creation 
of the ESM was concluded by euro area countries in Treaty form, and the rule to adopt 
the ESM was unanimity rather than QMV. Meanwhile, the legal bases for the adoption 
of the European Semester and the ESM got changed in the Lisbon Treaty, while those 
for the founding of the ESRB essentially remained the same. Those results imply two 
things: first, the changes of legal bases, which indicate EU legislative procedures, do 
not guarantee institutional/legalistic spillover from unanimous voting to QMV in the 
Council, as some policies were already under QMV and some measures were adopted 
via Treaty conclusions which require unanimity of contracting parties; second, more 
policy areas began to be covered by QMV, while some policy domains related to core 
national interests still remained under the rule of unanimity, Jensen’s 
institutional/legalistic spillover, theoretically, will gradually lose its predictive and 
explanatory power in accounting for EU developments, and accordingly, two types of 
situation may re-vigor institutional/legalistic spillover: the expansion to new EU policy 
areas and the transfer of policy areas previously subjected to unanimity to QMV — the 
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former might be promoted by globalization and the latter suggests more national 
authority and competence shall be pooled at the EU level, that is, a higher degree of EU 
political integration. In addition, as far as the three measures are concerned, the causal 
chain “as the Commission tends to choose the use of QMV as its proposals’ legal bases 
for member states to reach agreement and thus arouses member states’ attention to the 
limits of current decision-making of unanimity” is not applicable to the case of the 
ESM, because the introduction of this new mechanism is not covered by the normal EU 
legislative procedure, but subject to a Treaty conclusion which requires the unanimous 
approval of the participating states. Meanwhile, both the cases of the European 
Semester and the ESRB reject this causal chain, because before the Lisbon Treaty, the 
codifying of these two new measures should also be covered by QMV rather than 
unanimity under the Nice Treaty, and there is no necessity for the Commission to 
propose such — this dissertation terms it “a saturated state”, where the assumed 
conditions have already been met, being so “saturated” that the theory under concern 
becomes inapplicable to new EU developments and thus loses its explanatory power. 
Furthermore, the main considerations bringing about the Lisbon Treaty include: (1) 
more efficiency in EU decision-making, (2) more democracy via giving a greater role 
to the EP and national parliaments, and (3) a more coherent external representation 
(“Treaty of Lisbon, Questions and Answers”, European Union), whereas “the increase 
in the number of legal bases where the Council acts by QMV instead of unanimity” is 
“designed to improve effectiveness in the functioning of the Council”, which “being 
coupled with a new QMV system designed to make it more legitimate and, in principle, 
simpler, should facilitate decision-taking” (Piris 2010, 212). Therefore, the causal 
mechanisms posited by H4 are not found in the case studies.  
H4 argues that decision-making by QMV in the Council is the most advanced 
stage of EU political integration, which gets enshrined in the OLP; connecting to the 
research results in the previous section 6.1 (particularly Table 6.1), this dissertation 
finds that QMV of legalistic procedures does not guarantee a higher level of EU 
political integration, neither does it define the limits of decision-making modes which 
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stage of EU 
political 
integration 
Level 4 Shared 
competences 
In the General 
Board: a simple 
majority or two 
thirds of the votes 
cast with the 
quorum of two 
thirds of the 
members with 
voting rights (see 
Table 5.4) 
The ESM Treaty 
amendments 
to Article 136 




member states  
Unanimity by 
the Heads of 
State or 
Government 




form of EU 
political 
integration 
Level 5 Exclusive 
competences 
In the Board of 
Governors and the 
Board of Directors: 
by unanimity (a 
derogation: a 
qualified majority 
with a 85% 
threshold), 
qualified majority 
with a 80 % 
threshold or simple 
majority  
Sources: Own Compilation on the basis of Table 6.1 and the research results of this section. 
 
Table 6.24 combines the research results of H1 and Table 6.22 and adds the final 
column of the decision-making modes adopted by the three new measures. As shown 
in Table 6.24, though at present, QMV stands for the most advanced stage of EU 
political integration in the context of EU legislative procedures, it does not necessarily 
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lead to a high political integration result (i.e. the political integration degree of the 
European Semester is level 1-2), while the ESM Treaty agreement, which is subject to 
unanimous voting of the euro countries, though taking the least developed form of EU 
integration, may cause an outcome of a high degree political integration. So there is no 
proportionate connection between EU legislative procedures and the degree of political 
integration of policy outcomes under those procedures. Rather, as concluded in section 
6.1 (see Proposition 2), the political integration degree of the EU’s new measures is 
related to the competence division laid down by the EU Treaties which is relevant to 
the nature of the issues concerned. More interestingly, the voting modality of QMV in 
the Council does not prescribe the possible voting modes which may be used under the 
new policies and measures. As Table 6.23 shows, the ESM not only adopts unanimity 
and QMV, but also simple majority, while the General Board of the ESRB also applies 
simple majority under certain circumstances. 
 To conclude, though the first half of H4 can explain the general development of 
QMV’s expansion into more policy areas between the two grand Treaty revisions (i.e. 
the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty), it fails to account for the three specific cases of 
EU development. Meanwhile, the second half of H4 about the Commission’s specific 
contributions to the expansion of QMV does not gain supportive evidence from the 
three cases, and this shows that there is a limit for the Commission to choose QMV 
purposively as its proposals’ legal bases so as to arouse member states’ attention to the 
limits of current unanimity. Moreover, up to now, QMV in the Council represents the 
most advanced stage of EU political integration to adopt legislative acts, but it does not 
necessarily lead to policy results of a higher degree of political integration. When 
Proposition 2 argues that “the mode and degree of EU political integration are defined 
and limited by EU Treaties”, it stresses that EU political integration connects to the 
competence division already prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty; in comparison, QMV 
adopted in EU legislative procedures turns out to barely have indicative power to 
explain EU political integration entailed in concrete EU policies and development. All 
those can be traced back to the definition and indicator of political integration: the 
collective decision-making modes (see Table 2.1), which emphasize the locus of 
activities rather than the voting modalities in collective decision-making, suggesting an 
outcome-oriented measurement rather than a process-oriented criterion; nevertheless, 
QMV, which may assume different weights and thresholds (see Table 6.23), has 
provided the legal bases of EU political integration as well as prescribed the most 
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advanced form of institutional/legalistic spillover for the EU to adopt legislative acts. 
Finally, the reasons causing the failure of H4 in the case studies show that there might 
be “a saturated state” for some integration approaches and theories: they may account 
for EU developments in the past well, but turn out to be inapplicable to the up-to-date 
developments only because the new developments have already surpassed the stage 
posited by the approaches and theories (i.e. original theoretical conditions), and thus 
the theory concerned exhibits “a saturated state” — a situation where the original 
theoretical conditions have already been met and hence the assumed conditions are too 
saturated to make the relevant theory still possess the explanatory power; nevertheless, 
such a saturated state is not unchangeable, and the new challenges may present fresh 
situations to “dilute” the saturated conditions, and thus the approach or theory in 
concern shall regain its vigor again. The saturated state of institutional/legalistic 
spillover presenting in the case studies of this dissertation suggests that 
institutional/legalistic spillover does not necessarily accompany EU political 
integration.  
 
6.5 Evidence for H5: Exogenous Spillover 
As H5 can be dissected into four sub-hypotheses, this dissertation will check each of 
them one by one against the three cases. To begin with, H5a has already been got 
confirmed in the previous hypothesis tests: one of the conclusions in section 6.3 
supports the first half of H5a, while evidence for the second half of H5a is present in 
several sections, particularly by Tables 1.2 and 6.7.  
Regarding H5b, the first half of factor (1) is justified by the evidence presented 
in section 6.2, while the second half of factor (1) — “the EU acts as an effective buffer 
to the external financial turmoil and economic crisis” — gets supporting evidence at 
least in two respects. The first aspect is the establishment of the temporary rescue 
facility — the EFSF and then the permanent one the ESM — to provide necessary and 
urgent financial aid to the euro countries plagued by the sovereign debt crisis, so as to 
avoid member state bankruptcy. The loans to Greece before the founding of the EFSF 
have vividly illustrated the buffer function of the EU and eurozone to its member states 
in front of severe financial shocks and economic recessions (e.g. Hosli et al. 2011a; 
2011b). The purpose of financial assistance which goes with strict conditionality of 
economic and financial reforms is not to directly bail out the troubled states (in 
accordance with the “no-bailout” clause laid down by Article 125 TFEU and Article 
401 
 
123 TFEU prohibiting monetary financing), but means to add financial liquidity to the 
economies and buy time for the beneficiary countries to carry out necessary fiscal and 
structural reforms so as to restore economic competitiveness and financial stability in 
the long run (ECB Monthly Bulletin July 2011, 71). The second aspect is the big 
intra-EU market for national economies when encountering a global economic crisis. 
As shown in Figure 6.9, there was a sharp drop of the internal trade amount between 
the euro countries and other EU member states during the course of 2008 and 2009, but 
from 2010 to 2012, intra-trade of the EU gained a recovering momentum and at the end 
of 2011, the total trade in both exports and imports terms has exceeded the level before 
the global financial crisis. Therefore, there is no doubt that the EU has provided its 
member states with a potential huge “domestic” market of economic growth, which 
serves as an effective buffer for member states to safeguard against the repercussions 
of the world-wide economic recession. Meanwhile, the presence of factor (2) posited 
by H5b is ascertained by EU politicians’ evaluations on the harsh challenges lying 
ahead of the EU. As for the context where the EU stands, the Commission clearly 
stated that: 
 
“The recent financial crisis and pressure on the financial stability in Europe 
have underlined more clearly than ever the interdependence of the EU's 
economies, in particular inside the euro area. Member States were supported 
by being part of the EU, with its 500-million-people strong internal market 
and common currency for sixteen Member States. Existing instruments and 
methods of co-ordination enabled the EU to pull together its recovery efforts 
and to weather a storm that no Member State could have done on its own. 
However, these recent experiences also showed gaps and weaknesses in the 
current system, underlining the need for stronger and earlier policy 
co-ordination, additional prevention and correction mechanisms and a crisis 
resolution facility for euro-area Member States.” (COM(2010) 250 Final 12 
May 2010, 2) 
 
Obviously, “stronger and earlier policy co-ordination” was realized through the 
European Semester and “a crisis resolution facility for euro-area member states” refers 
to the temporary EFSF, based on which a permanent crisis resolution mechanism — 
the ESM — was developed. In comparison, the ESRB, being responsible for EU-wide 
macro-prudential supervision, composes an essential part of “additional prevention and 
correction mechanisms”, as preventive and corrective actions “should also cover 
macro-prudential aspects to prevent or curb excessive credit growth or exuberant asset 
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price developments, in line with the [...] European Systemic Risk Board analysis” 
(COM(2010) 250 Final 12 May 2010, 7); besides, whenever the Commission makes 
risk assessments and thus decides on appropriate policies, it “would take into account 
relevant input from the European Systemic Risk Board” (COM(2010) 250 Final 12 
May 2010, 8). As for the sensitivity and susceptibility of national economies and 
financial markets due to increasing economic and financial interdependence, Figures 
6.13, 6.14, and 6.15 show the turmoil of government bond yields in the selected euro 
states during the euro zone sovereign debt crisis. Chaired by Van Rompuy, The Task 
Force Report on 21 October 2010 has set up the general framework for the EU to 
address the financial crisis and the sovereign debt turmoil in the eurozone, which, inter 
alia, expresses a full consideration on the situation suggested by H5b (2):  
 
“The recommendations in the Task Force Report address the high degree of 
economic inter-dependence, particularly in the euro area, while preserving 
national responsibilities on fiscal and economic policies.”  
[...] 
“The Greek crisis showed that a more robust framework for crisis 
management is needed. Indeed, the recent events have demonstrated that 
financial distress in one Member State can rapidly threaten macro-financial 
stability of the EU as a whole through various contagion channels. This is 
particularly true for the euro area where the economies, and the financial 
sectors in particular, are closely intertwined and where crisis management 
facilities were missing.” (The Task Force Report, 21 October 2010) 
 
Therefore, the establishment of the EFSF and the ESM is the main means taken 
by the EU to avoid contagion and keep financial stability. All in all, H5b is confirmed 
and the two proposed factors are fully present.  
Subsequently, this dissertation moves to the test of H5c. Originally, H5c 
proposes a relationship between the EU and third parties outside the EU, but the 
European Semester functions as a fiscal surveillance and policy coordination 
mechanism of EU member states at a macro level, not targeting third parties of non-EU 
member states, nor covering any particular policy areas that third parties outside the 
EU shall negotiate — basically, the European Semester is an internal instrument 
dealing with intra-EU issuesand. Therefore, H5c is not applicable to the first case of 
this dissertation. With regard to the ESRB, the relationship of the EU with third parties 
hypothesized in H5c is also not applicable due to the nature of the ESRB — 
responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system across the EU 
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via issuing non-legally-binding warnings or recommendations. Nevertheless, due to 
“the integration of international financial markets and the contagion risk of financial 
crises, there is a need for a strong commitment on the part of the Union (of the ESRB) 
at the global level”, the ESRB seeks closer cooperation with as well as draw expertise 
from other international macro-prudential supervision mechanisms, particularly the 
IMF and the FSB, and meanwhile, the ESRB shall “take on all the global 
responsibilities required in order to ensure that the voice of the Union is heard on 
issues relating to financial stability” (ESRB Regulation, (7)). Due to the nature and 
missions of the ESRB, this new EU body has no legal personality (ESRB Regulation, 
(15)), which rules out the possibilities for the ESRB to represent the EU to bargain and 
sign the contract with third parties; consequently, the relationship between the ESRB 
and third parties outside the EU is defined in ESRB Regulation Article 3, clause 2 (i) as 
“coordinating its actions with those of international financial organizations, 
particularly the IMF and the FSB as well as the relevant bodies in third countries on 
matters related to macro-prudential oversight” (emphasis added).  
Concerning the case of the ESM, H5c is still not applicable, because at present 
the ESM is the permanent crisis resolution mechanism only for the eurozone countries, 
and it is an intergovernmental institution concluded by the euro states and not an EU 
body yet. The purpose of establishing the ESM is unequivocally stated in Article 3 of 
the ESM Treaty:  
 
“The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilize funding and provide stability 
support under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance 
instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, 
or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its 
Member States. For this purpose, the ESM shall be entitled to raise funds by 
issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial or other 
agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or 
other third parties.” (ESM Treaty, Article 3) 
 
Therefore, the ESM may interfere in the relationship with “other third parties”, 
and accompanying the ESM’s purpose is its full legal personality, which suggests that 
the ESM can contract with third parties (ESM Treaty, Article 32 (2)). In a certain sense, 
the ESM member states (i.e. the euro area countries) forge collective external positions 
against non-participant third parties, but the purpose of this is not to increase their 
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collective bargaining power against third parties — rather, the ESM means to provide 
essential financial assistance to the euro states so as to keep the financial stability of the 
beneficiary states, the eurozone, and the whole EU. From this perspective, the ESM 
increases the euro states’ collective ability to meet the outside demand. The financial 
assistance provided by the ESM, as pointed out previously, does not mean a fiscal 
responsibility transfer nor a financial bail-out, but a way to buy time for the troubled 
states so as to take reforms to regain economic vitality and prosperity; since the ESM is 
a crisis backstop of last resort, national governments are not supposed to rely on it.  
In short, the issue raised in H5c (i.e. EU common external positions v.s. third 
parties outside the EU) basically is not applicable to the three cases of this dissertation, 
as all three represent solutions to EU endogenous problems of a specific nature: policy 
coordination and surveillance among EU member states, EU-wide macro-prudential 
oversight as a complement and support to EU micro-level supervision, and a permanent 
financial assistance mechanism specially for the eurozone countries — all address 
intra-EU problems and their successful implementation and benefits-maximization will 
not necessarily depend upon third parties’ participation and thus not induce the EU or 
part of EU member states to negotiate with those outside the EU. However, the ESM’s 
legal personality enables it to negotiate and contract with third parties and the ESRB 
shall cooperate with international macro-prudential supervision agencies to access 
other supervisory bodies’ expertise and information. Needless to say, the EU’s practice 
of addressing the financial and sovereign debt crises could provide lessons and 
experience for other countries and regions to address similar problems of their own; 
nevertheless, even if the ESM may conclude agreements with third parties, the issues 
addressed by the three new measures are characterized by cooperation and coordination 
at the macro and intergovernmental levels rather than competition and negotiation 
between the EU and non-EU parties: the European Semester and the ESRB are not 
concerned with any single policy area, but cover multiple policy domains and stress the 
linkages and the mutual influence among them, while the ESM plays the role as a crisis 
backstop — the last resort that the euro countries shall turn to. They do not target any 
individual policy; rather, they stand for holistic approaches serving the general interest 
of the EU and cultivating financial stability and economic prosperity across the EU. 
Though the relationship posited by H5c is not applicable to the case studies in this 
dissertation, it is true that along with the adoption and implementation of the three 
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measures, the EU’s ability to meet challenges stemming from the outside world does 
increase. 
Lastly, as regards H5d, this dissertation finds that the ESRB and the ESM follow 
a general international trend and practice, and the external environment has a structural 
effect on the framing-up of the EU’s solutions to the crisis. Meanwhile, the European 
Semester, based on what the EU has already taken as measures, displays the EU’s 
original creativities in strengthening regional economic governance via coordinating 
and monitoring fiscal and economic plans of EU member states (see Table 6.25).  
 














No, but trying 
to make a better 
use of the 
existing EU 
instruments  
 European Commission President Barroso stated the following 
about the European Semester: “We need to strengthen economic 
governance in Europe. Although the EU has several instruments for 
the coordination of economic policy, the crisis has put in evidence 
that these have not been fully used and that there are certain gaps in 
the current system of governance.”① 
 Commissioner Rehn stated: “Coordination of fiscal policy has 
to be conducted in advance, in order to ensure that national budgets 
are consistent with the European dimension, that they don’t put at 
risk the stability of the other member states. This can be done in the 
framework of a European economic semester. For (the) euro-area it 
means deeper and broader surveillance, in particular with regard to 
macroeconomic imbalances.” ② 
 European Council President Van Rompuy stated: “[...] the 
so-called ‘European semester’ has been agreed whereby member 
states will confer at an earlier stage on the assumptions (in terms of 
growth projections, inflation rates, etc) on which their national 
budgets (are) based. This will allow you to bring the European 
consequences of national policy decisions into your national 
parliamentary debate. This is one of the means by which (we) 
emphasize how the decisions of each Member State affect all.”③ 
(Cf. section 5.2.1) 
The ESRB Yes;  “Comparable macro-prudential bodies were also established in 
some Member States at national level, as well as outside the EU, at 
more or less the same time, a prominent example of the latter being 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was set up 
in the United States under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.” (④, p.3) 
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 The ESRB is assumed to be “cooperating closely with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), which are expected to provide early warnings of 
macro-prudential risks at the global level, and the partners of the 
Group of Twenty (G-20)” and “should contribute, inter alia, towards 
implementing the recommendations of the IMF, the FSB and the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to the G-20.” (ESRB 
Regulation, (7), (8)) 
The ESM  Yes;  The creation of the ESM is based on the model and experience 
of the EFSF (see Table 5.5), while the latter’s “activation is subject 
to strong conditionality, in the context of a joint EU/IMF support, 
and will be on terms and conditions similar to the IMF” (⑤, p.6) and 
it offers three types of credit lines which are in line with those of the 
IMF” (⑥, D8).  
 Klaus Regling, the Managing Director of the ESM, explained: 
“The strategy we are following in Europe at the ESM has been used 
successfully over decades by the International Monetary Fund. Just 
like the IMF we temporarily grant loans at favourable interest rates 
to countries that have lost market access”. ⑦ 
 The CACs included in the ESM are not a new idea; they have 
already been concluded by the Ecofin in 2003 that “the Member 
States should include collective action clauses in their government 
bonds issued under foreign law or jurisdiction” and the EU has 
included the CACs in all its bond issuances. ⑧ 
Sources: ① European Commission-IP/10/859 (30 June 2010); ② European 
Commission-IP/10/561 (12 May 2010); ③Van Rompuy (26 October 2010); ④Dierick et al. 
(February 2012); ⑤Council of the European Union-9596/10 (Presse 108) ( 9/10 May 2010); 
⑥ EFSF FAQs (16 July 2013); ⑦ Regling (8 October 2013); ⑧ European 
Commission-MEMO/10/636 (1 December 2010).  
 
As Table 6.25 shows, H5d got confirmed by the cases of the ESRB and the ESM 
as “internationally prevailing policy paradigms and discourses” of macro-prudential 
supervision and of financial assistance to the countries who have lost market access 
due to unsustainably high yields for governmental securities have exerted impact on 
EU decision-makers: the establishment of the ESRB is in the trend of the international 
macro-prudential supervision development, and the ESM takes over the IMF’s 
long-standing practices as a successful model. In the two cases, the external context 
shaped EU decision-makers’ preferences; in comparison, what is suggested by H5d 
does not gain convincing evidence in the case of the European Semester. This failure, 
however, illustrates the EU’s originality and creativity to counter the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis as well as strengthen EU economic governance. To sum up, the 
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causal chains posited by H5 partially collapse in the case studies, as not all 
sub-hypotheses are confirmed by the cases: H5a and H5b get a full confirmation, H5c 
turns out to be not applicable to the three selected cases, and the causal mechanisms 
assumed by H5d gain strong supportive evidence in the second and the third cases 









7 Chapter Seven: Hypotheses Tests of 
Intergovernmentalism and New Insights Based on 
Case Studies 
7.1 Evidence for H6: A Criticism Levelled at LI’s 
Predictions of the Impervious Informal Consensus 
Practice in the Council 
Taking Table 6.21 into account, the application of QMV and the voting results in the 
Council regarding the three new mechanisms are presented in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1 Application of QMV in the Council Regarding the Three New Measures 




QMV in the Ecofin Council, 3122th meeting: all 27 member states vote for “Yes”— no 
“No” and “Abstain”, and the total votes cast are 345.① 
The ESRB QMV in the Ecofin Council, 3045th meeting: all 27 member states vote for “Yes”— no 
“No” and “Abstain”, and the total votes cast are 345.② 
The ESM  QMV in EU legislative procedures is not applicable to the case of the ESM due to its 
intergovernmental nature. (see Table 6.6 and Table 6.21) 
Sources: ①Council of the European Union-16662/11 (10 November 2011); ②Council of 
the European Union-16644/10 (19 November 2010).  
 
Obviously, the application of QMV in the Council implies the legislative 
procedures of the EU, notably the OLP, and the creation of the ESM does not fall into 
such categories. The case study results presented in Table 7.1, however, do not 
adequately support that “the Council of Ministers tends to apply the formal rules of 
QMV rather than take decisions on the basis of informal consensus”, because despite 
that the rule of QMV was applied in the Council to codify the European Semester and 
to establish the ESRB, there was unanimous approval by all EU member states to adopt 
the two new measures, and thus the distinction between the unanimous positions of 
national governments in QMV and “the basis of informal consensus” was not clear. 
Therefore, H6, formulated as a criticism to intergovernmentalism, does not gain 
adequate supporting evidence in the case studies of this dissertation and the traditional 
410 
 
scenario of informal consensus in the Council still appears to prevail; the 
intergovernmentalist assumption that the informal consensus practices in the Council 
tend to be impervious to external factors (e.g. the institutional design, the composition 
of the Parliament, and/or the views of the Commission) (Proposition 18), however, is 
still subject to empirical tests. Nevertheless, the unanimity displayed in Table 7.1 does 
indicate EU member states’ common positions on tackling the crisis, another evidence 
for H5a and Proposition 4.  
 
7.2 Evidence for H7: A Revised LI Three-Stage Framework 
Displayed in Figure 3.3, H7 capsulates the LI model which is constructed in 
accordance with LI arguments presented in Figure 3.2. This dissertation will test H7 in 
line with the analytical factors listed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. As H7 can be dissected 
into a series of sub-hypotheses, this dissertation will check them one by one. As the 
analyses in section 3.7.4.3 suggest, the first move is to examine the nature of the 
selected cases and to ascertain whether they fall into LI scope conditions. To begin 
with, as the LI model was born from the studies of the EC/EU grand bargains where 
intergovernmental negotiations dominate, the cases of the European Semester and the 
ESRB do not suggest typical formal interstate bargains among EU member states, but 
rather they illustrate daily decision-making and developments of the EU during the 
crisis. Therefore, the European Semester and the ESRB have failed to meet the 
requirement of the case selection of LI, which is supposed to be generalizable to 
international negotiations, while the ESM, created by Treaty agreement among the euro 
states, stands for a major negotiation among the contracting parties, Germany and 
France in particular (see Table 6.7), and thus the case of the ESM is suitable to be 
examined against LI. Still, this dissertation also tries to apply stage 1 and stage 3 of LI 
to the two “unsuitable” cases — the European Semester and the ESRB — to see what 
light LI can cast on our understanding of the two measures and whether some LI 
assertions are also applicable to EU daily normal decision-making.  
 
7.2.1 Evidence for H7a: National Preference Formation (LI Stage 1) 
Table 7.2 presents the case study results against H7a, the first stage of the LI model, in 





Table 7.2 Checking the First Stage of the LI Model: National Preference Formation 
 (I) The European 
Semester  
(II) The ESRB (III) The ESM  
H7a Not confirmed; 
(1) The nature and 
functions of the 
European Semester 
— policy 
coordination of each 
member state — 
address national 
economic interests 
in general (which 
shall guarantee a 







rather than any 
specific and 
individual sectoral 
interests, so interests 




(2) Born from the 
Task Force’s ideas 
and approved by the 
Ecofin Council on 7 
September 2010, the 
European Semester 
started from 1 
January 2011 before 
it was finally 
codified in an EU 
regulation of 16 
November 2011, and 







opinions of the 
creation of the 
ESRB (see Table 
6.19); nevertheless, 
the members of 
financial 
representatives tend 
to be transnational 
rather than national: 







Aegon and AVIVA 
plc. appear to be 
tinted with sort of 
national “domestic” 
color; besides due to 
the tasks assumed by 
the ESRB, the 
existing 
supranational ESAs 
also participate;136  
(2) The ESRB not 
only stands for the 
interests of powerful 
domestic 
constituents in 
financial sectors, but 
also represents 
Yes; 
(1) The two core euro members, Germany and 
France, formulated their preferences for the 
establishment of the ESM on the basis of the 
national economic interests rather than 
geopolitical or ideological concerns, as there 
were contagious risks among the euro countries 
due to the highly integrated economies among 
them; the financial turmoil and the sovereign 
bankruptcy of a euro state shall endanger the 
interests of the whole euro area countries — a 
stable financial market is crucial to the eurozone 
countries’ economies; 
(2) Germany’s and France’s national 
preferences for the ESM were expressively 
enshrined in the bilateral “Deauville Deal” 
reached by German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 
October 2010, where France “backed Paris in its 
desire to water down sanctions to be imposed on 
excessive-spending EU countries” while “[i]n 
return, Paris endorsed Berlin’s push for a change 
to the EU treaty in order to set-up an EU bailout 
fund and default mechanism”; ① 
(3) German government preferences were 
based on the following considerations: first, 
Germany was “the main bankroller” of the loan 
of €110 billion to Greece, and it adamantly 
rejected the idea of endorsing such an emergent 
bail-out again and “its Constitutional Court 
would slap down any extension of the 
Greek-type bail-out on the basis that the current 
EU treaty specifically rules out member state 
rescues”; second, the EFSF and EFSM were 
temporary backstops, and the German 
government wanted to have “something more 
substantial” to replace the temporary measures 
before they would expire; third, the default 
mechanism upheld by Ms Merkel meant that 
                                                 
136 See “Annex II: Meetings of the Group and Hearings in 2008 – 2009”, in the de Larosière Report 
(25 February 2009). (Cf. Table 6.19 (2)). 
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mainly pushed by 
EU supranational 




Council) rather than 
specific interest 
groups (see Table 
6.6). 
national government 





financial markets so 





investors, rather than taxpayers alone, would 
also bear at least part of the losses of a state 
bankruptcy so as to avoid “a cascading panic in 
the markets” caused by sovereign defaults like 
Greece in the spring of 2010; ① 
(4) The Merkel government urged a strict 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanism of the 
SGP to avoid similar cases of Greece whose 
budget transgressions had tottered the entire 
currency system, and consequently, it “favor(ed) 
highest possible degree of automatism,” and 
supported the Commission’s relevant proposals
②; however, in the Franco-German Deauville 
Deal, “Germany retreated from its position 
automatic sanctions” so as to “win French 
support for a permanent mechanism for crisis 
resolution”; accordingly, decisions made on 
sanctions would remain the status quo: QMV in 
the Council, which opposed the Task Force 
Report’s recommendation and the Commission’s 
proposal of the automatic sanctions of “the 
reverse voting mechanism” (i.e. RQMV); ③  
(5) In comparison, the French government had 
“an entirely different vision” and it “has always 
tended to side with the southern Europeans who 
tend to see Germany’s demands for strict 
stability criteria as a nuisance”②; for the deal, 
Germany “gave away [...] firm fiscal discipline 
[...] of automatic fines for deficit violators” and 
“also agreed to a French proposal that deficit 
violators should lose voting rights in the EU’s 
Council of Ministers”, and the latter, however, 
“would require wholesale changes to the Lisbon 
Treaty” ④; 
(6) The controversies caused by the 
German-French deal are that “a permanent fund 
and the default procedure require a change to the 
EU treaty”, and furthermore, “spendthrift states 
to be stripped of their voting rights within the 
Council of Ministers — a move that everyone 
agrees would require a treaty change” ; among 
the member states, “Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK are believed to be 
adamantly opposed to” such a voting rights 














the national (as well 
as the EU) economic 
interests in general 






and taxpayers are 
also diffuse, but the 
new mechanism 
displays a clear 
equilibrium between 
national fiscal and 
economic behavior 






from the common 
sense of the 
necessity to 
coordinate fiscal and 
economic plans so 
(3) Out of 
economic interest 
considerations 





national interests in 
keeping financial 
stability within the 
EU;  
(4) The ESRB 





supervision at the 
micro-level and the 
pooled 
macro-prudential 
oversight at the EU 
level; 
(5) All the three 
factors (3a), (3b) and 
(3c) in Figure 3.2 





on the creation of 
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as to reap greater 
economic benefits, 
indicating (3a) and 
(3b), and also 
encompassing (3c).  
the ESRB; 
moreover, the ESRB 
fills the vacuum of 
the EU integration 






other words, it 
serves the economic 
interests of 
individual actors and 
the whole region.  
remained resolute in her demand for a major 
change to the treaty” to establish a permanent 
rescue mechanism; ① 
(7) The default mechanism agreed by both the 
France and Germany expressed the economic 
interests of domestic constituents (i.e. 
taxpayers), exhibiting the interest formation 
pattern of investors on the one hand and 
taxpayers and regulators on the other hand, as 
Germany and France, being the number one and 
number two contributors to the EFSF, also 
beared a large share of the loan to Greece; 
(8) In addition, Germany and France’s 
endeavors to setting up the permanent 
mechanism to safeguard the eurozone and the 
single currency as well as leading to the 
agreement on the loans to Greece also had 
political implications: “the euro’s collapse would 
be a fatal step backwards for the European 
project – in which Germany was so key” and 
“[t]here is a very strong determination among 
the member states to save what we have done 
over 50 years all together”.⑤ 
 Falling into the categories of Stage 1 in Figure 3.2? 
Summary (1) X; 
(1c)* Mode 3 (see 
the notes below) 
(1) √ (1a); 
 
(1) √ (1a); 
(1d)* Mode 4 (see the notes below) 
 (2) X; 
(2d)* a holistic 
approach to the 
general interests of 
national economies  
(2) √ (2a); 
(2a)* specific 
domestic sectoral 
interests (which may 
also represent the 
general demands of 
the naiotnal 
economy as a 
whole); 
(2d)* 
(2) √ (2a) and (2b); 
(2c)* other factors (such as the political will to 
secure EMU and/or the EU) 
 (3) √;  
(3d)* (see the notes 
below) 
(3) √; 
(3d)* (see the notes 
below) 
(3) √ (3a) and (3b); 
(3b)*ruling governmental coalitions’ 
macro-economic preferences and/or stances on 
the fate of the EU and/or EMU 
Notes: “√” indicates the fact that the case falls into the range of the categories/predictions of 
the LI model presented in Figure 3.2; “X” means the concerned is/are out of the 
categories/predictions of the LI model; “*” suggests that there are modifications and/or new 
developments adding to the LI model on the basis of the case studies. 
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(1c)* Mode 3 (an exception to Mode 1): When addressing the general economic and 
financial environment and/or the interconnectedness across different sectors, the line 
between producers and taxpayers/regulators tends to become diffuse as national preferences 
are based on the general economic considerations rather than any specific individual 
sectoral interests, exhibiting an equilibrium of the responsibility and actions between the 
national/micro level and the EU/macro level. (Proposition 19) 
(1d)* Mode 4 (a mixture of Modes 1 and 2): In terms of issues directly related to the fate of 
the euro and/or the EU, national preference formation is not only based on economic interest 
calculations, but also carries political considerations on securing the political project which 
enshrines more than half a century’s efforts. (Proposition 20) 
(3d)* The common sense and the necessity of sound interactions, coordination and 
cooperation among EU member states and between the national/micro and the 
supranational/macro levels to serve national economic interests in general.  
Sources: ①Phillips (28 October 2010, EUobserver); ②Müller et al. (25 October 2010, 
Spiegel Online); ③Kovacheva (22 October 2010, Euinside); ④“Brussels Summit: EU 
Agrees to Merkel’s Controversial Euro Reforms” (Spiegel Online, 29 October 2010); ⑤
Alexander (25 June 2011, The Telegraph). 
 
Before conducting the empirical test of LI (H7) with the case of the ESM, this 
dissertation has tried to apply LI to the two unsuitable cases — the European Semester 
and the ESRB — to see whether LI is applicable to EU daily normal decision-making. 
As the evidence presented in Table 6.19 and the overviews of the selected cases in 
chapter five show, the European Semester and the ESRB have exhibited the EU’s and 
its member states’ holistic macro-level approaches on the basis of individual 
micro-level developments to address the crisis (also demonstrating a converged point 
of economic interests of the member states); consequently, the interests of specific 
powerful domestic constituents are not prominent. Moreover, the implementation of 
the European Semester started from 1 January 2011 (which was born from the Task 
Force’s ideas and approved by the Ecofin Council on 7 September 2010) before it was 
finally codified into EU regulation of 16 November 2011 (cf. Table 6.6), and the 
foundation of the European Semester was pushed by national governments and/or the 
Heads of State or Government before the relevant interest groups were consulted, 
because the issues concerned by the European Semester (as well as the ESRB) are 
related to the national economic interests in general (which shall guarantee a stable and 
healthy economic and financial environment for individual domestic constituents and 
national economies) rather than any specific and individual sectoral interests. Even in 
the case of the ESRB where various representatives from the financial sectors have 
delivered their demands and opinions of the creation of the ESRB, the members of 
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financial representatives tend to be transnational rather than national: among the listed 
representatives, only AMAFI (French Association of Financial Markets), LIBA 
(London Investment Banking Association), and insurance companies of Munich 
Reinsurance Company, and Aegon and AVIVA plc. look to be tinted with sort of 
national “domestic” color.
137
 Therefore, the interests of specific “powerful domestic 
constituents” are diffuse in the two cases; instead, the two new measures reflect the 
necessity of macro-level coordination and supervision, which are considered to be 
indispensable and beneficial to supplement and support micro-level developments. 
Those, however, have confirmed part of H7g, a scope condition of the LI, namely that 
the more diffuse representation of domestic societal interests is, the less predictable and 
more uncertain national preferences are, and the worse LI works. 
Though the cases of the European Semester and the ESRB are not suitable to the 
LI analysis, the LI does shed light on the explanation of the two cases, and (I)(1) and (2) 
in Table 7.2 appear to confirm H7g and H7h, the scope conditions of LI: (I)(1) shows 
that the more diffuse representation of domestic societal interests is, the worse LI 
works, while (I)(2) (as well as the case of the ESRB) displays EU supranational 
institutions’ and their leaders’ entrepreneurship when national governments lack 
critical information, expertise and even legitimacy that the Commission and the EU 
leaders (e.g. Van Rompuy) can provide so far as the issues of policy coordination (and 
macro-prudential oversight) across the EU are concerned. Nevertheless, the diffuse 
sectoral interest representation in the European Semester case does not indicate “the 
less predictable and more uncertain national preferences”. Rather, national 
governments support and push for the introduction of this new mechanism — they 
have a very clear and certain preference, which agrees with the common sense to 
realize maximal benefits via strengthening macro-level policy coordination and 
surveillance. This suggests another potential scope condition for the LI application, 
which can be added as (14) to Figure 3.2: for the policies and measures not addressing 
a single and discrete issue but dealing with the interconnections and interdependence 
among various economic sectors, national preference formation is based on a holistic 
and systemic consideration rather than any particular groups’ interests; under such 
occasions, interest groups’ positions should be largely in line with national government 
                                                 
137 See “Annex II: Meetings of the Group and Hearings in 2008 – 2009”, in de Larosière Report (25 
February 2009). (Cf. Table 6.19 (2)).  
416 
 
preferences, as the macro-level measures are supposed to facilitate micro-level 
activities, so even the representation of domestic societal interests may appear weak 
and diffuse, national preferences for those issues that serve EU economic growth and 
prosperity tend to embrace further integration; at the same time, EU supranational 
institutions and EU leaders shall exert their influence on policy formation, as they 
possess macro-level information, resources, expertise and/or legitimacy that individual 
governments lack. The implementation of the European Semester and the ESRB 
actually has spotlighted policy vacuums in the EU: macro-level coordination and 
supervision and the necessities to address interconnections and interdependence among 
different policy domains. Those issues have also been underplayed or even neglected 
by EU integration theories — for example, (12) in Figure 3.2 only stresses sectoral 
economic interests vis-à-vis geopolitical and ideological concerns. It is clear that along 
with the micro-level development and integration of discrete policy areas, new 
challenges to EU economic governance emerge against the trend of globalization: 
macro-level coordination and supervision across various policy areas from holistic and 
systemic approaches. Accordingly, the existing LI’s two scope conditions can be 
supplemented by a third one:  
Proposition 21: On the issues cutting through multiple policy domains and 
addressing the interconnections and interdependence among various economic and 
financial sectors, the representation of domestic societal interests tends to be weak and 
diffuse; nevertheless, national governments tend to assume predictable pro-integrative 
positions, and meanwhile, EU institutions and their leaders tend to exert influence on 
policy formation as they possess macro-level information, resources, expertise and/or 
legitimacy that each individual national government lacks.  
The European Semester and the ESRB do not meet the case selection 
requirement for LI studies (as they do not contain formal intergovernmental bargains 
among EU member states), so Proposition 21 should not be added to the LI model; 
nevertheless, the two cases have exposed the potential topics that LI may encounter in 
the future, and Proposition 21 then can serve as the third scope condition to justify the 
first stage of national preference formation of the LI model, which naturally needs to 
be tested by EU empirical facts in the coming days.  
This dissertation now moves to the case studies results of the ESM presented in 
Table 7.2. H7a is confirmed by the case of the ESM, and stage 1 of LI works well to 
account for Germany and France’s initial preferences for the ESM. Germany’s strong 
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demand of establishing a permanent rescue mechanism for the euro countries derives 
from its general economic considerations. For one thing, the bankruptcy of a euro 
member state will cause disastrous financial and economic turmoil in the eurozone as 
well as encroach the credibility of the common currency — the euro, which in turn will 
definitely harm Germany’s economic interests. For another, the temporary EFSF shall 
expire soon and the German Court seems not to approve any Greek-style-like bailout 
again in the future (which, however, looks likely for some euro countries), so a 
permanent crisis resolution framework is essentially and urgently needed. Besides, the 
German government has a policy tradition of keeping price stability while avoiding 
high inflation rates (which also has become the primary objective of the ECB) and it 
prefers a stable and credible currency; in comparison, the French government has a 
policy tradition of devaluating national currency to stimulate economic growth while 
having high inflation rates (Hosli 2005). Contrasting with Germany’s strict sanction 
demands, the French government prefers a looser sanction mechanism for the countries 
who broke the SGP rules, and it is explainable: in terms of governmental deficits and 
debts, France has a poorer behavior than Germany, and France itself has higher 
possibility to be sanctioned. Tables 6.14 and 15 suggest that, from 2006 to 2012, 
France’s budget deficit rates were always higher than that of the Germany (and in 2012, 
the record was 4.8% of its GDP, much above the 3% criterion, while Germany 
obtained 0.2% surplus in 2012); though both countries’ debt rates were above the SGP 
requirement of 60% of GDP, the figure of 90.2% for France in 2012 signaled a 
worsening situation, nearly ten percentage points higher than that of Germany (81.9%). 
In addition, the France’s economy appears more impotent to walk out of the mire of the 
crisis, as Table 6.13 shows, there was barely a sign of GDP growth (0.0%) for France 
during 2012. Accordingly, France has a greater possibility to violate the SGP rules; 
therefore, it prefers a not-so-strict sanction mechanism. Apart from the realistic and 
imminent economic interest considerations, the funding of the permanent ESM is also 
out of political interests: to safeguard the eurozone, to save the euro, and thus to secure 
the fruit of the EU and EMU. As Table 7.2 indicates, the two core euro member states, 
Germany and France, have flagged out their choices of establishing a permanent rescue 
mechanism to replace the temporary EFSF; nevertheless, not every euro member is 
happy with the Franco-German deal. Table 7.3 further illustrates national divergences 




Table 7.3 From the Deauville Deal to the Finalization of the ESM: Negotiations, Compromises, and 
National Preferences Redefined  
I 
Suggestions of the 
Deauville Deal reached 
by Germany and France, 




Preferences and responses of other EU member states, EU institutions and 
EU leaders to the Deauville Deal 
1. To establish a 
permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism to 
help the euro countries 
struck by the sovereign 
debt crisis so as to 
safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro area 
as a whole.  
 The idea to amend the current Lisbon Treaty, which has undergone 
eight years of tortuous negotiations, arouses wide substantial 
concerns and “hardly any member state wants to embark on a 
years-long negotiation and ratification process complete with risky 
referendums”②; particularly, it is “a real horror” to Ireland, as the 
Lisbon Treaty was approved after two difficult referendums in that 
country, and the President of the Commission, Barroso, is “firmly 
against Treaty changes”④; nevertheless, as Merkel feared, the 
permanent rescue mechanism “would contravene rules against EU 
bailouts already written into the Lisbon Treaty”, so a consensus was 
reached among the member states that “smaller changes were 
necessary”⑪; 
 The Franco-German initiative has gained support, for instance, from 
Finnish Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi, because “[t]he euro area 
needs a credible permanent crisis mechanism to ensure the financial 
stability of the euro area as a whole,” and Sweden’s Prime Minister 
Fredrik Reinfeldt agrees with a small treaty change, “because 
everyone understands if this is to be strong and workable we need 
Germany inside”⑥;  
 Slovakia, the only country that in the euro area who once declined to 
rescue Greece, is happy to see Germany have tabled a legally 
justified permanent mechanism, and it holds that “the French, 
Spanish and Italians were only ready for cosmetic changes” and 
“[n]ow we have the Czechs, Germans and Scandinavians on our 
side”; ⑤ 
 The EP has a more radical idea: it supports Treaty changes to 
establish an EMF and wants to create a new post responsible for 
economic and monetary policy under the charge of a Vice President 
of the Commission who should at the same time chair the Ecofin. ④ 
2. The permanent rescue 
mechanism should 
include provisions for 
“an adequate 
participation of private 
creditors” ①, which 
means “future rescue 
packages might involve 
 The intention to have a default mechanism to impose possible losses 
on creditors in place is that without an insolvency procedure, a 
rescue fund “would encourage reckless government borrowing and 
thoughtless investment decisions” (⑦, p.1). However, Merkel was 
under fire for such an insolvency procedure, because to let the 
private bond holders share the costs of a bail-out would push up 
borrowing costs and make a bail-out more likely (⑦, p.2), and 
indeed, the later facts show that investors responded to the 
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a write-down of existing 
debt” (⑦, p.1).  
 
German-French deal “by pushing Ireland and Portugal to follow 
Greece into bailouts” and then Cyprus⑧. Strong criticisms come 
from, for example, ECB President Trichet and Greek premier 
Papandreou, as the former holds the critical opinion that “this 
private-sector involvement (PSI, in Euro-jargon) badly spooked the 
markets about the value of the European debt they were holding” 
(⑨), while the latter worries that the insolvency mechanism shall 
drive some euro countries into bankruptcy; anyhow, the position of 
Merkel is clear: “to reinforce her own standing with German 
taxpayers”; still, some Germans, together with EU politicians and 
economists, disapprove her “savings and punishment” policy, and 
they argue this could make the crisis worse (⑦, p.2);  
 It is widely acknowledged that “[a]t a time of acute nervousness in 
the market, the provisions for PSI were unlikely to help restore 
calm”. ⑨ 
3. “[T]he Council 
should be empowered to 
decide, acting by QMV 
to impose progressively 
sanctions”, ① watering 
down a proposal of 
tough sanctions against 
the states who 
consistently fail to 
reduce debt levels.  
 It causes “anger in several eurozone countries, particularly the 
smaller, northern members that had pushed for even tougher rules” 
and “reopen(s) resentments between small and large countries, and 
between fiscally restrained northern members and indebted 
southerners”; originally, smaller countries believed that Merkel shall 
back up “near-automatic fines against persistent debtors” beyond the 
political influence, because Germany tends to do so and actually for 
several month before the Deauville Deal, “the Netherlands, Finland 
and other northern countries had stood beside Germany”, pressing 
for the sanctions placed under the Commission’s technocrat charge 
rather than under the Council’s of national political influence; ③ 
 Germany believes that to gain France’s support is crucial to reach the 
agreement on budgets rules and a permanent ESM, because 
“countries such as Italy and Belgium, with their high sovereign debts 
levels, had gained support in blocking the tougher rules”. ③  
4. To suspend the voting 
rights of the member 
states concerned “[i]n 
case of a serious 
violation of basic 
principles of Economic 
and Monetary Union”. 
①  
 Juncker says the Franco-German deal is “unacceptable” as “it does 
not guarantee a strict course of stability and a stability pact with 
teeth”, while “Merkel’s plan to temporarily deprive deficit sinners of 
their voting rights within the EU isn’t just distasteful to Juncker, but 
also to other leaders, especially those of the smaller EU countries”; 
meanwhile, Juncker is “also furious about Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s 
attempt to shape policy without consulting other leaders first”;② 
 Barroso disagrees with the idea of withdrawing member states’ 
voting rights, and he believes that it “would never be accepted by all 
27 EU governments” ⑥; “[i]f treaty change is to reduce the rights of 
member states on voting”, “I (Barroso) find(s) it unacceptable and 
frankly speaking it is not realistic” ⑪. 
 Obviously, this proposal is unacceptable to those bailouted states, 
and other countries, such as Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and the UK also oppose to do so. Politicians believe that it goes too 
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far away from the reality as well as from the “political games” of the 
EU, as it is once commented by an EU diplomat: “Do you really 
believe the Irish prime minister can head back to Ireland and tell his 
people they have to vote in favour of removing their voting rights?” 
(25) 
II Processes of bargaining, compromising and redefining preferences after the Deauville Deal 
 As for the Treaty amendments, “the German finance ministry initially aimed at changing article 
125 itself (the “no-bailout” clause)”, but taking the arduous processes of Treaty revisions into 
account, it shifted the focus to other articles where minor treaty changes are possible via a 
simplified procedure without convening a European Convention and an IGC (but still requiring 
ratification all 27 EU member states), and two possible Articles (122, 136) are under lawyers 
considerations; (⑦, p.2)  
 For the watered-down sanction proposal, “France insisted on maintaining greater discretion for 
governments”, but later it gave some ground to the EP; ⑨ 
 Regarding stripping of the voting rights provision, it “was soon abandoned”, while the proposal 
of “adequate participation of private creditors” survived; originally, “haircuts were supposed to 
apply only to new debt issued from 2013, when the ESM was due to come into force. But this 
year (2011) the euro zone twice demanded that private creditors take losses on existing Greek 
debt”; ⑨ 
 Germany and France are still at loggerheads over the degree of PSI: Merkel “wants the private 
sector to take much of the strain” so as to counter the “fire from voters for the size of Germany’s 
contribution to the Greek bail-out”, while France “doesn’t want its over-exposed banks to foot 
the bill”— the reason is that “French banks hold €53 billion of Greek debt — more than those of 
any other country”; hence, Sarkozy was determined to “keep Greece on track” and reluctant to 
“make the banks foot more of the bill”, and he suggested a voluntary agreement instead; at the 
same time, when the German voters angrily opposed to “pull in their belts to pay for Greece’s 
crisis”, it was stated that “Merkel also faces pressure from Germany’s financiers”, such as the 
industrial giants ThyssenKrupp, Siemens and Daimler, to “promote the single currency” and “not 
to let Greece slide” ⑯. However, as time elapsed, Germany and France made concessions to 
each and adjusted their positions: “France has agreed with German demands for even greater 
‘automaticity’ in the process leading to sanctions; and Germany, in return, has agreed to weaken 
the articles on restructuring the debt held by private creditors”⑨.  
 “Germany more or less gave up its long-standing demand that countries in breach of fiscal rules 
should be taken to the ECJ” and in return, French President Sarkozy “has abandoned his fight for 
joint Eurobonds”⑨. 
III Negotiating step by step leading to the formation of the ESM 
 As a response to the Deauville Deal concluded on 18 October 2010, the EU summit on 28-29 
October 2010 reached the following conclusions (⑩, p.2):  
A. “a limited treaty change” to establish a permanent crisis mechanism while “not modifying article 
125 TFEU (‘no bail-out’ clause)”; 
B. the general features of the new mechanism including “the role of the private sector, the role of the 
IMF and the very strong conditionality” for the rescue programmes;  
 In addition, “the new mechanism would also give the [...] Commission new powers to scrutinize 
national budgets of member nations — and impose fines on so-called deficit violators”, but “the 
fines will not be automatic”; meanwhile, voting rights in the Council of Ministers won’t be 
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stripped ⑪; moreover, on 28 November 2010, the Eurogroup agreed that CACs shall be 
included in the euro area government securities starting from June 2013 (cf. Table 6.6 E, G), and 
there will be PSI on a case-by-case basis fully consistent with IMF policies “in order to protect 
taxpayers’ money, and to send a clear signal to private creditors that their claims are 
subordinated to those of the official sector” ⑫; as a result, the provisions of PSI and CACs are 
written into the ESM Treaty.  
 As the “six-pack” enters into force on 13th December 2011, financial sanctions of RQMV to 
reinforce the SGP rules “can be activated at any moment [...], if and when the conditions are 
met”; RQMV is a “semi-automatic decision-making procedure”, where “a financial sanction can 
be imposed by the Council on the basis of a Commission recommendation, unless a qualified 
majority of Member States vote against it”, while for the cases of a notice under Article 126(9) 
TFEU, “the financial sanction will be adopted by qualified majority voting as foreseen by the 
Treaty”. ⑬ 
 Addressing “some of the remaining shortcomings” after the “six-pack” which reinforces EU 
fiscal governance, a fiscal compact, as a part of the new TSCG (i.e. Articles 3 to 8 of the TSCG), 
was signed by 25 (without the UK and the Czech Republic) out 27 EU Heads of State or 
Government on 2 March 2012. This “fiscal compact envisages the mandatory introduction of a 
balanced budget rule and an automatically triggered correction mechanism at the national level 
as well as a strengthening of the automaticity of the excessive deficit procedure within the 
Stability and Growth Pact in case a euro area country breaches the deficit criterion” (⑭, p.79). 
The TSCG, including a new fiscal compact and strengthened economic policy coordination, is 
taken as a complement to the ESM Treaty, and the granting of ESM financial assistance is 
conditional on the ratification of the TSCG by the ESM member states concerned (ESM Treaty 
(5)).  
 Though agreed by the eurozone countries’ Heads of State or Government on 9 December 2011, 
the TSCG was also adopted by another eight non-euro member states, and entered into force on 1 
January 2013. The provisions of the TSCG are compatible with EU law and shall be incorporated 
into the EU Treaties within five years after it entres into force. The TSCG contracting parties 
have agreed to “transpose the ‘balanced budget rule’ into their national legal systems, through 
binding, permanent and preferably constitutional provisions”, which “should be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union” by the end of 2013 (TSCG; ⑮). This 
means the failure of national transposition can lead to financial sanctions imposed by the Court 
against the member state concerned (26).  
 Built upon the budgetary rules outlined in the SGP, the TSCG reinforces EU fiscal and economic 
governance in four aspects: first, under the balanced budget rule, annual structural government 
deficit must not exceed 0.5% of GDP — a figure set up by the preventive arm of the SGP — 
which also must be in line with the country-specific medium-term objective (MTO); second, an 
automatic correction mechanism of designed measures to reduce the budget deficit over a 
defined period of time must be in place at the national level of each contracting party by the end 
of 2013, which shall be triggered automatically in the event of deviations from the MTO or the 
adjustment path towards it; third, coordination among the TSCG contracting parties gets 
reinforced, as they agree to inform each other (as well as the EU) their plans of issuing new debt 
in advance and discuss their economic policy reform plans; finally, euro area governance is 
further strengthened, as the Heads of State or Government of euro states shall meet informally at 
least twice a year in the Euro Summit meetings to address the issues related to the single 
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currency. (TSCG; ⑮)  
IV The creation of the ESM by Treaty conclusions 
The final agreement of establishing a permanent rescue mechanism, the ESM, is crystalized in the 
ESM Treaty which is complemented by the TSCG: the former responds to the first (i.e. Treaty 
amendments to make the ESM viable) and second (i.e. private creditors’ participation) ideas in the 
Deauville Deal by carrying out a limited Treaty amendment to Artcile 136 TFEU via the simplified 
revision procedure and including PSI and CACs into the operation of the ESM, while the latter deals 
with disciplining national fiscal behavior via a “balanced budget rule” and an automatically-triggered 
correction mechanism at each national level of the TSCG signatories; at the same time, the third idea 
(i.e. remaining the status quo of QMV in the Council to impose sanctions against SGP violators) put 
forward by the Deal is finalized as semi-automatic RQMV for financial sanctions, and the fourth 
suggestion entailed in the Deal about suspensing concerned member states’ voting rights in the 
Council has been fully abandoned.  
V After signing the ESM Treaty (on February 2012): negotiations and compromises still go on 
 On 27 June 2012, in the run-up to the EU summit, Merkel “managed to get new French President 
François Hollande to sign off on her fiscal pact, which is deeply unpopular in Paris, in return for 
her support on the €130 billion ($165 billion) European Union ‘growth pact’”. (27)  
 At the late Friday evening of 29 June 2012, less than 24 hours before the German Parliament, the 
Bundestag, approved the establishment of the permanent €700 billion bailout fund (i.e. the ESM) 
and the fiscal compact included in the TSCG, “Merkel had made some tough and unexpected 
concessions after a marathon 15 hours of talks at an EU summit in Brussels lasting well into 
Friday morning”, and the euro area member states agreed the following: (1) the conditions for 
getting ESM aids are eased — a euro state now can receive ESM help if it fulfills the budget 
rules laid down by the Commission while “without agreeing to additional tough austerity 
measures”; (2) “[s]trict oversight by the troika” (i.e. the Commission, the ECB and the IMF) 
“will no longer apply”; (3) the ESM can directly bailout European Banks after the creation of an 
SSM, thus avoiding to push the member state concerned into a deeper debt mire via loaning to 
the government in exchange for austerity commitments⑰. Before the summit, Merkel opposed 
those measures and her preferences stuck to the rules that had already been agreed in the ESM 
Treaty with strict oversight particularly with the involvement of the IMF; Merkel was sharply 
criticized for caving in to the demands of the southern euro member states, particularly Italy and 
Spain, whose Prime Ministers secured the concessions by threatening to veto the €120 billion 
growth pact originally proposed by French President François Hollande as a promise to French 
voters during the his presidential election with the aim of stimulating the EU economy and 
complementing Merkel’s fiscal compact of austerity measures. For Merkel, even if the growth 
pact may do not have a real impact on EU economies, she “had promised the successful passage 
of the pact to the opposition back home, as well as support for a financial transaction tax, in 
exchange for their support in ratifying the ESM and the fiscal pact in Friday’s votes” ⑰.  
 Though on 29 June 2012, the German Parliament, the Bundestag, approved both the ESM and 
the Fiscal Pact, the two intergovernmental treaties — the ESM Treaty and the TSCG — were 
still subject to Germany’s highest court’s (i.e. the Federal Constitutional Court) review before 
they can finally get ratified. Though facing amount of petitions for temporary injunctions which 
would block the ratification of the ESM, on Wednesday 12 September 2012, the highest court 
gave a green light to the ESM, but set two conditions/reservations for Germany to ratify the 
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ESM: the limited German liability of €190 billion and the rights of the Bundestag to obtain 
confidential information of the ESM; meanwhile, the German court also rules that “the ESM 
cannot ‘become a vehicle of unconstitutional state financing by the European Central Bank’”, 
which means that the ECB’s bonds borrowing actions (known as the OMTs) are not permitted — 
such a ruling shall deprive the ESM of the means to increase its financial capacity, and as a 
consequence, the ESM fund can offer sufficient support for Cyprus or Ireland, but no longer for 
the bigger euro countries, like Spain or Italy ⑱. Obviously, the two reservations made by the 
German highest court embody German taxpayers’ interests, as any ESM bailouts suggest 
German taxpayers’ payment for the bill, while to strengthen the German Parliament’s saying on 
ESM operation affairs means to check against any potential unlimited and increasing bailout 
responsibilities allocated to Germany in the future. Germans’ warnings against the adoption of 
the ESM include: the permanent rescue fund could limit and even damage German parliament 
authority in budgetary decision-making, as the liabilities through international agreements could 
be “tying the hands of the budget legislature”; more realistically, if a ESM member failed to 
fulfil its shares of funding in the future, there would be a high possibility for other ESM 
members to take more payment obligations (22). As regards opposition to the ECB’s new 
initiatives of OMTs via the ESM, the main concern, among the worries such as lacking any 
parliamentary oversight of the ECB’s operations and possibly a high inflation rate caused by 
OMTs, is also about the increasing financial risk for German taxpayers as they would be in the 
end liable to all the ECB bond purchasing (23), (24). 
 In order to facilitate Germany to ratify the ESM Treaty, other eurozone member states took a 
quick response to the German court’s ruling within a week, and the contracting parties of the 
ESM worked out an legally binding “interpretive declaration” to clarify the ESM treaty so as to 
meet the two reservations of the German court: first, the upper ceiling of each member state’s 
liability specified in Annex II of the ESM Treaty shall not be exceeded “without prior agreement 
of each Member’s representative and due regard to national procedures” (addressing Article 8(5), 
ESM Treaty) — for Germany, it means that its liability of €190 billion can only be exceeded 
after obtaining the Bundestag’s permission; second, national parliaments can acquire 
comprehensive information from the ESM (addressing Article 32(5), Article 34 and Article 
35(1), ESM Treaty) ⑲,⑳.  
 As for the ECB’s bond purchasing, Germany’s highest court has expressed its skepticisms and 
criticisms. The hearings on such ECB programmes were conducted on 12-13 June 2013 and the 
court’s ruling was expected to be made several months later. In January 2014, the court was still 
reviewing the issue, and the possibility of “striking down the most successful tool in combating 
the crisis” has not been ruled out yet. (21)  
Sources: ①Deauville Declaration (18 October 2010); ②“Merkel at the EU Summit: The 
Iron Chancellor in the Euro Trap” (Spiegel Online, 28 October 2010); ③Chaffin and Spiegel 
(24 October 2010, Financial Times); ④Kovacheva (22 October 2010, Euinside); ⑤A 
Comment of the Newspaper Hospodárske Noviny quoted in Kovacheva (22 October 2010, 
Euinside); ⑥“EU Leaders Strive for Deal on Budget Discipline” (BBC News, 28 October 
2010); ⑦ Barysch (November 2010); ⑧ Neuger (19 March 2013, Bloomberg); ⑨
Charlemagne (5 December 2011, The Economist); ⑩European Council 28-29 October 2010 
Conclusions; ⑪“Brussels Summit: EU Agrees to Merkel’s Controversial Euro Reforms” 
(Spiegel Online, 29 October 2010); ⑫Statement by the Eurogroup (28 November 2010); 
⑬European Commission-MEMO/11/898 (12 December 2011); ⑭“A Fiscal Compact for a 
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Stronger Economic and Monetary Union” in ECB Monthly Bulletin (May 2012); ⑮“The 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG)”(Eurozone Portal); ⑯Alexander 
(25 June 2011, The Telegraph); ⑰“Parliament Approves ESM and Fiscal Pact: Merkel 
Secures Vote for Euro Treaties” (Spiegel Online, 29 June 2012); ⑱Hipp (13 September 2012, 
Spiegel Online); ⑲“Declaration on the European Stability Mechanism” (Council of the 
European Union, 27 September 2012); ⑳Kaiser and Rickens (20 September 2012, Spiegel 
Online); (21)Kaiser (12 June 2013, Spiegel Online); (22)Wittrock (10 September 2012, 
Spiegel Online); (23)“Petition Rejected: German Court Says It Will Not Delay ESM Ruling” 
(Spiegel Online, 11 September 2012); (24)“‘This Perverse Angst’: Draghi Defends Euro 
Rescue Policies” (Spiegel Online, 2 January 2014); (25)Phillips (28 October 2010, 
Euobserver); (26)“Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance Signed” (European 
Council, 2 March 2012); (27) Rickens (Spiegel Online, 29 June 2012).  
 
As Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show, Germany and its Chancellor Ms Merkel initiated 
and adamantly pushed through the establishment of a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism — the ESM — to replace the temporary one with the aim to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro countries. To have a permanent rescue mechanism as well 
as tougher fiscal rules in place is the core interests of the German government, and as a 
matter of fact, the two concluded treaties — the ESM Treaty and the TSCG — are 
designed to complement each other with the former to provide urgent financial 
assistance while the latter, whose ratification becomes a pre-requirement of receiving 
ESM aid, to strengthen eurozone fiscal governance and to correct national unsound 
fiscal behavior. The process leading to the final creation of the ESM, however, is not a 
straight and an once-time-bargaining and compromise. Rather, there are several bouts 
of national negotiations and concessions due to the disagreements among the member 
states and EU institutions towards Germany and France’s proposals, during which 
member state preferences also get modified and redefined. Nevertheless, Germany’s 
positions to establish a permanent rescue mechanism while strengthening the SGP rules 
get unswerving during the course of negotiations, and at the same time, the negotiated 
results at different stages represent the economic interests of powerful domestic 
constituents in the two leading euro states well: for both Germany and France, they 
aimed to meet the taxpayer’s interests on the bailout fund as they have made the largest 
contributions to the Greek rescue package and to the EFSF, the German government in 
particular. Meanwhile, the German government also took its multinational industrial 
giants’ demands into consideration, whereas the French government unequivocally 
tried to protect the interests of French banks and financial sectors the most. Therefore, 
even with the changes of national preferences during the negotiation course towards the 
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finalization of the ESM, H7a is confirmed as the ESM reflects the economic interests 
of powerful domestic constituents at least in Germany and France.  
Nevertheless, besides the economic factors, political considerations also have 
played a role in the formation of the ESM. Above all, if Greece or other euro member 
states was forced to leave EMU, it would not only endanger the single currency and 
EMU, but also mean a political failure of the EU integration project. Meanwhile, EU 
politicians generally believe that if the euro were to fail, so too would the EU
138
 — 
this is the conceptual background for ECB President Mario Draghi to pledge that “the 
ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” (Draghi 26 July 2012), 
paving the way for the ECB’s decisions of the OMTs (see Appendix 2). The political 
significance of the euro besides the economic benenfits it has brought is well 
crystalized in Merkel’s televised address to the nation in the New Year 2011:  
 
“We have to strengthen the euro, and it is not only a question of money. The 
euro is more than just a currency. It is our good fortune that we Europeans 
are united. A united Europe is the guarantor for our peace and our freedom. 
The euro is the basis of our economic well-being. Germany needs Europe 
and our common currency, for our own good, and for coping with global 
challenges.” (Smith 5 January 2011, The Wall Street Journal) 
 
 Second, Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), faced regional 
elections while Sarkozy was running up for his presidential re-elections, so both of 
them had to take voters’ attitudes on the ESM into account, and the clauses of PSI and 
CACs built into the ESM Treaty to protect the interests of taxpayers thus become 
explainable. It is, however, interesting to observe different public reactions towards the 
Greek bailout in the two core euro member states. In contrast to the German citizen’s 
60 percent opposition to the new aid for Greece, the French people “appear to have 
accepted the bail-out with Gallic resignation” as “[t]hey cannot contemplate letting the 
country go bankrupt” and consequently, “President Sarkozy has not had to deal with 
street protests against the bail-out, and the newspapers have refrained from shouting 
furiously about the terms” (Alexander 25 June 2011, The Telegraph). Such a sympathy, 
Philippe Moreau-Defarge, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations 
in Paris, argues that it is because “France is a Latin country that feels closer to the 
Greeks; they also feel it could happen to them” (quoted in Alexander 25 June 2011, 
                                                 




The Telegraph) — the former may appear symbolic and meta-physical, while the latter 
touches the spine of France: its economy is not as strong and robust as Germany’s; 
with an uncertain economic recovery ahead, it also has the risk of debt defaults. 
German citizens’ (including some prominent politicians’) strong opposition to the 
measures of bail outing other euro countries plagued by the sovereign debt crisis were 
fully demonstrated when the permanent rescue mechanism ESM was waiting for the 
German highest court’s ruling: 37,000 German people lodged their complaints about 
the ESM bailout, making the case of the ESM “the biggest constitutional complaint in 
German history” (Wittrock 10 September 2012, Spiegel Online). So apart from 
economic reasons, Germany’s original propositions have been tinted with strong 
political sentiments: siding with German taxpayers — a synonym of voters — is a 
political necessity and strategy. As Tables 7.2 and 7.3 suggest, Merkel’s option for an 
insolvency procedure to accompany the bailout for the beneficiary states was 
compelled by domestic pressures, as there were tensions and opposition when Merkel 
and her coalition government tried to get the Greek bail-out package and the EFSF 
passed through the German national parliament, the Bundestag, in May 2010. At that 
time, to secure both measures to be adopted, “Merkel called for an international 
financial transaction tax and announced a unilateral ban on naked short-selling of 
certain stocks and bonds” and meanwhile “Merkel is convinced that she cannot return 
to the parliament with another bail-out package unless it foresees the possibility that 
private investors, not only taxpayers, are involved” (Barysch November 2010, 3). 
Naturally, in the Deauville Deal, Germany pressed for the default mechanism of an 
insolvency procedure involving haircuts of shareholders. This also makes a footnote to 
Merkel’s determination to establish a legally binding permanent rescue mechanism. 
Moreover, to secure the ally of France so as to materialize Germany’s basic 
propositions, Merkel openly campaigned for Sarkozy’s re-election; when the Fiscal 
Pact had received the necessary support, Merkel was so pleased that she overtly said: 
“Nicolas Sarkozy supported me during my campaign. In the same way, I will now pay 
back that which he gave me” (“The Electoral Pact: Crisis Desperation Drives Merkel to 
Campaign for Sarkozy”, Spiegel Online, 6 February 2012). Another linked reason is 
that Merkel “fear(s) that a Socialist president in Paris may overturn its strategy to 
rescue the euro” as Sarkozy’s challenger, François Hollande, is a Socialist, who, 
leading the election survey, favors euro bonds while opposing “the anchoring of a 
balanced budget amendment — the so-called ‘debt brake’ — in the French constitution” 
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— an essential ingredient of the Fiscal Compact (“The Electoral Pact: Crisis 
Desperation Drives Merkel to Campaign for Sarkozy”, Spiegel Online, 6 February 
2012). In May 2012, Sarkozy was defeated by Hollande in the French presidential 
elections with about 48% against 51.7% of the votes, and it has been hold that two 
factors lead to French voters’ sanctions against him: France’s economic depression 
with low growth and high unemployment rates (about 10%) and “his flamboyant 
personal style” (Deen and Viscusi 7 May 2012, Bloomberg), and some analysts believe 
that the latter has contributed more to Sarkozy’s failure, but coming to Sarkozy’s 
management of the crisis, “in fact many consider good” (Poirier 8 May 2012, CNN). 
As Hollande also opposed the “inevitable” austerity measures to counter the crisis, his 
victory gave “a sense of relief in many European countries” (“Socialist Hollande In, 
Sarkozy Out, As France Elects a New President”, CNN, 7 May 2012), which implies 
that those “grieving” southerners under the programmes of budgetary cuts with 
austerity measures, such as Greece and Ireland, now have a powerful ally. Hollande’s 
promises to French voters to revive the French economy and to complement 
Germany’s demands of implementing austerity measures by the Fiscal Pact, as Table 
7.3 suggests, were enshrined in his growth pact proposals, and to make it viable 
alongside the already-negotiated Fiscal Pact had been prioritized as being an urgent 
issue on Hollande’s agenda (Poirier 8 May 2012, CNN). Hollande’s proposal was 
finalized in the EU summit of June 2012, where a Compact for Growth and Jobs of 
EUR 120 billion (equivalent to around 1% of the EU’s GNI) was reached to promote 
fast-acting growth measures (European Council 28/29 June 2012 Conclusions). The 
adoption of the growth pact appears as the new French President’s political success — 
at least, he fulfills his promises to the French voters, and additionally, he also wants to 
send a message to his domestic voters that “he was rebalancing ties after the ‘Merkozy’ 
era” (“Insight: Merkel and Hollande — Building a ‘Grand Bargain’”, Reuters, 10 July 
2012). Nevertheless, participants of the EU summit to adopt this growth pact “know 
themselves that the resolution is little more than a bit of window dressing for voters 
and financial markets”, and it “contains nothing new” while its effects on the economy 
are supposed to be “virtually nil” — it just helps the new President “save face” 
(Volkery 27 June 2012, Spiegel Online). However, the Italian Prime Minister Mario 
Monti, together with his counterpart of Spain, Mariano Rajoy, took this as a new 
opportunity to bargain with Merkel — they would not approve the growth pact 
proposed by France until “concrete measures to fight the high interest rates on Italian 
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government bonds [...] had been clarified”, successfully forcing Merkel to make 
concessions in the rules of governing the ESM bailout fund (see Table 7.3) (Volkery 29 
June 2012, Spiegel Online). The reason for Monti and Rajoy to press for those 
demands at this moment is also explainable by the domestic political pressure in their 
own countries: both Monti and Rajoy had to push through unpopular and painful 
reforms in Italy and Spain respectively, but there was strong domestic resistance to the 
reforms; government changes in the two countries were not unusual since the crisis, 
and Italy would have elections in the Spring of 2013 — a vital factor allowing 
Merkel’s concessions (Rickens 29 June 2012, Spiegelonline). Even after the operation 
of the ESM, Merkel herself also met huge domestic pressures when coming to the 
terms on the bailout of Cyprus under the ESM in March 2013, as she was campaigning 
for re-election in September (Neuger 19 March 2013, Bloomberg). Generally speaking, 
addressing the sovereign debt crisis is an economic issue, but at the same time it is 
closely related to domestic political situations and demands, as national citizens can 
sanction their leaders by their votes regarding how the politicians respond to the 
economic downturn, high unemployment rates and climbing up public debts during the 
crisis. No matter how largely Sarkozy’s personality accounts for his presidential 
re-election failure, he is just another head of government who falls out of the political 
altar, joining the long, but definitely unfolding, list of “the victims of the crisis” of the 
national leaders in Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia and the 
Netherlands (Deen and Viscusi 7 May 2012, Bloomberg). The scenario of domestic 
political fallout across Europe during the crisis has demonstrated that to address the 
crisis is not a pure economic issue. Therefore, apart from the specific economic 
interests, domestic party struggling and national-wide elections also account for 
national preference formation towards measures to solve the crisis, including the ESM.  
Moreover, Germany’s assertion on the creation of the permanent ESM and the 
strengthened SGP rules also reflects Merkel’s center-right governmental coalitions’ 
(composed of the conservative CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social 
Union (CSU) and the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP))
139
 
macro-economic preferences. Before the Deauville Deal, Merkel’s government has 
expressed its preferences clearly: making Treaty amendments to establish a new 
“legally unassailable” rescue mechanism for the euro countries while combining it with 
                                                 
139 See Wittrock (10 September 2012, Spiegel Online).  
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the SGP reform as a single package — it seems that Germany adopts an “all-or-nothing” 
strategy (see Table 7.2). In order to win France’s support, however, Merkel made 
concessions in the Deauville Deal to Sarkozy, loosening the sanction mechanism 
against the persistent SGP violators. This bilateral deal nevertheless caused rifts within 
the German federal Parliament, the Bundestag, and the strong criticisms came from, for 
example, the leader of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, and the Green Party politician Renate Künast (“Merkel at the EU Summit: 
The Iron Chancellor in the Euro Trap”, Spiegel Online, 28 October 2010). On 29 June 
2012, members of the Bundestag, including politicians from the opposition parties, 
approved the package championed by Merkel: a permanent euro rescue fund and a 
fiscal pact. For the former, the votes were 493-106 with five abstentions in favor of the 
ESM, while for the latter, the ballots were 491-111 with six abstentions; Merkel’s 
package requires two-thirds-majority support (i.e. 414 votes) in the Bundestag, because 
it concerns Germany’s internationally binding fiscal commitments to provide rescue 
funds in the ESM and correct budget deficits in the Fiscal Compact, which composes a 
vital part of the TSCG (“Parliament Approves ESM and Fiscal Pact: Merkel Secures 
Vote for Euro Treaties”, Spiegel Online, 29 June 2012). Later on the same day of 29 
June 2012, the Bundesrat, Germany’s legislative chamber representing German states’ 
interests, also approved Merkel’s package of the two measures, with fifteen out of 
sixteen states in favor, and the only opposition came from Brandenburg, an eastern 
state under the governance of the coalition of the center-left Social Democrats and the 
left-wing Left Party (“Parliament Approves ESM and Fiscal Pact: Merkel Secures Vote 
for Euro Treaties”, Spiegel Online, 29 June 2012). The stories of the establishment of 
the permanent ESM continued. Though the Bundestag approved the ESM and the 
Fiscal Pact on 29 June 2012, the two intergovernmental treaties — the ESM Treaty and 
the TSCG — were still subject to Germany’s highest court’s review before they could 
be ratified. The opponents of the two treaties lodged their complaints to the court as 
soon as the Bundestag approved them that evening, mainly worrying about German 
taxpayers’ “unlimited and irreversible liability risks” in the permanent rescue fund 
(“Green Light for ESM: German High Court OKs Permanent Bailout Fund with 
Reservations”, Spiegel Online, 12 September 2012), including Peter Gauweiler, a 
Bundestag member of the conservative CSU — apparently a discord within Merkel’s 
coalition (“Parliament Approves ESM and Fiscal Pact: Merkel Secures Vote for Euro 
Treaties”, Spiegel Online, 29 June 2012). Accordingly, the court announced that it 
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would hear the complaints on 10 July 2012,
140
 and its ruling then was expected to be 
delivered in the coming September, but just a week before the court’s ruling, Peter 
Gauweiler filed another new “emergency” petition over the ECB’s announcement on 6 
September 2012 to purchase unlimited sovereign bonds from the euro member states 
plagued by the sovereign debt crisis. Accusing the ECB of becoming an “unlimited 
ultra- and hyper- bailout fund” which gets out of national parliaments’ control, 
Gauweiler demanded that “the court reject the ratification of the ESM treaty until the 
ECB revises its decision” and thus the scheduled ruling on the ESM, together with the 
Fiscal Compact, should be delayed (Wittrock 10 September 2012, Spiegel Online). On 
11 September 2012, rejecting Gauweiler’s new petition for a temporary injunction, the 
court announced that it would not delay its ruling on the ESM.
141
 Reviewing all the 
petitions against the ESM, the German highest court, on 12 September 2011, still gave 
its OK to the ESM, but added two conditions to ensure Germany’s limited liability and 
the German parliament’s rights to be informed with the operation of the ESM; 
consequently, an “interpretive declaration” was agreed upon by all ESM members to 
meet the two conditions imposed by the German highest court (see Table 7.3), and 
after this clarifiying declaration, the ESM finally got ratified by Germany. At first 
glance, the plaintiffs seemed to be the losers, but since establishing a permanent rescue 
mechanism is unavoidable and a “must” to address the crisis, those opponents of the 
ESM actually had obtained what they wanted: the two conditions attached to the 
ratification of the ESM Treaty; Gauweiler himself even called the court’s ruling as a 
“huge success” (Hipp 13 September 2012, Spiegel Online).  
The case of the ESM confirms the validity of H7a, exhibiting the classic pattern 
of national preference formation based on the equilibrium of producers and investors 
on the one hand and taxpayers and actors who are interested in regulation on the other 
hand, while also illustrating how a concrete measure has been hammered out by euro 
states to meet the challenge of globalization. Besides, German government positions on 
the issue of the ESM mirror Merkel’s ruling coalitions’ macro-economic preferences, 
which fall into the prediction of the LI model (see 3b in Figure 3.2). Meanwhile, the 
ESM case also protrudes LI’s national preference formation arguments: national 
preference formation is not static; rather, responding to new rising situations, they get 
                                                 
140 See, for instance, Connolly (10 July 2012, The Guardian). 




modified and re-oriented during the negotiation process; nevertheless, the core 
assertions of nation states tend to remain unchanged. In addition, the unsuitable cases 
of the European Semester and the ESRB have revealed an unavoidable aspect that EU 
policy making must work on in the future: macro-level approaches addressing the 
interconnectedness and interdependence across various policy domains and sectors. To 
galvanize its robust analytical and predictive power, LI must take those new challenges 
into account, and Propositions 19, 20, 21 are attempts made by this dissertation to 
adapt LI to the future challenges.  
 
7.2.2 Evidence for H7b and H7c: Interstate Bargains (LI Stage 2) 
As the European Semester and the ESRB are established in accordance with EU daily 
decision-making procedures, they embody EU collective decision-making via EU 
supranational institutions (see Table 7.1), so the second stage of the LI model — 
interstate bargains — is only applicable to the case of the ESM. From the Deauville 
Deal in October 2010 to the signing of the ESM Treaty in February 2012, and then to 
the operation of the ESM in October 2012 after national ratification, the formation of 
the permanent crisis resolution mechanism, as Figure 7.1 suggests, has undergone 
several rounds of intergovernmental negotiations before it is finally concluded.  
 
The initiator of the ESM: Germany;  
Germany’s preferences: (1) to establish a permanent rescue fund via Treaty changes, with an 
insolvency procedure involving the losses and risks sharing of private investors (i.e. PSI); (2) to 
strengthen the SGP rules with tougher budget rules and an automatic sanction mechanism charged by 
the Commission rather than by the status quo of QMV in the Council (which is in line with the 
Commission’s and the EP’s positions)  
How to materialize those national interests?  
Germany’s strategy: forming a coalition with France, the number two in EMU and the EU 
France’s preferences: (1) a comparatively lenient fiscal sanction mechanism (a strong ally for the 
southern European states while opposition is coming from the Northern states who have better fiscal 
records); (2) depriving the voting rights of the persistent deficit violators in the Council (a proposal 
attracting universal opposition and criticisms); (3) the status quo of sanction decision-making by the 
Council (opposition from EU institutions and Northern euro states) 
  The first round of interstate bargains: the bilateral Deauville Deal struck by Germany and France on 
18 October 2010 
Negotiated results: there were interest swaps and compromises between Germany and France and the 
Deauville Deal represented a merger of both countries’ propositions, where Germany yielded to 
France’s demands and accepted all the preferences of France, and in return, France agreed to make 
Treaty revisions to establish a permanent rescue fund with a default mechanism  
Germany’s strategy: Germany made concessions to secure the support for Treaty amendments to 
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establish a permanent ESM with a default mechanism (a thing Germany really wanted) while pressing 
for budgetary discipline of strengthened SGP rules — the two measures (i.e. establishing a permanent 
bailout fund and implementing strict fiscal rules) were proposed hand by hand as a package offered by 
Merkel; France was a potential ally of southern member states who would block tougher SGP sanction 
rules, so conceding to France’s demands broke the possible block forged by the southern countries 
while also making Merkel’s package of the two measures viable. From another angle, if not 
compromising with France’s demands, Germany would lose both measures: France would not support 
Treaty changes for the permanent ESM, while southerners would possibly ally France to water down 
the budget rules and the sanction mechanism.  
The second round of interstate bargains: various responses to the Deauville Deal, forming a 
rough line between small fiscally-restrained northern members (together with the Commission 
and the EP) and large indebted southerners on the issue of a tougher and more-automatic sanction 
mechanism  
Negotiated results: (1) the EU summit of 28-29 October 2010 reached agreement on: (a) a limited 
treaty change to make a permanent ESM possible; (b) the participation of private sectors; (c) a sanction 
mechanism not to be automatic; (d) voting rights not to be suspended; (2) on 28 November 2010, the 
Eurogroup agreed that the ESM shall include PSI and CACs provisions — a specification of the 
default mechanism persistently demanded by Germany; the semi-automatic RQMV was introduced by 
the “six-pack”, which became effective as of 13 December 2011 onward 
Germany’s strategy: Germany caved in to France’s demands of weakening articles on the haircuts of 
the private creditor side, and in return, France agreed with a more automatic sanction process.  
The third round of interstate bargains: addressing the shortcomings of as well as further 
strengthening EU (particularly eurozone) fiscal governance after the “six-pack” 
Negotiated results: the TSCG (known as the Fiscal Compact) was agreed by the Heads of State or 
Government of the euro countries on 9 December 2011, and then the non-euro members (except the 
UK and the Czech Republic) also participated; the TSCG was signed by 25 member states on 2 March 
2012, and entered into force on 1 January 2013; the TSCG includes a fiscal compact based on the SGP 
rules, which introduces a balanced budget rule and an automatically triggered correction mechanism at 
the national level. 
Germany’s strategy: Confronted with the UK’s opposition, the TSCG was concluded as an 
intergovernmental Treaty rather than an EU Treaty, excluding the “recalcitrant” governments; 
Germany bound the ESM and the TSCG together, and the TSCG was included in the ESM Treaty as a 
prerequisite for ESM member states to receive ESM assistance.  
The fourth round of interstate bargains: the formation of the ESM Treaty  
On 11 July 2011, the 17 euro countries signed the ESM Treaty; later, on 21 July and 9 December 2011, 
decisions were made by the eurozone Heads of State and Government to increase the effectiveness of 
the ESM, including (a) “new financing tools”, (b) “more flexible pricing”, (c) “link with fiscal 
compact”, (d) “new emergency decision-making procedure”, (e) “alignment with IMF practice as 
regards private sector involvement”, and (f) “timing of capital contribution”; incorporating those 
decisions, the ESM Treaty was signed again on 2 February 2012.142 The ESM Treaty was subjected to 
national ratification of the euro countries, and the permanent ESM did not become operative until 8 
October 2012. 
 
                                                 
142 See ESM Treaty Factsheet (Council of the European Union, 2 February 2012).  
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After signing the ESM Treaty, interstate bargains and compromises still continued. 
The fifth round of interstate bargains: Newly elected French president Hollande wanted to get his 
growth pact to be adopted, a promise he made to the French voters during his presidential 
campaign to stimulate the French economy and claimed to complement Merkel’s Fiscal Pact 
which stressed austerity measures; before the EU summit on 29 June 2012, Merkel agreed to 
support Hollande’s growth pact, and in return, Hollande agreed to sign off the unpopular fiscal 
pact championed by Merkel.  
Negotiated results: Hollande’s proposal was adopted as a Compact for Growth and Jobs on the euro 
area summit of 29 June 2012; to secure the Growth Compact which is in exchange for the Fiscal 
Compact, Merkel made concessions to Italian and Spanish Prime Ministers’ demands of easing the 
conditions for granting an ESM aid, dropping the previously planned troika oversighting, and 
approving direct bailouts to European banks as soon as an SSM is created. 
Italy and Spain’s strategy: forcing Merkel’s concessions on some terms of the ESM (which would help 
reduce the yield rates of their government bonds) by threatening to torpedo Hollande’s growth pact.  
Germany’s strategy: Germany opposed the demands made by Italy and Spain, but it needed the ally 
and support of France to the Fiscal Compact; meanwhile, a growth pact was also needed by Merkel to 
placate her domestic opposition in exchange for their support for the ESM and the TSCG.  
The sixth round of interstate bargains: responding to the German highest court’s ruling of 
imposing two conditions for the ESM  
Germany was the last ESM member to ratify the ESM Treaty, and other euro states were anxiously 
waiting for the approval of the ESM by the German highest court after it passed through the German 
Parliament on 29 June 2012; the petitions against the ESM were backed by 37,000 German citizens; 
still, the German court finally favored the ESM on 12 September 2012 but imposed two conditions; to 
meet German highest court’s requirements for ratification, the euro states quickly adopted an 
“interpretive declaration” issued on 27 September 2012 to clarify the court’s concerns. Thus, the last 
obstacle for the operation of the ESM was removed.  
Another issue petitioned was the ECB’s purchasing of government bonds via the ESM, which, up to 
January 2014, was still under the review of the German highest court. Uncertainty still hovers over the 
fate of this powerful tool which can largely amplify the capacity of the ESM, and another round of 
interstate bargains related to the ESM is still possible in the future.  
Due to the uncertainties and new emerging situations/factors, the possibilities of interstate 
bargains and compromises on the operation of the ESM cannot be ruled out.  
Figure 7.1 Interstate Bargains and Compromises Leading to the ESM 
Sources: Own compilation based on the previous section 7.2.1 of this dissertation. 
 
As Figure 7.1 shows, the intergovernmental bargains for the formation of the 
ESM were not finalized at once; instead, negotiations among euro states to create the 
permanent mechanism have spread over into several rounds, even after the ESM Treaty 
got signed. Since the UK is not a contracting party of the ESM, it does not participate 
in the ESM negotiation process, and it seems that there is nowhere to talk about any 
kind of superiority the UK can exploit during the formation of the ESM. Therefore, this 
dissertation mainly focuses on the two core euro states: Germany and France.  
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Still, with regard to the complementary treaty to the ESM — the TSCG — which 
was concluded by the euro countries while opening up to the non-euro member states, 
the UK, together with the Czech Republic, decided not to participate. At the very 
beginning, the Fiscal Compact was expected to be adopted as an EU treaty, but in the 
EU summit of December 2011, the UK vetoed it, so consequently, it was agreed to be 
adopted as an international treaty instead. That the UK went to veto the Fiscal Compact 
as an EU Treaty, and did not even “opt out”, was explained by the UK Prime Minister 
Cameron as to safeguard the single market and the UK’s national interests, in particular 
its financial services industry, as well as to prevent the “misuse” of EU institutions by 
the euro bloc to implement their policies (Miller 27 March 2012). The UK government, 
however, did not divulge its negotiating positions before the summit — a tactic 
purposely taken by the UK leaders (Miller 27 March 2012, 4-5). Even after the summit, 
the “safeguards” proposals upheld by Cameron were not well publicized, and it was not 
until on 23 February 2012 when David Lidington, the UK Minister for Europe, 
appeared before the Commons European Scrutiny Committee that the UK’s rationales 
behind its veto were clearly revealed:  
 
“Our reasons for so doing were that there is a clear relationship between 
aspects of financial services regulation, in particular banking regulation, and 
fiscal policy. The purpose of the proposed Treaty amendments in December 
was to give greater priority within the European treaties to the objective of 
securing the fiscal integration of the eurozone. We were also concerned, 
when we approached the European Council in December, about the fact that 
there were a number of specific financial services measures that we felt were 
threatening the integrity of the single market in order to safeguard particular 
interests of members of the eurozone.” (Quoted in Miller 27 March 2012, 6) 
 
As a non-euro member state, Cameron wanted the Eurozone to put its house in 
order and address its problems properly, but he opposed to “misuse” EU institutions. 
He said that some uses of the EU institutions in the intergovernmental Fiscal Compact 
might be “highly questionable”, reiterating that: “we want those institutions to sort out 
the problems of the European Union, and we want them to stick to fiscal union and not 
go into single market issues. If they were to go into single market issues and threaten 
Britain’s national interests, of course we would act” (quoted in Miller 27 March 2012, 
15). Originally, the UK put forward its own proposal to seek safeguards, but the French 
government refused to accept, as Sarkozy said: “in order to accept treaty revision 
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among the 27 EU states, David Cameron asked us — something we all judged 
unacceptable — for a protocol to be inserted into the treaty granting the United 
Kingdom a certain number of exonerations on financial services regulations ... We 
could not accept this, since we consider, quite on the contrary, that a part of the world’s 
woes stem from the deregulation of the financial sector” (quoted in Miller 27 March 
2012, 5).
143
 This led Cameron not to participate and the TSCG took an 
intergovernmental route. To veto rather than choosing an “opt-out” of an EU Treaty 
means that there shall be neither obligations nor the binding force of EU law or 
additional EU law on the UK (Miller 27 March 2012, 15-16). Though Cameron’s 
rejection of the Fiscal Compact (also the TSCG) attracted both praise and criticisms 
domestically, the positions of his government were unambiguous: to protect UK’s 
national interests of the single market as the tighter fiscal integration in the eurozone 
may imply non-euro members be at the expense, where the UK’s financial sector may 
bear huge losses (Miller 27 March 2012, 16-17). Some politicians and scholars, 
however, were doubted that whether Cameron’s veto defended “British national 
interests in the long-term”, because UK’s veto did not stop other euro states under the 
Franco-German leadership to go ahead with what they had proposed — on the contrary, 
France and Germany said “NO” to Cameron’s demands of safeguards for financial 
services, so some would argue that “that’s not wielding a veto, that’s called losing” 
(Miller 27 March 2012, 41). According to those, the negotiations for the TSCG 
confirm part of H7b as the member states (i.e. the UK) who shall economically benefit 
the least from the agreement tend to impose conditions and make hard bargains. LI’s 
prediction is correct in the way that the UK, as being a non-euro member state, benefits 
less from the ESM Treaty, and thus it tends to assume a superior bargaining position 
and actually it exploits this opportunity to maximize its national interests by imposing 
conditions — a protocol to protect the UK financial industry. The UK’s strategy, by 
vetoing an EU Treaty proposal, falls well into the categories of the LI model, 
indicating 6a in Figure 3.2. Another tactic wielded by the UK government — 
concealing its negotiating positions from other negotiators — also falls into the 
prediction of the LI model (see 4b in Figure 3.2); Cameron’s recourse to it meant to 
increase the UK’s bargaining power, but this time Germany and France, who would 
economically benefit the most from the TSCG (and the ESM), did not compromise on 
                                                 
143 See also, for example, Waterfield (9 December 2011, The Telegraph).  
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the UK’s demands. The reason is quite obvious: the ESM is for the euro states, and the 
TSCG containing the Fiscal Compact was meant to complement the ESM, so without 
the UK, the TSCG can also function as what it means to the euro countries. This 
illustrates another potential condition to the application of the LI model: the status of 
negotiating member states should be within the same block, or else the prediction made 
in H7b that “member states who economically benefit the most from the EU’s new 
measures and policies tend to compromise the most on the margin to realize gains” is 
untenable as the euro block can just go ahead on EMU affairs without taking non-euro 
member states’ opinions. Accordingly, another scope condition for the LI model can be 
added:  
Proposition 22: The LI model’s second stage (i.e. interstate bargains) works 
better when the negotiating parties belong to the same block in terms of the relevance 
of the agreement to them.  
This proposition can be tested in the following section when we turn to Germany, 
France and other contracting parties of the ESM, who belong to the same block of the 
Eurogroup, and to whom the ESM is highly relevant.  
As mentioned in section 7.2.1, to establish a permanent ESM contains both 
economic and political significance. Germany was the initiator of the ESM, and the 
economic benefits for Germany include keeping financial stability of the euro area and 
a stable and credible single currency; the adoption of the ESM conveys good wishes as 
well as pragmatic needs of Germany as well as other euro member states: to achieve a 
stable and prosperous EMU and the EU. Then here comes the question: why does 
Germany try its best to secure a permanent rescue mechanism and not kick the 
“profligate members”, like Greece, out of the eurozone? Apart from the intentions to 
save the political achievements of European regional integration, which carries 
endeavors of European politicians, economists and scholars for more than a half 
century, the realistic and imminent considerations are the economic interests of 
Germany as well as other eurozone countries. A single common currency in one 
respect means an enlarged “domestic” market for the euro states, and in another respect, 
it implies increasing interdependence among those member states, particularly in the 
financial sectors. For the former point, export-driven Germany, as argued by CNN, 
needs not only the euro, but also the weakest members to stay in the euro, because 
intra-eurozone trade has accounted two-thirds of German exports while “a weak 
currency has been a ticket to prosperity” (Sanati 14 November 2011, CNNMoney). The 
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birth of the euro shows that the EMU project with a single common currency has the 
advantages of streamlining business, reduce transaction fees and guard against foreign 
exchange risks, while the former Deutsche Mark was once being one of the most stable 
and strongest national currencies at that time (Hosli 2005); adopting the euro with other 
11 EU member states in 1999 (and now with other 17 euro countries in 2014) means 
the devaluation of Mark, which makes German products more competitive in the world 
wide (Sanati 14 November 2011, CNNMoney). A CNN’s report reveals Germany’s 
economic interests for the euro, the eurozone, and other euro countries:  
 
“[...] Germany [...] is the world’s second-largest exporting country. The euro 
has played a significant part in this. German exports have more than doubled 
since they went on the euro in 1999, going from around 469 billion euros to 
well over a trillion euros in 2010. The rate of growth was also twice as fast 
as other nations in the zone. While there is no doubt that the Germans make 
quality stuff, the reason they are able to export so much at competitive price 
points is because they are operating with a relatively cheap currency. [...] 
Even though the eurozone is in crisis and the region looks to be headed for 
another recession, German exports in September (2011) rose nearly 1% from 
the previous month to 91.3 billion euros, which is the highest level since 
records began. In August (2011), when the crisis hit overdrive, exports were 
up 0.2% from the previous month. Meanwhile, imports into Germany fell 0.8% 
for September, increasing the nations burgeoning current account surplus. 
Normally that would cause Germany’s currency to strengthen, but since 
there was trouble down south, the euro weakened, making German exports 
even more competitive.” (Sanati 14 November 2011, CNNMoney)144  
 
At the same time for the eurozone countries,  
 
“An artificially low euro in Germany means an artificially high euro in 
weaker countries like Spain and Greece. That means those countries can 
afford to buy German goods. It’s therefore no wonder why German cars, 
white goods, electronics and machinery dominate the eurozone. [...] German 
companies like Siemens (SI), Daimler, Deutsche Bahn, and Ferrostaal have 
been accused of funneling millions of euros to Greek politicians to secure 
military and civilian government contracts. In one incident, Siemens 
allegedly paid 100 million euros to Greek officials to secure a contract to 
upgrade Athens’s telecommunications infrastructure for the 2004 Olympic 
Games.” (Sanati 14 November 2011, CNNMoney) 
                                                 
144 In general, Germany has also suffered economic recession due to the worldwide economic 
depression since 2009, but in 2012, its “exports have rebounded sharply from the crisis to surpass 
their peak of 2008” with a rising wage, a faster growth rate and less unemployment compared with 




The costs of the exit of the troubled euro states would be huge and unimaginable 
for Germany. Take Greece for example; if Greece broke away from the eurozone,  
 
“[...] it would cost around 20% to 25% of the country’s GDP or 6,000 to 
8,000 euros per German citizen upfront to walk away. It would then cost 
around 3,500 to 4,000 euros per German citizen every year going forward. In 
contrast, [...] if the eurozone swallowed 50% of the debt of Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal it would cost a little over 1,000 euros per German in a single hit. 
That’s a much better outcome than going it alone. The study did not include 
extending a bailout to Italy, which has total debt outstanding that is around 
three times that of all those nations combined. But for the sake of argument, 
say one takes a 50% haircut on Italian debt – some 900 billion euros, that 
bailout would theoretically still cost less to the Germans than it would if they 
decided to leave the euro.” (Sanati 14 November 2011, CNNMoney)145  
 
Analysts in general believe that the bailout costs for German people are lower 
than those caused by any euro dismemberment. After all, the purpose of the bailout 
was to buy time for the beneficiary euro states to pay debts and thus avoid debt defaults, 
national bankruptcy and financial turmoil, and Germany (as well as other ESM 
member states) could even make profits by loaning to the beneficiary states, so when a 
rescue succeeds, Germany would get more back. On this matter, it is calculated that 
“covering the entire financing needs of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
through 2015 would cost about $1.6 trillion”; normally, the IMF may contribute 1/3, 
and the left should be taken by Germany and other euro countries, but even if Germany 
puts up $500 billion, the money would not be forfeited, and “Germany could even turn 
a profit” (Porter 26 June 2012, The New York Times). 
Besides those visible “dominant” economic calculations, another not-so-visible 
“recessive” factor that leads Germany’s and France’s agreement to bailout Greece and 
create a permanent rescue fund is the interconnectedness across the financial sectors: 
the states plagued by the sovereign debt crisis are also financed by banks 
“headquartered in the core countries” and any sovereign debt defaults in the euro 
countries, such as Greece, would definitely impose losses to the German and French 
                                                 
145 A countering argument is that stronger and rising demands of the emerging markets such as China 
and India can effectively outweigh Greece and other periphery countries’ exits from EMU — all these 
trade flows appear visible and statistically calculable; nevertheless, “the financial interconnectedness 
between Germany and the rest of Europe makes clear that any notion of being able to act 
independently of Europe is illusory” (Smith 5 January 2011, The Wall Street Journal). 
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citizens. This is the reason “why there isn’t a larger ‘Occupy Wall Street’-like 
movement made up of angry and unemployed young Germans camping out in 
Frankfurt parks”, despite the fact that German citizens have expressed strong 
opposition to the bailout to Greece and the ESM. It is unfair to ask German taxpayers 
to bailout other lavishing euro countries, but to let Greece or any other euro countries 
to break away, that is, to let them declare national bankruptcy, would be more fatal to 




It is generally held that Germany has gained economic advantages via adopting 
the single currency. When a newly emerging political party in Germany advocates a 
return to the old currency German Mark, some analysts have incisively pointed out that 
“without the euro, Germany’s GDP would be lower by about 0.5% per year between 
2013 and 2025. This equates to a loss of around €1.2 trillion, or €14,000 per citizen” 
(“Germany Needs the Euro – Report”, New Europe, 30 April 2013). In comparison, 
even in the hypothetical scenario where Germany would write off 60% of its loan 
repayments to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, it is argued, “Germany would only see 
a slow-down in the economy by about 0.5%. This figure is explained by the added 
benefits Germany would gain from higher exports to the debtor nations, which would 
see better economic conditions following the write-off” (“Germany Needs the Euro – 
                                                 
146 It is reported that “German banks had $548 billion — or €446 billion at prevailing exchange rates 
— at risk in the five problem countries of the euro zone as of June (2001) (…) (while) had €392 
billion of capital and reserves (…) Thus, it does not matter whether Germany tries to withdraw from 
monetary union, or have fiscal sinners expelled from it: the credit losses and writedowns caused by 
the ensuing currency moves would effectively bankrupt the German banking system, even before 
manufacturers start shifting jobs to cheaper locations as capital that had been stored in the euro gets 
reallocated to the new D-Mark”, see Smith (5 January 2011, The Wall Street Journal). Another 
example is that when Goldman Sachs once lent money to the Greek government and helped Greece to 
cheat so as to meet the requirement to join the eurozone in 2000, Goldman Sachs at the same time 
purchased another financial derivative: Credit Default Swaps (CDS) from some of Germany’s 
public-sector banks, known as Landesbanken, to disperse the risk of money lending to Greece. In 
essence, Goldman Sachs paid German banks for what essentially constituted insurance for 20 years: if 
the Greek government would default, these German banks would have to take the responsibility to 
pay for the debt. Through the financial instrument CDS, Germany, the largest economic entity in the 
euro area, had been linked to the chain of Greek debts. CDS purchased by Goldman Sachs were 
inexpensive when Greece could manage to pay its debt, but when the Greek government’s capacity to 
pay was put into question, costs for Greece to borrow money were rising — and so did the CDS 
prices. In such circumstances, Goldman Sachs was able to sell CDS at a higher price, and thus, was 
one of the actors who had gained benefits via these exchanges. See Hosli et al. (2011a).  
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Report”, New Europe, 30 April 2013).
147
 The negative impact of reverting to the Mark 
would be directly observed in the German labor market and manufacturing sectors:  
 
“Since the advent of the single currency, Germany’s labor costs have fallen 
more than 15 percent against the average labor costs of all the countries 
using the euro, and about 25 percent against those of the troubled nations on 
the periphery. If it dumped the euro for a new deutsche mark, its exchange 
rate would surge to make up for the difference, potentially crippling its 
exports, which have fed most of its economic growth over the last decade”. 
(Porter 26 June 2012, The New York Times) 
 
In essence, if Germany reverted to its old national currency or the euro were 
dissolved, Germany’s currency exchange rate would increase and thus eliminate its 
current advantage in exports. In short, the economic benefits brought by the single 
currency calculated above have crucially decided Germany’s positions, as The New 
York Times summarizes, “the German government knows it must ultimately cave and 
open its wallet to save the single currency” (Porter 26 June 2012, The New York Times). 
In comparison, France’s benefits from the euro and then the ESM are dwarfed by those 
gained by Germany, and in a certain sense, Germany has made profits from all other 
euro countries. France’s Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg once openly 
complained the comparatively low wages in Germany: “Germany has a giant export 
surplus over its trading partners and that is a fact,” and “German industry has created 
for itself a competitive advantage by keeping a lid on pay raises. This situation, this 
imbalance, is not sustainable economically. It is indeed dangerous” (“French Minister 
Says German Wages Need to Rise to Help Euro Zone”, Reuters, 16 April 2013). Some 
economists agree that “the generally low wage growth in Germany over the past 
decade has contributed to the imbalances that have exacerbated the euro zone’s 
sovereign debt crisis,” and it is reported that from 2007 to 2011, the average wage 
growth rate in Germany was 1% while the figure for the whole euro area was 2.7% 
(“French Minister Says German Wages Need to Rise to Help Euro Zone”, Reuters, 16 
April 2013). Obviously, there is an asymmetrical benefit distribution of the single 
currency and then the ESM agreement, and thus LI (H7b) correctly predicts that 
national asymmetrical interdependence to the ESM determines the relative bargaining 
power of the nation states: Germany, who economically benefits the most from the 
                                                 
147 See also Petersen et al. (2013). 
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ESM, has compromised the most on the margin (e.g. France’s demands in the 
Deauville Deal, France’s growth pact proposal, and southerners demanding for easing 
the accessions to the ESM fund) so as to realize its core interests (a permanent bailout 
fund for the euro countries complemented by a Fiscal Compact of strict budgetary rules 
and an automatic correction mechanism at the national level of the euro states). 
Meanwhile, those who benefit the least from the strict accession to the ESM, for 
instance, Italy and Spain who have to pay much higher and almost unsustainable 
interest rates for government securities, have imposed conditions and made hard 
bargains (see the fifth round of interstate bargains in Figure 7.1). Such a hard bargain is 
also well predicted by LI, as the strategy used by the Italian and Spanish Prime 
Ministers falls into the category of 6a: vetoing a proposal in Figure 3.2. Additionally, 
that the TSCG goes without the UK and the Czech Republic illustrates the strategy of 
6c in Figure 3.2, as Germany and France finally opted for an intergovernmental Treaty 
excluding the “recalcitrant” governments. All those prove the explanatory and 
predictive power of the LI model, and the validity of H7b in the case of the ESM also 
confirms Proposition 22, which, of course, shall remain ever open to further research 
and empirical tests.  
As for H7c, the formation of the ESM reflects the will and interests of the big 
member states (Germany and France in particular) rather than the supranational 
entrepreneurship, not only because EU entrepreneurs rarely possess information or 
expertise unavailable to the euro states to form the ESM — the predecessor EFSF, 
concluded by the eurozone countries as a private company, was already in operation, 
offering experience for the ESM contracting parties — but also because Germany and 
France are the number one and number two contributors to the loans to Greece. It is 
interesting to observe that among the six rounds of interstate bargains as illustrated in 
Figure 7.1, the fifth round is probably the hardest interstate bargain for Germany as 
Merkel made several concessions, where Italy and Spain, the number three and number 
four contributors to the EFSF and the ESM, successfully forced Germany to accept 
their demands. This not only shows a linkage between capital contributions (which is 
based on the economic power) and the voice rights and political influence, which has 
already been asserted by Proposition 11 in Chapter six, but also suggests the 
importance of forming coalitions to increase individual party’s negotiating power. To 
sum up, H7c is confirmed while other causal mechanisms can be added to H7c:  
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H7cextended: The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis tend to reflect big countries’ will rather than supranational 
entrepreneurship, because EU entrepreneurs rarely possess information or expertise 
unavailable to the member states; the amount of financial contributions to the new 
measures and policies, which is proportionate to member states’ economic powers, 
decides each member state’s political influence and bargaining power over the 
formation of the new measures and policies — the measures and policies concerning 
only EMU countries tend to reflect Germany’s and France’s national interests, which, 
however, can be challenged by a coalition of other EMU member states, particularly 
by the coalition forged by Italy and Spain.  
H7cextended as well as Proposition 11 implies that the scenario of Franco-German 
dominance on EMU affairs will not get changed easily but is not impossible — 
forming a coalition is an effective means, and the decisive factor contributes to the 
current Franco-German leadership is the economic power of the two member states. In 
general EU affairs, the UK, together with Germany and France, has a great say (e.g. the 
establishment of the ESRB, see Table 6.7); since the ESM concerns the euro countries 
only, Germany and France can go with their decisions without the participation of the 
UK. Taking the situation of the sovereign debt crisis into consideration, the economic 
power of any other (euro) member states seems most unlikely to challenge Germany’s 
number one status in the foreseeable future. Obviously, according to Figure 7.1, 
Germany has played a leading role in the formation of the ESM, and only the coalition 
of the southerners and France could successfully challenge Germany’s dominating 
power, as the fifth round of interstate bargains in Figure 7.1 illustrates. So from another 
perspective, to make an alliance with France was crucial to secure Germany’s national 
interests, and the Franco-German or German-French compromises shall be the 
prominent pattern for EMU affairs in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, Germany 
tends to exert more leverage than France in their bilateral relationship, as it is described 
that in the Deauville Deal, “Sarkozy knuckled under to Merkel’s demands that 
investors be made to pay for buying the wrong countries’ bonds”, which “marked the 
end of German-French parity in handling the crisis”; after the Deauville Deal “the 
balance shifted continually toward Berlin” (Neuger 19 March 2013, Bloomberg). A 
nation state’s political leverage is closely related to its economic power, and France’s 
relatively declining political weight was due to its economic slide. This suggests that 
crises also offer the possibility to reshuffle economic power distributions and 
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consequently political clout within the EU system; however, the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis this time appears to further have strengthened Germany’s leading role while 
weakening France’ and other euro countries’ political influence on EMU affairs. 
Anyhow, according to Tables 7.2 and 7.3 and Figure 7.1, from the Deauville Deal to 
the final formation of the ESM, Germany has successfully materialized its core 
interests, while France’s proposals outlined in the Deauville Deal were almost totally 
abandoned (e.g. the QMV progressive sanction mechanism and voting rights 
suspension), and even the growth pact offered by new French President Hollande as a 
counteract to Merkel’s fiscal pact of budget discipline was generally regarded as only 
“a symbolic victory for Hollande” (“Insight: Merkel and Hollande — Building a 
‘Grand Bargain’, Reuters, 10 July 2012). Though Germany repeatedly made 
concessions, the interstate bargain results represent Germany’s will and interests (i.e. 
setting up a permanent rescue mechanism with PSI and CACs together with a fiscal 
compact with stricter budgetary rules and automatic-triggered national deficit correct 
mechanisms for euro countries) more than France’s and that of other euro countries. 
We will see whether Germany’s dominating role in EMU affairs gets further 
strengthened or not in the future. 
As shown in Figure 7.1, throughout the spanning of several rounds of 
intergovernmental negotiations, the core interests of Germany have not been changed 
and moreover, finally got materialized, though Germany has made several concessions 
to the demands of other ESM contracting parties. Figure 7.1 exhibits Germany’s tactics 
and strategies to secure its core interests: (1) formulating package deals (i.e. binding 
strengthening the SGP rules and establishing a permanent rescue mechanism together, 
binding the ESM with the insolvency procedure involving PSI and CACs), (2) building 
a coalition with France, (3) making concessions on the margins to other euro states in 
exchange for the establishment of the ESM and stricter fiscal rules, and (4) also 
meeting the demands of the domestic opposition (e.g. insisting on a default mechanism 
coming along with the bailout mechanism, promoting a financial transaction tax, and 
promising the adoption of the Growth Pact to stimulate economic recovery) to gain 
their support to the ESM and the TSCG. From the Deauville Deal in October 2010 to 
the EU summit of 29 June 2012, Merkel’s repeated concessions did not go without 
strong criticisms from both the German citizens and politicians; nevertheless, the final 
formation of the ESM demonstrates a diplomatic victory for Merkel, because 
accompanying the placement of the ESM, “she has received a pair of important 
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trade-offs”: the fiscal pact and the growth pact — a second thought will see Merkel’s 
compromises are “pretty clever”: “a clever retreat to secure greater gains” (Rickens 29 
June 2012, Spiegel Online). As a matter of fact, the tactic to meet the demands of the 
domestic opposition is tricky. According to Reuters reports, before the EU summit of 
29 June 2012, Merkel and Hollande had already reached an agreement in Paris on a 
possible direct bank bailout by the ESM with a single and centralized supervision 
mechanism of the European banks (i.e. the Bank Union with a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM)), but “they kept the pact secret”, because Merkel’s side feared that 
the leaking of this deal might add extra difficulties for Merkel to secure the two-thirds 
parliamentary majority votes on the ESM and the Fiscal Compact two days later; 
anyhow, Merkel “had to show German lawmakers and the public she was being tough” 
(“Insight: Merkel and Hollande — Building a ‘Grand Bargain’, Reuters,10 July 2012). 
Though the German economy is the number one in the euro area and it seems that 
Germany always plays a leading role in EMU affairs, it still needs to take other 
eurozone countries’ demands into account; more realistically, the German government 
alone cannot secure enough support for its proposals, and consequently, it 
pragmatically tends to ally with France, the number two in the euro area. Forming a 
coalition with France has twofold effects: in one respect, Germany gains France’s 
support and then German interests gets guaranteed, and in another respect, the southern 
member states which tend to have different positions shall lose France’s support, and 
thus it becomes much harder for southerners to challenge the German-Franco decisions. 
Figure 7.1 also reveals the essence of German interstate bargains: swapping marginal 
interests to secure the core national interests. Based on those analyses and taking (6a), 
(6b) and (6c) into consideration, another proposition can be added to the second stage 
of the LI model:  
Proposition 23: Interstate bargains consist of (several rounds of) national 
interest swaps and compromises; negotiating parties can make use of various 
strategies to secure their national interests the most, such as (a) offering package deals, 
(b) forming an alliance with other powerful parties, (c) making concessions in the 
marginal interests in exchange for support for core interests, (d) meeting certain 
demands of domestic opposition, (e) threatening to veto, (f) withdrawing from financial 
commitments, and/or (g) excluding recalcitrant negotiators.  
Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1 suggest that forming a coalition with France was crucial 
for Germany to achieve its goals. Meanwhile, the road to the formation of the ESM has 
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been made up of several rounds of interstate bargains, which challenge the unitary 
nature of “interstate bargains” proposed by the LI model. In addition, Germany’s core 
interests and its basic baseline in negotiations have reflected the German government’s 
long time policy-orientations: a stable and credible currency, strict budgetary rules and 
low inflation rates. Meanwhile, France’s propositions on the creation of the ESM have 
also indicated a policy continuity of the French government: increasing governmental 
spending to stimulate economic growth and thus accepting higher government deficits 
with higher inflation rates. Consequently, regarding their attitudes towards the southern 
debt-ridden countries, Germany made strongly demands on budgetary cuts with 
austerity measures, while France possessed a lenient position tinted with sympathy to 
the southerners, and as a counter to Germany’s Fiscal Compact, France tabled a growth 
pact. Due to each government’s particular policy traditions, German-French 
cooperation or compromises would repeat history, and similar German-French 
packages would on the one hand express a German stickiness to stricter budgetary 
discipline while on the other hand would convey France’s growth obsessions. As 
pointed out by Spiegel, Merkel’s fiscal pact and Hollande’s growth pact is similar to 
the case of the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and at that time, 
German “Chancellor Helmut Kohl insisted on a stability pact for the 
soon-to-be-introduced euro”, while in exchange for France’s support, “the freshly 
elected French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, a Socialist like Hollande, received a pact 
aimed at creating jobs and growth”; the comments go on: “‘That is nothing new. EU 
summits have promised similar packages … dozens of times over the years’. And this 
year once again” (Volkery 27 June 2012, Spiegel Online). Two points can be drawn 
from this: first, the core interests of a nation state tend to be stable and not easily 
changed, and current national policies are rooted in government policy traditions; 
second, since the formation of the single currency, the German-French style of interest 
swaps to gain mutual support defines the general framework of EMU. The first point 
can be restated as follows: 
Proposition 24: National core interests are the bottom line of interstate bargains, 
which tend to be unwavering during negotiations while exhibiting national policy 
tradition over time. 
The second point, together with the previous analyses for H7b and H7cextended, 
implies the following:  
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Proposition 25: The eurozone sovereign debt crisis further strengthens 
Germany’s leading role while weakening France’s political leverage in EMU affairs; 
nevertheless, Germany must form a coalition with France so as to materialize its 
national interests. Consequently, on the one hand, the new EMU policies and measures 
tend to start from and/or end at the merger and/or compromise of the propositions of 
the two core euro states, which normally are characterized by a German-French style 
of stricter v.s. lessened fiscal rules and of budgetary cuts v.s. spending growth 
emphases; on the other hand, Germany tends to make concessions to France’s 
demands, but the negotiation results tend to represent Germany’s national interests 
more than France’s due to asymmetrical national economic powers. 
Proposition 24 stresses the resistant nature of core interests to get changed during 
intergovernmental negotiations as well as over time — an assertion and confirmation 
of HI, while Proposition 25 can be regarded as a specification and further elaboration 
of H7b and H7cextended. 
 
7.2.3 Evidence for H7d, H7e and H7f: Institutional Choice (LI Stage 3)  
Though the first two cases are not suitable for LI analyses, this dissertation will also 
check to what extent the third stage of the LI model is applicable to EU daily 
decision-making. Table 7.4 presents the case study results in line with the LI model in 
Figure 3.2.  
  
Table 7.4 Checking the Third Stage of the LI Model: Institutional Choice  
In accordance with the third stage of LI illustrated in Figure 3.2 
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recapitalizing the 
country’s banking 
sector, which means 
Spain has meet all 
policy conditionality 
















The second country 
covered by the ESM 
is Cyprus: on 8 May 
2013, the ESM 
agreed an FFA to 
Cyprus, and by the 
end of 2013, four 
times of 
disbursement had 
been released in 
accordance with the 
Cypriot 
government’s 
fulfillment of the 
conditions set out in 
the MoU.⑤  
Notes: “√” indicates that the concerned aspects fall into the categories/predictions of the LI 
model presented in Figure 3.2; “X” means the concerned are out of the categories/predictions 
of the LI model; “*” suggests there are new modifications to and developments of the LI 
model based on the case studies; “NATN” stands for “not applicable till now (at the end of 
2013)”, and the concerned are still subject to the tests of the EU empirical developments in 
the coming days; “FR” represents “further research”, which deserves a separate detailed 
study.  
Sources: ①European Parliament-20121019BKG54051 (20 January 2014); ②European 
Commission-SWD(2013) 800 Final (13 November 2013); ③ESRB Recommendation on 
Lending in Foreign Currencies (ESRB/2011/1) Follow-up Report – Overall Assessment 
(November 2013); ④See “Spain’s Exit” (ESM); ⑤See “ESM Financial Assistance for 
Cyprus” (ESM); ⑥Hallerberg et al. (September 2012). 
 
Table 7.4 shows that the first two cases fall into the LI prediction to a certain 
degree, and it also points out the potential weakness of the LI model in accounting for 
the recent development of the EU projects to meet the demands of increasing economic 
interdependence and integration: policy coordination and surveillance from the 
supranational level with holistic approaches to serve national economies and the 
interests of the whole EU — a tendency has been stated in Propositions 19 and 21. The 
new factors derived from the case studies — (8d), (9c), (10d) and (10e) — can be taken 
as supplements to the possible situations that LI may encounter in the future. The LI 
model’s validity and power, however, get better confirmed and clarified by the case of 
the ESM. Table 7.4 displays that among the five items checked, LI has largely 
accounted for the ESM in three aspects, with one out of LI expectations (i.e. forms of 
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sovereignty delegation) and one requiring further tracing and research (i.e. 
non-compliance caused by high costs for powerful domestic actors). Accordingly, new 
theoretical developments are derived from the case study of the ESM: first, 7(d) 
underscores the necessity for the EU to have substantial, concrete and effective 
measures in place rather than general and unspecified EU Treaty prescriptions, 
fulfilling some vacuums of the EU integration project which have been exposed and 
acerbated during the crisis; second, the extension of (8c) emphasizes the impact of the 
external environment and world-wide general practice over EU development — a point 
has already been elaborated by neo-functionalism (see H5d); third, 9(d) adds another 
possible form of sovereignty delegation to the LI repository, implying different speeds 
of the integration pace among EU member states; fourth, (10f) supplements the means 
to guarantee domestic commitments via strengthening national parliament involvement 
in the new measures, which shall enhance national democratic accountability in both 
guaranteeing credible domestic commitments and checking national executives; finally, 
the checking of the relationship among national non-compliance, high costs and 
powerful domestic actors’ interests evolves over time, suggesting LI’s resilience and its 
historical point of view, the changeable environment and the uncertainties in the EU 
project. In short, H7d and H7e can be modified as follows: 
H7dmodified: In order to solve the debt crisis, nation states make institutional 
choices to delegate and pool sovereignty to EU supranational institutions and/or 
intergovernmental institutions among (part of) EU member states so as to guarantee 
the credibility of intergovernmental commitments, and the latter may cause 
differentiated integration speeds among EU member states. 
H7eextended: Member states’ credible commitments can be guaranteed and 
realized via strengthening the national executive, the national judicial branch, the 
national parliament and/or the very domestic groups that support the policy in the first 
place vis-à-vis other domestic forces favoring non-compliance.  
The case of the ESM confirms the validity of H7d in the way that first, it is an 
intergovernmental institution concluded by the ESM member states; second, ESM 
member states delegate their sovereignty to this new intergovernmental institution 
(instead of EU supranational institutions): the ESM Board of Governors and Board of 
Directors via the voting modes of unanimity, qualified majority or simple majority — a 
different situation out of the prediction of (9a) and (9b) of the LI model; third, any 
ESM grants are accompanied by strict conditionality, and till the end of 2013 the two 
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assistance ESM programmes to Spain and Cyprus have not witnessed national 
defections from the agreed national commitments in carrying out reforms. As regards 
H7e, a new element is added: securing credible national commitments via 
strengthening national parliaments (though it has twofold effects), which has been 
vividly illustrated by the German Parliament’s approvals of the ESM and TSCG (see 
Table 7.3). The fact is that the Bundestag “already has the right to vote on whether a 
country should receive ESM aid” (Wittrock 10 September 2012, Spiegel Online).  
Finally, it is noticeable that among the five sub-propositions of “institutional 
choice” illustrated in Figure 3.2 and Table 7.4, the aspects of institutional designs (cf. 
H5d) and non-compliance caused by high costs (cf. H3) have illustrated the 
convergence of the two traditionally competing European theories — 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism — at HI. Nevertheless, the different 
orientations of the two grand theories are also obvious: neo-functionalism emphasizes 
institutional restraints on national commitments based on transaction-theory (e.g. H3), 
while LI stresses specific domestic actors’ determination on national commitments (e.g. 
national executives, courts, parliaments, and/or certain domestic interest groups). 
Nevertheless, the bases where the integration theories build up their theoretical 
frameworks are the same: economic activities and interactions among the European 
nation states. 
 
7.2.4 Evidence for H7g and H7h: Two Limitations to the LI Model 
H7g and H7h set up two limitations for the application of LI. To check the validity of 
the two sub-hypotheses, this dissertation first presents a summary on the explanatory 













Table 7.5 Summary of the Explanatory and Predictive Power of the Three Stages of LI  
Checking the three stages (1-11) and the LI hypotheses presented in Figure 3.2  
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Notes: “√”: falling into the categories and the predictions of the LI model; “X”: out of the expectation 
and categories of LI; “*”: modifications or new developments based on the case studies; “NSC”: not a 
suitable case for an LI study, but an tentative attempt to apply the LI model to account for EU daily 
decision-making ; “NA”: not applicable; “MND”: modifications and/or new developments; NATN: 
“not applicable till now (at the end of 2013)”, which remains to be checked by the EU empirical 





The summary above indicates the following: 
First, the LI model appears not to explain EU daily decision-making well. 
Though part of the elements in LI Stage 1 and Stage 3 can account for the cases of the 
European Semester and the ESRB, the two cases nearly reject all the three 
sub-hypotheses (H7a, H7d, and H7e) while indicating several out-of-LI-prediction 
situations (see “MND” (modifications and/or new developments) in Table 7.5). The 
rejection of H7a, H7d, and H7e by the European Semester, however, is accounted for 
by the LI scope condition H7g, while the confirmation of H7a and rejection of H7d and 
H7e by the ESRB suggest the validity of the other scope condition of H7h: 
Commission President Barroso exerts influence on the establishment of the ESRB, 
because national governments lack critical information, expertise and the legitimacy 
that the Commission nevertheless can provide. From such a perspective, LI, though 
failing to account for EU daily decision-making, is a rigorous theory as the two scope 
conditions safeguard the most suitable cases for LI examination. Nevertheless, the two 
limitations (i.e. H7g and H7h) appear not fully to account for the failures of the 
hypothesis tests by the two cases. Proposition 21, derived from the case studies of the 
European Semester and the ESRB, can be added to the LI model as another new scope 
condition, as the issues addressed by the two cases indicate potential new topics and 
situations LI may deal with in the future; accordingly, the “MNDs” based on the case 
studies of the two measures can be integrated into the LI model illustrated in Figure 
3.2. 
Second, as for the ESM which was finalized by several rounds of 
intergovernmental bargains, the LI model works well to explain the creation of the 
ESM: H7a, H7b, H7c and H7e are confirmed, while H7d is partially confirmed, 
leaving H7f for further research as the situation indicated by H7f has not happened yet. 
The extension of H7c and H7e and the modification of H7d suggest the new rising 
situations falling out of LI’s predictions as well as possible supplements to the LI 
model illustrated in Figure 3.4. As Table 7.5 shows, except (9) (which leads to 
H7dmodified) and (11) (which remains open for further tests), the case of the ESM falls 
into all other LI explanatory and predictive categories, with several new propositions 
developed from the case studies, which supplement and should be integrated into the 
LI model. All those newly added elements and propositions, as part of the LI model, 
also are subject to empirical tests of the ongoing EU developments. As for the two 
limitations of the application of LI, the ESM confirms both H7g and H7h: for the 
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former, the ESM exhibits a mode of national preference formation based on 
producers/investors vis-à-vis taxpayers and regulators; for the latter, the ESM is an 
intergovernmental institution concluded by hard interstate bargains, and EU leaders 
(e.g. Barroso and Van Rompuy) and the Commission, the ECB and other EU bodies 
have exerted influence because some parts of the formation of the ESM need their 
expertise and the legitimacy that the individual member states do not have, such as 
making Treaty revisions to lay down the legal basis for the creation of the ESM and the 
finalization of CACs. Barroso, Van Rompuy and the Commission played the role of 
facilitating intergovernmental negotiations and helping materialize the agreements 
reached by the national governments (see Table 6.6), and Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1 
show that national governments are the core actors and deciders of the formation of the 
ESM. Moreover, another scope condition is derived from the case study of the ESM — 
Proposition 22, which points out the possible situation where not all member states 
participate in an interstate bargain (i.e. block-ins v.s. block outs), connoting different 
relevance and weights of importance of the agreement concerned to each member state 
as well as differentiated integration speeds among EU member states (see H7dmodified). 
To sum up, the two scope conditions of the LI model demonstrate its theoretical 
rigor. Though the European Semester and the ESRB are not suitable cases for an LI 
analysis (and consequently, they almost disconfirm all the LI hypotheses), some 
elements of the LI model do appear effective to explain the two cases. Meanwhile, 
representing the new developments after the 2008 crisis, the two cases shed light on the 
potential topics and situations that may impose challenges to LI in the future, and the 
new elements and propositions, including two new scope conditions Propositions 21 
and 22, derived from the two cases’ studies (e.g. Table 7.5) can be viewed as valuable 
supplements to the LI model illustrated in Figure 3.4. In comparison, the ESM forged 
by intergovernmental bargains is a suitable case for an LI examination. The research 
results show that the LI model works well to account for the EU’s recent developments: 
among the six LI sub-hypotheses, only one (H7d) is partially confirmed and another 
will be evaluated through the evolving time (which suggests an HI perspective). In 
addition, two hypotheses (H7c and H7e) get extended, one modified (H7d) and four 
extra Propositions (22-25) are formulated via the case study of the ESM, among which 
Propositions 21 and 22 are newly derived scope conditions for the application of LI. 
All in all, the ESM demonstrates intergovernmental bargains as well as national leaders’ 
rational choices, that is, their rational calculations on both the economic benefits and 
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political implications of the euro countries’ financial stability as well as the EMU 
project (see sections “7.2.1” and “7.2.2”), and H7 as a whole is almost fully confirmed 
by the ESM. Moreover, the ESM enlarges the spatial dimension of the LI model. 
Originally, H7 presents a simple process of decision making by intergovernmental 
negotiations: 
 
Figure 7.2 A Simple Steady Process of the LI Model 
 
The ESM, however, exhibits an extended and more elaborated flow from Stage 1 
to Stage 3:  
 
  
Rational choices of national leaders 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to Figure 7.3, interstate bargains concerning the same issue may occur 
again due to new rising situations, and both institutional choice finalizations and 
national commitments evolve over time, displaying dynamics as well as uncertainties 
in the EU integration process (see Figure 7.1). The global context (such as the financial 
crisis of 2008) would influence the development of the EU, and the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis triggered by the financial crisis, as a matter of fact, pushed the recent 
institutional establishments and reforms of the EU (see Table 1.2). The post-2008 crisis 
era spurred national leaders and supranational institutions to make rational choices to 
safely drive the EU from the crisis; consequently, the crisis imposed challenges, which 
at the same time also offered an opportunity for the EU to develop and reform — a 
point of view which has already been stated in chapter six on neo-functionalist studies 
(see Propositions 4 and 9). Moreover, Figure 7.3 and Figure 6.17 show the 
convergence of the neo-functionalist and LI case study results: the efforts and choices 
made by the elites (i.e. subjective initiatives), and the EU’s interaction with the external 
world (i.e. the objective environment). The proposition of “rational choices made by 
national leaders” in H7 highlights the fact that the EU is also propelled by the elites, 
particularly when confronting a sudden and severe crisis which requires decisive and 
swift response. Though uncertainties persist in the future, one thing is sure: the trend of 
European integration is irreversible, and various efforts are expected to save the 
achievements of the EU and EMU. 
 
7.3 Evidence for H8: Impact of Exogenous Shocks from an 
LI Perspective 
In accordance with the analysis after the formation of H8 in chapter three, this section 
shall check whether the post-2008 crisis era (the eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 
particular) caused EU substantive reforms or incremental policy–making changes 
suggesting a “European constitutional settlement”. Following the elaboration of section 









Table 7.6 Substantive Reforms or Incremental Changes? 
 Substantive reforms? (Three indicators) Incremental changes? (Two indicators) 
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Yes; 
The EP’s involvement in the 
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strengthened over time (②, 
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Communication (COM(2010) 
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a risk of softening 
the CSRs as well as 
quasi-consensus by 
the member states.  
of the second cycle in 2012, the 
EP can exploit the instrument 
of the Economic Dialogue at 
different points in time during 
the Semester process — “a 
more formal involvement” (②, 
p.29) and “an important step 
forward” (②, p.22). Later, due 
to the “two-pack”, the EP can 
access the discussion of the 
Commission’s assessment of 
the euro countries’ national 
draft budgets, and also can 
have its own assessment taken 
into consideration in the yearly 
AGS formulation (②, p.24; 
③). 








Via the OLP, 
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established by 
REGULATIO
N (EU) No 
1092/2010. 




modality by the 
ESRB General 
Board is a simple 
majority or two 
thirds of the votes 
cast. 
No;  
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The ESRB is held accountable 
to both the EP and the Council. 
(See ESRB Regulation; Table 
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l supervision at 
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level together 
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First, the ESM is not 
an EU body, but it 
makes use of the 
existing EU 
institutions such as 
the Commission, the 
ECB and the CJEU;  
Second, the ESM 
Board of Governors 
and Board of 
Directors rule the 
ESM via the modes 
of unanimity, 
qualified majority 
and simple majority 
as specified in the 
ESM Treaty, so in 







to a euro state might 




negotiations (e.g. the 
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down the MoUs 
as conditions to 
receive the ESM 
assistance.  
Yes; 
The EP is not involved in the 
ESM, but the Council, together 
with the Commission, is 
responsible for the ESM 
post-programme surveillance 
(ESM Treaty. (17)) 
Yes; 
It provides as 
well as fills the 






is modelled on 
the basis of its 





ESM assistance is 
subject to national 
parliament approval, 
such as by the 
German Bundestag.  
Sources: ①European Commission-MEMO/12/386 (30 May 2012); ②Hallerberg et al. (September 2012); ③
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013.  
 
In light of Table 7.6, the European Semester shows incremental changes rather 
than substantive reforms, and so does the ESRB with the exception that the voting rules 
adopted by the ESRB change the consensus scenario. The peculiarity of the ESM is 
that it is not an EU body but an intergovernmental institution established by only part 
of the EU member states. On the one hand, the ESM represents a substantive reform as 
the ESM was established via Treaty amendments, and it also enables the decentralized 
fiscal, administrative and coercive powers of the beneficiary states to be subject to the 
ESM conditionality at a more centralized level (to the degree of carrying out economic 
reforms and implementing reducing-budget-deficit measures agreed in the MoUs), but 
it does not change the quasi-consensus practices as the assistance package to the 
beneficiary states is still hammered out via (hard) intergovernmental and international 
negotiations; on the other hand, the ESM indicates an evolution from the temporary 
financial backstop — the EFSF — to the permanent crisis resolution mechanism. As a 
consequence, H8 is not fully confirmed by the three cases, but the ESRB and the ESM 
do exhibit certain features of substantive reforms and the latter confirms H8 in the 
aspects of indicators 1 and 3. At the same time, all the three cases present evidence for 
incremental changes in terms of indicator 4 and 5, which in another way around, 
supports LI’s assumption of a “European constitutional settlement”, that is, when 
reaching at a certain plateau, the EU shall move along with incremental changes rather 
than substantial reforms like those once brought by the creation of the single market 
and the single currency. As a result, the ESM represents both a substantive reform as 
well as an incremental change, and the latter aspect also indicates policy learning and 
continuity from the previous practice of the EFSF — a historical point of view.  
Evidence for incremental changes indicated by the three cases and the OLP to 
adopt the first two measures suggests that the EU has developed a stable and 
comparatively “mature” institutional framework to solve the crisis — a constitutional 
settlement claimed by LI. Treaty revisions, even being a prerequisite to the creation of 
the ESM, have been carried out in accordance with EU institutional procedures 
462 
 
prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty. The adoption of the three new measures follows the 
already laid-down EU rules and procedures, exhibiting the resilience and stability of 
the EU institutional framework when confronting the severe crisis. Still, several 
explanations are needed to clarify the indicators of substantive reforms. First, “the 
current EU institutional framework” in indicator 1 can mean two things: one refers to 
the rules and working procedures of the EU, while the other can indicate the concrete 
operative EU institutions and bodies, such as the Commission and the ECB, and this 
dissertation defines the “institutional framework” in the first sense.
148
 Second, as for 
indicator 2, the evolution of QMV in the Council via EU Treaty revisions (see section 
2.5.1 and Table 6.23) actually has changed the legal basis for the EU and its member 
states to make decisions and adopt policies; nevertheless, the quasi-consensus scenario 
in practice appears unchanged in the decision-making patterns under the European 
Semester — even though the causal mechanism remains to be further clarified (see 
section 7.1) — and the ESM. Two kinds of discrepancies are observable: the first one 
is the discrepancy between the rules that lead to the adoption of the new measures (e.g. 
the legal basis provided by the EU Treaties) and the rules that shall operate under the 
new measures;
149
 the second discrepancy is related to the rules governing the new 
mechanisms on paper and those in practice. Judging from EU legalistic rules to adopt 
the European Semester and the ESRB, the OLP means changes to the unanimous 
voting mode in the Council, but anyhow consensus scenarios are still present (see 
Table 7.1); while judging from the rules adopted by the concrete measures, the 
decision-making patterns prescribed in the three new mechanisms imply deviations 
from consensus decision-making, but in practice, the European Semester and the ESM 
still resort to the quasi-consensus ruling.
150
 This dissertation, as Table 7.6 suggests, 
                                                 
148 If the EU’s institutional framework is explained in the second sense, then both the European 
Semester and the ESRB would say “Yes” to the first indicator of the substantive reforms; even with 
those confirmations, both cases still lack evidence for the second and third indicators. This 
dissertation regards the two senses of “institutions” as two layers of the EU institutional framework, 
with the former being more substantial and invisible, while the latter is more superficial and 
observable. So this dissertation sticks to the first sense.  
149 Such a discrepancy has been encountered and addressed by the neo-functionalist analysis in 
chapter 6, see tests for H1 and H4. 
150 As regards the European Semester, the EU’s surveillance of budgetary policies started from the 
SGP laid down by the Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 by QMV in the Council, 
according to which the Council shall deliver an opinion on the Commission’s recommendations on 
the broad guidelines in accordance with Article 103 (TEU, 92/C 191/01) by QMV; with the 
effectiveness of Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011, the Council, in accordance with Article 121 TFEU, 
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defines “the current EU institutional framework” (indicator 1) as the EU’s institutional 
rules of decision-making rather than any concrete institutional body, while it also 
prescribes the subjects of indicator 2 and indicator 3 as the rules operating under the 
new measures in empirical practice rather than on paper, or rather than the EU 
decision-making rules leading to the adoption of the new measures. Accordingly, 
among the three new measures, only the ESM meets indicator 1 as a creation outside 
the current EU institutional framework, while in practical operation, both the European 
Semester and the ESM display discernible quasi-consensus decision-making — a 
national control scenario. All in all, H8 is confirmed by the ESM in two aspects (out of 
three) of substantial reforms, while it gets full and partial rejections from the European 
Semester and the ESRB, respectively. Those confirmations and rejections, in one 
respect, justify LI’s proposition of EU constitutional settlement and possible substantial 
reforms due to unforeseen exogenous shocks, while in another respect, they prove that 
crises can also be opportunities, for incremental changes or for substantive reforms. In 
addition, the case studies show that the EU’s recent developments do not challenge 
much of LI’s assumption of the national control scenario over the core national issues, 
but a crack on the national control over their fiscal activities (which are expected to 
remain national) has been signaled by the operation of the ESM.  
 
7.4 Evidence for H9: LI Assumptions on a Salient EU Issue 
Increasing the Turn-Out Rate of the EP Election (a 
Preliminary Analysis) 
As the analyses after the formation of H9 in chapter three have pointed out, H9 shall be 
tested after the EP election in May 2014. What can be done in this dissertation is to 
check whether the on-going sovereign debt crisis has become a salient EU issue in the 
minds of the European citizens. 
                                                                                                                            
also shall act with QMV defined by Article 238(3)(a). As for the operation of the ESRB, the actual 





①Q: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? 
(Max. 2 Answers) 
Figure 7.4 a) Top Concerns of European Citizens-% EU① 
 
 
②Q: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? 
(Max. 2 Answers) 
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③Q: And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment? (Max. 2 
Answers) 
Figure 7.4 c) Top Concerns of European Citizens-% EU③ 
 
 
④Q: And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment? 
(Max. 2 Answers) 
Figure 7.4 d) Top Concerns of European Citizens-% EU④ 
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Sources: ①Adapted from Standard Eurobarometer 80 (Autumn 2013, 11); ②Adapted from 
Standard Eurobarometer 70 (June 2010, 34); ③Adapted from Standard Eurobarometer 80 
(Autumn 2013, 13); ④Adapted from Standard Eurobarometer 70 (June 2010, 39).  
 
According to Figure 7.4 a), in the course of 2013, the most important two things 
in the mind of the European citizens at the national level were unemployment and the 
economic situation — two direct impacts of the sovereign debt crisis — with the 
former registering at 49% in the autumn of 2013 with two percentage points lower than 
the figure in spring 2013 (51%). As for the concern rate of 49% of unemployment, it is 
“the first time this item has lost ground since the Standard Eurobarometer of spring 
2011, EB76” (Standard Eurobarometer 80, 11). Compared with these figures in the 
course of 2008 before the EP election in 2009, concerns of unemployment in autumn 
2008 took the third place, counting 26%, while inflation and the economic situation 
were listed as top one and two issues, both marking 37% (see Figure 7.4 b)). At the 
personal level, according to Figure 7.4 c), the top concerns of the European citizens are 
inflation and unemployment, reaching 40% and 20% in the autumn of 2013. In 
comparison, when the same survey was carried out in October-November 2008 for the 
first time by the Eurobarometer, the top two personal concerns were rising prices 
(50%) and the economic situation (23%) due to the influence of the global financial 
crisis, and at that time, the concerns for unemployment made up of 14%, ranking the 
fifth place after the concerns for the health system and pension. Therefore, in 2008, the 
European citizens regarded rising prices/inflation and the economic situation as the 
most important issues at both the personal and national level, while the EP election 
turnout rates, amid the global economic recession, continuously declined in 2009 (45% 
for the 27 member states) since 1979 (of 66% for the 9 member states) (e.g. Lelieveldt 
and Princen 2011, 120-121), so this dissertation rules out the causal relationship 
between citizens’ concerns for inflation and the economic situation and a higher EP 
turnout rate in the logic of H9. Observing the changing ranks in Figure 7.4, this 
dissertation proposes a causal chain between people’s concerns for unemployment and 
the turnout rate of the EP election. The rationale is as follows: in recent years, due to 
the on-going eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the unemployment records registered 
worse during 2009 to 2012 across the EU (see Table 6.17 and Figure 6.12), while the 
issue of unemployment tops the list of people’s concerns for their country, far ahead of 
the economic situation, and at the same time, it ranks the second for the most two 
important things at the personal level; so unemployment can be regarded as a salient 
467 
 
issue in the minds of the Europeans, and this dissertation assumes that people also 
understand the unemployment situation is directly caused by the on-going sovereign 
debt crisis, and in such a way, the sovereign debt crisis can be regarded to have become 
a salient EU issue to the EU citizens. 
However, the empirical test for H9 in the future may also need to take other 
factors into account, among which a new institutional rule was introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty: the EP is entitled to elect the president of the Commission from the “top 
candidates” of the EU-level political parties entering the 2014 campaign (cf. Article 
17(7) TEU) — a factor might “reverse the familiar pattern of low turnouts” (Stratulat 
and Emmanouilidis September 2013, 1). Moreover, the salience of the sovereign debt 
crisis may also unleash negative campaigns and more protests against European 
integration, which “could consolidate the bloc of populist Eurosceptic lawmakers in the 
next European Parliament” (Stratulat and Emmanouilidis September 2013, 1). Besides, 
according to an EP Eurobarometer Summary (EB77.2) (21 May 2012), public opinion 
towards the ways of tackling the crisis has exhibited a clear difference between the 
euro countries and the non-euro member states. So the general EP election turnout can 
be divided into two sub-categories: the turnout in the euro countries and in the 
non-euro countries. Finally, other conceptual factors and trends may play a role in 
accounting for the test results of H9. For example, as for the survey question in 2013: 
“My voice counts in the EU?”, less than a third of the Europeans have considered that 
their voices do count in the EU, while the disagree rates keep rising, going up from 
52% in 2004 to 66% 2013 (Standard Eurobarometer 80, 7). The research about the 
turnout of the 2014 EP election is interesting and multifaceted, and so far, this 










8 Chapter Eight: Hypotheses Tests of HI and New 
Insights Based on Case Studies 
Because HI is a point of convergence of the traditionally competing neo-functionalism 
and intergovernmentalism, some of the hypothesis tests in this section shall resort to 
the evidence and case study results in the previous two chapters. 
 
8.1 Evidence for H10: A Critical Juncture? 
H10 intends to check whether the 2008 global financial crisis means a critical juncture, 
thus introducing new paths for EU policies of economic governance. The indictors for 
a critical juncture and new paths are the changed and redefined national-national and/or 
national-supranational competence and powers entailed in the new measures.  
 
Table 8.1 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Juncture for EU Economic Governance? 
 Compared with the previous practices 
(Cf. 6 (6) in Table 6.18)  
Any changed and redefined 
national-national and/or 
national-supranational competence and 
powers? 




Before 2011, budgetary surveillance via SCPs 
(which was introduced by Regulation 1466/97 
as part of the SGP’s preventive arm in 1997) 
and coordination of structural reforms via NRPs 
(introduced by the revamped Lisbon Strategy in 
2005) followed two separate procedures with 
two different calendars: the first SCPs “shall be 
submitted before 1 March 1999” and “updated 
programmes shall be submitted annually” 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97), 
“normally by 1 December of each year”①, 
while the NRPs, on the basis of the IGs (another 
initiative of the re-launched Lisbon Strategy in 
2005(②, pp. 20-21) , which is the merger of the 
BEPGs and the EGs (③, pp. 10-11) submitted 
in October④; moreover, before 2011, “there has 
been ex-post coordination of member states’ 
structural reforms and budgetary priorities” as 
No; 
Though the Commission’s power and 
autonomy are extended under the European 
Semester (see Table 6.11), both the 
national-national and national-supranational 
relationships remain unchanged: the EU 
guides, coordinates and gives CSRs, while 
national governments have their final 
decisions on whether and to what degree to 
implement the CSRs; meanwhile, only peer 
pressure has been imposed by the European 
Semester among the EU member states. 
The key to define national-national and 
national-supranational competence and 
power under the European Semester is that 
no binding decisions could be made, though 
the violation of budgetary rules can lead to 
sanctions under other separate procedures. 
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the NRPs and SCPs were submitted after 
national parliaments’ budgetary decisions ⑤.As 
from 2011, the time of submitting the NRPs and 
SCPs at the national level and of assessing and 
coordinating of these policies at the EU level 
was synchronised in a single mechanism; 
meanwhile, all those synchronised policy 
coordination become ex-ante, as EU priorities 
and objectives enshrined in the AGS are issued 
“before the drawing up of the NRPs and SCPs 
and before the adoption of national budgets” 
⑤.  
Moreover, before 2011, due to the separate and 
different policy coordination procedures, 
“[t]here was no comprehensive view of the 
efforts made at national level, and no 
opportunity for Member States to discuss a 
collective strategy for the EU economy”⑥; 
since 2011, the European Semester has provided 
a platform for the EU member states to do so. 
Up to now, all possible EU economic policy 
coordination has been integrated under the same 
umbrella of the European Semester, the contents 
of which have been expanding over time since 
the first cycle of 2011: (a) Euro Plus Pact 
commitments were decided to be included in the 
SCPs and NRPs in March 2011; (b) the six-pack 
in December 2011 codified the European 
Semester and introduced a new policy 
surveillance under the Semester: preventing 
macroeconomic imbalances; (c) in January 
2013, the Fiscal Compact contained in the 
TSCG further strengthened the enforcement of 
the MTO defined by the SGP, which has been 
covered by the European Semester; (d) in May 
2013, after the six-pack, the “two-pack” 
targeting only the euro countries continued the 
SGP reforms, introducing and integrating a 
common budgetary surveillance timeline 
particularly for the eurozone countries into the 
European Semester — an autumn counterpart to 
the spring semester. (See section 5.2.1 and 
Appendix 1)  
(see e.g. Table 5.3) 
Moreover, the new legislations of the 
six-pack introduce special provisions for 
the euro countries, and after the six-pack, 
the two-pack further strengthened euro area 
economic governance, “perpetuating” 
unbalanced governance between the euro 
and non-euro blocks. (⑦, p.46) 
The 
ESRB 
Before the ESRB, there was no such an 
EU-wide macro-prudential supervision 
Yes; (cf. (10) in Table 6.19) 
The ESRB for the first time defines the 
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mechanism; the establishment of the ESRB 
fulfills a vacuum of the EU project. (See e.g. 
5(2) in Table 6.18; Table 7.6) 
“Supervisory reform has so far relied on an 
evolutionary approach, [...]. While certain 
progress in convergence has been achieved, this 
progress has not allowed the EU to identify 
and/or deal with the causes of the current 
financial crisis”. (Annex I, de Larosière Report, 
25 February 2009) 
 
power distribution of the supranational 
macro-prudential supervision at the EU 
level and its addressees at the national 
level. The national-supranational 
asymmetrical power distribution under the 
new EU body is framed up by the nature of 
the ESRB: it has no legal personality and 
does not have legally binding powers to its 
addressees; the principle under the ESRB is 
act/comply-or-explain, and the 
implementation of the ESRB 
recommendations is subject to national 
discretion. (See e.g. Table 6.6).  
The 
ESM 
Before the ESM, there were no such permanent 
tools for the euro countries to resort to, and only 
a contemporary financial backstop — the EFSF 
— was available. 
Yes; 
The temporary EFSF was established by the 
euro countries as a private company located 
at Luxembourg, which would expire soon 
and does not obtain a legal basis in the EU 
Treaties, but the ESM, via Treaty 
amendments, acquires the legal basis in the 
EU Treaties and is concluded by the euro 
states as a permanent intergovernmental 
institution. Judging from its practical 
operation, the ESM shows path dependence 
from the EFSF, but from the legal basis 
angle, the ESM ushers new and 
meant-to-be-permanent-and-not-transient 
national-supranational and national-national 
geometries under the EU legal framework 
due to the changes to EU Treaties: the 
former refers to the fact that beneficiary 
states must meet the conditionality of 
reducing budget deficits and carrying out 
structural reforms set out in the agreed 
MoU to receive tranches of ESM aids (see 
e.g. Table 5.5, (11) in Table 6.19), while 
the latter is expressed in the different shares 
of the ESM contracting parties’ 
contribution to the ESM funds (see Table 
6.9).  
Sources: ①“Stability and Convergence Programmes” (European Commission); ②European 
Commission-SEC(2010) 114 Final; ③Hallerberg et al. (August 2011); ④See “Database – 
NRPs Prior to 2011” (European Commission); ⑤Delors et al. (February 2011); ⑥European 




The research results presented in Table 8.1 show that among the three selected 
cases, the European Semester, compared with the previous EU practices, does not 
indicate a critical juncture in terms of redefining national-national and 
national-supranational power distributions, thus refutes H10, while the other two cases 
confirm the critical juncture assumption of H10. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing 
again that critical junctures rest on the arguments of path dependence, and the 
judgement of a critical juncture is based on the precedents in the past. As a result, the 
European Semester exhibits strong path dependence from the EU’s previous economic 
policy coordination and surveillance mechanisms under which no binding decisions 
shall be taken, and thus the previous national-national and national-supranational 
relations remain unchanged. In contrast, filling a vacuum of the EU project, the ESRB 
indicates a critical juncture as a totally new national-supranational geometry on the 
issue of macro-prudential oversight across the EU is introduced and established by the 
ESRB; assuming the features of the EFSF, the ESM indicates a critical juncture on the 
“path” built by the EFSF; compared with the EFSF, the ESM has obtained a legal basis 
in the EU Treaties. It is worth pointing out that, however, the research results in Table 
8.1 display a sort of “incongruence” with the case study results in chapter six and 
chapter seven, such as Table 6.11 and Table 6.19, and the main reason is because of the 
different gauges and measurements entailed in different theoretical approaches and 
lenses.  
In accordance with the analyses after the derivation of H10 in chapter four, the 
following section will check HI’s other arguments relevant to the assumption of critical 
junctures, which are valid in the cases of the ESRB and the ESM. The vindication of 
H10 by the ESRB and the ESM leads to the following further analyses.  
First, HI argument 7 on the possible factors that could cause a critical juncture 
has been justified: this time, it is the economic crisis that forges the branching points of 
the EU project. The specific patterns of timing and sequence of events (HI arguments 









Table 8.2 A Timeline for the Establishment of the ESRB 
 Before the establishment of the ESRB:  
The EU lacks a supranational body being responsible for macro-prudential supervision of the financial 
systems across the EU, and no agencies have ever conducted such an EU-wide function to provide 
necessary information, warnings and recommendations to national economies and micro-level 
economic and financial activities. Traditionally, micro-prudential supervision of individual firms has 
been at the center of the focus of the supervisors around the world. Some member states have 
established their macro-prudential bodies at the national level, which, however, appear scattered, 
fragmented and inadequate. 
Since financial stability is a precondition for the prosperity of the real economy, EP resolutions have 
repeatedly pointed out the loopholes in the EU’s financial supervisions as regards the EU’s ever 
increasingly integrated financial markets:  
(1) 13 April 2000: The EP’s resolution on the Commission’s communication on implementing the 
framework for financial markets: Action Plan, where the EP argued for the “reduction of systemic risk 
and/or improvement of the forecasting system for those risks while also facilitating the conclusion of 
transactions”; ① 
(2) 21 November 2002: The EP’s resolution on prudential supervision rules in the European Union, 
where the EP “[r]ecommends that macro-prudential policies be given more prominence and calls for 
micro- and macro-prudential policies to be more closely linked”, and “notes also that the European 
Central Bank has a significant role to play in macro-prudential analysis”;② 
(A) July 2007: Triggered by US subprime mortgages and financial derived products, the financial 
crisis broke out in the US and soon spread over the world, causing “the most serious and disruptive 
financial crisis since 1929”; the major factors underlying the crisis were ample liquidity and low 
interest rates which had created a widespread housing bubble; in the US, this situation was “fuelled by 
unregulated, or insufficiently regulated, mortgage lending and complex securitization financing 
techniques”, and at the same time, across the globe, financial innovations have “amplified and 
accelerated the consequences of excess liquidity and rapid credit expansion”. The problems exposed 
by the crisis are about failures in the assessment of risks by firms and financial institutions (e.g CRAs), 
the proper use and regulation of financial derivations and products such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), and the lack of national (regional, and even worldwide) macro-prudential 
supervision which deals with systemic risks, inter-connected vulnerabilities, and contagious effects 
across financial sectors;③  
(3) 11 July 2007: The EP’s resolution on financial services policy (2005 to 2010) – White Paper, 
where the EP “points out that those market changes also affect the nature, source and transfer of 
systemic risk, and thus the effectiveness of existing ex-ante risk mitigation tools; calls, therefore, for 
evidence-based identification and evaluation of the sources of systemic risks and the underlying 
dynamics of financial crises in this context”;④  
(4) 23 September 2008: With the aim to “minimize the risk of future financial crises”, the EP gave its 
recommendations on hedge funds and private equity to the Commission, where the EP “[c]onfirms [...] 
the principle of subsidiarity and the fundamental rights of citizens”;⑤ 
(5) 9 October 2008: The EP gave its recommendations on Lamfalussy follow-up to the Commission, 
where the EP was aware that “the interlocking of many national authorities has increased complexity 
and blurred the lines of responsibility, especially for macro-prudential supervision and crisis 
management”; the EP suggested that legislative acts should be adopted, among other things, to 
“establish [...] policies on macro prudential supervision and financial stability” at the EU level, 
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including “setting up an EU early-warning system and early-intervention mechanism”;⑥  
 From the de Larosière report to the Commission’s proposal to establish the ESRB:  
(6) November 2008: A High-Level Group chaired by Jacques de Larosière was entrusted by the 
Commission to make recommendations on how to strengthen EU financial supervision; 
(B) February 2009: It is evaluated that “18 months after the beginning of the crisis, the full scale of the 
losses is unknown” and meanwhile, “the crisis is now global, deep, even worsening”;③ 
(7) 25 February 2009: The de Larosière Report was finalized, and it recommended, inter alia, the 
establishment of an EU level body ESRC to carry out macro-prudential supervision of the EU financial 
system as a whole;  
(8) 4 March 2009: The Commission’s Communication “Driving European Recovery”, giving a broad 
support to the de Larosière Report and its recommendations; 
(9) 19 and 20 March 2009: The European Council agreed with the recommendations put forward by 
the de Larosière Report; 
(10) 22 April 2009: The EP’s positions on Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) and the EP’s 
position at first reading corresponds to the final legislative act: Directive 2009/138/EC⑦, which aims 
at “eliminat(ing) the most serious differences between the laws of the Member States as regards the 
rules to which insurance and reinsurance undertakings are subject” as well as “protect(ing) (..) policy 
holders and beneficiaries of the undertakings of the same group particularly in crisis situations”;⑧ 
(11) 23 April 2009: The EP’s positions on CRAs, and the EP’s position at first reading corresponds to 
the final legislative act: Regulation (EC) No1060/2009 ⑨; “[t]he principal aim of this Regulation is to 
protect the stability of financial markets and investors”, and “[t]he crisis in international financial 
markets has clearly demonstrated that it is appropriate to examine further the need for wide-ranging 
reforms of the regulatory and supervisory model of the Community financial sector”⑩;  
(12) 27 May 2009: The Commission’s Communication “European Financial Supervision”, tabling EU 
level financial supervision reforms, including the creation of the ESRB for macro-prudential 
oversight ; 
(13) 9 June 2009: The Council supported the Commission’s suggestions and also concluded the ECB’s 
role for the ESRB;  
(14) 18 and 19 June 2009: The European Council also supported the Commission’s suggestions and 
welcomed that the relevant legislative proposals shall be in place during 2010; 
(15) 23 September 2009: The Commission proposed the ESRB Regulation — COM(2009) 499 Final; 
 The co-legislative procedure leading to the operation of the ESRB:  
(i) 7 October 2009: The Committee referral was announced in the EP (first reading/single reading); 
(ii) 20 October 2009: Debate in the Council reached a broad agreement on the regulation establishing 
the ESRB and the Council decision entrusting the ECB with specific tasks; consequently, “the Council 
invited the presidency to start negotiations with the European Parliament on the regulation on the basis 
of this approach with a view to reaching agreement at first reading” and “to take the necessary steps to 
initiate the process with the European Parliament on the Council decision, while taking note of the 
need for further political negotiations before reaching a final agreement in December 2009 on the 
complete package setting up a new supervisory structure for the EU”;⑯ 
(16) 26 October 2009: The ECB gave its opinion to the Commission’s proposal of establishing the 
ESRB, fully supporting the Commission’s proposal and giving extra emphases on the independence of 
the ECB and the necessary consultation from the advisory technical committees;⑪ 
(17) 28 October 2009: The report of the IMF, the BIS and the FSB presented to the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors stated the variation of the assessment of systemic risk due to 
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the different economic environments; 
(18) 22 January 2010: The EESC gave its opinion on the Commission’s proposal, including clarifying 
the definition of systemic risks and emphasizing the independence of the ESRB;⑫ 
(iii) 10 May 2010: The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in the Parliament adopted the 
report by Sylvie Goulard (ALDE, FR)* on the Commission’s proposal, which recommended 
amendments to the Commission’s proposal as the EP’s position at first reading under the OLP; ⑰ 
(iv) 25 May 2010: The Committee report was tabled as the EP’s draft legislative resolution for the EP 
plenary for first reading, having regard to the opinion of the ECB of 26 October 2009, to the opinion of 
the EESC of 22 January 2010, and “to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs (A7-0168/2010)” ; (22) 
(v) 6 July 2010: Debate in the EP;  
(vi) 7 July 2010: The EP adopted amendments to the Commission’s proposal, by 612 votes for and 40 
against with 37 abstentions, at first reading under the OLP, but “[t]he vote on the legislative resolution 
was postponed to a future plenary session”;⑱ 
(vii) 13 July 2010: The Council debated and adopted “a political guideline with a view to continuing 
negotiations with the European Parliament”; originally, it is planned that both the Council and the EP 
should reach an overall agreement in time so as to enable the EP to adopt the ESRB regulation at its 
first reading on 8 July, but the divergence between the Council and the EP postponed the EP’s voting, 
and as a result, “the Council has agreed on the compromise proposals submitted by the Presidency 
with a view to facilitating continuing negotiations”;⑲  
(C) 21 July 2010: In the US, the FSOC was established under Public Law 111-203 (Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act), and for the first time, the US has a statutorily mandated 
collaborative body to conduct comprehensive monitoring of the US financial system (i.e. 
macro-prudential supervision);⑬ 
(viii) 7 September 2010: The Council endorsed an agreement reached with the EP on 2 September on 
the key elements of reforming the EU financial supervision framework (which consists of the creation 
of an ESRB responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system, and three 
supervisory authorities (the EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA)) and these supervisory bodies were expected to 
become operational as of 1 January 2011; the EP “is expected to adopt the texts in first reading during 
its plenary session starting on 20 September” and the Council “will formally adopt them at a 
subsequent meeting without further discussion”. (21, p.9) 
(19) 22 September 2010: The EP adopted its position at first reading to adopt the ESRB regulation, and 
the EP’s position corresponds to the final legislative act: Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 ⑭; the 
adopted resolution amending the Commission’s proposal and “[t]he amendments are the result of a 
compromise agreement between Parliament and Council” ⑳; 
(20) 17 November 2010: The Council adopted legal texts of the ESRB after the EP’s first reading, 
which “follows an agreement reached with the European Parliament on the key elements of the reform, 
as endorsed by the Council at its meeting on 7 September”; ⑮ 
(21) 24 November 2010: the ESRB was signed and codified in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, and 
the end of the procedure in the EP; 
(IX) 15 December 2010: Final act was published in Official Journal;  
(X): 16 December 2010: ESRB Regulation entered into force;  
(22) 1 January 2011: the ESRB became operational. 
 Since the operation of the ESRB as of 1 January 2011 
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(23) 27 June 2013: The ESRB was given new tasks as the CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU) and CRR 
(Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) (together known as the CRD IV-Package) were published in the EU 
Official Journal, including giving: (a) recommendations to EU member states on countercyclical buffer 
rates, (b) opinions to the Commission on the systemic risk brought by member states’ buffer rates, and 
(c) opinions on the use of national macro-prudential instruments; 
(24) The advent of the SSM and the Bank Union shall complicate the relationship between the ESRB, 
the ECB and the SSM, as the last one shall deal with macro-prudential policies and supervision in the 
bank area, which has already been covered by the ESRB functions. Potential changes to the operation 
of the ESRB arethere. 
Notes: The event selection in Table 8.2 is based on ESRB Regulation (see (1)-(22)), the de 
Larosière Report (see (A) and(B)), the study of international discourses in Table 6.25 (see 
(C)), the OLP leading to the establishment of the ESRB (referring to (15), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), 
(v),(vi), (vii), (19), (20), (21), (viii), (IX) and (X)); (23) and (24) come from Mcphilemy et al. 
(2013, 78-83). 
* ALDE, FR: Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, France. 
Sources: ① European Parliament-A5-0059/2000 (13 April 2000); ② European 
Parliament-P5_TA(2002)0568 (21 November 2002); ③ The de Larosière Report (25 
February 2009); ④European Parliament-P6_TA(2007)0338 (11 July 2007); ⑤European 
Parliament-P6_TA(2008)0425 (23 September 2008); ⑥ European 
Parliament-P6_TA(2008)0476 (9 October 2008); ⑦European Parliament-P6_TA(2009)0251 
(22 April 2009); ⑧Directive 2009/138/EC; ⑨European Parliament-P6_TA(2009)0279 (23 
April 2009); ⑩Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009; ⑪ ECB-CON/2009/88; ⑫EESC-ECO/268 
Macro and Micro Prudential Supervision (22 January 2010); ⑬See “Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, About FSOC” (US Department of the Treasury) and “Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, Home” (US Department of the Treasury); ⑭European 
Parliament-P7_TA(2010)0335 (22 September 2010); ⑮Council of the European 
Union-16452/10 PRESSE 303 (17 November 2010); ⑯Procedure 
File-2009/0140(COD)-20/10/2009; ⑰Procedure File-2009/0140(COD)-10/05/2010; 
⑱Procedure File-2009/0140(COD)-07/07/2010; ⑲Procedure 
File-2009/0140(COD)-13/07/2010; ⑳Procedure File-2009/0140(COD)-22/09/2010; 
(21)Council of the European Union-13161/10 PRESSE 229 (7 September 2010); 
(22)European Parliament-A7-0168/2010 (25 May 2010).  
 
Table 8.2 justifies a branch point punctuating EU policy continuity in the aspect 
of macro-prudential oversight, and the spillover of the US subprime mortgage crisis 
into a global financial crisis causes the EU to create a new EU body — the ESRB — 
and thus the EU’s macro-prudential supervision sets on a new path. Before the 
establishment of the ESRB, EU-wide macro-prudential supervision was absent; even 
though the EP as early as 2000 and 2002 had already pointed out the potentiality of 
systemic risks and thus the necessity of carrying out macro-prudential overseeing and 
risk forecasts, no substantial reforms occurred to the EU macro-prudential supervisory 
framework. It was not until the global financial crisis triggered by the US subprime 
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mortgage crisis that the issue of macro-prudential oversight became imminent, urgent 
and indispensable to safeguard the financial stability as well as the economic growth of 
the EU. As indicated by Table 8.2, after the time point of “(A) July 2007”, the EP’s 
resolutions, events (3), (4) and (5), all were related to the financial crisis, and these 
topics dealt with EU regulation deficiencies spotlighted by the financial crisis, such as 
on hedge funds and private equity (4); as a matter of fact, the EP’s suggestions in its 9 
October 2008 resolution had already heralded the essential missions and functions of 
an EU macro-prudential oversight body in the future (5), which later materialized in the 
form of the ESRB. From the de Larosière Report in February 2009 to the 
Commission’s final proposal of establishing the ESRB in September 2009, a directive 
on insurance and reinsurance and a regulation on CRAs were adopted, both of which 
emphasized crisis management against the background of the financial crisis, obviously 
addressing the shortcomings revealed by the crisis. After the Commission submitted its 
proposal to the EP and the Council, a co-legislative procedure (i.e. the OLP) was on the 
way, and the ESRB was finalized as a compromise between the EP and the Council, 
where the ESRB regulation corresponds to the EP’s position for first reading under the 
OLP. Based on the ESRB regulation, the events selected in Table 8.2 not only reveal 
the critical juncture, the timing and sequences of those events, but also display how a 
new EU body was created under existing EU decision-making procedures, where 
different actors and EU institutions are accordingly involved in. Once again illustrating 
the Commission’s initiatives in putting forward proposals, Table 8.2 in the meantime 
also shows the active interactions among three institutions involved in EU legislation: 
the Commission, the EP and the Council. From this perspective, the existing EU 
institutional structure shapes the way to produce new EU policies and measures. 
Nevertheless, according to the ESRB regulation, the de Larosière Report and even the 
resolutions by the EP, both the eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the issue of 
governmental debts are not included as a key event on the way towards the 
establishment of the ESRB. This fact demonstrates that the creation of the ESRB is 
more exogenously pushed rather than endogenously compelled.  
Second, a further constraint of national government powers does not happen 
under the ESRB (see e.g. (11) in Table 6.19), and thus the operation of this new 
mechanism does not fall into the neo-functionalist and HI’s expectation of an 
unintended consequence. With regard to any possible asymmetrical access to EU 
decision-making processes, at the very beginning, the de Larosière Report carried out a 
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broad consultation from various representatives from European financial services 
associations and international institutions (see (2) and (4) in Table 6.19; Table 7.2), and 
the relevant interest groups were also consulted for two times before the Commission 
tabled its final proposal (see also 6 (6) in Table 6.18): the first consultation was about 
the de Larosière Report, and received opinions were put into the Commission 
Communication on 27 May 2009, based on which came the second consultation, 
“whereby all financial services sector operators and their representative bodies, 
regulators, supervisors, other interested parties to were invited to comment on the more 
detailed reforms presented in the May 2009 Communication” (COM(2009) 499 Final, 
emphasis added); then during the co-legislative process, the opinions from the ECB 
and the EESC were taken into account before the EP adopted its first reading position 
(iii and iv in Table 8.2). The EESC (already mentioned in Table 6.18) is the only 
consultative body at the EU level and “the only way for Europe’s interest groups — 
trade unionists, employers, farmers, etc. — to have a formal and institutionalized say 
on draft EU legislation”; established by the Rome Treaty, the membership of the EESC 
“is made up of representatives of Europe’s employers’ organizations, trade unions, 
farmers, consumer groups, professional associations, and so on”, thus representing the 
broadest interests of various societal groups across the EU; in practice, dealing with the 
relevant legislative proposals put forward by the Commission, the EESC normally will 
work out compromises among various relevant interest groups and give its collective 
opinion to the legislative proposals, which shall be published in the EU Official Journal 
and “likely to be a common-sense response” that the Council will work on (EESC 
FAQs). Thus, the opinions from the EESC stand for a broad agreement among different 
interest groups. So from the consultation contributing the de Larosière Report, to the 
opinions issued by the EESC, and then to the establishment of the ESRB, it appears 
that the EU has tried to hear and include as many inclusive opinions as possible (e.g. 
“all financial services sector…”); according to those consultations, EU institutional 
arrangements do not forge an asymmetrical access for different interests groups to the 
decision-making process. Nevertheless, the institutional design of the ESRB may, for 
better or for worse, indicate an asymmetrical access and introduce disproportionate 
power distributions: as shown in Table 5.4, the ESRB General Board who has the 
voting rights on ESRB affairs does not include any representatives of European 
financial interest groups, and actually the ETUC has voiced their demands to have a 
seat in the ESRB (see Table 6.5). From this angle, those who have the voting rights in 
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the ESRB are the “winners”, while interest groups who want to involve in ESRB 
decision-making are the “losers”. 
After analyzing the timeline leading to the establishment of the ESRB, the 
following section turns to the timeline for the creation of the ESM.  
 
Table 8.3 A Timeline for the Establishment of the ESM 
 From the global financial crisis to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis which firstly broke out in 
Greece:  
(A) July 2007: The US subprime mortgage crisis broke out and financial repercussions started to 
spill over the world, causing the global financial crisis and world-wide economic recession; (see (A) 
in Table 8.2)  
(B) February 2009: The global financial crisis continued and worsened; (see (B) in Table 8.2) 
(C) 20 October 2009: Greece conceded that its government deficit continued to surge in 2009, 
exceeding 12% of its GDP, which was alarmingly above the SGP criterion of no more than 3% of 
GDP, and thus the eurozone sovereign debt crisis firstly broke out in Greece; the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis was linked to the global financial and economic crisis in the way that in times of a global 
financial crisis, it is difficult for member states to gather capital on international markets, which will 
increase the yield rates for issuing government bonds and the risk of national debt defaults, and those 
situations will be worsened by already high government budget deficits and debts; the global financial 
crisis put Greek unsustainable fiscal and financial situations into publicity; 
(D) December 2009: The world’s three major rating agencies subsequently downgraded the Greek 
sovereign credit rating, and it was very difficult and unsustainable for Greece to finance from the 
markets; 
(E) 23 February 2010: The four biggest banks in Greece were downgraded by the rating agency 
Fitch to the lowest investment status, another “deadly” blow to the Greek economy, and Greece then 
was on the brink of bankruptcy;  
(F) 25 March 2010: EU leaders agreed on a plan to rescue Greece, which would be jointly financed 
by the eurozone countries and the IMF;  
(G) 27 April 2010: The rating agency Standard and Poor’s slashed the Greek debt to BB+, giving 
the highest “junk-level rating”, and the Greek economic situation became precarious; 
(H) 2 May 2010: EU leaders agreed to activate an aid package amounting to 110 billion euros (i.e. 
80 billion euros from the eurozone member states and 30 billion euros from the IMF) to help Greece; 
Greece in turn promised to save 30 billion euros by spending cuts and increasing taxes in three years 
and slash its budget deficit rates from 13.6% in 2009 to 3% in 2014; 
 After the bilateral loans to Greece: a temporary mechanism — the EFSF — providing financial 
assistance to the euro member states;  
(1) 9 May 2010: The Ecofin Council made the decision to establish a temporary financial assistance 
and rescue mechanism by the euro member states — the EFSF — along with the EFSM, so as to 
provide financial assistance to the euro area countries if needed; the Council explained the reason: “In 
the wake of the crisis in Greece, the situation in financial markets is fragile and there was a risk of 
contagion”①, implying that without essential measures to stop the spreading of the sovereign debt 
crisis, the existence of the whole eurozone and even the EU would be endangered;  
(2) 24 June 2010: “[T]he Head of Government and State agreed to increase EFSF’s scope of 
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activity and increase its guarantee commitments from €440 billion to €780 billion which corresponds 
to a lending capacity of €440 billion”; (EFSF FAQs 9 December 2013, 1 )  
(3) 21 July 2010: “[T]he Heads of Government and State agreed to further increase EFSF’s scope 
of activity”; (EFSF FAQs 9 December 2013, 1)  
(4) 18 October 2011: The amendments to the EFSF scope of activity and lending capacity, which 
followed all necessary national procedures of approval, entered into force;  
(5) 28 November 2010: The first EFSF financial assistance programme to Ireland was carried out, 
which got concluded on 8 December 2013;  
 Establishing a permanent crisis resolution mechanism: the ESM; 
(I) 17 December 2010: The European Council agreed to establish a permanent ESM to assume the 
tasks fulfilled by the temporary rescue mechanism EFSF and the EFSM so as to provide financial 
assistance to euro area states; 
(II) 25 March 2011: The European Council adopted Decision 2011/199/EU to make amendments to 
Article 136 TFEU so as to enable the euro area member states to establish a permanent mechanism to 
safeguard the stability of the eurozone;  
(6) 17 May 2011: The EFSF financial assistance for Portugal was agreed upon by the Eurogroup 
and Ecofin Ministers;  
(III) 20 June 2011: The Commission and the ECB were requested by the ESM contracting parties to 
perform the tasks provided for in the ESM Treaty; 
(IV) 11 July 2011: The finance ministers of the 17 eurozone countries signed the Treaty Establishing 
the ESM; 
(V) 21 July 2011: In order to increase the financial assistance effectiveness and to prevent financial 
contagious risks, the euro area Heads of State or Government agreed to increase the flexibility of the 
ESM linked to appropriate conditionality;  
(7) 26 October 2011: The euro area Heads of State or Government agreed to offer a second 
financial assistance programme for Greece under the EFSF after the first bilateral loans to Greece in 
May 2010;  
(VI) 28 November 2010: The Eurogroup agreed to include standardized and identical CACs in all 
newly issued euro area government bonds, and the relevant detailed legal arrangements of which, at 
the request of the European Council on 25 March 2011, were finalized by the EFC (see G in Table 
6.6);  
(VII) 9 December 2011: The eurozone Heads of State or Government concluded a new international 
agreement — the TSCG (including a new fiscal compact), which was adopted as a complement to the 
ESM Treaty via agreeing that the ratification of the TSCG is a condition to receive ESM assistance as 
of 1 March 2013 and the granting of ESM assistance is subject to national compliance of placing an 
automatically triggered correction mechanism in national law after the transposition period of one 
year after the entry into force of the TSCG (Article 3(2) TSCG);  
(VIII) 2 February 2012: The modified ESM Treaty, which incorporates amendments aiming at 
increasing the ESM effectiveness and flexibility, was signed again;  
(8) 21 February 2012: The EFSF financial assistance to Greece was agreed upon by the Eurogroup;  
(IX) 20 July 2012: The Eurogroup endorsed the agreement to provide financial assistance to Spain 
under the framework of the EFSF, but it was agreed that the assistance programme would be taken 
over by the ESM once the permanent institution became fully operational;② 
(X) 27 September 2012: The ESM Treaty entered into force;  
(XI) 8 October 2012: After the ratification by all 17 euro member states, the ESM was inaugurated to 
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be ready to provide financial assistance;  
(XII) 11 December 2012: The first tranche of funds to Spain was disbursed in the form of debt 
securities issued by the ESM after the Spanish government formally requested for the disbursement 
on 3 December 2012; assistance for Spain was the first ESM programme operation;  
(XIII) 8 May 2013: The ESM Board of Directors approved the financial assistance to Cyprus;  
(XIV) 1 July 2013: The ESM superseded the EFSF and became the sole mechanism to provide 
financial assistance programmes to the euro states, but still, the EFSF continued to exist, remaining 
operative to the finance programmes that started before the signing of the ESM Treaty (i.e. only for 
Portugal and Greece, as Ireland successfully exited the EFSF financial assistance programme on 8 
December 2013);  
(XV) 31 December 2013: Spain exited the ESM financial assistance programme. 
Notes: Table 8.3 is complemented by Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1, and the latter two provide 
detailed information on interstate negotiations that lead to the formation of the ESM. 
Sources: The events selected before the creation of the EFSF (i.e. (A)-(H)) are based on Hosli 
et al. (2011a), which are regarded as the main reasons to establish the EFSF; the selected 
events regarding the EFSF, indicated by (1)-(8), are based on EFSF FAQs (9 December 2013); 
the events regarding the ESM, indicated by (I)-(XV), are based on the ESM Treaty and ESM 
FAQs (30 January 2014). Other consulted sources: ① Council of the European 
Union-9596/10 (Presse 108) (9/10 May 2010); ② See “Financial Assistance for the 
Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in Spain” (European Commission).  
 
In light of Table 8.3, the time and sequence of the events leading to the 
establishment of the ESM reveals a causal chain from the US subprime mortgage crisis, 
to the global financial crisis, to the Greek and eurozone sovereign debt crisis, then to 
the temporary financial assistance makeshift EFSF, and finally to the permanent rescue 
mechanism — the ESM. The chronological time points in Table 8.3 explain the causal 
relations among these events, and being different from the case of the ESRB where the 
debt issues and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis do not necessarily account for the 
formation of the ESRB in the causal chain presented in Table 8.2, these two factors are 
the prominent reasons and steps leading to the creation of the ESM. The rationale 
behind the establishment of the EFSF and the ESM is to safeguard the financial as well 
as economic stability of the eurozone and the EU as a whole — also a justification for 
selecting the events of the Greek sovereign debt crisis before the adoption of the EFSF 
in Table 8.3, which, however, is threatened by the eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
caused by the high government budget deficits and debts of the member states, which 
get revealed and exacerbated due to the global financial crisis originating from the US. 
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis occurred under the synergy of both the 
external/international crisis and internal worsening national fiscal behavior: without the 
former, the exposure of member state unsound and unsustainably high budget deficits 
482 
 
and debts would have been postponed; without the latter, so-called the sovereign debt 
crisis might not have happened or at least not have been so serious. The euro countries’ 
sovereign debt crises, all in all, root in their poor fiscal discipline, and the solutions to 
this collective crisis naturally target member state budgetary situations alongside 
realizing economic growth, both of which get entailed in the conditionality for the euro 
states to ask for an EFSF and ESM financial help. In short, intending to keep internal 
stability in the context of globalization, the EFSF/ESM deals with internal problems 
exposed and fueled by external factors; from such a perspective, the ESM is 
exogenously triggered while endogenously needed. 
The causal steps leading to the establishment of the ESM support the role of the 
global financial crisis as a critical juncture for the development of the EU’s crisis 
management and resolution mechanism, a characteristic of which is the co-existence of 
the temporary EFSF and the permanent ESM for some time. Under the EFSF and ESM 
assistance programmes, beneficiary states’ government powers get constrained in 
making their budgetary and economic plans, which, in another way around, confirms 
both neo-functionalist and HI’s assumptions of “unintended consequences”. Since the 
ESM was created via interstate bargains and compromises, the issue of potential 
asymmetrical accesses for different interest groups to the EU decision-making process 
becomes diffuse, because participants of intergovernmental negotiations are national 
governments and their leaders, who are expected to represent the general interests of 
voters, rather than any particular interest groups. Nevertheless, the formation of the 
ESM, according to Table 7.3, was hammered out between the opposite interests of 
taxpayers and financers: on the one hand, taxpayers are reluctant to bail out and bear 
the loss of the debt-ridden countries, while on the other hand, financers, such as 
European banks, do not want to pay too much for a state bankruptcy. The negotiated 
results reflected both sides’ concerns, as France and Germany made concessions with 
each other: France agreed with Germany’s demands for PSI and a greater automatic 
sanction procedure for the fiscal discipline violators while Germany agreed to weaken 
the articles on restructuring the debt held by the private creditors (see Table 7.3). 
Despite the weakened debt restructuring articles of PSI, the default mechanisms of 
CACs and PSI were successfully included into the ESM provisions. National 
preferences and negotiation results for the ESM tell the “winners” of the taxpayers and 
the “losers”of the private investors under the ESM, if there is any.  
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Though the case of the European Semester does not indicate a critical juncture 
for EU policy coordination in terms of national-national and national-supranational 
relations, the timeline of events leading to the operation of the European Semester does 
display clear path dependence of policy continuity and heritance for the EU’s fiscal and 
economic coordination and surveillance from the SGP to the European Semester.  
 
Table 8.4 A Timeline for the Adoption of the European Semester 
 EU policy coordination before the implementation of the European Semester: 1998-2010 
(1) 1997: The SGP was agreed upon by the European Council to ensure budgetary discipline after the 
adoption of the single currency by the euro member states and the implementation of a new 
exchange rate mechanism for the non-euro member states. The SGP was underpinned by (a) 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of 
Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies (the preventive 
arm), which entered into force on 1 July 1998, (b) Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 
1997 on Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (the 
dissuasive arm), which entered into force on 1 January 1999, and (c) a European Council 
Resolution on the SGP Amsterdam 17 June 1997. Two criteria were laid down in the SGP, which 
should be respected by the EU member states: (a) an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of 
GDP, and (b) a government debt lower than 60% of GDP or approaching that value. The Council 
Regulation 1466/97 prescribed that member states should submit their stability and convergence 
programmes (i.e. SCPs: stability programmes by the euro zone members and convergence 
programmes by the non-euro member states) annually to the Commission;  
(2) 2005: The SGP got reformed by (a) Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 
Amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary 
Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, and (b) Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on 
Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, which 
entered into force on 27 July 2005. The two criteria remained the same but other goals, such as 
the long-term sustainability of public finances, were added to the assessment of the SCPs. 
Besides, the Council Report of “Improving the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact” 
was adopted on 20 April 2005; 
(A) July 2007:The breakout of the US financial crisis and its repercussions on the global financial 
market and the world economy; (see Table 8.2) 
(B) February 2009: The global financial crisis continued and worsened with the severest global 
economic recession; (see Table 8.2) 
(3) 3 March 2010: The Commission proposed the EU’s growth strategy for the coming decade — 
Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, setting out ambitious 
objectives in five policy areas to be reached by 2020: employment, innovation, education, social 
inclusion and climate/energy. Each member state shall set up its own national targets in these five 
areas and both the EU and member states shall take concrete actions to implement the strategy, 
which now get coordinated and checked by the European Semester via the AGS and NPRs;  
(4) 25-26 March 2010: The European Council meeting decided to set up a Task Force chaired by its 
president Van Rompuy to work out proposals to strengthen budgetary discipline and to improve 
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the EU’s crisis resolution framework;  
(5) March 2010: As one of the Task Force’s earliest initiatives, the European Semester was agreed to 
be framed up as a new code of conduct on the implementation of the SGP, which only needed 
approval from the Ecofin Council; the main reasons to adopt the European Semester are explained 
as follows:  
(a) “The economic crisis has revealed a clear need for stronger economic governance and 
coordination at EU level. Until now, discussions between the EU and Member States on 
economic priorities and structural reforms were taking place through different processes. 
Reports were issued separately and decisions spread across the year with no clear synergies 
or linkages”; (European Commission-MEMO/11/14, emphasis added) 
(b) In the context of the urgent sovereign debt crisis, the EU first agreed an aid package to 
Greece, and then a temporary rescue mechanism to safeguard eurozone stability. “Alongside 
this short-term action there was debate on reform of European economic governance, fed by 
the European Commission and proposals of the task force chaired by Herman Van Rompuy. 
From this debate was born the idea of a ‘European Semester’”; (Delors et al., February 2011) 
(c) When the eurozone member states decided to use the single currency, they also “meant to 
treat their economic policies as a common concern”, so “the financial and economic crisis 
really brought home to them the need to restart economic integration” and thus a new 
instrument for closer economic policy coordination and surveillance was put in place; 
(European Parliament-20121019BKG54051, 20 January 2014) 
(6) 12 May 2010: The first Communication by the Commission;  
(7) 30 June 2010: The second Communication by the Commission; 
(8) 7 September 2010: The Ecofin Council approved the amendments to the Code of Conduct on 
implementing the SGP and decided to launch the European Semester as of the first day of January 
2011;  
(9) 29 September 2010: The Commission tabled its proposal COM(2010) 526 Final based on the two 
Communications; this proposal was a part of the Commission’s “six-pack” proposals to 
strengthen EU economic governance and make significant reforms to the SGP;  
(10) 21 October 2010: The Task Force Report was finalized, explaining that the cycle of reinforced 
ex-ante coordination of the European Semester “will cover all elements of economic surveillance, 
including policies to ensure fiscal discipline, macroeconomic stability, and to foster growth, in 
line with the Europe 2020 Strategy” (The Task Force Report, item 43); the European Semester is 
one of the five recommendations put forward by the Task Force Report to address the challenges 
of the Union’s economic governance brought by the financial crisis and the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis: (a) towards greater fiscal discipline by strengthening the SGP rules; (b) a new 
surveillance mechanism addressing the risk of macroeconomic imbalances and vulnerabilities; (c) 
deeper and broader coordination: the European Semester; (d) a robust framework for crisis 
management: the EFSF, the EFSM and more; (e) “stronger institutions and more effective and 
rules-based decision making”; 
 The starting and the first cycle of the European Semester in 2011 
(11) 1 January 2011: The European Semester became operational, bringing innovations to EU policy 
coordination in the following aspects:  
(a) shifting the time of submitting the SCPs (which were introduced by Regulation 1466/97 in 
1997 as part of the SGP’s preventive arm) before national government parliaments pass the 
next year(s)’ budgetary plans;  
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(b) aligning the time of submitting the NRPs (which were introduced by the revamped Lisbon 
Strategy in March 2005) together with the submission of the SCPs (i.e. budgetary 
projections); 
(c) publishing EU priorities and objectives in the AGS early to conduct an ex-ante guidance on 
both national fiscal plan and growth strategy formation; 
 During the first cycle of the European Semester in 2011: more elements were integrated into the 
same mechanism  
(12) March 2011: Euro Plus Pact commitments to improve cross-country coordination of growth 
policies shall be presented in the SCPs and NRPs and thus be checked under the European 
Semester;  
(13) 13 December 2011: Bringing significant reforms to the SGP, the “six-pack” became effective, 
among which the European Semester got codified in Article 2-a of Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011. Meanwhile, a new content of EU policy coordination and surveillance was introduced 
into the European Semester: preventing macroeconomic imbalances through the MIP (Regulation 
(EU) No 1176/2011). In addition, due to the “six-pack”, the EP’s role from the second cycle of 
the Semester also got strengthened (Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011; see also Table 7.6); 
 From the second cycle in 2012, the coordinated elements under the same umbrella of the 
European Semester include:  
(a) the BEPGs (based on Article 121(2) TFEU); 
(b) the EGs (based on Article 148(2) TFEU); 
(c) the NRPs submitted by the member states need to fully account for the BEPGs, EGs and for the 
AGS (released by the Commission each year at the beginning of the Semester on the basis of 
three-block evaluation: the EU 2020 Strategy, the Macroeconomic Report, and the Joint 
Employment Report), which “also include reference to concrete measures undertaken in the 
framework of the Euro Plus Pact, and of any other policy initiative launched at the European 
Council level” (Hallerberg et al., September 2012, 16)  
(d) the SCPs must be summited in conjunction with the NRPs by the member states equally in April 
(instead of December) before national budgetary processes start;  
(e) macroeconomic imbalance surveillance under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 includes the new 
Alert Mechanism Report (AMR);  
 2013: The European Semester continued to expand  
(14) January 2013*: The TSCG containing the Fiscal Compact entered into force, further 
strengthening the enforcement of the MTO defined by the SGP (which has already been subject to 
the European Semester) with a balanced budget rule and an automatically triggered state-specific 
correction mechanism; 
(15)  May 2013: The “two-pack” further pushes and complements the SGP reforms by the six-pack, 
introducing a common budgetary surveillance timeline to the euro countries, which gets 
integrated into the European Semester as being an autumn counterpart to the spring semester 
exercise.  
(more coordinated contents may be added to the European Semester in the future)  
 Summary: All types of the possible EU policy coordination related to EU economic governance 
have been integrated under one unified framework — the European Semester, which evolves and 
expands over time.  
(a) The European Semester cuts across all the three pillars of EU economic policy coordination: (a) 
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the European 2020 Integrated Guidelines (IGs: a merge of the BEPGs and EGs) regarding 
non-binding policy guidance now aligned in the Commission’s AGS; (b) the SGP revised and 
reinforced by the six-pack (then by the two-pack and the TSCG); (c) the new MIP based on 
in-depth (qualitative) analyses of a number of nominal and real indicators introduced by the 
six-pack, now entailed in the Commission’s IDRs; 
(b) Two essential tools are anchored in the European Semester: the Europe 2020 Strategy and the 
SGP, while both the two instruments, coordinated under the European Semester, are open to be 
updated and developed along with the EU project. 
Notes: * The TSCG is legally binding policy coordination developed outside the Community 
method by part of the EU member states (without the participation of the UK and the Czech 
Republic). As the substance of the TSCG has been agreed to be incorporated into the EU 
legal framework within five years, “[f]urther changes in the legislative and institutional 
package are likely to affect the working of the European Semester” and “[t]he impact of the 
TSCG on de-facto economic policy coordination in Europe is difficult to predict and the 
relation to the European Semester is also uncertain” (Hallerberg et al. 2012, 45). As a matter 
of fact, the “two-pack” which entered into force on 30 May 2013 for all eurozone countries, 
has integrated some elements of the Fiscal Compact contained in the TSCG into EU law (see 
Appendix 2).  
Sources: Own compilation on the basis of European Parliament-2012/0002(NTT); Hallerberg 
et al. (August 2011, September 2012); The Task Force Report; “Europe 2020” (European 
Commission); European Commission-MEMO/11/14 (12 January 2011); Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011; Delors et al. (February 2011); European Parliament-20121019BKG54051 (20 
January 2014); Table 6.6 and Table 6.18 of this dissertation.  
 
Table 8.4 shows how policy coordination regarding EU economic governance 
evolved over time from the SGP in 1998 to the European Semester in 2011, and then to 
the new developments of the European Semester after 2011. The reason and time to 
adopt the European Semester reflect a more economic concern than a financial one: it 
is two years after the global financial crisis in 2008 that the decision was made to 
improve and synchronize member state budgetary and economic plans. The time gap 
indicates the causal link between the global financial crisis and the establishment of the 
European Semester is not so much immediate and direct. Nevertheless, as the European 
Semester is rooted in the SGP rules, which address national budgetary discipline, the 
European Semester is one of the necessary measures to battle with the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. The causal relations between the sovereign debt crisis and the 
adoption of the European Semester appear more direct:  
 
“In 2010 the euro faced a public debt crisis which was largely the result of 
the global financial crisis. Public debts and deficits both increased as a 
consequence of recession-related factors: the transfer of private debt to the 
state (mainly due to the public commitment to save the banking system), a 
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fall in tax revenues because of higher unemployment and increased public 
spending due to automatic stabilisers. But the euro crisis was also a result of 
certain weaknesses in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and of 
structural problems in eurozone countries (in particular, gaps in 
competitiveness between them). The crisis thus proved right those who, for 
over a decade, have called for a genuine economic pillar within EMU. It 
highlighted the gaps in the coordination and surveillance of eurozone 
economic policies, and demonstrated the interdependence of the countries 
which share the single currency.” (Delors et al., February 2011)  
 
Therefore, the causal chains are clearly revealed: the US subprime crisis — the 
global financial crisis — the global economic recession and the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis — a necessary reform of EU economic governance — one of the earliest 
initiatives by the Task Force: the European Semester. As illustrated by (10) in Table 
8.4, broadening and improving policy coordination via the European Semester is just 
one component of EU economic governance addressing the ever increasing economic 
inter-dependence among EU member states, particularly in the euro area, and the 
European Semester is highly related to other components of EU economic governance, 
cutting across other economic policy coordination (see summary in Table 8.4). When 
the European Semester was first agreed in March 2010 and then adopted by the 
Council on September 2010, it was at the height of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
(see Table 8.3); the coordination of budgetary plans towards the SGP criteria via 
national MTO included in the SCPs under the European Semester conveys one of the 
rationales and approaches to address the eurozone sovereign debt crisis: reigning the 
blooming national deficits and debts and directing them onto a sustainable track.  
In terms of national-national and national-supranational relations, the European 
Semester does not change the power distribution scenario in EU economic policy 
coordination dating back to the SGP’s preventive arm in 1997: the Commission gives 
guidance and recommendations, while the Council adopts recommendations, and no 
binding decisions shall be made under such policy coordination. The global financial 
crisis, then the world-wide economic recession, and even the eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis do not cause a critical juncture for EU policy coordination. Rather, they function 
as catalysts, expediting EU policy coordination reform and broadening EU policy 
coordination on the existing path initiated by the SGP in 1997 after the agreement of 
adopting the single currency (see 5(c) in Table 8.4). Without making any substantial 
changes to the national-national/national-supranational relations, the European 
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Semester indicates path dependence of EU policy coordination rather than a critical 
juncture for a new path essentially departing from the previous EU practices.  
The European Semester does not make further constraints on national 
government powers; therefore, the development of this new mechanism does not 
support the neo-functionalist and HI’s assumption of unintended consequences. Being 
different to both the ESRB and the ESM, the European Semester was codified into EU 
regulation after it had already been put into implementation for a while. Though the 
relevant EU institutions and “all stakeholders” had been consulted for the two 
Communications before the Commission tabled its final proposal to establish the 
European Semester (see 6 (6) inTable 6.18), this new measure started being operational 
after the approval by the Ecofin Council, where interest groups’ influence on the 
adoption of this new mechanism became diffuse. Moreover, as far as the substance of 
the European Semester is concerned, it addresses EU economic governance from a 
holistic approach, dealing with policy coordination among EU member states as well as 
between the EU guidance and national policies; consequently, the addressees under the 
European Semester are national governments rather than any specific interest groups, 
and the European Semester, instead of addressing any peculiar interest groups, means 
to serve the general interests of all societal groups by guaranteeing a sound economic 
environment for national economic growth (see Table 7.2). Therefore, to discuss an 
asymmetrical access for interest groups to decision-making and to assess any specific 
“winners” and “losers” under the European Semester appears trivial and irrelevant.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that if we merge the three separate timelines 
together, we shall observe a multi-faceted, elaborate and interconnected jigsaw of EU 
new developments, which, nevertheless, just represents a part of the EU’s and its 
member states’ efforts to address the post-2008 crisis situation in Europe. To solve the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis while strengthening EU economic governance is not an 
easy task; besides the newly adopted measures and policies which address specific 
dimensions of EU economic governance (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3), the EU and the 
member states must take care of the inter-relations and possible synergies among those 
measures and policies, and how to realize smooth and effective coordination and 
cooperation among various different mechanisms is another topic for the EU and its 




8.2 Evidence for H11: Structural Effects of Path 
Dependence 
H11 consists of two sub-assumptions indicated by “on the one hand” and “on the other 
hand”, and the hypothesis test for H11 shall check the presence of the two 
sub-hypotheses in the three cases. Table 8.5 presents the case study results regarding 
the two sub-causal mechanisms. 
 







Mechanism 1: The EU's new measures 
adopted during the post-2008 crisis era 
are conditioned by prior institutional 
arrangements and commitments which set 
limits on the possible available options, 
make certain alternatives appear more 
attractive, and lead actors to redefine their 
interests; 
(cf. Table 6.22)  
Mechanism 2: The new measures reflect a 
complex context that shapes actors’ 
strategies, world views and action arenas, 
which, having been advocated by EU 
institutions with each iteration of the new 
measures, will shape actors’ preferences 
and/or self-images as the status quo of the 
new measures is regarded as the right way to 





 The legal basis and procedures for 
EU economic policy coordination are 
prescribed in Article 121 TFEU and the 
adoption and codification of the European 
Semester follow the words in the Treaty;  
 Compared with the previous 
practices, the first cycle of the European 
Semester synchronizes the submission of 
the SCPs and NRPs and changes ex-post to 
ex-ante EU guidance before national 
parliaments adopt their annual budgetary 
plans; the coordinated substance remains 
the same, and what has been changed are 
the timing and sequences of EU guidance 
and recommendations, national submission 
of their SCPs and NRPs, and national 
formation of budgetary and economic 
plans. The starting of the European 
Semester, therefore, is totally based on the 
contents of policy coordination provided 
by the prior institutional arrangements and 
national commitments. The same 
coordinated contents under the new and 
old procedures suggest that the previous 
arrangements have set limits on the choices 
Yes; 
 The time to adopt the European 
Semester shows a complex context for the 
EU to address the economic crisis and the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis in the wake of 
the global financial crisis. EU 
decision-makers’ strategies and their world 
view are well expressed in the reasons to 
adopt this new policy coordination 
mechanism; (see sections 1.3.4 and 5.2.1; 
Tables 6.25 and 8.4)  
 By the end of 2013, the European 
Semester has been implemented for three 
years of three cycles while the fourth cycle 
for 2014 was just kicked off by the 
Commission’s adoption of the AGS on 13 
November 2013①; since it started in 2011, 
there were continuous new contents added to 
the European Semester procedure, and 
meanwhile democratic accountability and 
transparency of this new mechanism got 
improved, as the EP gained more saying 
during the coordination procedure. The task 
expansion and growing maturity of this new 
measure reflect that it has been regarded as 
the right way to address the crisis and to 
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for the new mechanism. National annual 
submission of the SCPs and NRPs in line 
with EU guidance and the SGP rules under 
the previous scattered and different policy 
coordination procedures has been 
implemented for some years, national 
governments, though not being legally 
bound, willingly or reluctantly, are 
expected to redefine their interests 
according to the Commission’s 
recommendations, which shall affect 
common people’s lives.  
 
 
strengthen EU economic governance;  
 The European Semester has been 
advocated by EU institutions, and with each 
Semester cycle’s reiteration of the codified 
procedure, the European Semester has 
developed into the only policy coordination 
mechanism for EU economic governance, 
which evolves into an inclusive policy 
coordination procedure, integrating all 
possible coordinated dimensions and policy 
areas under a single sheet of procedure. EU 
institutions’ advocacy for the European 
Semester is illustrated by the EP’s 
resolutions. For instance, during the 
economic dialogue on 20 January 2014, 
MEPs* and 140 of their national 
counterparts, while stressing the fact that “no 
EU country is any longer able to conduct its 
economic policy in complete isolation from 
other EU countries”, emphasized the 
importance of the European Semester as 
being “an integral part of the process for 
economic integration and, in the longer term, 
a step towards real economic union”; though 
the implementation of the European 
Semester was criticized that “as for 2012 
only 15% of the recommendations had been 
carried out”, the EP’s opinions are very 
supportive, advocating, for example, more 
legislation to achieve economic convergence 
and “a fund to cushion the short-term 
negative effects of economic reforms”.② 
The ESRB Yes; 
 The ESRB was established on the 
basis of Article 114 TFEU via the OLP;  
 Though there is no predecessor for 
the ESRB, the creation of the ESRB 
follows principles of competence division 
laid down in the EU Treaties: “Since the 
objective of this Regulation [...] cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
because of the integration of the Union 
financial markets, and can therefore be 
better achieved at the Union level, the 
Union may adopt measures in accordance 
Yes; 
 As a direct response to the world-wide 
financial repercussions in the context of EU 
macro- and micro- prudential oversight, the 
creation of the ESRB was shaped by the EU 
leaders’ strategies and world views; (see 
sections 1.3.4 and 5.2.2; Tables 6.25 and 
8.3); 
 The ESRB is the first and the only EU 
body responsible for macro-prudential 
oversight of the whole EU financial system;  
 Since its operation from January 2011, 
the ESRB has carried out its missions and 
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with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out 
in Article 5 of the Treaty on European 
Union. In accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, as set out in that Article, 
this Regulation does not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve that objective” 
(ESRB Regulation, item (33)); the ESRB 
also follows the EU normal practices in 
regulating financial markets, such as 
regulations on hedge funds and private 
equity (see (4) in Table 8.2), where the 
principle of subsidiarity has ever been 
implemented and complied with; 
 Because ESRB recommendations are 
not legally binding, there might be 
different degrees of compliance, but due to 
the nature and purposes of the 
recommendations, the addressees cannot 
simply ignored them, or else they shall be 
punished by the potential financial risks 
that have been warned by the ESRB. This 
is the main reason why there are no 
non-compliant member states regarding the 
ESRB Recommendation on Lending in 
Foreign Currencies (ESRB/2011/1). 
Implementing ESRB recommendations 
means to adjust the EU’s previous 
practices and the already-defined financial 
interests. Meanwhile, the EU’s legislative 
bodies shall take ESRB warnings and 
recommendations into consideration when 
they adopt relevant legislations, and this 
also will lead relevant actors to make 
adjustments to their interests. (See Table 
6.19) 
tasks in accordance with the prescriptions in 
the ESRB regulation, and an evaluation 
report by the EP summarizes the ESRB’s 
work, achievements and contributions in 
three aspect: (a) identify and mitigating 
systemic risk; (b) forming an institutional 
framework for macro-prudential policy by 
coordinating national macro-prudential 
policy frameworks, cooperating with the 
ESAs, engaging in international and third 
country macro-prudential authorities, and 
keeping interactions with other EU 
institutions; (c) making contributions to the 
EU legislative and regulatory process; 
published in the ESRB website, concrete 
actions and recommendations by the ESRB 
(the proof for the iteration of this new 
measure) demonstrate that the status quo is a 
preferred choice as well as a normalized 
practice to carry out EU macro-prudential 
supervision; ③ 
 The detailed explanations for items (b) 
(see ③, pp.45-50) and (c) (see ③, 
pp.51-54; Annexes I and II in ③) mentioned 
above show EU institutions’ advocacy to this 
new macro-prudential overseeing instrument, 
supporting the argument that the ESRB has 
been regarded as the right way to address the 
crisis; another example is that in its report on 
29 January 2014, the EP “[c]alls on the 
Commission, in cooperation with the 
European Systemic Risk Board, to assess 
systemic risks to capital markets and society 
at large owing to the overhang of unburnable 
carbon assets” (④, item 16), which 
illustrates the ESRB has shaped the EP’s 
preferences and been accepted as a right way 
to deal with the challenges to the EU.  
The ESM Yes; 
 The permanent rescue mechanism 
becomes possible only after Treaty 
revisions in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty, 
which suggests that the birth of the ESM is 
conditioned by EU prior institutional 
Yes;  
 The ESM was established during the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis, reflecting a 
complex context where EU leaders tried to 
stop crisis spreading and stabilize financial 
markets; the formation of the ESM also 




 The ESM is an intergovernmental 
institution established by the eurozone 
countries; ESM operation and national 
commitments to it basically follow the 
model of the temporary EFSF, a private 
company funded by the eurozone 
countries, and thus the EFSF, as becoming 
the predecessor to the ESM, appears more 
attractive than other suggestions, such as 
the idea of establishing an EMF (see e.g. 
Table 6.7), thus setting limits on the 
possible available options; what the 
eurozone countries did was to make Treaty 
amendments and conclude a permanent 
crisis resolution mechanism on the basis of 
their previous arrangement of the 
temporary financial rescue mechanism;  
 The ESM redefines national interests 
in the sense that conditionality detailed in 
the MoUs forces the beneficiary euro states 
to carry out deficit and debt cuts and 
structural reforms. 
and preferences; (see sections 1.3.4 and 
5.2.3; Tables 6.25, 7.3, and 8.3; Figure 7.1); 
 Starting from 1 July 2013, the ESM 
becomes the only rescue fund that the euro 
member states can apply for within the 
Union; under the ESM, financial assistance 
programmes have been carried out for Spain 
and Cyprus, and Spain successfully exited 
from the ESM programme on the last day of 
the year of 2013; all those show that the 
ESM has been regarded as the right way to 
address the crisis and to support the member 
states — if any of the euro countries need 
urgent financial assistance, going to the ESM 
becomes their natural and only available 
option within the currency union (e.g. the 
case of Cyprus); consequently the operation 
of the ESM shapes the euro governments’ 
preferences.  
 
Notes: * MEPs: Members of the European Parliament. 
Sources: ① European Commission-IP/13/1064 (13 November 2013); ② European 
Parliament-20121019BKG54051 (20 January 2014); ③Mcphilemy et al. (October 2013); ④
European Parliament-A7-0065/2014 (29 January2014); other sources come from research 
results in the previous chapters in this dissertation, which are indicated accordingly in the 
Table above.  
 
Research results in Table 8.5 confirm the validity of H11 in all three selected 
cases. Some supporting evidence for H11, as indicated in Table 8.5, comes from the 
hypothesis tests in the previous chapters, suggesting the overlaps among the three 
typical EU integration theories. The ESM has two peculiar features: (1) it was created 
via Treaty revisions, and (2) it is not an EU body, but an intergovernmental institution 
which, nevertheless, makes use of the existing EU institutions and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU. Therefore, on the one hand, the establishment of the ESM is 
conditioned by prior EU institutional arrangements, but on the other hand, it displays 
flexibility and a maneuver space for national governments and their leaders under the 





8.3 Evidence for H12: Past Choices, Timing and Sequences 
of Events  
Similar to H11, H12 also consists of two mechanisms, and each of them contains two 
sub-causal chains. So as a matter of fact, H12 can be divided into four sub-hypotheses, 
and the vindication of H12 is based on the existence of these four causal mechanisms.  
 
Table 8.6 Checking the Four Causal Mechanisms Posited in H12 
 Mechanism 1: 
The choices of 
the specific new 
measures to cope 
with the 
post-2008 crisis 
era are made on 







Mechanism 2: the 
sequences of 
institutional 
decisions entailed in 
EU decision-making 
procedures to adopt 
the new measures 
matter as certain 
alternatives are 
irreversibly dropped 
from the range of 
possible options 
along with the 
proceeding of the 
decision-making 
procedure; 
Mechanism 3: path 
dependence 
indicates a way to 
link decision-making 
through time and to 
narrow conceptually 
the choice set; 
Mechanism 4: the new 
measures have become 
the only available 
options for actors to 
resort to, along which 
societal groups make 
adaptions to the new 
measures and 
incrementally build up 
their vested interest in 
maintaining and even 





Yes; (see Tables 
8.4 and 8.5) 
















the EU already 
No; 
The European 
Semester was put 
forward by the Task 
Force as one 
component to 
address the crisis; it 
gained general 
support and quickly 
got approved and 
implemented. No 
other alternative 




appeared during the 
decision-making 
process leading to 
Yes; (see Table 8.4) 
The implementation 
of the European 
Semester had started 
before it was 
codified into EU 
law. From the day 
when the Task Force 
put forward the idea 
to establish the 
European Semester, 
to the Council’s 
approval, to the Task 
Force’s final report, 
then to the first cycle 
of the Semester, and 
finally to the OLP to 
lay down this new 
procedure into EU 
Yes; 
The European Semester 
is the only while an 
inclusive policy 
coordination mechanism 
for the EU; 
The implementation of 
the CSRs would finally 
exert an impact on the 
citizens’ lives when 
national governments 
adopted budgetary cut 
measures and carried 
out economic reforms in 
accordance with the 
CSRs, and thus societal 
groups would make 
adaptations. But besides 
general support, interest 
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had into a single 
sheet.  
the implementation 





has ever been the 
only choice 
suggested to 
improve EU policy 
coordination. So the 
conceptual choice 
set of how to 
enhance policy 
coordination had 
been narrowed down 
only to the choice of 
the European 
Semester. 
groups also voiced their 
critical opinions, and 
their adaptation, 
maintenance and 
development of this new 
procedure were set in a 
tone of criticisms: 
according to Table 6.5, 
the ETUC was 
vehemently against any 
policies undertaken 
under the European 
Semester that would 
damage the core 
interests of the workers: 
employment and 
welfare; based on the 
feedback from the 
societal groups, the 
European Semester also 
makes adaptations by 
taking the ETUC’s 
suggestions into 
consideration, such as 
increasing the 
democratic 
accountability of this 
new measure and 
improving gender 










are the legal 
elements 
threading 






The idea and 
formation of the 
ESRB were born 
from the de 
Larosière Report 
where the ESRB was 
initially named the 
ESRC; the ESRC 
proposed by the 
report outlined the 
contour for the 
ESRB later proposed 
Not fully confirmed; 
For the first half: 
Yes; ESRB path 
dependence indicates 
a way to link 
decision-making 
through time via the 
OLP; it also displays 
path dependence of 
the legal principles 
for the ESRB to be 
built up, where 
subsidiarity and 
Yes; 
The ESRB is the only 




According to Table 6.5, 
societal groups, 
represented by 
BusinessEurope and the 
ETUC, fully support the 
ESRB, expressing their 
interests in maintaining 
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also become the 
rationales for the 
establishment of 
the ESRB;  
by the Commission 
(see section 1.3.4); 
From the de 
Larosière Report to 
the Commission’s 
proposal and then to 
the adoption of the 
EU regulation to 
establish the ESRB, 
the sequences of 
institutional 
decisions, according 
to Table 8.2, do not 
see any other 
alternatives 
competing to the 
ESRB dropped off, 
and the ESRC 
proposed in the 
report is the only 
tabled suggestion for 
EU legislative 
institutions to work 
on; along with the 






arrangements of the 
ESRB get expanded 
and revised by the 
negotiations between 
the EP and the 
Council after taking 
the ECB’s and the 
EESC’s opinions 
into account.  
proportionality have 
conducted EU in 
regulating its 
financial market for 
a long time;  
For the second half: 
No; the ESRB 
indicates an original 
creation to fill one of 
the vacuums of the 
EU project, and the 
initiation of the 
ESRC and then the 
ESRB suggest a free 
space of design, with 
no restrictions 
imposed by any 
predecessors; 
besides, the OLP 
procedure to 
establish the ESRB 
does not display a 
way to conceptually 
narrow down the 
choice set, but 
instead, a way to 
expand and revise 
the proposed ESRB. 
and developing the 
ESRB. For example, the 
ETUC advises to give 
legally binding powers 
to the ESRB and 
demands a seat in the 
ESRB for itself; 
Due to the functions and 
missions of the ESRB, 
the addressees of ESRB 
warnings and 
recommendations are 
“the Union as a whole 
or to one or more 
Member States, or to 
one or more of the 
ESAs, or to one or more 
of the national 
supervisory authorities” 
(ESRB Regulation, (17), 
see also Table 6.1), not 
including any specific 
societal groups, and thus 
the relations between 
the ESRB and the 
societal interest groups 
tend to be diffuse; 




concrete measures and 
policies will definitely 
affect societal interest 
groups, in financial 
sectors and/or 
non-financial sectors, 
and the relevant interest 
groups are expected to 
make adaptations 
accordingly to avoid 
potential risks. One 






where households and 
non-financial 
corporations are affected 
due to the policy 
changes in lending 
foreign currencies ①.  






The ESM is not 
established by EU 
decision making 
procedures via such 
as the OLP; rather it 
is an 
intergovernmental 
institution set up by 
the eurozone 
countries, so the 




did appear during the 
formation of the 
ESM, such as to 
create an EMF and 
to make treaty 
amendments to 
which Article(s), and 
some of them did 
irreversibly get 
discarded from the 
range of possible 
options, while some 
elements were 
re-introduced in to 




Tables 6.7 and 7.3; 
Figure 7.1)  
No; 
Path dependence in 
the ESM does not 










choice set of the 
elements forming the 
ESM remains open 




contribute to a 
dynamic rather than 
a static ESM (see 




From 1 July 2013 
onwards, the ESM is the 
sole crisis rescue 
mechanism for the euro 
member states within 
the Union;  
Table 6.5 presents the 
interest groups’ opinions 
towards the ESM, 
exhibiting their strong 
support to the ESM and 
their vested interest in 
maintaining and 
developing this new 
mechanism into “a 
politically independent 
EMF open to all EU 
members” or into a tool 
that can recapitalize 
banks directly;  
The formation of the 
ESM shows the tensions 
and different interests 
between taxpayers and 
financial investors; the 
clauses about CACs and 
PSI finalized in the 
ESM Treaty have a 
direct impact on the two 
rival interest groups, and 
under the ESM clauses, 
societal groups must 
make adaptations 
accordingly (see e.g. 
section 7.2.1). 
 
Sources: ①ESRB Recommendation on Lending in Foreign Currencies (ESRB/2011/1) 




Case study results in Table 8.6 show that none of the three cases fully confirms 
the causal chains argued by H12. The causal relationships assumed by sub-mechanism 
1 and sub-mechanism 4 are confirmed by the three cases, while the other two causal 
chains in H12, more or less, collapse in the case studies. The following part examines 
those failed mechanisms and offers explanations.  
First, the second sub-mechanism of H12 fails in all three cases. The reasons, 
however, are different. For the first two cases, the reason is that both the European 
Semester and the ESRB became the only options to improve policy coordination and to 
conduct macro-prudential supervision across the EU, respectively; no other alternative 
ideas were ever put forward. To a certain degree, they reflect that EU decision-makers 
tend to reach a consensus facing severe challenges and that the relevant issues are 
urgent. Moreover, the legislative process leading to the establishment of the ESRB 
shows that the Commission’s proposal has been revised and more elements were added 
to the draft legislation by the EP in accordance with the ECB’s and the EESC’s 
suggestions. As for the third case, the ESM was created by a Treaty conclusion among 
the euro countries’ outside the Community method, thus the sequences of EU 
decision-making procedures are not applicable to the establishment of the ESM, but 
competing suggestions did appear at the beginning of the formation of the ESM. 
Because the ESM was established via a Treaty conclusion among the euro states, the 
operation of the ESM is still subject to intergovernmental negotiations, which in turn 
are under the influence of the external context, emerging challenges, and even the 
changed bargain powers of the contracting parties.  
Second, the third sub-mechanism entailed in H12 is confirmed by the case of the 
European Semester, while it gets partially confirmed by the ESRB and rejected by the 
ESRB. Its collapse in the case of the ESRB is due to the same reason explaining the 
failure of sub-mechanism 2 above: from the very beginning to put forward the idea to 
establish an institution purposely to take the responsibility of EU wide 
macro-prudential supervision, the ESRB was the only option on the table, and all 
debates were around the design of a brand new body at the EU level, so conceptually 
narrowing down the choices did not happen. Rather, more contents were put into the 
draft legislation after relevant consultations. As there was a blank for EU 
macro-prudential oversight before 2011, path dependence linking to the past choices 
and institutional arrangements on such an issue appeared weak, only in the aspect of 
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the legal principles upon which the ESRB would be built; nevertheless, the OLP 
leading to the creation of the ESRB displayed strong path dependence, which links 
various stages of the decision-making procedure through time contributing to the 
finalization of the ESRB. Regarding the failure of sub-mechanism 3 in the case of the 
ESM, the reason is also the same as the reason leading to the failure of 
sub-mechanism 2 above: the ESM is not an EU institution and its creation is on the 
basis of the collective EU decision-making procedures; thus path dependence in terms 
of EU decision-making procedures becomes inapplicable to the case of the ESM. The 
ESM is a result of intergovernmental bargains, and in reality the conceptual choice 
for the concrete operation of the ESM remains dynamic, subject to further 
modifications or reforms (see e.g. Figure 7.1). Two distinctive “types” of path 
dependence emerge during those analyses: path dependence linking past choices 
through time, and path dependence of the EU decision-making procedure mainly 
represented by the OLP. According to the theoretical background where H12 is 
derived and taking the proposition of H12 as a whole, path dependence in the third 
sub-mechanism in H12 talks about the latter, and the purpose is to see whether the 
OLP to adopt the European Semester and the ESRB has an effect in eliminating 
multiple options to achieve the same goal. Case studies do not confirm these, which 
nevertheless in another way around, reiterates Proposition 4 presented in chapter six.  
As for the first sub-mechanism, it has already been tested in H11; for the fourth 
sub-mechanism, its confirmation by the three cases reveals more. In the case of the 
European Semester, it is interesting to observe that adaptations are visibly effective in 
two ways: on the one hand, national policy making under the guidance of the CSRs 
definitely changed the pre-existing patterns of benefit distribution and had an impact 
on common people’s lives, and societal groups, who are unwilling to accept their 
benefit loss, have to adapt themselves to this new policy coordination mechanism; on 
the other hand, societal groups voiced their critical (but not utterly opposing) opinions 
(e.g. the ETUC) regarding policies governed by the European Semester — another 
form to maintain and develop the new measure, and for those opinions which demand 
social equality and progress and more democratic accountability, decision makers 
cannot simple ignore them, and they must be properly tackled under the mechanism. 




Viewing the research results for sub-mechanism 4, this dissertation finds that 
two prominent features are shared by the three cases. The first one is that the three new 
measures represent holistic approaches to address the issues concerned, emphasizing 
EU policy interconnectedness and interdependence. The second one is that, the three 
new mechanisms, no matter adopted via the OLP or intergovernmental negotiations, 
have indicated top-down reforms and meanwhile their direct addressees are national 
and/or supranational level entities rather than sub-national societal groups and common 
citizens (nevertheless, implementing policies produced by the three new mechanisms 
shall inevitably influence interest groups and finally the common people’s daily lives); 
consequently, societal groups’ and common citizens’ adaptations to the new measures 
tend to be responsive rather than proactive. Policy transmission pattern of 
(supranational —) national — sub-national and individual in the context of European 
integration may deserve further research.  
 
8.4 Evidence for H13: The Engine of Path Dependence — 
“Increasing Returns”  
As a matter of fact, H13 contains two sub-mechanisms, and the second one can be 
further divided into six causal chains (H13a-f). Table 8.7 gives case study results, 
checking the presence of those causal mechanisms claimed by H13. 
 
Table 8.7 Checking the Causal Mechanisms Posited in H13 
 The European 
Semester 
The ESRB  The ESM  
Mechanism 1: Once 
the new measures 
are established to 
deal with the crisis, 
actors tend to stick 
to them due to the 
increasing returns, 
that is, the relative 
benefits brought by 
current measures 
compared with other 
possible options 
increase over time, 
and the costs of exit 
(i.e. sunk costs) or 
Not fully confirmed: 
not “compared with 
other possible 
options”; 
 An EP report 
sheds light on the 
benefits brought by 
this new measure: 
though “there is still 
room for 
improvement” (①, p. 
9/43),“the European 
Semester is the proper 
framework within 
which to ensure the 
Not fully confirmed: not 
“compared with other 
possible options”; 
 The benefits of the 
ESRB are well expressed 
by the mission, objectives 
and tasks prescribed by 
Article 3 ESRB 
Regulation, and Table 8.5 
has already outlined the 
achievements and 
contributions of the ESRB 
to the EU project;  
 The ESRB plays an 
indispensable role in 
Yes; 
 The benefits of the 
ESM are obvious and 
essential to help the 
beneficiary states to 
avoid bankruptcy and 
stop the contagious crisis 
spreading beyond, thus 
safeguarding the financial 
and economic stability of 
the eurozone and the EU 
as a whole;  
 The effects of 
increasing returns, sunk 
costs, and self-reinforcing 
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the costs of 
switching to the 
previously plausible 




for actors to stick 
with and not 
abandon the new 
measures, only 
adapting the new 
measures 





governance of the euro 
area Member States 
that are linked by 
common responsibility, 





policies and the 
implementation of the 
European Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs as 







Member States under 
the Community 
method, thus 
guaranteeing a better 
economic governance 
which represents added 
value for Europe” (①, 
p.35/43); the effects of 
increasing returns and 
sunk costs are obvious, 
as “the current 





and budgetary policies 
is needed in order to 
achieve a more 
integrated and 
balanced economic 
union” (①, p.7/43), 
but they do not have 
comparisons with other 
safeguarding financial 
stability; its birth fulfills 
the vacuum of EU 
macro-prudential 
supervision, and it is the 
only option originating 
from the de Larosière 
Report;  
 The increasing 
returns and sunk costs 
account for actors’ 
incentives to stick with, 
not abandon the ESRB 
(see Tables 8.5 and 8.6); 
the ESRB has been 
entrusted with new tasks 
by the legislated CRD 
IV-Package (i.e. the CRR 
and CRD IV)); as a 
consequence, the ESRB 
has obtained a new role in 
“giving guidance and 
recommendations on 
countercyclical buffers 
rates, providing opinions 
on systemic risk buffers 
and other macro-prudential 
instruments” (②, p.81); 
nevertheless, the ESRB’s 
status as being the EU’s 
single macro-prudential 
supervision mechanism 
shall be challenged by the 
forthcoming creation of the 
SSM (②, pp.78-83).  
 
processes all are present 
in the case of the ESM; as 
compared with other 
options, such as to 
establish an EMF similar 
to the IMF to provide 
loans to the EU member 
states, the benefits 
brought by the ESM 
increase over time (as it 
is agreed as the 
permanent rescue 
mechanism for the euro 
states and starts to 
operate) while to abandon 
or to revert to other 
choices means a huge 
loss and risk; 
 The ESM already 
became the sole rescue 
mechanism for the euro 
member states, and it will 
not be abandoned; it has 
been modified and 
adapted to the changing 
environment and newly 
rising situations, such as 
the relaxation in granting 
ESM aids and in carrying 
out oversight as a 
consequence of interstate 
bargains (see Table 7.3 
and Figure 7.1). 
Therefore, the effects of 
positive feedbacks are 
also noticeable in the case 
of the ESM. 
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possible alternatives — 
from the outset, the 
European Semester is 
the only tabled 
suggestion to improve 
EU policy 
coordination;  
 EU actors do 




and revisions during its 
implementation (see 
Table 8.4), and the 
so-called positive 
feedbacks are strong. 
(Cf. Table 8.5) 
as a result, with each iteration of the new measures, 
(a) actors’ 
preferences and the 
rules that bind them 
are increasingly 
reinforced and the 
status quo of the new 
measures is 
regarded as the 
right way to solve 
the crisis; 
Yes; (see Table 8.5) 
Though no legally 
binding decisions shall 
be made under the 
European Semester, 
the procedure of this 
new policy 
coordination 
mechanism itself has 
been codified into EU 
regulation, thus 
obtaining binding 
powers to the EU 
member states who 
should accordingly 
follow the prescribed 
European Semester 
procedure with the 
relevant documents.  
Not fully confirmed;  
Actors’ preferences are 
increasingly reinforced and 
the status quo of the new 
measure is regarded as the 
right way to solve the 
crisis (see Table 8.5); 
nevertheless, the ESRB 
has not been equipped with 
binding policy instruments, 




principle (see e.g. Table 
6.6), so “the rules that bind 
them (actors/addressees) 
are in doubt.  
Yes; (see Tables 8.5 and 
8.6) 
 There is general 
support for the permanent 
rescue funds;  
 The rules binding 
the beneficiary states are 
the conditionality of 
reducing deficit and debt 
rates and carrying out 
economic reforms, which 
suggests “painful” 
experiences but necessary 
changes for the member 
states concerned and their 
citizens in the long run; 
 The ESM has a 
distinguish feature among 
the adopted measures to 
counter the crisis: it 
remains as the last resort 
for the euro states to take; 
the more frequently the 
ESM grants assistance, 
the more unstable and 
dangerous situation the 
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EU and EMU face (cf. 
section 6.1.1). The 
placement of a permanent 
rescue mechanism is also 
helpful to calm down the 
ever climbing-up 
government bonds’ yield 
rates. 
(b) the once 
competitive options 
are excluded; 
No; (see Tables 8.5 and 
8.6) 
The European 
Semester is the only 
tabled proposal to 
address the issue 
concerned.  
No; (see Tables 8.5 and 
8.6) 
Except the ESRB, no other 
alternatives have been 
proposed to address the 
issue concerned.  
Yes; (see Tables 8.5 and 
8.6) 
The alternative options 
include the establishment 
of an EMF supported by 
the EP (see Table 7.3) 
while opposed by the 
French government (see 
Table 6.7). 
(c) the equilibriums 
formulated by the 
new measures to 
solve the crisis are 
resistant to change; 
Yes; 
The equilibrium 
entailed in the 
European Semester is 
mainly about the 
power distribution 
between supranational 
rulings and national 
autonomy, where the 
Commission gives 
guidance and 
formulates the CSRs, 
the Council adopts the 
CSRs, and then 
national governments 
materialize the CSRs; 
non-binding decisions 
under the Semester 







decisions on their 
national budgetary 
plans and the ways to 
Yes; 
The equilibrium under the 
ESRB has been entailed in 
the principle of 
“act/comply-or-explain”, 
which means ESRB 
recommendations have no 
legally binding power to 
its addressees. From the 
first day of the operation of 
the ESRB to the expanded 
tasks under the CRD 
IV-Package which became 
effective on 1 January 
2014, the implementation 
of ESRB recommendations 
was subject to the 
addressees’ discretion, and 
such an equilibrium appear 
to be resistant to change; 
nevertheless, the creation 
of the SSM in the near 
future may challenge the 
equilibrium (②, pp. 
82-83), which remains to 
be checked in the future.  
Yes; 
The equilibriums 
formulated by the ESM 
are visible: (a) 
conditionality for the 
euro states to receive 
ESM assistance indicates 
“must” reforms for the 
beneficiary states; (b) the 
inclusion of PSI and 
CACs into the ESM 
Treaty suggests a new 
equilibrium between 
private investors and 
taxpayers, where the 
former rather than the 
later shall pay the bill of 
bankruptcy; those two 
equilibriums are unlikely 




implement the CSRs; 
this equilibrium tends 
to remain intact and 
resistant to change 
alongside the 
development of the 
European Semester. 
(d) specific paths 




movement in the 
same direction; 
Yes; 
All policy coordination 
regarding EU 
economic governance 
has been integrated 
into the same 
procedure of the 
European Semester.  
Yes; (see evidence for 
mechanism 1 and (e) 
above) 
The path of 
“act/comply-or-explain” 
for EU macro-prudential 
supervision has extended 
into more policy areas as 
new tasks are assigned to 
the ESRB.  
Yes; (see evidence for 
mechanism 1 above) 
The ESM operates in 
accordance with the ESM 
Treaty; since it is the 
product of 
intergovernmental 
negotiations, some rules 
of the ESM may get 
modified and changed as 
the results of interstate 
bargains responding to 
newly rising situations.  
(e) the iteration of 
rules codified in the 
new measures and 
the repetition of the 
cumulative 
commitments on the 
existing paths make 
changes difficult and 
condition the form 
where new 
branching points 
will occur in the 
future;  
Not fully confirmed; 
 For the first half: 
No; due to the nature 






are not the crucial 
factors to make 
changes difficult, but 
rather the 
indispensability of an 
EU policy coordination 
mechanism makes the 
existing path framed 
up by the European 
Semester essential to 
EU economic 
governance and thus 
not easy to change; in 
addition, under the 
European Semester, 
macro-constraints are 
Not fully confirmed; 
 For the first half: No; 
the reason is similar to that 
for the European Semester: 
ESRB recommendations 
(i.e. a sort of 
macro-constraints) are not 
legally binding to its 
addressees and there are no 
sanction rules against 
non-compliance, so the 
implementation of them is 
subject to addressees’ 
discretion, and meanwhile, 
the commitments of 
societal groups at the 
micro level, if there is any, 
do not guarantee the 
stickiness of the path under 
the ESRB. Rather, it is the 
indispensable function and 
role of the ESRB that 
make it difficult and 
unnecessary to change the 
ESRB; 
Not fully confirmed; 
 For the first half: 
Yes; since July 2013, the 
ESM has become the 
only available permanent 
rescue mechanism for the 
euro countries within the 
Union, which indicates 
that it is difficult to shift 
to any other choices of 
the same functions; the 
main rule under the ESM 
is that granting the 
tranches of assistance 
depends upon the 
beneficiary states’ 
reforms and compliance 
with the conditionality 
agreed by the ESM and 
the beneficiary states; the 
binding conditionality 
(i.e. the macro-constraint) 
contributes to the 
commitments of the 
beneficiary states, and it 
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not legally binding and 




adjustments in the 
context of the on-going 
sovereign debt crisis, 





obligations for national 
governments to submit 
the relevant documents 
have been codified into 
EU regulations, and 
the iteration of those 
rules contributes to the 
stickiness of the new 
measure; 
 For the second 
half: Yes; the 
equilibrium initiated in 
the first cycle of the 
European Semester 
conditions the form of 
the newly added 
coordinated contents 
into the European 
Semester in the later 
days. 
 For the second half: 
Yes; the ESRB conditions 
the form to carry out 
macro-prudential oversight 
across EU policy areas, 
such as for countercyclical 
buffers rates (see evidence 
for mechanism 1 above). 
is generally reckoned as 
beneficial and necessary 
to promote national 
economic growth in the 
long term, though it may 
cause painful 
micro-adaptations of the 
societal groups; in reality, 
the ESM functions well 
as a firewall against the 
spreading of the 
sovereign debt crisis: 
Spanish banks, 
successfully exiting from 
the ESM programme, 
have avoided bankruptcy, 
thus not stirring turmoil 
and causing instability in 
the financial markets; 
therefore, contributing to 
the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the ESM, 
the iteration of the ESM 
rules and the 
commitments from both 
ESM contracting parties 
and the beneficiary states 
make it difficult to 
change the ESM path 
along with the fact that 
the ESM is the sole crisis 
resolution mechanism for 
the euro member states 
within the EU; 
 For the second half: 
No; the repetitive 
operation and 
enforcement of the ESM 
rules do not sufficiently 
condition the form of the 
new contents added to the 
ESM, because the ESM is 
an intergovernmental 
institution, and the 
contracting parties can 
make changes to the ESM 
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via interstate bargains 
against a dynamic 
environment, such as the 
issue of purchasing 
government securities via 
the ESM by the ECB (see 
Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1) 
(f) and it is 
increasingly unlikely 
that the new 




At the end of 2013, the 
European Semester has 
been expanded and 
strengthened, and it 
seems unlikely the EU 
will change its policy 
coordination into 
another path, but the 
European Semester 
remains to be modified 
along with the EU’s 
development.  
Yes;  
At the end of 2013, the 
ESRB remains as the only 
EU body responsible for 
EU macro-prudential 
oversight. It seems 
unlikely the EU will shift 
such a task to other new 
bodies, but the 
forthcoming SSM, which 
shall conduct 
macro-prudential 
supervision across the 
European banks, may lead 
some revisions to the 
exiting ESRB whose 
supervisory responsibility 
covers the bank area.  
Yes;  
The ESM has already 
become the sole 
permanent rescue 
mechanism for the 
eurozone countries within 
the EU, but the contents 
of the ESM Treaty may 
get revised and expanded 
along with the EU’s 
development.  
 
Sources: ①European Parliament-A7-0312/2012 (12 October 2012); ②Mcphilemy et al. 
(October 2013). 
 
According to Table 8.7, sub-mechanism 1 of H13 gets a full confirmation only in 
the case of the ESM, while it partially collapses in the other two cases. The reason 
causing the failure is that “other possible options” and “switching to the previously 
plausible alternatives” are not applicable to the two cases of the European Semester 
and the ESRB, as both measures are initiated as the only one option to address the 
issues concerned and there are no other tabled choices. This fact, on the one hand, 
displays the consensus among EU and national leaders on the ways to address the crisis, 
while on the other hand, it reveals a particular feature of (EU) political 
decision-making: when a new measure is tabled, adopted, and implemented, the once 
competitive ideas are wiped out from the very beginning, because there is no chance 
for the alternative measures to be adopted and implemented, and subsequently to be 
tested by reality and then be compared with the adopted new measure in discussion. 
Originally, the idea of path dependence is utilized to summarize and characterize 
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human being’s technology history (see section 4.2.2), but obviously, technological 
inventions and political measures are different: when a technological solution wins out, 
the unchosen technologies are still there on the markets, providing available facts and 
statistics for the newly adopted measure to compare, but as for political decisions, 
when a new measure is adopted and implemented, the once competitive alternatives 
also lose the chance to ever materialize, and thus cannot offer empirical comparisons to 
the selected measure. As the cases of the European Semester and the ESRB illustrate, 
without alternatives to compare does not reject or diminish the effects of increasing 
returns, sunk costs and positive feedbacks, and thus “compared with other possible 
options” and that “the costs of switching to the previously plausible alternatives rise 
(i.e. self-reinforcing processes)” are not the necessary components for path dependence. 
Moreover, if the new measures are not as good as expected, they can be revised and the 
elements of the previously discarded alternatives or of any other similar practices can 
be added to the new one; from such a perspective, newly adopted measures in politics 
enjoy a larger space to be modified and become more viable than those in technology 
under the fierce market competition pressure. In comparison, being different to the first 
two cases, there were other competitive choices to the adoption of the ESM, and 
subsequently, sub-mechanism 1 is confirmed by the ESM, but still, self-reinforcing 
processes (that “the costs of switching to the previously plausible alternatives rise”) are 
justified by the effective implementation and indispensable functions of the ESM rather 
than by the previous option of the creation of the EMF which has not ever materialized 
— interestingly, the ESM is advocated by the interest group of BusinessEurope to 
develop into an EMF (see Table 6.5). In short, previously available alternatives are not 
the necessary components to judge the path dependent effects of increasing returns, 
sunk costs, self-reinforcing processes and positive feedbacks. Rather, the 
indispensability and unique functions of the new measure to the issue concerned can 
adequately boost the path dependence effects well. 
The tests for H13(a)-(f), another six HI assumptions, reveal the following: 
First, H13 (a) is confirmed by the first and the third cases, while partially 
rejected by the ESRB. The reason is that ESRB recommendations are implemented 
following the principle of “act/comply-or-explain”, and non-binding rules under the 
ESRB dismiss the assumption of “the rules that bind them are increasingly reinforced”. 
A difference between the European Semester and the ESRB stands out: though the 
CSRs under the European Semester are also not legally binding, the European 
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Semester procedure of policy coordination has been laid down in EU regulation and 
thus national governments are obligated to comply with the Semester procedure to 
submit relevant documents. Alongside the annual implementation of the European 
Semester year after year, the rules binding national governments have been reinforced. 
In comparison, the rules that bind actors under the ESM are the strict conditionality 
coming along with ESM assistance. Second, the mechanism of H13(b) that “the once 
competitive options are excluded” is not present in the first two cases while applicable 
to the case of the ESM. The reasons have already been elaborated in explaining, for 
example, sub-mechanism 1 of H13. Third, all three cases support H13(c) and two 
equilibriums are distinguished in the operation of the ESM. Fourth, H13(d) is effective 
in all three cases, but is expressed in slightly different ways. The first two cases see 
how coordinated contents and macro-prudential oversight tasks get expanded under the 
European Semester and the ESRB respectively, while changes to the ESM witness 
modifications to the already concluded ESM Treaty. Fifth, as regards the causal 
relations suggested by H13(e), they have not been fully present in any of the three 
cases, but the factors that cause the collapses are different. For the first two cases, they 
confirm the first half of H13(e) while reject the second half of H13(e); in contrast, the 
ESM confirms the second half but reject the first half. The rejection of H13(e) by the 
European Semester and the ESRB is also rooted in the non-binding powers of the two 
measures, which have put “the repetition of the cumulative commitments” in doubt; 
moreover, the unique functions and indispensable roles of the two measures contribute 
to the stickiness of the existing path. In the case of the ESM, “the cumulative 
commitments on the existing paths” is guaranteed by the conditionality attached to the 
ESM financial assistance; besides, the political decision to let the ESM become the 
sole rescue mechanism is another factor to make any retreat from the ESM path 
unlikely. While the European Semester and the ESRB support the second half of 
H13(e), exhibiting a structuring effect of the two new measures on the future new 
developments in each policy area, the case of the ESM, however, tells that the 
development of the ESM is subject to intergovernmental negotiations and compromises 
among the ESM contracting parties. As Figure 7.1 suggests, more rounds of 
negotiations may come after the inauguration of the ESM due to the changeable 
environment. The ESM also has a structuring effect on the future development of the 
ESM, but as an intergovernmental institution, contracting parties’ will and interests 
appear more decisive for the new branching points of the ESM in the future. The three 
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cases suggest possible diverged consequences caused by two different ways to address 
the crisis: via the Community method or via an intergovernmental approach. Finally, 
H13(f) is confirmed by all three cases so far as the time period till the end of 2013 is 
concerned. Obviously, the words “be changed” in H13(f) are defined as shifting to 
other choices rather than the self-expansion and revisions of the three new measures. 
All the three new measures play an indispensable role in improving and strengthening 
EU economic governance. Both the European Semester and the ESM have become the 
sole mechanisms in its kind, while the status of the ESRB as the only EU body 
responsible for macro-prudential oversight may get challenged by the creation of the 
SSM.  
To sum up, not all the causal mechanisms entailed in H13 are confirmed by the 
three cases. The collapsed causal chains suggest: 
Proposition 26: The once competitive options are not the necessary components 
of path dependence, but the unique functions and indispensable role of a new measure 
tend to adequately guarantee path dependence initiated by the new measure. 
Proposition 27: Institutional structuring effects claimed by HI appear more 
observable in the legally binding measures adopted by the collective Community 
method, while they tend to be diffuse and weak in the measures concluded by 
intergovernmental approaches, because the latter are more subject to 
intergovernmental bargains and political will.  
HI stresses cumulative commitments under binding rules and sanction 
mechanisms contributing to the stickiness of existing paths, but not all EU policies are 
legally binding with sanction mechanisms, and thus certain HI assumptions actually are 
not applicable to some new EU developments. 
 
8.5 Evidence for H14: Conditions Conducive to Foster Path 
Dependence 
H14 intends to check whether there are favorable conditions to foster path dependence 
of the new measures; four factors, H14(a)-(d), are considered by HI as the components 
of a conducive environment to path dependence. Table 8.8 checks the presence of the 






Table 8.8 Checking the Presence of Favorable Conditions to Foster Path Dependence 




The European Semester  
 
The ESRB  
 
The ESM 
H14a: The EU’s new 
measures to address 
the crisis entail 
considerable 
institutional start-up 
costs, which serve as 
a strong incentive for 




The start-up costs of the 
European Semester 
involve the revision to 
the Code of Conduct on 
implementing the SGP 
and the coordination of 
EU supranational 
institutions (particularly 
the Commission and the 
Council) and each 
individual member state; 
the issue addressed by 
the European Semester is 
beyond any single 
national government’s 
ability and capacity, so 
without the support and 
participation of EU 
supranational institutions, 
policy coordination 
across EU member states 
is impossible; moreover, 
strong incentives for 
national governments to 
stick to the European 
Semester procedure also 
come from the benefits 
and compelling of 
national policy 




implementation of the 
ESRB, there was no such 
a macro-prudential 
supervision mechanism 
covering the EU 
financial system; the 
creation of the ESRB as 
a totally new EU body, 
in accordance with the 
tasks and functions 









fulfilling the vacuum in 
the EU project, the 
ESRB’s tasks are beyond 
the scope and capacity of 




coordination at different 
levels, EU wide data 




actors. (See e.g. ESRB 
Regulation, Article 15) 
Yes; 
The creation of the 
ESM — a permanent 
crisis resolution 




approval; the EU and 
EMU need a permanent 
fund which can provide 
urgent financial 
assistance to the 
eurozone countries so 
as to safeguard the 
stability of the euro 
area as well as the 
whole EU, and the 
ESM is purposely 
established to fill the 
vacuum of the EMU 
project; the start-up 
costs of the ESM 
involve €700 billion 
subscribed capital 
provided by the euro 
area member states with 
a lending capacity of 
€500 billion, among 
which €80 billion take 
the form of paid-in 
capital while the 
remaining €620 billion 
as being callable capital 
(see Table 5.5); the 
strong incentives to 
stick to the ESM not 
only come from the 
considerable 
institutional set-up 




indispensability of the 
ESM to the EU and 
EMU.  
H14b: National actors 
actively engage in 
learning and adapting 
to the new measures 
as the new measures 
are considered helpful 
to keep economic and 
financial stability; as 
actors gain more 
experience and 
expertise with these 
new measures, they 
are likely to introduce 
further innovations 
and changes into these 
measures and/or into 




The European Semester 
de facto has become the 
only but an inclusively 
grand policy coordination 
mechanism for national 
governments to 
coordinate economic and 
budgetary plans while 
obtaining their fellows’ 
information; the annually 
repetitive implementation 
of the European Semester 
has been gradually 
improved and expanded 
with lessons drawing 
from the previous years’ 
practices; though 
“national ownership of 
the process (and in 
particular of the CSRs) 
needs to be developed 
further” (①, p. 14), 
“national procedures and 
timetables have been 
adjusted (...) in a 
predictable framework” 
and “[s]ubstantial 
progress has been made 
on fiscal consolidation” (
①, p.4), while 
“[c]ountries most 
exposed to financial 
vulnerabilities have been 
most engaged in 
initiating ambitious 
structural reforms” (①, 
p. 14); the routinization 
of the yearly cycle and 
the progress made under 
the European Semester 
Yes; 
One example is national 
implementation of the 
ESRB Recommendation 
on Lending in Foreign 
Currencies 
(ESRB/2011/1): though 
the degree of compliance 
varied across EU 
member states, there was 
a high overall level of 
compliance, displaying 
national actors’ active 
learning of and adaption 
to the ESRB mechanism 
(see e.g. Table 7.4); 
ESRB recommendations 
are given to prevent 
systemic risks and 
safeguard financial 
stability; till the end of 
2013, the ESRB is the 
only EU body to carried 
macro-prudential 
oversight of the EU 
financial system, and 
new tasks have been 
added to the domain of 
the ESRB, such as 
giving opinions and 
recommendations on 
countercyclical buffers 
rates (see Table 8.7). 
 
Yes; 
The nature of the ESM 
is like a “hemostatic 
agent” to help the 
staggering euro 
member states — the 
last firewall against the 
financial and economic 
turmoil; resorting to the 
ESM indicates financial 
deterioration and 
potential instability, and 
national actors’ 
learning of and 
adaptions to the ESM 
are expressed in the 
beneficiary states’ 
adjustments and 
reforms in accordance 
with the conditionality 
coming along with the 
ESM assistance 
programmes; the ESM 
Treaty originally was 
signed in July 2011, 
and later it was 
resigned again on 
February 2012, 
incorporating the new 
elements agreed after 
July 2011, such as 
increasing ESM 
effectiveness and 
flexibility and including 
CACs into the ESM; 
the conclusion of the 
TSCG as a complement 
to the operation of the 
ESM can be regarded 




indicate national actors’ 
active learning of and 
adaptation to the new 
procedure; Table 8.4 
illustrates more 
coordinated contents 
have been introduced into 
the European Semester, 
and consequently, the 
European Semester gets 
expanded and modified.  
into other policy areas 
related to the ESM; 
nevertheless, those 
changes to the original 
ESM Treaty happened 
before the inauguration 
of the ESM, and they 
were made mainly on 
the basis of the 
experience and 
expertise gained from 
the EFSF as well as 
from the reality rather 
than from the operation 
of the ESM itself; the 
ESM has become the 
sole rescue mechanism 
for the eurozone 
countries, and all new 
developments and 
changes to the measures 
meant to financially aid 
the euro states shall 
undoubtedly fall into 
the ESM domain.  
H14c: The new 
measures are 
compatible with the 
activities of other 
actors and institutions, 
and moreover, the 
new measures 
promote new 
developments in the 
linked areas and 
policies, which in turn 
increase the viability 
of the new measures. 
 
Yes; 
The purpose of the 
European Semester is to 
synchronize and improve 
EU policy coordination 
and thus to strengthen 
EU economic 
governance; it makes 
renovations on the basis 
of the previous EU 
practices, noticeably 
changing ex-post to 
ex-ante policy 
coordination, while the 
coordinated contents, 
already there for some 
years, remaining 
unchanged. Thus, the 
new policy coordination 
procedure is compatible 
Yes; 
The ESRB must be 
compatible with the 
activities of other actors 
and institutions, or else it 
shall be difficult for the 
ESRB to carry out its 
tasks and for its 




include the Union as a 
whole represented by the 
Commission, one or 
more member states, one 
or more of the ESAs, one 




The ESM was designed 
to be compatible with 
the activities of other 
actors and institutions 
via the ways that, for 
example, the 
Commission and the 
ECB were requested by 
the ESM contracting 
parties to perform the 
tasks provided for in 
the ESM Treaty under 
the authorization of the 
representatives of the 
governments of the EU 
member states (see 
ESRB Regulation, 
(10)), and the disputes 
under the ESM are 
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with the activities of 
other actors and 
institutions. Moreover, 
the new measure gets 
further expansion, 
evolving into the only but 
an inclusive policy 
coordination mechanism, 
where all possible policy 
coordination has been 
integrated into the unified 
procedure, which, 
without doubt, has 
increased the viability of 
this new measure.  
Article 16), while 
institutional support to 
the ESRB involves the 
ESAs, the ESCB, the 
Commission, the 
national supervisory 





oversight and evaluation 
become necessary 
components to develop 
new EU legislations (see 
Table 8.5) and the 
expansion of the ESRB 
into new policy areas 
increases the viability of 
this new measure. 
subject to the 
jurisdiction of the 
CJEU. The ESM 
promotes new 
developments in policy 
areas related to the 
operation of the ESM. 
For instance, the ESM 
raises the possibility to 
directly recapitalize the 
European banks, 
encouraging the 
creation of the SSM 
(see Tables 6.5, 6.18 
and 7.3; Figure 7.1). 
The ESM viability not 
only increases due to 
the developments of the 
ESM itself and in the 
ESM related policy 
areas, but also because 
the political decision to 
make the ESM the sole 
mechanism of its kind.  
H14d: Actors whose 
options have failed 
will adapt their 
actions and 
expectations in 




There were no other 
alternatives proposed to 
address the issue 
concerned.  
Not applicable; 
No alternative options 
were presented during 
the formation of the 
ESRB. 
Yes; 
Initially, there were 
voices to establish an 
EMF, EFM or EDA as 
alternatives to the ESM 
(see Table 1.2). All 
those suggestions have 
failed and never 
materialized. EU 
member states agreed 
with treaty revisions to 
establish a permanent 
rescue mechanism, 
while the eurozone 
countries approved the 
ESM, adapting their 
behavior and 
expectations towards 
the new mechanism.  




Table 8.8 displays case study results, which suggest that there are favorable 
conditions to foster path dependence forged by the new measures. Except that the 
situation mentioned in H14(d) is not applicable to the first two cases, all other factors 
are present in the three cases. A prominent feature has been shared by the three new 
measures: they are necessary and indispensable components in EU economic 
governance, and till the end of 2013, they are the only and unique mechanisms to 
address the issues concerned, among which the ESM has already been mandated as the 
sole financial assistance mechanism for the euro states, the European Semester has 
evolved into an inclusive procedure integrating all possible EU policy coordination 
under the same umbrella, and the ESRB is the only EU body responsible for EU 
overall macro-prudential supervision (which, however, might be changed due to the 
establishment of the SSM). Therefore, one more favorable condition can be derived 
from the three cases: 
H14eadded: The uniqueness and indispensability of the new measures to the EU 
project also contribute to nurturing path dependence after they have been taken. 
The “considerable institutional start-up costs” in the cases of the three new 
measures include the fact that the issues addressed by the new measures are beyond the 
ability and capacity of individual member states, while the new measures represent 
holistic approaches, dealing with the ever integrated economies of the EU member 
states. So H14a can be expanded as follows: 
H14aextended: The EU’s new measures to address the crisis entail considerable 
institutional start-up costs and/or holistic collective approaches beyond individual 
member states’ capacity which intend to serve the interests of the EU as a whole while 
maximizing each individual member state’s gains from the increasingly integrated 
process; thus strong incentives are there for actors to stick to the new measures. 
Regarding the causal mechanisms suggested by H14b, they are present in all 
three cases, but the case of the ESM introduces a different way of actors’ learning of 
and adaptation to this new measure: not all national governments are supposed to be 
actively engaging with the ESM, because the ESM is the last resort and the last firewall 
for the euro member states and reverting to the ESM means an endangered financial 
and economic situation. The adaptation to the ESM indicates a “painful” experience to 
defend the overall national interests as much as possible, and this dissertation would 
call this type of adaptation “defensive adaptation” — the more frequent of the 
application of the measure, the more precarious of the national economic/financial 
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situation is indicated, and thus adaption to the new measure means a compelling 
process to “defend” and “save” the country concerned. Besides, the changes made to 
the original ESM Treaty show that actors could draw experience and expertise from the 
precedents to enrich the new measure even before this new measure starts to operate, 
which suggests that innovations and changes to the new measure may happen at any 
time points and could be inspired by any other sources. Accordingly, H14b can be 
restated as follows:  
H14bmodified: National actors actively engage in learning and adapting to the new 
measures as the new measures are considered helpful to keep economic and financial 
stability; as actors gain more experience and expertise with these new measures and/or 
due to the inspiration from other practices, they are likely to introduce further 
innovations and changes into these measures and/or into other related policy areas.  
The added element of “due to the inspiration from other practices” echoes the 
analyses in section 8.4 for the test of H13: a newly adopted measure can be improved 
and revised by integrating reasonable elements from alternative options and similar 
practices via political decisions.  
As for H14c, case study results suggest that the viability of the new measures is 
not only related to their implementation and self-developments, but also to the political 
decisions to make them as the sole mechanisms available to address the issues 
concerned. Therefore,  
H14cextended: The new measures are compatible with the activities of other actors 
and institutions, and moreover, the new measures promote new developments in the 
linked areas and policies, which in turn increase the viability of the new measures; in 
addition, political decisions to make a new measure the sole available mechanism of its 
kind reinforce the viability of the new measure. 
Regarding H14d, it is effective in the case of the ESM, but not applicable to the 
first two cases, because the situations of competitive alternatives as a sort of obstacles 
supposed by H14d are not present. Two different types of conditions can be 
distinguished: (1) the presence of positively reinforcing factors, such as H14a-c, and (2) 
the non- or less-presence of hindrance factors, like H14d. Such a distinction shall also 
be applicable to the conditions conducive to the neo-functionalist spillover effects (see 
Tables 2.3 and 6.18). All in all, there is a fertilizing environment for the three new 
measures to forge specific paths after them, and EU economic governance is very 




8.6 Evidence for H15: Four Features Likely Demarcating 
Path Dependence Processes  
H15 proposes four consecutive political steps that are expected to mark path 
dependence processes. The four assumed features, however, might not be necessarily 
presented in the three cases. 
 
Table 8.9 Checking the Four Consecutive Political Processes Featuring Path Dependence 
H15 referring to 
HI argument 15 
The European 
Semester  
(on the basis of Table 
8.4)  
The ESRB 
(on the basis of Table 8.2) 
The ESM 




The post-2008 crisis 
era exposes the 
necessity and urgency 
to improve and 
strengthen EU 
economic governance; 




The spillover of the US 
subprime mortgage crisis into 
a global financial crisis has a 
direct impact and serious 
repercussions on the EU 
financial system; it exposes 
the vacuum of EU 
macro-prudential supervision 
which shall help EU 
countries to prevent financial 
systemic risks and other 
loopholes in EU financial 
regulation. The ways to 
fulfill the vacuum and 
loopholes have a wide range 
of possible outcomes. 
Yes; 
The eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis exposes a 
vacuum of the EU project: 
the EU lacks a permanent 
rescue mechanism to 
safeguard EMU and the 
EU; along with the 
on-going sovereign debt 
crisis, the vacuum must be 
fulfilled, but how to fulfill 
opens to more than one 
option, such as the calling 
for establishing an EMF 
(see e.g. Table 7.3). That 
is, at the very beginning, a 
number of outcomes were 
possible.  
(b) contingency; Yes; 
To set up the Task 
Force chaired by Van 
Rompuy to work out 
solutions to the crisis 
as well as to strengthen 
EU economic 
governance is a 
contingency, but the 
idea of the European 
Semester put forward 
by the Task Force has 
an enduring influence 
Yes;  
To assign a High-Level 
Group under the charge of 
Jacques de Larosière to draw 
up recommendations to 
strengthen EU financial 
supervision is a contingency, 
but it exerts lasting impacts 
on the new architect of EU 
financial supervision by 
initiating the establishment of 
the ESFS, which 
encompasses the ESRB for 
Yes; 
The French government’s 
opposition to the creation 
of an EMF while its 
support to a permanent 
ESM makes to establish 
the ESM becoming the 
only viable option to 
fulfill the vacuum of the 
EMU project (see Table 
6.7). Another contingency 
is that after the signing of 
the ESM Treaty, new 
516 
 
on EU policy 
coordination.  
macro-prudential oversight 
and three ESAs for 
micro-prudential oversight 
(see section 1.3.4). 
French President Hollande 
tabled a growth pact as a 
counterpart to Merkel’s 
fiscal compact; originally, 
to adopt the growth pact 
was supposed to be the 
interest exchange only 
between Paris and Berlin: 
Merkel supported 
Hollande’s growth pact, 
while as a return, 
Hollande agreed to sign 
off the unpopular fiscal 
pact championed by 
Merkel; nevertheless, Italy 
and Spain took the 
approval of the growth 
pact as an opportunity to 
force Merkel to make 
more concessions on the 
ESM terms (see Table 7.3 
and Figure 7.1).  
(c) a critical role 
for timing and 
sequencing; 
Yes; 
The worsening and 
uncertain economic 
crisis during the course 
of 2009 catalyzed the 
formation and 
implementation of the 
European Semester. 
The Ecofin’s approval 
of the implementation 
of the new measure as 
of 1 January 2011 
came before the new 
procedure got codified 
into EU regulation. 
Obviously, the decision 
by the Ecofin to make 
changes to the Code of 
Conduct on 
implementing the SGP 
decisively laid down 
the basic framework 
for the European 
Yes; 
The global financial crisis 
triggered by the US subprime 
mortgage crisis marks a 
critical juncture for the EU’s 
macro-prudential supervision 
development (see Table 8.1), 
and clearly more attention 
has been diverted to 
macro-prudential oversight 
and financial market 
regulations, such as on hedge 
funds and private equity and 
on CRAs. The co-legislative 
procedure leading to the 
establishment of the ESRB 
displays the importance of 
the sequences of EU 
institutions’ involvement in 
the OLP. This time, the 
Council made compromises 
to the EP which took the 
opinions of the ECB, the 
Yes; 
The establishment of the 
temporary rescue 
mechanism — the EFSF 
— is crucial for the 
creation of the permanent 
ESM, as the latter is built 
upon the features of the 
former. The EFSF matters 
much more than later 
sequences of events, 
because the EFSF shapes 
the basic structure of the 
ESM, and the ESM’s later 
modifications all are 
developed on the basis of 
the basic structure. The 
outbreak of the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis and 
the imminent danger of 
sovereign bankruptcy 





suggests that “earlier 
parts of a sequence 
matter much more than 
later parts” of the 
co-legislative 
procedure. The OLP 
happened “too late” to 
have effects on 
changing the 
proceedings of the 
European Semester, 
“although it might have 
been of great 
consequence if the 
timing had been 
different”. This mirrors 
the converged interests 
in reforming EU policy 
coordination by the 
proposed idea of the 
European Semester.  
EESC, and the related EP 
Committees into 
consideration, and the EP’s 
first reading position 
corresponds to the final 
ESRB Regulation. Besides, 
around the same time, the US 
also for the first time 
established the FSOC to 
conduct macro-prudential 
oversight for the American 
financial system (see Table 
6.25); if the FSOC had come 
earlier, it might have been 
taken as a model for the EU 
to follow. Thus, the timing 
and sequences do play a 
crucial role in the formation 
of the ESRB. 
urgently needed. The 
global financial crisis and 
the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis have expedited 
the process to fulfil the 
vacuum of the EU project.  
 
and (d) inertia. Yes; 
Since the 
implementation of the 
European Semester, it 








into the same unified 
and synchronized 
procedure. As time 
goes by, the European 
Semester has 
introduced an 






Before the creation of the 
SSM, the ESRB is the sole 
body responsible for all EU 
macro-prudential oversight. 
The “act/comply-or-explain” 
principle underpins the 
equilibrium between the 
ESRB recommendations and 
its addressees, which is 
expected to be resistance to 
change and shall continue to 
underpin EU 
macro-prudential oversight in 
the newly explored policy 
areas.  
Yes; 
The equilibrium under the 
ESM is entailed in the 
MoUs, where ESM 
financial assistance is 
accompanied by strict 
conditionality that the 
beneficiary states must 
comply with. While 
receiving the ESM help, 
Spain and Cyprus have 
implemented structural 
reforms and austerity 
measures to reduce their 
budget deficits and debts 
accordingly. Spain’s 
successful exit from the 
ESM programme signals 
positive feedback and the 
ESM equilibrium has been 
reinforced. Moreover, the 
political decision to make 




as well as among EU 
member states. 
mechanism within the 
Union as of 1 July 2013 
also reinforces the ESM 
equilibrium’s resistance to 
change.  
 
Case study results in Table 8.9 show that all the four possible political processes 
posited by H15 are effective in the three cases, demonstrating a strong effectiveness of 
path dependence of the three new measures. The formation and operation of the three 
new measures can be studied and traced back by a series of events, and the four 
sub-mechanisms entailed in H15 offer an HI perspective/epistemology to sort out the 
sequences of these events. On the one hand, the four causal chains just posit possible 
while not unavoidable political processes indicating the effectiveness of path 
dependence; on the other hand, the selection of the sequence of events may not be 
exhaustive and consequently might neglect possible political processes. Therefore, H15 
tends to explain and unwind path dependence rather than to prescribe, offering an 
interpretative instrument to elucidate what has happened rather than to predicate what 
will happen. H15 represents an ex-post clarification to the facts. Moreover, though four 
assumed political processes happened in the three cases, the third case of the ESM 
suggests that the four sub-mechanisms are not necessarily in a consecutive linear order. 
The ESM is an intergovernmental institution set up by intergovernmental negotiations; 
due to this special nature, the operation of the ESM is still subject to further interstate 
bargains against a developing external environment. As a result, contingencies of 
relatively small events but with large impact may happen unexpectedly due to the 
newly rising situations: Spain and Italy successfully took the opportunity to approve a 
new growth pact upheld by new French President Hollande to revise what had been 
agreed on the ESM on paper. Though the second mechanism of contingency implies 
the third mechanism of a critical role for timing and sequencing, the case of the ESM 
suggests that the second mechanism not only can happen before, but also may after the 
third one. Thus, the four political processes supposed to feature the effectiveness of 
path dependence are not necessarily in a consecutive linear order. Finally, in addition 
to the effects of increasing returns and positive feedbacks, political decisions to make a 





8.7 Evidence for H16: Testing the Hypothesized Path 
Dependence Model 
In accordance with the analyses after the formation of H16 in chapter four, before 
moving to the test for H16, this dissertation first delineates the contour of the rules 
related to the adoption of the three new measures (under the Lisbon Treaty) dating back 
to the Nice Treaty, then to the Amsterdam Treaty, and finally to the Maastricht Treaty 
(i.e. the TEU). As Table 6.22 has already explored possible different legal bases under 
the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty to adopt the three new measures, this section 
pushes the research further back to the prescriptions in the Amsterdam Treaty and in 
the TEU related to the adoption of the three new measures.  
 
Table 8.10 Tracing back the Legal Bases to Adopt the Three New Measures (From the Lisbon Treaty 
to the Maastricht Treaty) 
 The European Semester The ESRB The ESM 
The legal bases 
provided by the 
Lisbon Treaty 
(see Table 6.22) 
 
Codified by the OLP (i.e. the 
co-decision procedure) based on 
Article 121 TFEU (ex Article 99 
TEC, which gets amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty via, for example, 
introducing Commission’s 
warnings to the member states 
concerned and changing the 
relevant co-operation procedure to 
the OLP). 
Established by the OLP 
(i.e. the co-decision 
procedure) based on 
Article 114 TFEU (ex 
Article 95 TEC, which is 
amended by the Lisbon 
Treaty mainly via adding 
the EP’s role in 
paragraph 4 and 5 and 
specifying the application 
of the OLP on the basis 
of the co-decision 
procedure in the Nice 
Treaty). 
Created by the 
ESM Treaty, an 
intergovernmental 





136 TFEU under 





Is the Euro” itself 
is a newly 
inserted Article 
under a newly 
added chapter by 
the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
Tracing back into EU Treaties 
The Nice Treaty Article 99 TEC prescribes 
coordination and multilateral 
surveillance of member states’ 
economic policies and 
performances, which shall be 
Article 95 TEC prescribes 
the co-decision procedure 
laid down in Article 251 
TEC to be possibly taken 
to address the issues 
No legal basis 
available for the 




codified as EU rules in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in 
Article 252 TEC (i.e. the 
co-operation procedure). No 
changes have been made to this 
Article by the Nice Treaty. 
related to the 
establishment or 
functioning of the internal 
market. The Nice Treaty 
makes no changes to this 




Renumbering ex Article 103 TEC 
as Article 99 TEC and ex Article 
189c as Article 252 TEC without 
substantial content changes. 
Renumbering ex Article 
100a TEC as Article 95 
TEC and ex Article 189b 
as Article 251 while 
replacing ex Article 100a 
(3), (4) and (5) with new 
paragraphs. 
No legal basis 
available for the 
creation of the 
ESM. 
The TEU (e.g. 
The Maastricht 




replaced by the 
term “European 
Community”) 
Article 103 TEC made changes to 
ex Article 103 (Chapter 1 — 
Policy Relating to Economic 
Trends, TITLE II — Economic 
Policy) of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic 
Community by introducing a new 
framework of economic policy 
coordination and multilateral 
surveillance, prescribing that 
detailed rules in those aspects shall 
be adopted in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 
189c TEC, that is, the co-operation 
legislative procedure introduced by 
the SEA. Later, Article 189c TEC 
was accordingly renumbered as 
Article 252 TEC by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
Article 100a (1) TEC 
made changes to ex 
Article 100a (1) of the 
SEA which prescribed the 
co-operation procedure to 
be applied to the issue 
concerned; consequently, 
the related legislative 
procedure shifted from 
the co-operation 
procedure prescribed by 
the SEA to the 
co-decision procedure 
laid down in Article 189b 
TEC. 
No legal basis 
available for the 
creation of the 
ESM. 
Summary The Maastricht Treaty serves as a 
critical juncture for EU economic 
policy coordination and 
surveillance, as Article 103 TEC 
was inserted to prescribe the 
relevant rules and the legislative 
procedure to rely on: the 
co-operation procedure laid down 
in Article 189c TEC; the contents 
of Articles 103 and 189c TEC did 
not get changed till the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The legal basis to 
establish the ESRB can 
be traced back to the 
SEA, which introduced 
Article 100a of the EEC 
Treaty. Article 100a of 
the EEC Treaty firstly 
was revised by the 
Maastricht Treaty by 
shifting the co-operation 
procedure into the 
co-decision procedure 
The historical 
roots for the ESM 
legal basis are 
comparatively 
“shallow”: only 
after 25 March 
2011, when the 
European Council 
adopted the 





(Article 100a (1) TEC), 
which, after being 
renumbered as Article 95 
TEC by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, was finally laid 
down as Article 114 
TFEU. 
Article 136 
TFEU, did the 
creation of the 
ESM obtain the 
legal basis in the 
EU Treaties; 
moreover, Article 
136 TFEU itself 
is a newly 
inserted part by 
the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
Sources: “EU Treaties” (European Union) and “Treaty of Lisbon, Questions and Answers” 
(European Union). 
 
According to Table 8.10, the case of the ESM does not support the proposed path 
dependent model of H16, as the legal basis for the creation of this permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism only can be traced back to the Lisbon Treaty. The 
ineffectiveness of H16 in ESM shows that, on the one hand, when the Maastricht 
Treaty laid down rules for EU and EMU economic governance, it did not foresee far 
enough of the collective sovereign debt crisis in the beginning of the 21th century, that 
is, EU decision-makers at that time were delimited by their horizons and expectations, 
while on the other hand, the EU actively took serious actions to deal with the newly 
rising challenges and the regional integration project gets developed and expanded into 
new policy areas. Besides, in order to get a permanent ESM in place, Treaty 
amendments were made to the Lisbon Treaty via the simplified revision procedure 
rather than the ordinary revision procedure, illustrating the resilience and flexibility of 
the EU project to adapt itself to the new environments. The failure of H16 to account 
for the ESM suggests that not all EU developments have a deep HI root that can date 
back to the birth of the “European Union”; new challenges may initiate totally new 
“sprouts” on the “trunk” of the EU project, while these new sprouts of paths shall 
provide HI roots for the EU’s developments in the future.  
Subsequently, this dissertation will check the assumed path dependent model 
with the European Semester and the ESRB, and the research results for each are 






Table 8.11 Checking H16 with the European Semester 
Checking the three 
features of the 
proposed path 
dependent model H16 
 
 
The European Semester  
(a) the TEU shapes and 
reinforces the 
preferences of the 
salient actors, which 
get further reinforced 
with the iteration of 
Treaty rules, and from 
T0 to T2, the initial 
rules set down at T0 get 
changed due to 
exogenous challenges 
rather than endogenous 
needs; 
 For the first half: Yes; 
The Maastricht Treaty for the first time laid down the relevant rules and 
possible legislative procedure to rely on to coordinate and monitor member 
states’ economic policy and performance; the contents of Article 103 TEC did 
not get changed until the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty Article 99 (i.e. 
Article 121 TFEU) made changes to ex Article 103 TEC laid down by the 
Maastricht Treaty, mainly including: (a) inserting that “the Commission may 
address a warning to the Member State concerned”, and (b) replacing “The 
Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 252, 
may adopt detailed rules” by “The European Parliament and the Council, acting 
by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
may adopt detailed rules”; 
The salient actors involved in the issue concerned by the European Semester 
are national governments and EU supranational institutions; the unchanged 
legal basis from the Maastricht Treaty to the Nice Treaty has reinforced the 
equilibrium between the two types of actors that no binding decisions shall be 
made under the economic policy coordination and multilateral surveillance 
procedures; the amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty further strengthen 
EU supranational institutions’ interests via more involvement of the 
Commission and the EP, and the OLP (to codify the European Semester) 
substitutes the co-operation legislative procedure since the Maastricht Treaty;  
 For the second half: No; 
The reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty mean to meet both the external 
globalization challenges and internal increasingly integrated economies’ needs. 
The expansion and normalization of the previous co-decision procedure as the 
OLP intend to improve EU efficiency while enhancing the democratic 
credibility of the EU collective decision. Due to intense and fast interactions 
between the external and internal environments, it is difficult to tell whether a 
measure is only to meet the exogenous challenges or endogenous needs; as far 
as the topic covered by the European Semester is concerned, to improve and 
reinforce EU economic policy coordination and surveillance as well as to 
strengthen EU economic governance is the demands from both the outside and 
inside of the Union. However, the implementation and codification of the 
European Semester show that the initial rules and the equilibrium between 
national states and EU supranational institutions laid down in the Maastricht 
Treaty (T0) remain almost intact and the basic framework of the European 
Semester itself, which dates back to the SGP, tends not to be changed 
endogenously (see Table 8.7).  
(b) the institutional 
arrangements and 
Yes; 
Economic policy coordination and surveillance of national fiscal performances 
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increasing sunk costs 
make actors stick to the 
existing course; 
are beneficial to national economies and the EU economy as a whole (cf. Table 
8.7).  
(c) the EU’s new 
measures to cope with 
the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis after the 
enforcement of the 
Lisbon Treaty (T2) are 
unintended 
consequences of the 
initial decisions of the 
TEU (T0) as (i) more 
national government 
competences and 
powers are delegated 
to EU institutions and 
national governments’ 
control over the EU 
policies (i.e. the new 
measures) is further 
reduced, and (ii) 
member states would 
have taken very 
different measures if 
they had faced the 
sovereign debt crisis 
after the enforcement of 
the TEU. 
Not fully confirmed ; 
The European Semester adopted by the EU to address the crisis does not exhibit 
an unintended consequence of the initial rules laid down in the Article 103 TEC 
of the Maastricht Treaty as  
 H16(c)(i):No; The European Semester does not see the trade-off 
competences and powers between national governments and EU supranational 
institutions, as no binding decisions shall be made under the European Semester 
procedure, there is no sanction mechanism for member states’ non-compliance 
to the Commission’s CSRs, and national parliaments have their final decisions 
on national budgetary and economic plans; (see (11) in Table 6.19) 
 H16(c)(ii): Yes; The legal basis to codify the European Semester has been 
shifted from the co-operation legislative procedure to the OLP; due to the 
Conciliation Committee entailed in the OLP, the adopted measure under the 
OLP must obtain approval from both the EP and the Council, while in the 
former process, the EP’s veto can be overridden by a unanimous Council (see 
section 6.4). Besides, the insertion of “the Commission may address a warning 
to the Member State concerned” by the Lisbon Treaty to the original 
prescriptions in the Maastricht Treaty defines a new role for the Commission. 
Moreover, the procedure and format design of the European Semester are based 
on the SGP adopted in 1997 (see Table 8.4); therefore, the European Semester 















The ESRB  
H16 (a);  For the first half: Yes; 
 Article 18 SEA prescribes that “The EEC Treaty shall be supplemented by the 
following provisions:  
‘Article 100a 
1. [...]. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission in co-operation with the European Parliament and after consulting the 
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Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
[...]” 
Article 100a introduced by the SEA deals with the harmonization of legislation to ensure 
the establishment and the functioning of the internal market.  
 The Maastricht Treaty changes the relevant co-operation procedure to the 
co-decision procedure, as the amendment goes: 
“Article 100a(1) shall be replaced by the following:  
‘1. [...]. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
189b and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for 
the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action 
in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.’” 
 The Amsterdam Treaty renumbers ex Article 100a as Article 95 TEC and ex Article 
189b as Article 251 TEC and replaces paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of ex Article 100a 
with new paragraphs;  
 The Nice Treaty goes without changes to these two Articles; 
 The Lisbon Treaty clearly normalizes the previous co-decision procedure as the 
OPL with the emphasis of the EP’s equal role to the Council in Article 100a(1); 
consequently, the EP’s role is accordingly added to other paragraphs in this Article 
(e.g. the words in paragraph 4 “If, after the adoption by the Council or by the 
Commission of a harmonisation measure” are replaced by “If, after the adoption of 
a harmonisation measure by the European Parliament and the Council, by the 
Council or by the Commission”). Consequently, Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 
TEC) says: “1. [...]. The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.”  
Therefore, from the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty, the essence of the legal basis 
to adopt the ESRB remains unchanged, and the interests of the salient actors involved in 
regulating EU financial markets (e.g. EU supranational institutions, societal groups 
represented by the EESC, and national governments) are reiterated and reinforced 
throughout time. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP’s equal role to the Council’s is further 
emphasized and thus the EU supranational institutions’ role gets strengthened; 
 For the Second half: Not applicable, because the co-decision procedure is renamed 
as the OLP and they actually refer to the same set of the legal procedure. Nevertheless, 
the establishment of the ESRB is more exogenously pushed rather than endogenously 
induced (see section 8.1).  
H16 (b); Yes; 
As early as in the Maastricht Treaty, the legal basis to adopt measures related to 
approximating laws and harmonizing legislation so as to ensure the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market was the co-decision procedure (which later got 
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renamed the OLP by the Lisbon Treaty). Measures addressing the improvement of EU 
financial surveillance definitely are beneficial to national economies and the EU project. 
(cf. Table 8.7)  
H16 (c)(i) and 
(ii). 
No; 
The newly implemented ESRB adopted under the Lisbon Treaty does not suggest an 
unintended consequence after the initial rules laid down in the Article 100a TEC of the 
Maastricht Treaty as 
 H16(c)(i):No; The ESRB recommendations have no binding powers to its 
addressees, and there are no sanction mechanisms for non-compliance. Rather, the 
principle under the ESRB is “act/comply-or-explain”, and accordingly, there is no 
trade-off of the competence and powers between national governments and EU 
supranational institutions (see e.g. Table 6.6 and (11) in Table 6.19); 
 H16(c)(ii): No; Under the Maastricht Treaty, the legal basis for the creation of the 
ESRB would be the co-decision procedure, being the same as the OLP under the Lisbon 
Treaty. Moreover, as the ESRB is a new invention without any previous designs to 
model, it is very likely that member states would have taken a similar measure like the 
ESRB to fulfill the vacuum of macro-prudential oversight in the EU project under the 
TEU.  
 
According to the case study results (Tables 8.11 and 8.12), the European 
Semester and the ESRB only partially support the proposed T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam 
Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty path dependent model. The two cases confirm 
H16(b) and the first half of the mechanism specified in H16(a), while the second half 
of H16a appears not true for the European Semester and not applicable to the ESRB; in 
comparison, H16(c) gets partially confirmed by the European Semester while it totally 
collapses in the case of the ESRB. The confirmation of the first half of H16a by the 
two cases shows an enduring structuring effect of the Maastricht Treaty on the EU’s 
later development and strong historical and institutional roots for the two new 
measures; nevertheless, the second half of H16(a) is rejected by the fact that any new 
EU policies and measures shall meet the endogenous needs of the EU, and due to ever 
increasing economic interaction and interdependence between the EU and the external 
world, the assumed distinctive line between exogenous-pushed and endogenous-needed 
policies tend to be diffuse. Moreover, Treaty conclusions and revisions demarcating the 
tested path dependent model result from both external and internal imperatives and 
pressures. However, it is true that from the SGP agreed in 1997 to the implementation 
of the European Semester in 2011, the coordinated issues like budgetary plans are 
domestically-oriented and the basic contents and framework of the SGP have sustained 
through over time into the European Semester. With regard to the case of the ESRB, 
the second half of H16 (a) turns out to be inapplicable, because the legal basis to adopt 
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the ESRB under the Lisbon Treaty has essentially remained unchanged since it was 
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, which, in one respect, displays the stability of the 
EU structure, while in another respect, suggests that issues related to the smoothing 
function of the single market from the onset of the creation of the “European Union” 
have received “maximum” attention as they are covered by the co-decision procedure 
which was firstly introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. As regards the “unintended 
consequences” argument posited in H16(c), neither the European Semester nor the 
ESRB sees the competence and power trade-off between national governments and EU 
supranational institutions, because no legally binding decisions shall be taken under 
both measures. So such a case study result suggests that unintended consequences shall 
be related to the development of EU binding rules. Lastly, apart from the legal bases 
prescribed in the EU Treaties, the relevant preceding practices are another factor that is 
very likely to have enabled the EU member states to take very different measures under 
the Maastricht Treaty if the 2008 crisis had happened at that time: the design and 
operation of the European Semester root in the SGP of 1997, and without the influence 
of the SGP, the structure and procedure of EU policy coordination and surveillance 
would have been different. Without doubt, the environment and context are quite 
different at different time points: the Maastricht Treaty laid down the three stages to 
realize EMU, while the SGP came after the Maastricht Treaty as a sort of guarantee for 
the finalization and proper functioning of EMU. Evolving from the SGP to the 
European Semester, EU policy coordination and surveillance, on the one hand, exhibits 
strong path dependence, while on the other hand, the SGP has changed the initial 
policy making environment, making itself a new variable to the design of the new 
measures in the future by defining possible models to be built upon and available 
choices to be selected from; thus the European Semester can be regarded as an 
unintended consequence of the initial decisions of the TEU (T0) as its policy 
predecessors have altered the initial context where the EU would have taken a different 
measure without the influence of path dependence starting from the SGP. Therefore, 
path dependence entails unintended consequences of possible different measures-taken 
in the initial conditions. In contrast, the ESRB has no precedents to be modeled from, 
and furthermore, its legal basis has remained the same since the Maastricht Treaty, so it 
is possible that the EU would have forged a similar measure like the ESRB to address 
the crisis; consequently, the establishment of the ESRB cannot be viewed as an 
unintended consequence of the initial decisions of the TEU (T0). Based on those 
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findings, Proposition 28 is put forward to condition the effectiveness of unintended 
consequences:  
Proposition 28: Unintended consequences after the initial decision tend to 
appear in two types of situations: (a) adopting new measures of legally binding powers 
where national control over EU policy is constrained; (b) adopting new measures built 
upon the previous practices or models, which have changed the context of the initial 
decision.  
Despite that the proposed path dependent model collapses in the three cases to 
different degrees, looking into the historical and institutional paths of the three new 
measures reveals a dynamically developing Union.  
 
Table 8.13 Historical and Institutional Paths of the Three New Measures since the Maastricht Treaty 
 T0the TEU-  
(Signed on 7 
February 1992 
and entering into 




(Signed on 2 
October 1997 and 
entering into force 
on 1 May 1999) 
T1bthe Nice Treaty- 
(Signed on 26 February 
2001 and entering into 
force on 1 February 
2003) 
T2the Lisbon Treaty 
(Signed on 13 
December 2007 and 








The SGP was 




No 1466/97 of 7 




referred to in 
Article 189c of 
the Treaty”①. 
Accordingly, the 
SCPs “shall be 
submitted before 






Article 4 and 
Article 8).  
In March 2000, 
the Lisbon 
Strategy was 
launched by the 
European Council, 
setting out a 
ten-year strategy 
aiming at making 
the EU “become 
the most dynamic 
and competitive 
knowledge-based 
economy in the 




with more and 
better jobs and 
greater social 
cohesion and 
respect for the 
environment” (④, 
p.2); following a 
Particularly based on 
Article 99(5) and “in 
accordance with the 
procedure laid down in 
Article 252 of the 
Treaty”, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 
1055/2005 of 27 June 
2005 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 
1466/97 was adopted
②. In re-launching and 
revamping the Lisbon 
Strategy in March 
2005, it was agreed that 
a set of IGs consisting 
of BEPGs and EGs 
would be adopted as “a 
general instrument for 
coordinating economic 
policies”, with the 
former “continu(ing) to 
embrace the whole 
range of 
 3 March 2010: 
The Europe 2020 
strategy was adopted 
with the purpose of 
helping the EU “go out 
of the crisis and prepare 
[the] EU economy for 
the next decade”, and it 
is built upon what has 
been achieved and the 
lessons learned from 
the Lisbon Strategy 
starting from 2000 
(revised in 2005)⑤;  
 March 2010: The 
Task Force was 
established and the idea 
of the European 
Semester was put 
forward by the Task 
Force;  
 7 September 
2010: The Ecofin 








a set of new and 
more powerful 
measures so as to 
steer and monitor 
economic policy 
reform to achieve 
the goals: (a) the 
IGs; (b) NRPs; (c) 
CSRs; (d) new 
OMCs launched 
under the Lisbon 






policies, as well as 
employment policy 
insofar as this interacts 
with those policies” 
while the latter 
“ensuring general 
economic consistency 
between the three 
strands of the strategy” 
(③, item 39 (b)); based 
on the IGs, each 
member state shall 
draw up NRPs, which 
“will make allowance 
for national policy 
cycles and may be 
revised in the event of 
changes in the 
situation” (③, item 39 
(c)). Another 
innovation of the 2005 
re-launch is the CSRs, 
which “[f]or the first 
time, policy advice 
covering the entire field 
of economic and 
employment policy was 
submitted to the 
European Council and 
the Council on a 
country-specific basis” 
(④, p.21).  
amendments to the 
Code of Conduct on 
implementing the SGP 
and agreed with the 
launch of the European 
Semester from 1 
January 2011; 
 March 2011: 
Commitments of the 
Euro Plus Pact shall be 
included in the SCPs 
and NRPs; 
 13 December 
2011: The “six-pack” 
became effective, 
among which the 
European Semester 
mechanism was 
codified in Regulation 
(EU) No 1175/2011 of 
the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 
November 2011 
amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 
1466/97, and a new 
element — preventing 
macroeconomic 
imbalances — was 
introduced by 
Regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011 via issuing 
the AMR under the 
European Semester;  
 January 2013: 
The Fiscal Compact 
subsumed in the TSCG 
further strengthened the 
enforcement of the 
MTO demanded by the 
SGP under the 
European Semester;  
 May 2013: The 




further by setting up a 
common budgetary 
surveillance timeline 
for the euro countries, 
which is designed 
under the European 
Semester as being an 
autumn counterpart to 







No precedents to 
the ESRB. 
No precedents to 
the ESRB. 
The EP’s 
resolution on 13 
April 2000 




for systemic risks 
while the EP’s 
resolution on 21 
November 2002 
spotlighted the 




No precedents to the 
ESRB. 
The EP’s resolutions on 
11 July 2007 called for 
identifying and 
evaluating systemic 
risks and potential 
financial crises, on 23 
September 2008 
stressed the subsidiarity 
principle applied to EU 
financial regulation, 




supervision with early 
warnings and 
interventions at the EU 
level. 
Particularly based on 
Article 114 TFEU and 
in accordance with the 
OLP, the ESRB was 
established by 
Regulation (EU) No 
1092/2010 of the 
European Parliament 
and of the Council of 
24 November 2010. 
The ESRB tasks were 
expanded after the 
CRD IV-Package was 
published in the EU 
Official Journal on 27 
June 2013. Besides, the 
forthcoming creation of 
the SSM may change 
the policy domain of 





No precedents to 
the ESM. 
No precedents to 
the ESM. 
No precedents to the 
ESM. 
 May 2010: The 
Ecofin Council agreed to 
establish the temporary 
rescue mechanism EFSF;  
 25 March 2011: The 
European Council made 
amendments to Article 136 
TFEU, providing the legal 
basis to create the 
permanent ESM;  
 11 July 2011: The 
ESM Treaty was signed by 
the eurozone countries;  
 2 February 2012: The 
modified ESM Treaty 
incorporating new 
agreements on the ESM was 
signed again; 
 27 September 2012: 
The ESM Treaty entered 
into force;  
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 8 October 2012: The 
ESM became operational 
after the ratification by all 
17 euro member states; 
 December 2012: The 
ESM granted its first 
assistance to Spain; 
 8 May 2013: The 
ESM approved financial 
assistance to Cyprus; 
 1 July 2013: The 
ESM became the sole 
operational rescue 
mechanism for the euro area 
countries;  
 31 December 2013: 
Spain successfully exited 
the ESM programme. 
Sources: ① Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97; ② Council Regulation (EC) No 
1055/2005; ③Presidency Conclusions-7619/1/05 REV 1. (23 March 2005); ④European 
Commission-SEC(2010) 114 Final (2 February 2010); ⑤“Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Jobs, Towards a Green and Innovative Economy” (European Commission). 
 
Table 8.13 displays different “depths” of HI roots for the three new measures, 
among which the European Semester exhibits the “longest” path from the past 
decisions, echoing the test results for H10 where the European Semester represents 
strong policy stickiness rather than a critical juncture. Table 8.13 also enlightens the 
research results of H10 by the other two cases: both the ESRB and the ESM mark 
critical junctures in each policy domain as they initiate totally new policies to the EU, 
introducing new equilibriums of national-national and/or national-supranational power 
distributions. As for the issues addressed by the ESRB, though after the Amsterdam 
Treaty, there were calls and attention for systemic risks and macro-prudential 
supervision, no concrete actions and policies have materialized at the EU level, and it is 
not until the global financial crisis in 2008 that the issues concerned were placed in the 
foreground; consequently, the ESRB was established under the effectiveness of the 
Lisbon Treaty. As for the adoption of the ESM, Table 8.13 illustrates how it embodies 
a critical juncture for the new path of the EMU assitance mechanism.  
Taking the case study results in Tables 8.11, 8.12 and 8.13 into consideration, 
among the three new measures, the European Semester supports the proposed model of 
T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty most; subsequently, this 
dissertation, according to the analyses in section 4.2.4, will probe into the case of the 
European Semester to check the thirteen analytical factors entailed in the proposed path 




Table 8.14 A Path Dependence Analysis of the European Semester since the Maastricht Treaty 




Path dependence of the European Semester: the evolution of EU budgetary and 
economic policy coordination under the EU Treaties  
T0(the TEU)-  
(IGC 1990-1991)  
 Treaty bases for EU economic policy coordination and surveillance: 
Article 103 TEC and Article 189c TEC (i.e. the co-operation procedure); 
 Concrete measures and policies developed under the TEU: the SGP 
reached in 1997, among which Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
particularly addressed the issue of strengthening the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, where 
national submission of the SCPs was brought into existence.  
T1a(the Amsterdam Treaty)- 
(IGC 1996; T1 stage in 
HI’s T0-T1-T2 model 
indicating analytical 
factors (1)-(4) and 
(8)-(13)) 
 Treaty bases: Article 99 (ex Article 103) TEC and Article 252 (ex Article 
189c) TEC (i.e. the co-operation procedure); no changes brought by the 
Amsterdam Treaty to the two relevant Articles in the Maastricht Treaty; 
 Concrete measures and policies developed under the Amsterdam Treaty: 
the Lisbon Strategy launched in March 2000; 
Analytical factors: (1): Yes; (2) No, the SGP for budgetary surveillance and 
economic policy coordination was not in place yet when the 1996 IGC took 
place, so the factor of micro-level adaptations was absent; (3) No, economic 
policy coordination at that time under the BEPGs and the EGs was not legally 
binding; (4) No, the relevant legal bases were not changed, and national 
governments’ control over relevant EU policies was not reduced as no EU 
institutions shall issue legally binding decisions to the member states; (8) No, 
the Amsterdam Treaty just renumbered ex Articles 103 and 189c TEC without 
changing the prescriptions in the two Articles; (9) and (10): No, the legal basis 
and the co-operation procedure to adopt the measures related to economic 
policy coordination and fiscal condition surveillance remained unchanged 
from the Maastricht Treaty; (11) Yes, policy coordination was indispensable 
for economic prosperity, particularly due to the increasingly integrated national 
economies, and thus switching away from the existing EU policy coordination 
rules and practices meant high costs; (12) Yes, though there were no binding 
rules for the issue concerned, a specific equilibrium between EU institutions 
and national governments had been established by the SGP, and the launch of 
the Lisbon Strategy showed strengthened preferences of actors pushing 
cooperation further; (13): Yes, the SGP went without changes.  
T1b(the Nice Treaty)- 
(IGC 2000; T1 and T2 





 Treaty bases: Article 99 and Article 252 TEC; no changes brought by the 
Nice Treaty to the two relevant Articles laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty 
and in the earlier Maastricht Treaty; 
 Concrete measures and policies developed under the Nice Treaty: (a) the 
re-launched Lisbon Strategy in 2005, introducing the practices of NRPs and 
CSRs; (b) SGP reforms in 2005, including Council Regulation (EC) No 
1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97;  
Analytical factors: (1): Yes; (2)Yes, the SGP rules and the Lisbon Strategy 
were generally regarded as beneficial measures to promote micro-level 
economic growth; (3) No, because no legally binding decisions shall be made 
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for the issue concerned; (4) No, the legal bases for the issue concerned were 
not changed, and no legally binding decisions suggested that national 
governments’ control over relevant EU policies was not reduced; (8), (9), (10): 
No, no Treaty changes were made to the two relevant Articles passed down 
from the Amsterdam Treaty and the co-operation legislative procedure 
remained unchanged, which indicated that the power and competence of the 
supranational institutions also remained unchanged since the Maastricht 
Treaty; (11): Yes, economic policy coordination and surveillance was an 
indispensable element for EU economic growth and prosperity, and breaking 
away from the existing rules and practices suggested high costs for national 
economies; (12)Yes, though there were no binding rules for the issue 
concerned, a specific equilibrium between EU supranational surveillance and 
national governments’ ultimate decisions on their budgetary plans and 
economic policies had been established and reinforced; the SGP reforms and 
the re-launched Lisbon Strategy showed reinforced preferences of national 
governments and EU institutions on the issue concerned; (13)Yes, though the 
SGP was amended, the purpose to do so was to strengthen the SGP rules as 
well as EU economic governance, and the basic principles entailed in the SGP 
were not changed, exhibiting the stickiness of the SGP rules and the increasing 
unlikeliness to change or break away from the SGP radically.  
 A changed context for 2000 IGC negotiations:  
(A) (5) member state preferences for the issue concerned did not undergo 
changes as the relevant Articles in the Nice Treaty remained the same and still 
no legally binding decisions shall be made; thus the presence of factor (1) at 
time T1a(the Amsterdam Treaty) appeared not decisive in shaping national government 
preferences for the issue concerned;  
(B) (6) member state bargaining powers were not relevant for the issue 
concerned; as (3) and (4) at time T1a(the Amsterdam Treaty) influence (6) at time 
T1b(the Nice Treaty), the negation of (3) and (4) at time T1a(the Amsterdam Treaty) did 
appear to account for the negation of (6) at time T1b(the Nice Treaty); 
(C) (7) powers of other actors were maintained at the status quo, as no Treaty 
amendments happened to the two relevant Articles; thus the negation of (4) at 
time T1a(the Amsterdam Treaty) appeared to explain the negation of (7) at T1b(the Nice 
Treaty).  
T2(the Lisbon Treaty) 
(IGC 2007; T2 stage in 




 Treaty bases: Article 121 of the TFEU (amending ex Article 99 TEC) and 
Article 294 TFEU (ex Article 251 TEC) (i.e. the co-decision procedure/the 
ordinary legislative procedure (OLP))  
 Concrete measures and policies developed under the Lisbon Treaty: (a) 
Europe 2020 launched in March 2010, which was based on the lessons and 
experience gained from the Lisbon Strategy covering the first decade of the 
21st century; (b) the European Semester implemented as of 1 January, 2011 and 
codified into EU law in December 2011; (c) new coordinated and monitored 
elements (such as the AMR of the MIP) added to the European Semester 




 A changed context for 2007 IGC negotiations: 
(A)  (5) member state preferences changed from the co-operation procedure 
to the OLP to codify the relevant measures into EU law and stressed the role of 
the EP and the Commission, exhibiting more democratic control as well as 
national willingness to strengthen economic policy coordination and fiscal 
performance surveillance; thus the presence of factor (2) at time T1b(the Nice 
Treaty), which was absent at time T1a(the Amsterdam Treaty), appeared more prominent 
in explaining those preference changes, while mechanism (4) of the posited 
path dependence model was still absent;  
(B) (6) member states understood the needs to strengthen the issue 
concerned, towards which they showed a consensus rather than power 
distributions; the discussion of member state bargaining powers was not 
relevant also because of the negation of (3) and (4) at time T1b(the Nice Treaty); the 
other way around, the absence of (3) and (4) at time T1b(the Nice Treaty) did 
account for the inapplicability of member state bargaining powers (i.e. the 
negation of (6) at time T2(the Lisbon Treaty)) in the proposed path dependence 
model; 
(C) (7) treaty changes made to ex Article 99 TEC prescribed more 
responsibilities for the Commission and the EP, while the relevant legislative 
procedure was shifted from the co-operation procedure to the OLP; thus the 
negation of (4) at time T1b(the Nice Treaty) appeared inadequate to account for the 
changes of (7) at time T2(the Lisbon Treaty), but the essence of the equilibrium 
between EU institutions and member states, since the preventive arm of the 
SGP adopted in 1997, has remained unchanged due to the non-binding 
decisions regarding the issue concerned. The redefined role for EU institutions, 
(7), can be explained by (2), (8), (11), (12) and (13). 
Notes: *‘On the issue concerned’ refers to the themes and functions of the European Semester: EU 
budgetary and economic policy coordination and surveillance, which can be traced back to the SGP’s 
preventive arm (i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97).  
To avoid internal text repetitions, the thirteen analytical factors are not presented here again. For the 
propositions of the thirteen factors and explanations to the formation of the proposed path dependent 
model, see section 4.2.4. 
 
Table 8.14 illustrates how and to what extent the proposed path dependent model 
T0the TEU-T1athe Amsterdam Treaty-T1bthe Nice Treaty-T2the Lisbon Treaty was effective or ineffective 
in accounting for the European Semester. The negation/absence of certain causal steps 
among these thirteen analytical factors entailed in the proposed model restates 
Proposition 28(a): the particularity of the European Semester and its preceding 
practices where no legally binding decisions shall be taken have led to the partial 
collapse of the proposed path dependence model to account for the birth of the 
European Semester. Two findings can be derived from Table 8.14: 
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Proposition 29: Among the three factors: (a) shifts in domestic conditions, (b) 
micro-level adaptations and “sunk costs” and (c) heavily discounted or unintended 
effects, factor (b) tends to exert decisive influence on member state preferences rather 
than the other two factors. 
Proposition 30: On the issues that require coordination and cooperation among 
the individual member states as well as between the EU and national authorities, EU 
institutions (particularly the Commission) tend(s) to be assigned more functional tasks 
to maximize the synergistic effects between each individual member state, while 
national consensus rather than bargaining powers prevails in these issues.  
Proposition 30 once again highlights an important element of the EU project: 
how to deal with the collective challenges faced by the member states from a holistic 
approach so as to maximize the synergistic effects between each individual member 
state; the most realistic and pragmatic reason for the existence and unstopping 
development of the European regional integration project is that it brings extra benefits 
to the member states, which they cannot obtain on their own. The rationale behind the 
ever developing EU can be stated as: achieving more than the sum of individual parts, 
or else nation states would choose to develop separately. The previous Proposition 21 
and H14aextended have already expected a policy tendency of the EU in the future: 
macro-level coordination, cooperation and surveillance of micro-level performances, 
which tend to cut across national borders and/or policy areas. Along with the ever 
integrated economies among member states, EU supranational institutions, typically 
represented by the Commission, tend to play a more active and synergistic role in 





9 Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
In the beginning of this new millennium, the European integration project reached 
another new milestone in its history: after arduous national ratification, the Lisbon 
Treaty, a revision of the aborted Constitutional Treaty, became effective as of 1 
December 2009. A new era of the EU began, but at the same time, the world economy 
encountered a serious recession due to the 2008 global financial crisis, which firstly 
originated from the 2007 US subprime mortgage crisis and subsequently triggered the 
most severe challenge to the EU and EMU since their creation: the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis starting from the fall of 2009. From the US subprime mortgage crisis, to the 
worldwide financial turmoil, and then to the euro area sovereign debt crisis, these 
consecutive events illustrate how deeply the world economies are interconnected with 
each other in the 21st century. 
Facing unexpected difficulties and challenges, the EU and its member states have 
been actively engaging in working out solutions to the negative impacts exerted by the 
global financial crisis, particularly the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which has 
tottered the credibility of the common single currency — the euro — as well as the 
existence of EMU and the European integration project as a whole. After the 2008 
global financial crisis, a series of new measures and policies have been adopted and 
implemented by the EU under the newly effective Lisbon Treaty, which aim at stopping 
the spread of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, restoring financial stability and 
regaining economic growth and prosperity. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 of this dissertation have 
offered a glimpse of the initiatives and new developments of the EU during the 
post-2008 crisis era as well as after the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the research question rose: 
Along with the EU’s various new measures to counter the crisis, where are the EU and 
EMU heading? That is, what are the tendencies of EU economic governance after the 
2008 crisis (as well as after the Lisbon Treaty)? This is the main research question 
(MRQ) of this dissertation, and to address it, another five sub-research questions 
(SRQs) were developed: Is the EU on the way towards a political union/political 
integration (SRQ1)? Do the current developments of the EU signify supranationalism 
over nationalism (SRQ2)? Why did the EU and member states agree to take these new 
measures (SRQ3)? What are the implications and consequences of the new 
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developments of the EU during the crisis (SRQ4)? What are the prospects for the EU 
and EMU in the future (SRQ5)? To answers these questions, this dissertation resorts to 
three main European integration theories — neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism 
(represented by LI, a later development of intergovernmentalism) and HI, which, 
developed on the basis of EU empirical facts and aiming at theorizing the EU, provide 
useful epistemic tools to understand the EU and grasp its developing trends. The 
philosophical base of utilizing European integration theories to answer the research 
questions and unravel our puzzles of the external world is the relationship between 
ontology (i.e. what is the world?) and epistemology (i.e. how can we know the world?): 
human history and various creations till today show that human beings can 
conceptualize and make changes to the external world. Via the epistemic tools offered 
by the three main European integration theories which by nature conceptualize the EU 
project, we can understand and grasp the EU and even make changes to improve the 
EU. Naturally, these conceptual tools should be continuously checked and modified by 
empirical developments, thus the theories themselves also get developed and updated, 
suggesting a benign relationship between theories and practices. Towards the same case 
of EU development, different integration theories may approach it from different 
angles with different focuses and emphasized factors. Then this gives rise to another 
SRQ of this dissertation: What is the explanatory and predictive power of the three 
different European integration theories when they are applied to the EU’s recent 
developments during the post-2008 crisis era (SRQ6)? That is, do these European 
integration theories account for the EU well and are there any theoretical developments 
of new variables and causal mechanisms to the existing theories? What are the 
theoretical reflections of the solutions to the crisis?  
To answer these SRQs and the MRQ, this dissertation utilizes the congruence 
method and process-tracing to test the derived hypotheses from each theory with the 
three selected cases consistently — the European Semester, the ESRB and the ESM. 
Adopted under the Lisbon Treaty, these three newly implemented measures typically 
represent the EU’s three distinctive rationales and approaches to address the negative 
impacts brought by the 2008 global financial crisis, particularly the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. First, implemented from 1 January 2011, the European Semester is designed 
as a reinforced EU policy coordination and surveillance procedure for coordinating, 
monitoring and giving recommendations to national fiscal and economic plans before 
national governments adopt their next year’s budgets; as more coordinated contents 
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and policy dimensions are added to the European Semester’s timetable, it has been 
developed into a grand and inclusive policy coordination and supervision mechanism, 
integrating all possible coordinated policy dimensions into a single framework. The 
European Semester represents the EU’s rationale to address the crisis via strengthening 
the coordination and supervision of member states’ fiscal and economic behavior so as 
to direct national fiscal conditions back to a sustainable track while promoting 
economic growth and job creation. Second, the 2008 global financial repercussions on 
the EU financial market revealed a “blind spot” of the EU financial system: there is no 
EU agency responsible for EU-wide macro-prudential oversight; thus, the purpose of 
establishing the ESRB is to fill such a vacuum in the EU project. The ESRB started on 
1 January 2011, and its main function is to prevent or mitigate systemic risks via 
issuing warnings and recommendations so as to keep financial stability and thus 
contribute to a stable internal market and EU economic growth. Obviously, the creation 
of the ESRB stands for the EU’s rationale to counter the crisis by strengthening EU 
financial supervision and blocking the loopholes of the Union’s financial system. 
Finally, the adoption of the permanent ESM via Treaty revisions shows the EU’s 
rationale to establish a permanent crisis resolution mechanism to provide direct, timely, 
and substantial financial assistance to the debt-ridden euro member states. Inaugurated 
in October 2012, the ESM works alongside the temporary financial assistance 
mechanism — the EFSF, but since 1 July 2013, the ESM has become the sole 
mechanism to provide financial assistance to the new requests in the future. Therefore, 
the three selected cases bear adequate variations for hypothesis tests so far as their 
nature, purposes and functions are concerned.  
Accordingly, chapter one, “Introduction”, mainly presents the research questions, 
the selection of the three European integration theories and the three new EU measures 
as cases to be studied, the research methods of congruence testing and process-tracing, 
and the whole research structure of this dissertation. Chapters two to four give the 
literature review of neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and HI consecutively, and 
based on each theory, hypotheses on the EU’s development during the post-2008 crisis 
era, particularly the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, are derived. Chapter five offers a 
summary of all the hypotheses to be tested, including the relationship among the 
derived main hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses, after which a general description of 
the selected three cases follows. Subsequently, chapters six to eight carry out 
hypothesis tests and case studies, one chapter for one theory’s hypotheses tests, 
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confirming, rejecting or revising these hypotheses, based on which new Propositions, 
as modifications or new developments to the existing European integration theoretical 
frameworks, are posited. Needless to say, all the Propositions in this dissertation are 
subject to further empirical tests. This chapter, Chapter nine, concludes: first, it will 
summarize the research results of hypotheses tests and case studies in the previous 
chapters; second, based on these research results, it will answer the research questions 
put forward in the beginning of this dissertation; finally, it will point out the research 
limitations of this dissertation and possible research topics in the future. Table 9.1 gives 
a summary of the hypotheses test results and new developments to the three EU 
integration theories. 
 
Table 9.1 Summary of Hypotheses Test Results in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight 
Vindication? Refutation? New Findings and Theoretical Developments? 
Neo-functionalism (H1-H5) 
 H1: confirmed; three new findings: 
Proposition 1: Political integration (of different degrees) will follow economic integration, because 
political integration is the extension of economic interests and it is a necessary step to foster further 
economic benefits.  
Proposition 2: The mode and degree of EU political integration are defined and limited by EU 
Treaties; the political integration degree entailed in an EU measure links to the competence division 
and the legal basis prescribed in the Lisbon Treaty, which suggests a low-to-high scale of political 
integration via the division of supporting competences/competences of coordinating economic and 
employment policies — shared competences — exclusive competences.  
Proposition 3: Non-EU nationals’ citizenship acquisitions and foreign tourist travelling, indicating 
personnel mobility across the EU, contribute to increasing social interactions which enhance EU 
political integration; the former tends to be subject to internal factors but impervious to external 
challenges, while the latter tends to be susceptible to external environments but impervious to internal 
crises. 
 H1a: not fully confirmed; a model construct: “Figure 6.5 A Functional Spillover Model”; 
 H1b: confirmed and extended; three new findings:  
H1bextended: Confronted with collective problems and challenges (e.g. the sovereign debt crisis), 
national interest actors, both governmental and non-governmental, support further integration and 
promote European-level solutions over national-level means because (a) to do so brings more benefits 
and (b) it is an internal logical demand by the nature of collective issues which, on the one hand, 
cannot be addressed by individual member states, while on the other hand, the solution to the 
collective issues ultimately relies on the substantial cooperation and efforts of the member states.  
Proposition 4: Confronted with crises, actors of different levels within the EU (i.e. interest groups, 
national governments, and EU institutions) tend to forge common positions and support EU 
integrative actions, so crises also mean opportunities and tend to push further integration; during the 
crises, the EU is a useful scapegoat for national governments to carry out economic and social 
reforms when national interest groups oppose to do so.  
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Proposition 5: The core interests of interest groups decide their positions towards the EU project as 
well as their alliance with the Commission and/or the national government; interest groups tend to 
ever support EU integration so long as their core interests are not intruded upon by EU policies.  
Proposition 6: The strength of interest groups’ support for an EU policy proportionately links to the 
degree of political integration indicated by that policy: the higher the degree of political integration 
entailed in an EU policy, the stronger support by interest groups for that policy will be.  
 H1c: not fully confirmed; five new findings:  
Proposition 7: In formulating solutions to the crisis, the Commission’s proposed initiatives tend to be 
framed up by the European Council and/or the Council of the Minister rather than by the Commission 
itself, which indicates that the fate of the EU still largely rests in the hands of the nation states. 
Proposition 8: Confronted with crises, two main EU institutions, the Commission and the EP, not only 
tend to forge common supportive positions towards the EU project, but also tend to take further 
pro-integrative measures to push the EU forward.  
Proposition 9: EU supranational institutions tend to take crises as opportunities to expand their 
powers and autonomy; meanwhile, EU institutions tend to mutually support each other’s positions. 
(Termed “a synergy of the cultivated spillover effects of EU institutions”)  
Proposition 10: Confronted with crises, actors within the EU, both institutional and non-institutional, 
not only tend to forge common pro-integrative positions toward the crises, but also willingly take new 
integrative steps, thus pushing EU political integration further; meanwhile, these actors tend to 
support each other’s positions. (Termed “a synergy between political spillover and cultivated 
spillover”)  
Proposition 11: A member state’s contributions to the EU integration project, which are largely 
proportionate to its economic power, decide its political status and political clout within the EU 
system, that is, the stronger an economy is, the bigger share it shall contribute, and then the greater 
influence it shall exert over EU policy making; consequently, the EU’s developments tend to reflect the 
biggest member states’ interests.  
 H1d: not fully confirmed; three new findings: 
Proposition 12: There is a distinctive line between the euro and non-euro states within the EU: the euro 
countries tend to be more supportive of the EMU project and more enthusiastic about EMU affairs 
than the non-euro countries.  
Proposition 13: During the crisis, the support rates for EMU tend to decrease, and thus the gap 
between public and elite support for the EMU project tends to get enlarged rather than narrowed.  
Proposition 14: During the crisis, though the EU is still regarded as the most effective level at which to 
tackle the crisis, the public view seeing national governments as the most effective actors to cope with 
the crisis tends to increase. 
 H2: partially confirmed; 
 For the first half of H2, confirmed with a model construct: “Figure 6.17: Favorable Conditions 
Fostering Spillover” and two new findings: 
Proposition 15: Crises, in institutional and/or non-institutional aspects, contribute to the occurrence of 
spillover and thus promote EU integration; five non-institutional factors (i.e. GDP growth; 
government budget deficits and debts, inflation, unemployment and sovereign bond yields) can be used 
to measure the magnitude of the crises, and the more severe the five indicators are, the more likely 
spillover will happen.  
Proposition 16: During a crisis, spillover effects tend to occur, because the threat imposed by the crisis 
tends to activate and promote actors’ motivations to work out solutions to the crisis. 
 For the second half of H2, rejected; a new finding: 
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Proposition 17: The EU integration process will not slow down, because (a) as new unanticipated 
challenges emerge along with globalization, policy areas for member states to reach agreement are not 
going to be exhausted, and (b) though more national actors will pursue their political rights at the EU 
level, confronted with crises, different interests tend to forge common positions, and meanwhile, EU 
institutional arrangements frame up the channels and the possible representation for different 
interests.  
 H3: not fully vindicated; modifications to each sub-hypothesis: 
H3amodified: Increasing cross-border transactions among EU member states demand more regulation at 
the EU level (i.e. European standards, rules, and/or dispute resolution mechanisms) and/or 
macro-frameworks to improve the environment of transactions, leading to a process of EU 
institutionalization where rules are introduced, revised or reinforced on the basis of the mutual 
enforcement among EU institutions, EU rules, and transnational society, which appears more salient 
in front of crises.  
H3bmodified: Along with the process of institutionalization, when EU supranational governance of 
making binding rules in a given policy area increases, national capacity to control policy outcomes in 
that policy area tends to decrease.  
H3cmodified: During crises, the EU’s new developments, which result from increasing cross-border 
transactions and transactors’ demand for more regulation at the EU level and which may lead to a 
higher degree of EU supranational governance, exhibit a path dependence fashion, which is hard to 
reverse as current supranational rules define transactors’ means to pursue their interests and/or 
dispute resolution mechanisms that shape the context for subsequent interactions and delineate the 
normative and institutional contours of future policy.  
 H4: rejected; a new finding: “a saturated state” for some integration approaches and theories to 
account for the EU, e.g. institutional/legalistic spillover does not necessarily accompany EU political 
integration. 
 H5: not fully confirmed, as  
 H5a: confirmed; 
 H5b: confirmed; 
 H5c: not applicable to the three selected cases; 
 H5d: confirmed by the cases of the ESRB and the ESM while refuted by the case of the 
European Semester. 
LI (H6-H9) 
 H6 (a criticism levelled at LI’s predictions of consensus practices in the council): not gaining 
adequate supporting evidence, while the intergovernmentalist assumption that the informal consensus 
practices in the Council tend to be impervious to external factors (e.g. the institutional design, the 
composition of the Parliament, and/or the views of the Commission) (Proposition 18) is still subject to 
empirical tests;  
 H7 (a revised LI three-stage model): the ESM (a suitable case) + the European Semester and the 
ESRB (unsuitable cases) (see Table 7.5); two models constructed: “Figure 7.2 A Simple Steady 
Process of the LI Model l” and “Figure 7.3 An Elaborated Process of the LI Model”; 
 H7a: confirmed by the ESM; two new national preference formation modes and a new scope 
condition added to the LI model presented in Figure 3.2:  
Proposition 19: When addressing the general economic and financial environment and/or the 
interconnectedness across different sectors, the line between producers and taxpayers/regulators tends 
to become diffuse as national preferences are based on the general economic considerations rather 
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than any specific individual sectoral interests, exhibiting an equilibrium of the responsibility and 
actions between the national/micro level and the EU/macro level.  
Proposition 20: In terms of issues directly related to the fate of the euro and/or the EU, national 
preference formation is not only based on economic interest calculations, but also carries political 
considerations on securing the political project which enshrines more than half a century’s efforts.  
Proposition 21: On the issues cutting through multiple policy domains and addressing the 
interconnections and interdependence among various economic and financial sectors, the 
representation of domestic societal interests tends to be weak and diffuse; nevertheless, national 
governments tend to assume predictable pro-integrative positions, and meanwhile, EU institutions and 
their leaders tend to exert influence on policy formation as they possess macro-level information, 
resources, expertise and/or legitimacy that each individual national government lacks. 
 H7b: not confirmed by the ESM and thus another new scope condition added to the LI model:  
Proposition 22: The LI model’s second stage (i.e. interstate bargains) works better when the 
negotiating parties belong to the same block in terms of the relevance of the agreement to them.  
 H7c: confirmed, and more causal mechanisms added to H7c:  
H7cextended: The EU’s new measures and policies to solve the euro area sovereign debt crisis tend to 
reflect big countries’ will rather than supranational entrepreneurship, because EU entrepreneurs 
rarely possess information or expertise unavailable to the member states; the amount of financial 
contributions to the new measures and policies, which is proportionate to member states’ economic 
powers, decides each member state’s political influence and bargaining power over the formation of 
the new measures and policies — the measures and policies concerning only EMU countries tend to 
reflect Germany’s and France’s national interests, which, however, can be challenged by a coalition of 
other EMU member states, particularly by the coalition forged by Italy and Spain.  
Three new findings after H7b and H7c: 
Proposition 23: Interstate bargains consist of (several rounds of) national interest swaps and 
compromises; negotiating parties can make use of various strategies to secure their national interests 
the most, such as (a) offering package deals, (b) forming an alliance with other powerful parties, (c) 
making concessions in the marginal interests in exchange for support for core interests, (d) meeting 
certain demands of domestic opposition, (e) threatening to veto, (f) withdrawing from financial 
commitments, and/or (g) excluding recalcitrant negotiators. 
Proposition 24: National core interests are the bottom line of interstate bargains, which tend to be 
unwavering during negotiations while exhibiting national policy tradition over time.  
Proposition 25: The eurozone sovereign debt crisis further strengthens Germany’s leading role while 
weakening France’s political leverage in EMU affairs; nevertheless, Germany must form a coalition 
with France so as to materialize its national interests. Consequently, on the one hand, the new EMU 
policies and measures tend to start from and/or end at the merger and/or compromise of the 
propositions of the two core euro states, which normally are characterized by a German-French style 
of stricter v.s. lessened fiscal rules and of budgetary cuts v.s. spending growth emphases; on the other 
hand, Germany tends to make concessions to France’s demands, but the negotiation results tend to 
represent Germany’s national interests more than France’s due to asymmetrical national economic 
powers. 
 H7d: not fully confirmed by the ESM, and thus a modified H7d:  
H7dmodified: In order to solve the debt crisis, nation states make institutional choices to delegate and 
pool sovereignty to EU supranational institutions and/or intergovernmental institutions among (part 
of) EU member states so as to guarantee the credibility of intergovernmental commitments, and the 
latter may cause differentiated integration speeds among EU member states. 
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 H7e: confirmed and extended; 
H7eextended: Member states’ credible commitments can be guaranteed and realized via strengthening 
the national executive, the national judicial branch, the national parliament and/or the very domestic 
groups that support the policy in the first place vis-à-vis other domestic forces favoring 
non-compliance. 
 H7f: not applicable till the end of 2013 and remaining open to empirical tests in the future;  
 H7g and H7h: confirmed by LI’s failure in accounting for the European Semester and the ESRB; 
further complemented by another two scope conditions: Propositions 21 and 22.  
 H8: not fully confirmed by the ESM, fully rejected by the European Semester and partially 
rejected by the ESRB; two points justified: (a) LI’s argument of EU constitutional settlement and 
possible substantial reforms due to unforeseen exogenous shocks, and (b) crises can also be 
opportunities for incremental changes or for substantive reforms; a new finding: a crack on national 
government control over their fiscal activities, which is a core of national interests and expected to 
remain national, has been signaled by the ESM. 
 H9: EP election turnout data in 2014 not available in the spring of 2014, and thus only 
preliminary analyses. 
HI (H10-H16) 
 H10: confirmed by the ESRB and the ESM (which indicate critical junctures) while rejected by 
the European Semester (which displays strong path dependence rather than a critical juncture);  
 H11: confirmed;  
 H12: not fully confirmed; new findings echoing, for example, Proposition 4; holistic approaches 
to the crisis stressed; 
 H13: not fully confirmed; two new findings:  
Proposition 26: The once competitive options are not the necessary components of path dependence, 
but the unique functions and indispensable role of a new measure tend to adequately guarantee path 
dependence initiated by the new measure. 
Proposition 27: Institutional structuring effects claimed by HI appear more observable in the legally 
binding measures adopted by the collective Community method, while they tend to be diffuse and weak 
in the measures concluded by intergovernmental approaches, because the latter are more subject to 
intergovernmental bargains and political will. 
 H14: H14(a)-(d) all confirmed except H14(d) not applicable to the European Semester and the 
ESRB; a newly developed favorable condition added to H14(a)-(d): 
H14aextended: The EU’s new measures to address the crisis entail considerable institutional start-up 
costs and/or holistic collective approaches beyond individual member states’ capacity which intend to 
serve the interests of the EU as a whole while maximizing each individual member state’s gains from 
the increasingly integrated process; thus strong incentives are there for actors to stick to the new 
measures. 
H14bmodified: National actors actively engage in learning and adapting to the new measures as the new 
measures are considered helpful to keep economic and financial stability; as actors gain more 
experience and expertise with these new measures and/or due to the inspiration from other practices, 
they are likely to introduce further innovations and changes into these measures and/or into other 
related policy areas. 
H14cextended: The new measures are compatible with the activities of other actors and institutions, and 
moreover, the new measures promote new developments in the linked areas and policies, which in turn 
increase the viability of the new measures; in addition, political decisions to make a new measure the 
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sole available mechanism of its kind reinforce the viability of the new measure. 
H14eadded: The uniqueness and indispensability of the new measures to the EU project also contribute 
to nurturing path dependence after they have been taken. (restating Proposition 26) 
 H15: confirmed; echoing H14cextended; 
 H16: partially confirmed by the ESRB and the European Semester, while totally rejected by the 
ESM; three new findings: 
Proposition 28: Unintended consequences after the initial decision tend to appear in two types of 
situations: (a) adopting new measures of legally binding powers where national control over EU 
policy is constrained; (b) adopting new measures built upon the previous practices or models, which 
have changed the context of the initial decision. 
Proposition 29: Among the three factors: (a) shifts in domestic conditions, (b) micro-level adaptations 
and “sunk costs” and (c) heavily discounted or unintended effects, factor (b) tends to exert decisive 
influence on member state preferences rather than the other two factors. 
Proposition 30: On the issues that require coordination and cooperation among the individual member 
states as well as between the EU and national authorities, EU institutions (particularly the 
Commission) tend(s) to be assigned more functional tasks to maximize the synergistic effects between 
each individual member state, while national consensus rather than bargaining powers prevails in 
these issues. 
Notes: Table 9.l is complementary to Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
With the research results listed in Table 9.1, the answers to the MRQ and SRQs 
raised in the Introduction to this dissertation (chapter one) can now be given. The 
following first addresses the six SRQ, and then comes to the MRQ.   
SRQ1 asked whether the EU is on the way towards a political union/political 
integration. Based on the empirical analysis of this dissertation, the answer is “Yes”. 
Table 6.1 indicates that the EU is on the way towards a political union, which, 
nevertheless, is unlikely to evolve into an entity of the highest degree of political 
integration (i.e. Mode 6 in Table 6.1); a prominent characteristic of this political union 
is the uneven political integration degrees across different policy areas, where the 
highest degree of political integration is entailed in the operation of the ECB with a 
unified monetary policy for the euro member states while the lowest degree of political 
integration tends to appear in policy coordination areas without legally binding powers 
to the member states, such as the European Semester. (See also the vindication of H1, 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 6 and 10, and the new finding to H4) 
SRQ2 asked whether the current developments of the EU signify 
supranationalism over nationalism. The answer, in light of the research results, is “Not 
too much”. According to Table 6.19 and the hypotheses test results of H3 about EU 
supranational governance based on transaction-based theory, implementing legally 
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binding policies is the key to pushing EU supranational governance over national 
control (see H3bmodified). Since the two new measures — the European Semester and 
the ESRB — do not have binding powers to their addressees, they do not signify 
supranationalism over nationalism, but the two do display strengthened and improved 
EU economic governance. The two measures’ unique functions and indispensable roles 
to the EU project indicate the trend of EU supranational governance in the future: (a) 
addressing collective challenges from holistic approaches (e.g. H14aextended); (b) 
emphasizing macro-level coordination and surveillance which serve the general 
interests of micro-level economic activities and tends to cut across different policy 
areas (e.g. H3amodified and Proposition 21); and (c) enhancing and improving 
coordination and cooperation among various actors at both the EU and national level 
(e.g. Proposition 30). In contrast, the ESM, which almost fully confirms the eleven 
causal steps entailed in H3 (see Tables 6.19 and 6.20), expresses supranationalism over 
nationalism, but the ESM has been developed by the intergovernmental approach (i.e. 
concluded by part of EU member states via interstate bargains) rather than by the 
Community method (e.g. the OLP which codified the European Semester and created 
the ESRB). The intergovernmental method, however, imposes new challenges for the 
EU: how can the intergovernmental treaties (which may only stand for part of member 
states’ interests) be compatible with the EU legal framework (i.e. the acquis 
communautaire), and to what extent is it justifiable for these intergovernmental 
interests to make use of existing EU institutions and resources which are supposed to 
serve the collective interests of the EU? Those worries had already been cited by the 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron when the TSCG went ahead without the 
participation of the UK (see Miller 27 March 2012). The parallel of intergovernmental 
approaches with EU collective decision-making also brings about another two concerns: 
first, intergovernmental treaties concluded by only a part of the member states and thus 
not binding to all tend to divide the EU member states into “ins” and “outs”, which 
causes different integration speeds (e.g. H7dmodified) and may polarize the existing 
cleavages in the EU project, such as South-North, big-small, core-periphery or 
euro-non-euro; second; intergovernmental treaties, though legitimized by national 
governments and their electorates, lack the participation and legitimization of the EP at 
the EU level, and thus raise the issue of democratic credibility when implemented at 
the EU level (Hallerberg et al. September 2012, 29). As a consequence, both the EU 
and its member states must solve the legality challenges and implementation problems 
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brought by the juxtaposition of existing EU law and the newly concluded 
intergovernmental binding agreements among (part of) EU member states. 
As for SRQ3 about the reasons for the EU and member states to agree to take 
these new measures, the research reveals that basically, dealing with the collective 
sovereign debt crisis as well as the general financial turmoil and economic recession in 
the wake of 2008 global financial crisis is beyond individual member states’ capacity 
and ability (see confirmation of H5b). The new measures, approaching the problems 
from the macro level with holistic perspectives, can bring realistic benefits to national 
economies (e.g. H1bextended and H14aextended). The supranational entity — the EU — is 
the most suitable available choice to fulfill the functions of macro-level coordination 
and surveillance, and despite the fact that public support for EMU decreased during the 
crisis, the EU is still regarded as the most effective level at which to tackle the crisis 
(Propositions 13 and 14). Other explanations may include: (a) national leaders’ political 
considerations to secure the EMU and the EU project (Proposition 20), (b) EU policies 
are taken as a useful “scapegoat” to carry out reforms that national levels should but 
have failed to implement due to domestic pressures and opposition (Proposition 4), (c) 
crises push both the EU and national governments to forge common pro-integrative 
positions (Proposition 10), (d) national interest groups’ representation tends to be 
diffuse on the issues cutting through multiple policy domains and/or addressing 
financial and economic interconnectedness and interdependence (Propositions 19 and 
21), (e) policy tradition and institutional structural effects (see the confirmation of H11), 
(f) international discourse and the EU’s own original initiatives (see hypotheses tests 
for H5d).  
Concerning SRQ4, each confirmed hypothesized causal mechanism and the 
revisions and theoretical developments made to the hypotheses in this dissertation 
explain the implications and consequences of the EU’s new developments during the 
crisis from various perspectives. For instance, from a neo-functionalist point of view, 
the new EU measures of economic integration lead to EU political integration, the 
degree of which tends to increase along with growing economic cooperation and social 
interaction among member states; standing on an LI camp, we find that though national 
governments, facing the severe collective crisis, tend to reach a consensus on 
strengthening policy coordination and fiscal, financial and economic supervision from 
a macro perspective, the EU’s new developments during the post-2008 crisis era still 
tend to reflect big countries’ will, especially on EMU affairs where Germany’s leading 
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role has been further reinforced while France’s political leverage has been weakened 
via the dealing with the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In comparison, from an HI 
perspective, though the crisis has pushed a gush of institutional and policy reform of 
the EU, not all policies suggest critical junctures of substantial reforms to the EU 
project, and some measures display strong stickiness to EU and member state previous 
practices and policy traditions. Therefore, these three integration theories provide us 
with very useful epistemic lenses and conceptual tools to understand and unravel the 
EU.  
SRQ5 is closely related to SRQ4, as the implications and consequences of the 
EU’s new developments naturally indicate and, to a certain degree, prescribe the future 
of the EU and EMU. As a matter of fact, SRQ5 can be viewed as another version of the 
MRQ; still, SRQ5 about the prospects of the European integration project can be 
approached by probing the nature and the dynamics and driving forces of the EU. So 
firstly, what is the EU? According to Cini and Borragán (2010b, 3),  
 
“The European Union is a family of liberal-democratic countries, acting 
collectively through an institutionalized system of decision making. When 
joining the EU, members sign up not only to the body of EU treaties, 
legislation, and norms (the so called acquis communautaire), but also to a set 
of shared common values, based on democracy, human rights, and principles 
of social justice. Even so, members, and indeed the European institutions, 
are keen to stress the diversity of the Union — most obviously in cultural 
and linguistic terms.”  
 
Compared with such a general conception of the EU, the EU, based on the 
analysis in this dissertation, can be defined from its functions:  
The European Union is a political project purposely forged by the European 
national states to meet their common challenges and to realize collective prosperity, 
stability and security. The EU aims to properly complement national functions and 
fulfill those that are beyond each individual member state’s capacity and ability. 
Challenges and crises always expose nation states’ limitations while also pointing out 
the necessity and the potential benefits of strengthening EU-wide supranational 
governance, coordination and cooperation, and thus they also mean and indeed provide 
opportunities for EU growth and development (e.g. Proposition 4). Coming into the 
new era of globalization, the likelihood for EU member states to retreat from this 
regional integration regime becomes dimmer, while the importance of the EU, like “an 
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aircraft carrier” providing a safe and stable platform for the member states (like 
“individual aircrafts”) has ever been increasing. How would it be realistic and possible 
for a single “aircraft” (i.e. an EU member state) to abandon this European “carrier base” 
(i.e. the EU)? More likely is that member states will build this giant “carrier” more 
accommodationable for each “aircraft” to handle specific “internal mechanic 
difficulties” (i.e. domestic problems) and/or “external bad weather” (i.e. external 
challenges).  
From such a perspective, besides supranational and national actors, newly 
emerging situations and crises (being external or internal) are also the driving forces 
behind the integration process (see Propositions 4 and 9 and justified point (b) after H8 
test), and EU dynamics, apart from institutionalization and intergovernmental 
negotiations, also rest on solving problems arising from national searches for economic 
prosperity, political stability and military security from the ever integrated and 
interdependent national economies as well as the world economy. Consequently, this 
dissertation asserts that EU economic integration with political integration results is 
irreversible, and the EU and EMU have become more mature and stronger after 
weathering through the crisis.  
SRQ6 addresses the explanatory and predictive power of the three European 
integration theories to account for EU recent developments after the 2008 crisis. Based 
on the empirical analysis of this dissertation, the following answers can be given.  
Table 9.1 provides the hypotheses test results for each hypothesis derived from 
the three European integration theories. Generally speaking, the causal mechanisms 
posited by the three theories (except the inapplicable situations and unsuitable cases) 
largely account for the three selected measures, and meanwhile, based on the case 
studies, some of the derived hypotheses have been modified or extended, new 
propositions (as many as thirty) with some new variables have been added, and three 
models have been constructed (see Figure 6.5 A Functional Spillover Model; Figure 
6.17: Favorable Conditions Fostering Spillover; Figure 7.3 An Elaborated Process of 
the LI Model). 
To be specific, among the five neo-functionalist hypotheses (H1-H5), H1 is fully 
confirmed, while the other four partially collapse in the three cases. Though H1 has 
been vindicated by the three measures, the specific three sub-type spillover 
mechanisms (H1a-H1c) are effective to different degrees, and only H1b (i.e. political 
spillover) has been fully confirmed by the three cases. H1d is an attempt to ascertain a 
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proportionate increase among political spillover, cultivated spillover and public support, 
along with increasing functional spillover; the case study results, however, refute such 
a proportionate connection assumption, and public support rates for the EU project 
appear to be issue- and country-specific. With regard to LI — a later and adapted form 
of intergovernmentalism — it turns out to be the most rigorous theoretical framework 
among the three selected theories, as it not only effectively accounts for the creation of 
the ESM, but also the two scope conditions attached to the LI model work well in 
explaining LI’s applicability to the suitable case (i.e. the ESM) and LI’s weak 
applicability to the unsuitable cases (i.e. the European Semester and the ESRB). 
Nevertheless, LI’s failure and inapplicability to EU daily decision-making (see Table 
7.5) have restrained its theoretical explanatory and predicative power to account for the 
EU’s developments. Targeting at and specializing in explaining EU milestone-like 
developments brought about by intergovernmental negotiations, the LI model has been 
continuously checked, modified, and expanded; similarly, in this dissertation, the 
existing propositions got refined and new factors and causal mechanisms were added to 
the LI model. As a consequence, this dissertation with new propositions has sharpened 
LI’s accuracy and rigorousness. Besides, the intergovernmentalist constitutional 
settlement argument has been justified, while another two assumptions (Proposition 18 
and H9) still need further checking. As for HI, it advocates a retrospective view to 
evaluate EU policies and offers a dichotomous understanding of EU development: path 
dependence or critical junctures. Any policies and actions must have historical roots 
and ancestors, or else they represent critical junctures so far as they define a new 
national-national and/or supranational-national competence and power geometry 
compared with the previous practices. The argument of path dependence emphasizes 
policy continuities due to the structural effects of the context as well as the mutual 
structural effects between policies and the general context (institutional and 
non-institutional), while the proposition of critical junctures stresses substantial 
reforms departing from the previous practices or the existing structural constraints, 
indicating changed competence and power distributions between EU institutions and 
member states and/or among the member states. Such dialectically dichotomous 
historical and institutionalist views seem to make HI unassailable — it actually 
represents an effective epistemic instrument to recognize and grasp reality, but still, the 
case study results of this dissertation indicate several deficiencies of HI assumptions 
(e.g. see Propositions 26 and 27). For example, HI’s arguments of the trade-off between 
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increasing supranational governance and decreasing national control over EU 
policy-making and unintended consequences (also a neo-functionalist perspective) tend 
to be only applicable to explain legally binding policies; besides, not all EU policies 
have solid and deep historical roots, and suddenly rising unexpected situations can 
bring new sprouts of paths, such as in the case of the ESM.  
Approaching the EU from different perspectives with different focuses, the three 
integration theories tend to complement rather than compete with or substitute each 
other. Neo-functionalism tends to grasp the general spillover and supranational 
governance trends of the EU project in a globalization context with the focuses on EU 
collective decision-making involving supranational institutions together with national 
governments and interest groups, while LI is particularly devoted to explaining EU 
leaping developments forged by intergovernmental negotiations, emphasizing national 
interests, bargaining powers and asymmetrical gains. Generally speaking, 
neo-functionalism takes a top-down approach, while LI (intergovernmentalism) 
presents a bottom-up view to account for the EU. Nevertheless, despite their sharp 
contrasts, it is amazing to find that the new findings via their own lenses tend to 
support the propositions of each theory’s “traditional opponent”. For instance, 
Proposition 5 formulated after the neo-functionalist political spillover hypothesis test 
stressed “core interests” of societal groups in deciding their positions towards the EU 
process and EU policies, which actually is a key concept wielded by LI (see 
Proposition 24 and Figure 7.3); in turn, the case study results after the LI model test 
further confirmed the indispensable role of EU supranational institutions and their 
leaders (Proposition 21), which has always been valued the most by neo-functionalism 
— even though the existing LI model has already admitted and prescribed the role for 
the supranational actors as being one of its scope conditions (see H7). Moreover, both 
neo-functionalism and LI address some common topics: (a) public support for the EU 
(H1d and H9), (b) potential two speeds of integration (Proposition 12, H7dmodified), and 
(c) the proportionate links among the national economic power, financial contribution 
to the EU/EMU project, and the political leverage over EU/EMU affairs and thus EU 
policies tending to express big member states’ wills and preferences (Proposition 11 
and H7cextended). Viewing all of these three integration theories together, all of them are 
based on the micro level economic activities: neo-functionalism emphasizes 
cross-border transactions, LI domestic constituents (e.g. producers v.s. 
taxpayers/regulators), HI “sunk costs”; without doubt, micro economic activities are 
550 
 
the ultimate base, engine and goal of the European integration project. 
Regarding the possibilities suggested in the Introduction (chapter one) of this 
dissertation of synthesizing multiple causal chains linking the specific independent and 
dependent variables (i.e. possible “equifinality” in typology), this dissertation suggests 
a combination of the three distinctive theoretical tools to explain a new measure 
simultaneously, as each of the three has its own peculiarities. The experience of the 
case studies of this dissertation vividly supports the following.  
Proceeding with the hypotheses tests in chapters six, seven and eight, the 
prominent features of each theory were revealed: neo-functionalism stresses spillover 
effects and the pro-integrative role of both supranational and national actors; in contrast, 
LI mainly focuses on national interests and preferences and national governments’ role 
in deciding EU policies via interstate bargains, while HI tends to explore policy 
constraints and roots from the past into the future, emphasizing the structural effect of 
path dependence. Facilitated by the three theories, the dissertation has obtained 
particular epistemic lenses and theoretical tools to understand and unravel the EU: 
chapter six, offering neo-functionalist hypotheses tests, makes studies on EU collective 
decision-making mainly involving EU supranational institutions as well as the general 
trend of EU economic integration; then chapter seven of LI changes the focus to the 
national states: national interests, bargaining powers, potential asymmetrical 
institutional access and benefit gains, and finally chapter eight diverts attention to the 
policy roots and historical paths of the new measures. Obviously, each of the three 
theories has its own strengths and particular value in accounting for the three new 
measures as well as the EU, and it is not until in chapter eight that the relevant previous 
EU practices and policy traditions of the three new measures were revealed.  
Therefore, combining the three integration theories’ particularities together will 
be a powerful and relatively comprehensive epistemic tool to understand, grasp and 
unravel the EU. Equipped with the three European integration theories, when coming 
across a new EU policy or measure, we know how to understand it better by asking and 
answering: how has it been brought into existence against a specific context (a 
neo-functionalist perspective)? What are national government positions based on 
domestic interest groups (an LI approach)? How is it connected with the previous 
practices and how about its viability in the future (an HI perspective)? Based on the 
research results of this dissertation, a scope condition for the application of the three is 
advised: neo-functionalism is more suitable to explain policies and measures developed 
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via the EU’s collective decision-making procedures, while LI is more appropriate in 
accounting for those developed outside the Community method, that is, via 
intergovernmental negotiations; by comparison, HI is more applicable to those of 
legally binding powers to their addressees.  
Having focused on the answers to the SRQs of this dissertation, it is now 
possible to move to the MRQ of this dissertation: along with the EU’s new 
developments during the post-2008 crisis era, particularly during the eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis, what are the tendencies of EU/EMU economic governance now 
and in the future? The first five SRQs actually have provided detailed answers to the 
MRQ from five related, but different angles. Here, focuses are shifted to the three 
selected cases themselves to see what trends of EU economic governance in the future 
are particularly entailed and reflected by the three new measures. The most prominent 
feature of the European Semester and the ESRB is that under both, no legally binding 
decisions shall be taken, which indicates a trend of strengthening EU economic 
governance in the future: promoting macro level guidance, cooperation and 
surveillance, which may not necessarily have legally binding powers to the addressees, 
so as to serve micro level activities better. This trend demands and suggests another 
trend of EU economic governance in the future: improving policy and institutional 
coordination and cooperation cutting across multiple policy areas and involving 
various national and supranational actors, which implies taking holistic approaches to 
the issues concerned from a whole EU perspective so as to bring out a maximal 
synergetic effect of each individual member state as well as individual policies and 
agencies (see also Proposition 30); in essence, how to maximize the synergistic effect, 
and as for the EU, how to maximize the extra benefits brought by the coming together 
of 28 member states. With regard to the ESM, its formation and functional evolution 
show a German-Franco dominance over EMU affairs, where German leverage begins 
to surpass France’s due to the enlarged gap of the economic powers between them, but 
at the same time, France is an indispensable partner/coalition member for Germany to 
materialize its national interests. Being designed as the permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism for the euro area countries, the ESM indicates a justification for a 
two-speed EU. Last but not least, the EU’s new developments after 2008 almost 
happen with the effectiveness of the Lisbon Treaty — the selected three cases are the 
examples, so the conclusions above also suggest EU economic governance trends after 
the Lisbon Treaty.    
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Apart from the theoretical developments, new findings and answers to the 
research questions, this dissertation also has its research limitations: it does not 
examine the interactions and possible synergetic effects of the three selected measures, 
neither does it delve into the real impacts and effectiveness in solving the crisis after 
their implementation. Nevertheless, with solid literature reviews and applications of 
three major European integration theories, this dissertation has gained a broad 
understanding of EU economic governance and the EU’s efforts to solve the crisis, 
which shall build up a platform for the further research on the issues related to the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis and EU economic governance. Research after this 
dissertation could address the limitations pointed out above, mainly focusing on the 
practical functions and effects of the individual measures over time, such as the 
European Semester. Moreover, the EU’s methods, experience, and lessons to counter 
the severe economic recession and the sovereign debt crisis have provided valuable 
examples for other countries and regions to improve economic governance. As the 
author of this dissertation comes from China, the world’s second largest economy today, 
the author plans to carry out research of “lessons and inspirations of EU economic 
governance during the post-2008 crisis era to China’s economic governance in 
transformation”. This dissertation is a summary of doctoral research, but a new starting 






Appendix 1: The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
151
: Surveillance of Budgetary 
Policies 
 Overview:  
Agreed in 1997, the SGP contains two arms: “[t]he preventive arm seeks to ensure that 
fiscal policy is conducted in a sustainable manner over the cycle, preventing recourse to the 
corrective arm” while “[t]he corrective arm – also known as the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) – sets out the framework for countries to take corrective action in the case 
their government deficit is above 3% of GDP or when their debt is over 60% of GDP and 
not falling quickly enough towards the Treaty reference value” (SGP FAQs, European 
Commission).  
 
“The cornerstone of the preventive arm is the country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO), defined in structural terms (i.e. in cyclically 
adjusted terms and net of one-off and other temporary measures). Member 
States outline their medium-term budgetary plans in stability and 
convergence programmes (SCPs), which are submitted and assessed 
annually in the context of multilateral fiscal surveillance under the European 
Semester. 
[...] 
Non-compliance with either the preventive or corrective arms of the Pact can 
lead to the imposition of sanctions for euro area countries. In the case of the 
corrective arm, this can involve annual fines for euro area Member States 
and, for all countries, possible suspension of Cohesion Fund financing until 
the excessive deficit is corrected.” (“Stability and Growth Pact”, European 
Commission) 
 
In short, “3%” and “60%” are the two key convergence criteria for the EU member states to 
join EMU as well as the rules in place to ensure sound public finances of the euro countries. 
The evolution of the SGP reflects the demands and necessity of strengthening the fiscal 
discipline for the eurozone states. In comparison, “[t]he Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure (MIP) operates alongside the SGP to identify and correct macroeconomic 
                                                 




imbalances and monitor competitiveness developments” (“Stability and Growth Pact”, 
European Commission). 
These two crucial ‘convergence criteria’ were maintained later, while other elements were 
introduced during the evolution of the SGP between 1997 and the SGP reforms of 2005, in 
2011 with the “six-pack” and in 2013 by the “two-pack”. Moreover, the intergovernmental 
TSCG, also known as the “Fiscal Compact”, concluded by the eurozone countries plus 
eight non-eurozone members (but without the participation of the UK and the Czech 
Republic), has entered into force on 1 January 2013. An emphasis was notably put on the 
country-specific MTO, aimed at meeting the two fiscal criteria defined in the original SGP, 
which actually is the core of the “balanced budget rule” as introduced by the TSCG (Hosli 
and Pan 2014). 
 
 Legal basis of the SGP: 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): Articles 121 and 126 provide 
the legal basis for the SGP preventive arm and the corrective arm and the EDP; Protocol 12 
defines public deficit and debt reference values: 3% and 60% of GDP. 
 
 The evolution of the SGP’s preventive arm:  
 Origin: 
1997: The SGP was approved as secondary legislation: Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 
1997 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and 
Coordination of Economic Policies, which entered into force on 1 July 1998.  
 Significant SGP reforms in 2005 and 2011via the six-pack: 
2005: Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and 
Coordination of Economic Policies, which entered into force on 27 July 2005. “The two original 
criteria were maintained but other aspects were introduced, including the long-term sustainability of 
public finances in the assessment of the stability and convergence programmes”.①  
2011: Two of the six-pack — Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 On the Strengthening 
of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic 
Policies and Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area — became 
effective as of 13 December 2011. The former codified the European Semester into EU law, while the 
later introduced an interest-bearing deposit sanction (amounting to 0.2% of GDP) to the preventive 
arm of the SGP.  
March 2010: The European semester was agreed, and at the beginning it was framed as a new code of 
conduct on the implementation of the SGP, which only needed approval from the Ecofin Council of 7 
September 2010 to initiate the first cycle of the Semester.(④, p.12) 
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September 2010: The Commission proposed the “six-pack”, which consists of five Regulations and 
one Directive to strengthen EU economic governance.  
12 January 2011: The adoption of the first AGS by the Commission marked the start of the first 
European semester in line with the Europe 2020 strategy (which was launched in 2010, concerning the 
EU’s ten-year growth and jobs strategy).  
March 2011: The Euro+ Pact (i.e. the Euro Plus Pact) concluded by the 17 euro states with another 
six non-euro member states (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) aims at 
“improving the fiscal strength and competitiveness of Member States” via “present(ing) their 
commitments in time to be included in their SCPs and NRPs”①, and thus the Euro Plus Pact falls 
directly into the European Semester mechanism. It is not a secondary legislation, and rather a political 
commitment of the euro area states and other interested EU member states to enhance policy 
coordination.  
13 December 2011: The “six-pack” entered into force, legislatively bringing the coordination, 
surveillance and policy advice given on the budgetary and economic policies under the same umbrella 
of the European Semester. Among other things, “[t]he Economic Dialogue codified by the six-pack 
gives the European Parliament the right to intervene in the Semester at almost any point in time”, thus 
redefining the EP’s role in as well as giving legitimacy and credibility to the Semester process (④, 
p.14); meanwhile, the new MIP is also introduced by the six-pack, “which imposes compulsory 
adjustment on euro area Member States that suffer from significant macroeconomic imbalances” (④, 
p.15). Furthermore, the six-pack strengthens financial sanctions for euro area states by introducing 
reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) for most sanctions.  
 Further SGP reforms after the six-pack: 
1 January 2013: The Fiscal Compact, contained in the intergovernmental TSCG, entered into force, 
further strengthening SGP key provisions by enshrining a balanced budget rule with a lower limit of a 
structural deficit of 0.5% GDP and a country-specific automatic correction mechanism “in case of 
deviation from the MTO (as defined in the SGP) or the adjustment path towards it (also included in the 
‘two-pack’)” into national law, preferably of constitutional nature②, and the failure to do so may lead 
to a financial sanction of 0.1% GDP imposed by the ECJ⑤. The TSCG without the participation of the 
UK and the Czech Republic, is binding on all euro states which shall ratify it, “while other contracting 
parties will be bound only once they adopt the euro or earlier if they signal it”②. Other provisions in 
the TSCG aiming at reinforcing the SGP include: re-stating the debt rules introduced by the six-pack, 
particularly deficit behavioural commitment reproducing RQMV for the euro states and reinforcing 
economic policy coordination and surveillance via “ex-ante coordination of debt issuance plans among 
Contracting Parties and economic partnership programmes for Member States in EDP, which detail the 
structural reforms needed for an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficit”⑤. Though 
the TSCG is an intergovernmental Treaty and not an EU Treaty, it does prescribe the incorporation of 
its substance into the EU legal framework within five years. Currently, the TSCG runs in parallel with 
the six-pack. In fact, the TSCG further strengthens SGP rules and continues SGP reforms after the 
six-pack via an intergovernmental approach: it imposes more stringent sanction rules than the six-pack 
does. For instance, Article 7 of the TSCG suggests that the RQMV applies to all stages of the EDP, as 
the eurozone states breaching the deficit criterion have to support the Commission’s proposals or 
recommendations unless a qualified majority opposes the Commission’s decisions. This means RQMV 
“applies to all stages of the EDP, even if not foreseen in the six-pack”⑤. 
30 May 2013: The “two-pack”, built on the six-pack and complementing the SGP reforms, “the 
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European framework for fiscal surveillance, and the European Semester for economic policy 
coordination” while only applicable to the euro area states, entered into force, with the purpose of 
specifically introducing additional surveillance and monitoring procedures and thus stronger budgetary 
discipline mechanisms for the euro area countries due to “the higher potential for spillover effects of 
budgetary policies in a common currency area”; it paves the way for further reinforcing EMU with the 
steps outlined in the Commission’s “Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU”③. The six-pack reforms 
the SGP mainly by adding new requirements to budgetary policy, notably new fiscal rules to the EU 
member states, while the “two-pack” focuses on euro states’ budgetary coordination and surveillance 
by introducing and integrating a common budgetary timeline and common budgetary rules into the 
European Semester: “national draft budgets (of the euro states) need to be submitted to the 
Commission by 15 October every year so that the Commission can check adherence to commitments 
taken in their Stability Programmes” (④, p.46). The relation between the two-pack with other EU 
economic governance measures are as follows: (1) regarding the TSCG, it integrates some elements of 
the Fiscal Compact into EU law, “including the requirements for Member States in EDP to prepare 
economic partnership programmes and the requirement for ex-ante coordination of Member States’ 
debt issuance plans”; (2) as for the reformed SGP and the European Semester, it adds an autumn 
counterpart to the spring semester exercise, focusing on the eurozone countries’ budgetary plans for 
the coming year so as to check whether national budgetary policy is in line with the SGP and CSRs 
and thus give opinions before national budgets get adopted; in addition, due to the enhanced 
surveillance process (i.e. the new reporting procedures of the measures taken by member states in the 
EDP), it strengthens the Commission’s “toolbox” for making timely on a breach of EDP 
recommendations, which may lead to decisions of imposing gradual financial sanctions introduced by 
the six-pack; (3) concerning the operative financial backstops, it is consistent with ESM/EFSF 
guidelines, and moreover, it “embeds in the EU legal framework the working practices established 
under these intergovernmental instruments”③.  
 Further SGP reforms and content expansions of the European Semester may continue in the 
future.  
Sources: ① European Parliament-2012/0002(NTT); ② “Stability and Growth Pact” 
(European Commission); ③European Commission-MEMO/13/457 (27 May 2013); ④
Hallerberg et al. (September 2012); ⑤“Six-Pack? Two-Pack? Fiscal Compact? A Short 
Guide to the New EU Fiscal Governance” (European Commission). The Table of “The 
evolution of the SGP” above is adapted from ①,②,③,④,⑤ and “Surveillance of Budgetary 




Appendix 2: The ECB’s Responses and Actions in the Post-2008 Crisis Era 
In the entry of “EU Response to the Economic and Financial Crisis” on the official 
website of the Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, it is 
clearly stated that 
 
“The economic crisis has prompted intense and sustained action by the EU’s 
national governments, the European Central Bank and the Commission. All 
have been working closely together to support growth and employment, 
ensure financial stability, and put in place a better governance system for the 
future.” (“EU Response to the Economic and Financial Crisis — April 2014”, 
European Commission)  
 
Therefore, in order to obtain a rounded picture of the EU’s efforts to address the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which is the main theme for the EU after the 2008 crisis, 
it is essentially necessary to know the ECB’s responses and measures to counter the 
economic and financial crisis as well as the euro crisis. Apart from its procedural 
involvement in adopting new EU regulation and rules to address the crisis (e.g. the 
codification of the European Semester, the establishment of the ESRB, the six-pack, 
and the two-pack) and the new concrete tasks conferred upon the ECB along with the 
implementation of the EU’s new measures to combat the crisis, the ECB has its own 
eye-catching initiatives: it purchases member states’ sovereign debts on secondary 
markets, contributing to the building up of a financial stability safety-net alongside the 
EFSM, the EFSF, the permanent ESM and the IMF. Two events demonstrate such 
initiatives.  
The first one is that, from 6 July 2009 to the end of June 2010, the ECB directly 
purchased a nominal amount of 60 billion euro-denominated covered bonds issued in 
the euro area, which is called the “covered bond purchase programme” (CBPP) (Beirne 
et al. 2011, 5).
152
 This initiative aims at “(a) promoting the ongoing decline in money 
market term rates; (b) easing funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises; 
(c) encouraging credit institutions to maintain and expand their lending to clients; and 
                                                 
152  Also see ECB Press Release (4 June 2009, Purchase Programme for Covered Bonds); 
ECB/2009/16 (Decision of the European Central Bank of 2 July 2009 on the Implementation of the 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme). Trichet (13 July 2009) explained that “[c]overed bonds are 
debt securities issued by banks, which give them access to funding of a longer-term nature than the 
ECB’s refinancing operations. Covered bonds thus allow banks to manage the maturity mismatch 
between their assets and liabilities”, which are believed to complement the ECB’s other liquidity 
management measures.  
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(d) improving market liquidity in important segments of the private debt securities 
market” (ECB/2009/16), and it is evaluated that “the CBPP has been effective in 
meeting its objectives” (Beirne et al. 2011, 5). As this CBPP expired on 30 June 2010, 
the ECB, after “taking into account market conditions and the Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy needs”, decided to start a second CBPP (CBPP2) of a nominal value of EUR 40 
billion from 4 November 2011 onwards till 31 October 2012 with the objectives to “(a) 
easing funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises, and (b) encouraging 
credit institutions to maintain and expand lending to their clients” (ECB/2011/17), and 
being available for lending is the salient feature of the CBPP2 portfolio (ECB Press 
Release, 3 November 2011). Such new policies, however, are against the statutory 
rules for the ECB as being a fully independent institution (Hosli 2005, 51), so when the 
two CBPPs were legalized, the ECB clearly stated that the Guideline ECB/2000/7 of 31 
August 2000 (ECB/2000/7) is NOT applicable to both programmes.
153
 This new policy 
instrument of covered bond purchasing is defended by former ECB President Trichet 
(1 November 2003 — 31 October 2011) as one of the “non-standard measures” — 
compared with the traditional standard measure: the interest rate management — taken 
by the ECB to tackle the new problems arising from the new situations (Trichet 13 July 
2009).  
The second initiative taken by the ECB is that on 6 September 2012, “aim(ing) at 
safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the 
monetary policy”, the Governing Council of the ECB, following the terminated 
Securities Market Programme (SMP), decided to implement outright purchases of 
sovereign bonds on secondary markets in the euro area — a new framework called 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), which is conducted with strict and effective 
conditions to the countries attached to an appropriate programme under the EFSF and 
the ESM (e.g. Cœuré 23 September 2012; Draghi 9 October 2012).
154
 New ECB 
President Draghi (9 October 2012) said it is an important initiative for the ECB to 
address the distortion and the asymmetry of financing costs for banks across the euro 
area, which “hinder[...] the smooth functioning of credit markets and the transmission 
of monetary policy”, but the conditionality means that the countries concerned have to 
request a bailout via the EFSF or the ESM before the OMTs can be activated. The 
                                                 
153 See Decision of the ECB of 2 July 2009 (ECB/2009/16) and Decision of the ECB of 3 November 
2011 (ECB/2011/17). 
154 See also ECB Governing Council Decisions (September 2012).  
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OMT is a bold method put forward by the ECB to drive down the sovereign debt yield 
levels in Spain, Italy and other troubled euro countries, and the market did give 
positive reactions to the ECB’s this decision as the Spanish government’s costs of 
borrowing over two years fell from 4.71% to 2.80%, three years from 5.09% to 3.68%, 
and four years from 5.97% to 4.60% (“ECB’s Mario Draghi Unveils Bond-Buying 
Euro Debt Plan”, BBC News, 6 September 2012). The OMTs are valued to be able to 
“address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in 
particular, fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro” and thus is 
taken as an instrument of the ECB to support confidence in the European financial 
market as well as to keep price stability in the euro area (Cœuré 23 September 2012). 
Again, the OMT framework does not comply with the original ECB rules, which forbid 
the ECB to monetize national debts or directly buy government bonds, and the OMT 
tool, “cut(ting) the borrowing costs of debt-burdened eurozone members by buying 
their bonds”, is a new invention by the ECB against the new harsh financial and 
economic situation to save the single currency (“ECB’s Mario Draghi Unveils 
Bond-Buying Euro Debt Plan”, BBC News, 6 September 2012). Draghi, the President 
of the ECB, defends this new device in the following way: 
 
“The Governing Council remains firmly committed to preserving the 
singleness of its monetary policy and to ensuring the proper transmission of 
the policy stance to the real economy throughout the euro area. OMTs will 
enable us to provide, under appropriate conditions, a fully effective backstop 
to avoid destructive scenarios with potentially severe challenges for price 
stability in the euro area. Let me repeat again what I have said in past months: 
we act strictly within our mandate to maintain price stability over the 
medium term; we act independently in determining monetary policy; and the 
euro is irreversible”. (Draghi et al. 4 October 2012). 
 
Moreover, the ECB has adopted other measures such as admitting certain assets 
denominated in pounds sterling, yen or US dollars as eligible collateral (ECB/2012/23) 
and lowering key interest rates
155
 to improve euro countries’ capital liquidity. 
Altogether, as Trichet (13 July 2009) once summarized, the ECB approaches the 
financial crisis and then the euro crisis from four dimensions: interest rates, enhanced 
                                                 
155 Starting from 11 July 2012, the ECB decided that the interest rates on the main refinancing 
operations, on the marginal lending facility and on the deposit facility are at 0.75%, 1.50% and 
0.00%, respectively. Since 2008 till October 2012, it has lowered its policy rate from 4.25% to 0.75%. 
See “Key ECB Interest Rates” (European Central Bank). 
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credit support, liquidity management measures, covered bond purchases.
156
 All in all, 
the most significant and eye-catching policies adopted by the ECB during the 
post-2008 crisis era are the newly implemented non-standard measures, such as the 
modification of the allotment procedures and the collateral policy and the introduction 
of OMTs so as “to ensure the effective transmission of its monetary policy across the 
euro area” (Cœuré 23 September 2012). All the non-standard measures suggest the 
creativity, flexibility and changing positions of the ECB in front of the new severe 
challenges. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that an integrated “banking union” is forming. 
On 12 September 2012, the Commission made proposals on a single supervisory 
mechanism (SSM) for all banks in the euro area under the leadership of the ECB 
(COM(2012) 510 Final), which “includes further components such as a single rulebook, 
common deposit protection and a single bank resolution mechanisms”, marking the 
first step towards the establishment of a “banking union” (“Banking Union”, European 
Commission). Later, on 8 October 2012, Cœuré, a Member of the Executive Board of 
the ECB, said that the ECB was proceeding with a banking union and he elaborated the 
banking union as follows:  
 
“It is an institutional framework which ultimately should have three legs: a 
single supervisory mechanism (SSM), a common resolution structure and a 
shared deposit insurance. The SSM would bring all supervisory decisions 
about euro area banks under one roof, at the ECB, allowing supervisors to 
take into account externalities and general exposures to systemic risk. The 
common resolution structure, with a unified resolution regime and single 
resolution fund, would manage efficiently the wind-down even of large 
cross-border banks. Shared deposit insurance would reassure depositors that 
their money is safe in any euro area bank, regardless of its country of 
operations or legal domicile.” (Cœuré 8 October 2012) 
 
The SSM is finalized and created by two regulations: Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013 (in accordance with a special legislative procedure) and Regulation (EU) 
No 1022/2013 (in accordance with the OLP), and according to the latter, the SSM 
becomes effective as of 30 October 2013. The significance of the creation of the SSM, 
as Draghi (17 December 2012) once pointed out, lies in the fact that re-launching the 
                                                 
156 For the detailed and updated information on the ECB’s responses to the post-2008 crisis situation, 
see the Annex of “Chronology of Monetary Policy Measures of the Eurosystem” in each ECB 
Monthly Bulletin from, for example, January 2009.  
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longer-term vision on EMU, the SSM shall complete the current EMU “towards a 
genuine EMU” with “a clear demonstration that euro area Member States are ready to 
agree to a substantial sharing of sovereignty when circumstances require”. Meanwhile, 
Cœuré (8 October 2012) emphasizes that the banking union should be jointly 
implemented with other measures, such as the Fiscal Compact and the functioning of 
the EBA. Besides, according to the Commission website, on 10 July 2013, the 
Commission tabled its proposal for a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for the 
Banking Union (COM(2013) 0520 Final), which, as being designed “to centralize key 
competences and resources for managing the failure of any bank in the Euro Area and 
in other Member States participating in the Banking Union”, is believed to complement 
the SSM and the bank union; it is now in the legislative procedure, and on 15 April 
2014, the EP gave its support to the Commission’s proposal (“Banking Union”, 
European Commission). 
In a nutshell, each new policy and measure developed by the ECB is an integral 
component contributing to keeping the financial stability of EMU and enhancing the 
credibility of the euro. Taking a holistic point of view, each EU institution and member 
state shall pay their shares in solving the post-2008 crisis, and the mutual 
communication, coordination and cooperation among various actors and institutions at 
both the EU and the national level is a requirement for the successful and effective 
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Streit. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 144-48. 
Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. 2009. “Behind the Scenes of Differentiated Integration: Circumventing 
National Opt-Outs in Justice and Home Affairs.” Journal of European Public Policy 16(1): 
62-80. 
Alter, Karen J. 1998. “Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the 
European Court of Justice.” International Organization 52(1): 121-47. 
Alter, Karen J. 2001. Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International 
Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Argomaniz, Javier. 2009a. “When the EU Is the ‘Norm-Taker’: The Passenger Name Records 
Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms.” Journal of European 
Integration 31(1): 119-36.  
Argomaniz, Javier. 2009b. “Post-9/11 Institutionalisation of European Union Counter-Terrorism: 
Emergence, Acceleration and Inertia.” European Security 18(2): 151-72. 
Armstrong, Kenneth A., and Simon Bulmer. 1998. The Governance of the Single European Market. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Arthur, W. Brian. 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Aspinwall, Mark, and Gerald Schneider. 2001. “Institutional Research on the European Union: 
Mapping the Field.” In The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of 
Europe, eds. Gerald Schneider and Mark Aspinwall. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1-18.  
Atikcan, Ece Ozlem. 2010. “European Union and Minorities: Different Paths of Europeanization?” 
Journal of European Integration 32(4): 375-92. 
Bache, Ian, Simon Bulmer, and Defne Gunay. 2012. “Europeanization: A Critical Realist Perspective.” 
In Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization, eds. 
564 
 
Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio M. Radaelli. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 64-84. 
Barnes, James, Marshall Carter, and Max Skidmore. 1980. The World of Politics. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Barrera, M., and Ernst B. Haas. 1969. “The Operationalization of Some Variables Related to Regional 
Integration: A Research Note.” International Organization 23(1): 150–60. 
Berglund, Sara, Ieva Gange, and Frans van Waarden. 2006. “Mass Production of Law. Routinization 
in the Transposition of European Directives: A Sociological-Institutionalist Account.” Journal 
of European Public Policy 13(5): 692-716.  
Beyers, Jan. 2005. “Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council 
Officials.” International Organization 59(04): 899-936. 
Beyers, Jan, and Guido Dierickx. 1998. “The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: 
Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?” Journal of Common Market Studies 36(3): 
289-317. 
Bicchi, Federica. 2006. “‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 13(2): 286-303. 
Blatter, Joachim, and Markus Haverland. 2012. Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in 
Small-N Research. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Blauberger, Michael. 2009. “Compliance with Rules of Negative Integration: European State Aid 
Control in the New Member States.” Journal of European Public Policy 16(7): 1030-46.  
Bornschier, Volker, and Nicola Fielder. 1995. “The Genesis of the Single European Act. Forces and 
Protagonists behind the Relaunch of the European Community in the 1980s: The Single 
Market.” Unpublished Paper. Paper Presented at the Second European Conference of Sociology 
“European Societies: Fusion or Fission” (30 August-2 September 1995), Budapest. 
Borońska-Hryniewiecka, Karolina. 2011. “Europeanization of Non-State Actors: Towards a 
Framework for Analysis.” In Civil Society and International Governance: The Role of 
Non-State Actors in the EU, Africa, Asia and Middle East, eds. David Armstrong, Valeria Bello, 
Julie Gilson and Debora Spini. London: Routledge, 73-91. 
Brams, Steven J., and Paul J. Affuso. 1976. “Power and Size: A New Paradox.” Theory and Decision 
7 (1-2):29-56. 
Bräuninger, Thomas, Tanja Cornelius, Thomas König, and Thomas Schuster. 2001. “The Dynamics of 
European Integration: A Constitutional Analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty.” In The Rules of 
Integration: Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe, eds. Gerald Schneider and 
Mark Aspinwall. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 46-68.  
565 
 
Bromley, Simon. 2001. “Introduction: Governance and the European Union.” In Governing the 
European Union, ed. Simon Bromley. London: SAGE in Association with the Open University, 
1-26.  
Brosig, Malte. 2010. “The Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa.” International Peacekeeping 
17(3): 327-42.  
Bulmer, Simon. 1983. “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 21(4): 349-63. 
Bulmer, Simon J. 1994. “The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach.” 
Journal of Public Policy 13(4): 351-80. 
Bulmer, Simon J. 1998. “New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 5(3): 365-86. 
Bulmer, Simon, and Martin Burch. 2001. “The ‘Europeanisation’ of Central Government: The UK 
and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective.” In The Rules of Integration: 
Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe, eds. Gerald Schneider and Mark Aspinwall. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 73-96. 
Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli. 1993. “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration.” International Organization 47(1): 41-76. 
Bursens, Peter, and Jana Deforche. 2008. “Europeanization of Subnational Polities: The Impact of 
Domestic Factors on Regional Adaptation to European Integration.” Regional & Federal 
Studies 18(1): 1-18. 
Cameron, David R. 1992. “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences.” In Euro-Politics: 
Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community, ed. Alberta M. Sbragia. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 23-74. 
Cameron, David R. 1995. “Transnational Relations and the Development of European Economic and 
Monetary Union.” In Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 37-78. 
Cameron, David R. 1998. “Creating Supranational Authority in Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policy: 
The Sources and Effects of EMU.” In European Integration and Supranational Governance, 
eds. Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 188-216. 
Campbell, John L. 2004. Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.  
Carter, Caitríona, and Romain Pasquier. 2010. “The Europeanization of Regions as ‘Spaces for 
Politics’: A Research Agenda.” Regional & Federal Studies 20(3): 295-314. 
566 
 
Checkel, Jeffery T. 2001. “Constructing European Institutions.” In The Rules of Integration: 
Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe, eds. Gerald Schneider and Mark Aspinwall. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 19-39. 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2007. “Constructivism and EU Politics.” In Handbook of European Union Politics, 
eds. Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond. London: SAGE Publications, 
57-76. 
Christiansen, Thomas. 1997. “Reconstructing European Space: From Territorial Politics to Multilevel 
Governance.” In Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 51-68. 
Cini, Michelle. 2010. “Intergovernmentalism.” In European Union Politics, 3rd Edition, eds. Michelle 
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Crises and Opportunities: Strengthened European Union Economic Governance after 
the 2008 Financial Crisis 
 
This dissertation uses three different major schools of thought to analyze recent 
developments in European economic governance during the post-2008 crisis era, which 
was thematically dominated by the euro area sovereign debt crisis. The main research 
question driving the work is: Along with the adoption and implementation of the EU’s 
new measures, what path are the EU and European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) embarking on? That is, what are the economic governance tendencies of the EU 
and EMU after the 2008 crisis? This main research question (MRQ) is divided into five 
sub-research questions (SRQs): Is the EU on the way towards a political union/political 
integration (SRQ1)? Do the current developments of the EU signify supranationalism 
over nationalism (SRQ2)? Why did the EU and member states agree to take these new 
measures (SRQ3)? What are the implications and consequences of the new 
developments of the EU during the crisis (SRQ4)? What are the prospects for the EU 
and EMU in the future (SRQ5)?  
To answer the SRQs and thus the MRQ as well as to unravel the development of 
the EU, this dissertation resorts to three main EU integration theories — 
neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (a latest descendant of 
intergovernmentalism) and historical institutionalism (HI) — whose propositions are 
expected to explain the EU’s recent developments and provide predictions about the 
EU’s development in the future. This also leads to another SRQ of this dissertation: 
What is the explanatory and predictive power of these three different European 
integration theories when studying the EU’s recent developments after 2008 (SRQ6)? 
From the theoretical frameworks offered by the three European integration 
theories, a broad range of hypotheses has been deducted. These hypotheses are then 
applied to three selected cases in terms of recent EU developments (differing in terms 
of nature and functions, but being similar in the intention to solve the crisis): the 
European Semester, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Using congruence testing and process tracing, each theory 
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is tested in detail in terms of its proposed causal mechanisms accounting for the 
development of the EU. If the causal chains suggested by the hypotheses drawn from 
each integration theory are present in the selected cases, the hypotheses will be 
vindicated, and if not, the hypotheses are found to lack sufficient evidence to support 
them and thus require further examinations and modifications. When a hypothesized 
mechanism fails wholly or partially in the case studies, the reasons causing such a 
failure are probed, and thus new variables, hypothesized mechanisms or theoretical 
explanations are possibly developed. As a result, based on the hypotheses tests by the 
three selected cases, some new variables are explored and added to the original 
hypotheses, new propositions formulated in hypothesis form, and predictions made. 
The acceptance, rejection or revision of the hypotheses makes a possible contribution 
to on-going debated EU studies and the ever further developing European integration 
theories; moreover, they provide answers to the SRQs of this dissertation, which finally 
lead to the answers to the MRQ.  
Accordingly, the dissertation is structured as follows. The first chapter 
(introduction) states the research questions and objectives, defines the theoretical 
frameworks, and describes research design and methodology. Then chapter two, 
chapter three and chapter four present the literature review and hypotheses derivation 
based on the three integration theories respectively. Chapter five offers a summary of 
the hypotheses formulated and to be tested, with an illustration of the relationships 
among the hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses. Chapter five also offers a general 
description of the three selected new measures. The next three chapters — chapter six, 
seven and eight — carry out the case studies and hypotheses tests for the three theories, 
each chapter for one theory, with research results, new findings and predictions 
presented in the form of Propositions. Finally, chapter nine draws conclusions based on 
the research, where answers to the SRQs and MRQ as well as research limitations are 
offered based on the hypotheses tests and the case studies of the previous chapters.  
The findings can be summarized as follows. The empirical analysis of this 
dissertation shows that the EU is on the way towards a political union, but it is unlikely 
to evolve into an entity of the highest degree of political integration. A prominent 
feature of this political union is the uneven extent of political integration across 
different policy areas, where the highest degree of political integration is entailed in, 
for example, the operation of the European Central Bank (ECB), with a unified 
monetary policy for the euro member states, while the lowest degree of political 
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integration tends to appear in policy coordination areas without legally binding powers 
to the member states (answers to SRQ1). The recent wave of EU reforms and new 
developments does not suggest a strong trend of supranationalism over 
intergovernmentalism, because the two among the three selected new measures do not 
have legally binding powers for their addressees; nevertheless, they entail strengthened 
and improved EU economic governance, which also indicates new trends of EU 
supranational governance in the future (answers to SRQ2). A basic reason for the EU 
and member states to agree to take these new measures is that addressing the crisis is 
beyond individual member states’ capacity and ability (answers to SRQ3). As for the 
implication and consequences of the new developments of the EU during the crisis, the 
three European integration theories tested on the basis of the case studies offer their 
own particular perspectives via the vindication and modification of their assumptions 
on the basis of the empirical findings. From a neo-functionalist point of view, the new 
EU measures of economic integration lead to EU political integration, while from an LI 
angle, the EU’s new developments during the crisis still tend to reflect and reinforce 
the big countries’ influence and powers. By comparison, an HI exploration reveals that 
not all policies adopted and implemented during the crisis suggest critical junctures of 
substantial reforms to the EU project; rather, some measures display strong 
connections to the previous practices and policy traditions (answers to SRQ4). The 
prospect for a member state to quit the EU or EMU appears unlikely; EU integration is 
irreversible and the regional integration project appears to have become more mature 
and stronger after weathering through the crisis (answers to SRQ5).  
All of these findings lead to the answers to the MRQ: To address collective issues 
and challenges from holistic approaches is a tendency of EU economic governance for 
the future, which, tending to cut across different policy areas, requires effective 
communication, coordination and cooperation among various actors within the EU. 
The rationale behind collective EU-level solutions is to maximize synergistic effects 
among the individual member states as well as individual EU institutions and policies, 
aiming to achieve more than the sum of the individual parts. The research of this 
dissertation shows that crisis is also an opportunity for the EU to develop and mature, 
and EU economic governance has been strengthened after the 2008 global financial 
crisis (as well as after the Lisbon Treaty).  
As far as SRQ6 about the explanatory and predictive powers of the three main 
European integration theories is concerned, the hypotheses test results suggest that the 
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causal mechanisms posited by the three theories (with the exception of a few 
inapplicable situations and unsuitable cases described in the case study sections) 
largely account for the three selected main measures. Approaching the EU from 
different perspectives with different focuses, the three integration theories tend to 
complement, rather than compete with or substitute each other. Neo-functionalism 
appears to work better to explain policies and measures developed via the EU’s 
collective decision-making procedures, while LI turns out to be more suitable to 
account for approaches developed outside the Community method, that is, via 
intergovernmental negotiations; by comparison, HI tends to be more applicable to areas 
characterized by legally binding powers to their addressees. 
Apart from the theoretical developments, new findings and answers to the 
research questions presented above, this dissertation has its research limitations: it does 
not examine the interactions and possible synergetic effects of the three selected 
measures, neither does it delve into the actual impacts and effectiveness in solving the 
crisis after their implementation. Research in the future may address these limitations 
and the author, who comes from China, plans to carry out research on “lessons and 
inspirations of EU economic governance during the post-2008 crisis era to China’s 
economic governance in transformation”. This dissertation serves as a starting point to 








Crisis en Mogelijkheden: Versterkt Economisch Bestuur na de Financiële crisis van 
2008 
 
Dit proefschrift maakt gebruik van drie verschillende belangrijke denkkaders om de 
recente ontwikkelingen in het Europees economisch bestuur in de periode na de 
financiële crisis van 2008 te analyseren. Deze periode werd thematisch gedomineerd 
door de schuldencrisis in de eurozone. Dit proefschrift is opgezet rond de volgende 
hoofdonderzoeksvraag: Welke nieuwe weg slaan de EU en de European Economische  
en Monetaire Unie (EMU) in, tegelijk met het aannemen en implementeren van de 
nieuwe maatregelen van de EU? Met andere woorden, wat zijn de beleidsvoornemens 
van het economisch bestuur van de EU en de EMU na de crisis van 2008? Deze 
hoofdonderzoeksvraag (HOV) is onderverdeeld in vijf sub-onderzoeksvragen (SOVs): 
Is de EU op weg naar een politieke eenheid/politieke integratie (SOV1)? Wijzen de 
huidige ontwikkelingen van de EU eerder op supranationalisme dan op nationalisme 
(SOV2)? Waarom gingen de EU en de deelnemende staten akkoord om deze nieuwe 
maatregelen aan te nemen (SOV3)? Wat zijn de implicaties en de gevolgen van de 
nieuwe ontwikkelingen van de EU tijdens de crisis (SOV4)? Wat zijn de vooruitzichten 
voor de EU en de EMU in de toekomst (SOV5)? 
Om de SOVs alsook de HOV te beantwoorden en om de ontwikkeling van de EU 
te ontrafelen, maakt deze dissertatie gebruikt van drie fundamentele EU integratie 
theorieën – het neo-functionalisme, het liberaal intergouvernementalisme (LI) (een 
recente tak van het intergouvernementalisme) en het historisch institutionalisme (HI). 
De stellingen van deze integratie theorieën worden verwacht de recente ontwikkeling 
van de EU te verklaren en voorspellingen te bieden over de ontwikkeling van de EU in 
de toekomst. Dit leidt tot een andere SOV van deze dissertatie: Wat is de verklarende 
en de voorspellende kracht van deze drie Europese integratie theorieën bij het 
bestuderen van de recente ontwikkelingen van de EU na 2008 (SOV6)? 
Vanuit de theoretische kaders die de drie Europese integratie theorieën bieden, 
werd een brede range aan hypotheses afgeleid. Deze hypotheses zijn vervolgens 
toegepast op drie geselecteerde cases van recente EU ontwikkelingen (die verschillend 
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zijn op vlak van hun aard en functies, maar overeenstemmend zijn in hun intentie om 
de crisis op te lossen): Het Europees Semester, het European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), en het Europees Stabiliteit Mechanisme (ESM). De voorspellingen van de 
theorieën over de causale mechanismen die de ontwikkeling van de EU kunnen 
verklaren werden in detail getest aan de hand van congruence testing en process-tracing, 
Als de causale ketens, voorspeld door de hypotheses van de verschillende integratie 
theorieën, teruggevonden worden in de geselecteerde cases, dan zijn de hypotheses 
gerechtvaardigd. Als dit niet het geval is, dan is er niet genoeg evidentie die de 
hypotheses ondersteunt en is er bijgevolg nood aan verder onderzoek en aan 
aanpassingen. Wanneer de case studies een van de hypothetische mechanismen 
volledig of gedeeltelijk tegenspreken, dan wordt de oorzaak hiervan onderzocht en 
worden er bijgevolg wellicht nieuwe variabelen, nieuwe hypothetische mechanismen of 
theoretische verklaringen ontwikkeld. Bijgevolg worden er, gebaseerd op de 
hypothesetoetsing door de drie verschillende cases, nieuwe variabelen onderzocht en 
toegevoegd aan de oorspronkelijk hypotheses, worden er nieuwe voorspellende 
hypotheses geformuleerd en worden er voorspellingen gemaakt. Het aanvaarden, 
verwerpen of herzien van de hypotheses levert een mogelijke bijdrage aan de 
gedebatteerde EU studies en aan de Europese integratie theorieën die zich blijvend 
verder ontwikkelen. Daarenboven verschaffen ze antwoorden op de SOVs van deze 
dissertatie wat tot een antwoord op de HOV leidt. 
Deze dissertatie is daarom als volgt opgebouwd. In het eerste hoofdstuk (inleiding) 
worden de onderzoeksvragen en doelstellingen, de theoretische kaders, het 
onderzoeksdesign en de onderzoeksmethode uiteengezet. In hoofdstuk twee, hoofdstuk 
drie en hoofdstuk vier wordt een literatuuroverzicht gegeven en worden de hypotheses 
van de drie verschillende integratie theorieën besproken. Het vijfde hoofdstuk biedt een 
samenvatting van de hypotheses die geformuleerd zijn en getoetst moeten worden, en 
bevat daarnaast een illustratie van de verbanden tussen de verschillende hypotheses en 
de sub-hypotheses. Daarenboven biedt hoofdstuk vijf een algemene beschrijving van 
de drie geselecteerde nieuwe maatregelen. In de volgende drie hoofdstukken – 
hoofdstuk zes, zeven en acht – worden de case studies en de hypothesetoetsing van de 
drie theorieën besproken, alsook de onderzoeksresultaten, nieuwe bevindingen en 
voorspellingen geformuleerd in de vorm van stellingen. Elk van deze hoofdstukken 
focust op één van de theorieën. Tenslotte worden in hoofdstuk negen conclusies 
geformuleerd over het onderzoek. Hierbij worden antwoorden op de SOVs en de HOV 
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en de beperkingen van het onderzoek toegelicht, gebaseerd op de hypothesetoetsing en 
de case studies van de voorgaande hoofdstukken. 
De bevindingen kunnen als volgt samengevat worden. Uit de empirische analyses 
van deze dissertatie blijkt enerzijds dat de EU op weg is naar een politieke eenheid, 
maar dat het anderzijds onwaarschijnlijk is dat de EU een eenheid zal worden die 
gekenmerkt wordt door de hoogste mate van politieke integratie. Een opvallend 
kenmerk van deze politieke unie is dat er sprake is van een verschillende mate van 
politieke integratie over de verschillende beleidsgebieden. De hoogste mate van 
politieke integratie wordt teruggevonden in, bijvoorbeeld, de werking van de Europese 
Centrale Bank (ECB), waarbij er eenheid is op vlak van het monetair beleid voor de 
Europese lidstaten. De laagste mate van politieke eenheid, daarentegen, wordt 
teruggevonden in politieke coördinatiegebieden die geen legale bindende krachten 
kennen voor de lidstaten (antwoord op SOV1). De recente golf van EU hervormingen 
en ontwikkelingen wijst er niet op dat er eerder sprake is van een trend van 
supranationalisme dan van intergouvernementalisme, want twee van de drie 
geselecteerde nieuwe maatregelen hebben geen legaal bindende krachten. Desondanks 
houden ze wel een sterker en verbeterd EU economisch bestuur in, wat ook wijst op 
een nieuwe tendens van EU supranationale bestuur in de toekomst (antwoord op 
SOV2). Een reden van de EU en lidstaten om akkoord te gaan met de nieuwe 
maatregelen is het feit dat het aanpakken van de crisis buiten de capaciteiten en 
mogelijkheden van de individuele lidstaten ligt (antwoorden op SOV3). Met betrekking 
tot de implicaties en gevolgen van de nieuwe ontwikkelingen van de EU tijdens de 
crisis, verschaffen de drie Europese integratie theorieën – die getest zijn op basis van 
de case studies – hun eigen particuliere standpunten via de rechtvaardiging en 
aanpassing van hun assumpties op basis van de empirische bevindingen. Vanuit een 
neo-functionalistisch standpunt leiden de nieuwe EU maatregelen van economische 
integratie tot EU politieke integratie. Anderzijds, vanuit het perspectief van LI, 
reflecteren en versterken de nieuwe ontwikkelingen van de EU tijdens de crisis nog 
steeds de invloed en kracht van de grote landen. In overeenstemming hiermee stelt het 
HI perspectief dat niet alle beleidsmaatregelen die aangenomen en geïmplementeerd 
zijn tijdens de crisis op belangrijke keerpunten en substantiële hervormingen van het 
EU project wijzen, maar dat sommige maatregelen eerder sterke overeenkomst 
vertonen met de vroegere praktijken en beleidstradities (antwoord op SOV4). Het is 
onwaarschijnlijk dat een lidstaat in de toekomst de EU of EMU zal verlaten. EU 
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integratie is onomkeerbaar en het blijkt dat het regionaal integratie project sterker en 
meer matuur geworden is na een periode van verwering door de crisis (antwoorden op 
SOV5). 
Deze bevindingen leiden tot antwoorden op onze HOV: een trend van EU 
economische bestuur in de toekomst is om collectieve kwesties en uitdagingen aan te 
pakken met een holistische benadering, en dit vereist effectieve communicatie, 
coördinatie en coöperatie – over de grenzen van verschillende beleidsgebieden - tussen 
de verschillende actoren in de EU. De rationale achter de collectieve EU-level 
oplossingen is om de synergetische effecten tussen de individuele lidstaten te 
maximaliseren, alsook tussen de individuele EU instituties en beleidsvormen. Dit heeft 
als doel om meer te bereiken dan enkel de som van de individuele delen. Het 
onderzoek van deze dissertatie toont aan dat crisis ook een mogelijkheid biedt voor de 
EU om verder te ontwikkelen en de EU economische bestuur is sterker geworden en is 
verder gegroeid sinds de globale financiële crisis van 2008 (als ook na het Verdrag van 
Lissabon).  
Wat SOV6 betreft over de verklarende en voorspellende kracht van de drie 
belangrijke Europese integratie theorieën, suggereren de resultaten van de 
hypothesetoetsing dat de causale mechanismen die de drie theorieën voorstellen (met 
de uitzondering van enkele ontoepasbare situaties en niet geschikte casussen 
beschreven in de case studie secties) grotendeels de drie geselecteerde maatregelen 
kunnen verklaren. In het bestuderen van de EU vanuit verschillende perspectieven met 
verschillende focus, blijkt dat de drie integratietheorieën elkaar eerder aanvullen dan 
elkaar te vervangen of dan elkaar tegen te spreken. Neo-functionalimse lijkt goed te 
zijn in het verklaren van beleid en maatregelen die ontwikkeld zijn door collectieve 
beslissing makingsprocedures van de EU. De LI blijkt geschikt te zijn om 
benaderingen te verklaren die niet ontwikkeld zijn op basis van de Community 
methode, maar via intergouvernementele onderhandelingen. De HI blijkt vooral goed 
toepasbaar op vlak van zaken die gekenmerkt worden door legale bindende krachten 
tussen de verschillende partijen.  
Naast de theoretische ontwikkelingen, de bevindingen en antwoorden op de 
onderzoeksvragen die hierboven beschreven zijn, heeft deze dissertatie ook 
onderzoeksbeperkingen. De interacties en mogelijke synergetische effecten van de drie 
geselecteerde maatregelen werden niet bestudeerd. Daarenboven werd ook de actuele 
impact en effectiviteit in het oplossen van de crisis niet in detail bestudeerd. 
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Toekomstig onderzoek kan deze beperkingen adresseren, en de auteur van dit 
proefschrift, die afkomstig is uit China, plant om onderzoek uit te voeren naar “lessen 
en inspiraties van EU economische bestuur tijdens de post-2008 crisis periode voor de 
transformerende Chinese economische bestuur”. Deze dissertatie biedt een beginpunt 
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